Aristotle's Metaphysics Book 4 Notes

Aristotle's Metaphysics, Book 4

Science of Being

• There is a science that studies being insofar as it is being, and its properties in its own right.
• This science is distinct from the special sciences, which each focus on a specific part of being and its coincidental properties, such as mathematical sciences.
• The principles or highest causes being sought must be the causes of the nature of some subject as it is in its own right.
• The elements of beings are the elements of being not coincidentally, but insofar as it is being.
• Thus, we ought to find the first causes of being insofar as it is being.

Ways of Speaking About Being

• Being is spoken of in many ways, but always with reference to one thing or nature rather than homonymously.
• Examples:
  • Health: Something is called 'healthy' because it preserves, produces, indicates, or can receive health.
  • Medical: Something is called 'medical' because it has medical science, is suited to it, or is its function.
• Similarly, being is spoken of in many ways, but all cases refer to one principle.
  • Some things are called beings because they are substances.
  • Others are called beings because they are attributes, roads to, perishings, privations, qualities, or products of substance.
  • Negations of substance or its related terms are also considered.
• "Not being is" means that not being is not being.
• A single science studies all healthy things, and similarly, a single science studies things spoken of with reference to one nature.
• It is the task of a single science to study beings insofar as they are beings.
• The primary object of a science is the one on which others depend, such as substance.
• The philosopher must grasp the principles and causes of substances.

Parts of Philosophy

• There are as many parts of philosophy as there are types of substances.
• There exists a first philosophy and a second philosophy following it.
• Being is immediately divided into genera, so sciences conform to these.
• The philosopher is spoken of in the same way as the mathematician.
• For every genus, there is a single perception and science, such as grammar studying all types of sounds.
• A science that is one in genus studies all species of being insofar as it is being, and its species study the species of being.

Being and Unity

• Being and unity are the same and of a single nature since they imply each other, like principle and cause.
• They are not one and the same in the sense of being revealed by the same account.
• One man is the same as a man, and a man who is is the same as a man; the repetition reveals nothing different.
• The addition of 'one' reveals the same thing as 'is' reveals, and unity is nothing different from being.
• The substance of a thing is non-coincidentally one thing; and similarly it is essentially some being.
• There are as many species of being as of unity.
• It is a task for a science that is the same in genus to study the what-it-is about these species.

Opposites and Contraries

• Practically all the contraries are referred to this principle.
• It is the task of one science to study opposites, and plurality is the opposite of unity.
• It is the task of one science to study negation and privation, as both involve studying the one thing of which they are negations or privations.
• In negation, we say something does not belong to the subject without qualification.
• In privation, we add a differentia and involve some nature that is the subject of which the privation is said.
• The mentioned science knows about the contraries of different, unlike, unequal, and everything else spoken of with respect to plurality and unity.
• Contrariety is a type of difference, and difference is a type of otherness.
• Unity is spoken of in many ways, so these will also be spoken of in many ways, but a single science can study them all.
• Different sciences are required only if things have no one common property and their accounts are not referred to one thing.
• Everything is referred to the primary thing (e.g., everything called one is referred to the primary unity).
• We should first distinguish how many ways each thing is spoken of, and then show how each is spoken of with reference to the primary thing in each predication.
• Evidently, it is the task of a single science to take account both of these things and of substance, and it is the philosopher’s task to be able to study all these things.

Attributes of Unity and Being

• These are attributes of unity insofar as it is unity, and of being insofar as it is being.
• The science of being knows both what being and unity are and also their coincidents.
• The mistake of current thinkers is that, although substance is prior, they comprehend nothing about it.
• There are attributes distinctive of number insofar as it is number such as oddness and evenness, commensurability and inequality, being more and being less; these belong to numbers both in their own right and in relation to one another.
• Likewise, there are attributes distinctive of the solid, both moved and unmoved, and of the moved, both weightless and having weight.
• In the same way, there are some attributes distinctive of being insofar as it is being, and it is the philosopher’s task to investigate the truth about these.

Dialectic, Sophistry, and Philosophy

• Dialecticians and Sophists assume the same guise as the philosopher because sophistic has the appearance of wisdom and dialecticians practice dialectic about all things.
• Being is common to all things, and they practice dialectic about all things because all things are proper to philosophy.
• Sophistic and dialectic treat the same genus as philosophy, but philosophy differs from dialectic in the type of power it has and differs from sophistic in its decision about how to live.
• Dialectic tests in the area where philosophy achieves knowledge, while sophistic has the appearance of knowledge, but not the reality.
• One column of contraries is privation, and all contraries are referred to being and not being, and to unity and plurality.
• Stability belongs to unity, motion to plurality.
• Beings and substance are composed of contraries.
• The principles are contrary; some say they are the odd and even, some the hot and cold, some the determinate and indeterminate, others love and strife.
• All other contraries are also evidently referred to unity and plurality, and the principles recognized by others fall completely under unity and plurality as their genera.
• It is the task of a single science to study being insofar as it is being.

Principles of Contraries

• All things are either contraries or composed of contraries, and unity and plurality are principles of the contraries.
• Unity and plurality belong to one science, whether or not they have one common property.
• Even if unity is spoken of in many ways, the nonprimary unities are spoken of with reference to the primary unity; the same applies to contraries.
• This is true even if being or unity is neither universal and the same over them all nor separable.
• Some beings and unities are spoken of with reference to one thing, and others in succession.
• It is not the geometer’s task to study what a contrary is or what completeness is or to study unity, being, same, or different, but only to study them on the basis of an assumption.
• It is the task of a single science to study both being insofar as it is being and also the things that belong to it insofar as it is being.
• The same science studies not only substances but also their attributes such as prior and posterior, genus and species, whole and part, and other things of this sort.

Axioms and Substance

• It is the task of one and the same science or of different sciences to study both the axioms (as they are called in mathematics) and substance.
• It is the task of one and the same science—the philosopher’s—to examine these, since these belong to all beings and are not distinctive of one genus in separation from the others.
• Every scientist uses the axioms because they belong to being insofar as it is being, and each genus is a being.
• Each uses them to the extent he needs them, and that is however far the genus about which he presents his demonstrations extends.
• The axioms belong to all things insofar as they are beings, so it is the task of the one who knows being insofar as it is being to study the axioms.
• None of those who investigate a special area undertakes to say anything about whether or not the axioms are true.
• Some of the students of nature did so because they thought they were examining the whole of nature and examining being.
• There is someone still higher than the student of nature, since nature is only one kind of being; investigating these axioms will also be a task of this universal scientist, the one who studies primary substance.
• The study of nature is also a type of wisdom, but not the primary type.

Principles and Deductions

• Some object to accepting principles that have not been demonstrated, due to a lack of education in analytics.
• Someone who comes to the science of being must already know about analytics and not ask about it when he studies the science of being.
• Study of the principles of deductions is also a task for the philosopher, i.e., for the one who studies the nature of all substance.
• Whoever has the best claim to knowledge of a given genus ought to be able to state the firmest principles of his subject matter; hence whoever has the best claim to knowledge of beings insofar as they are beings should be able to state the firmest principles of all things, and this person is the philosopher.

Firmest Principle

• The firmest principle of all is one about which it is impossible to be mistaken.
• This sort of principle must be known best because what we make mistakes about is invariably what we do not know, and it cannot be an assumption.
• A principle that we must already possess in order to understand anything at all about beings is not an assumption, and what we must know in order to know anything at all is a principle we must already possess.
• It is impossible for the same thing both to belong and not to belong at the same time to the same thing and in the same respect (with all further distinctions to meet logical complaints).

Ultimate Belief

• This is the firmest principle of all, since it has the distinguishing feature previously mentioned.
• It is impossible for anyone to suppose that the same thing is and is not, though some people take Heraclitus to say this; for what one says need not be what one supposes to be true.
• It is impossible for contraries to belong at the same time to the same thing (with customary further distinctions added).
• What is contrary to a belief is the belief in its contradictory; hence evidently it is impossible for the same person at the same time to suppose that the same thing is and is not, since someone who makes this mistake would have contrary beliefs at the same time.
• All those who demonstrate refer back to this belief as ultimate because this is by nature the principle of all the other axioms as well.