Autonomy and the Administration of Aesthetics by Trude Iversen - Notes
Autonomy and the Administration of Aesthetics
Marx's Theory of Alienation
Marx's theory of alienation centers on the idea that the organization of labor drives history through various modes of production. Some Marxists consider alienation the primary lens through which to analyze society and critique the existing system. Alienation from one's work and its products negatively impacts cognition, because labor is inherently a cognitive activity, influencing both self-awareness and understanding of the environment.
The Artist as Autonomous Producer
Within this framework, artists are often viewed as autonomous producers, operating outside the direct pressures of capitalist accumulation, since their work is not primarily motivated by profit. The question arises: How does this perception of autonomy influence the potential for critique and counter-strategies? Does autonomous art production always lead to liberation, or can autonomy itself become an ideological constraint? These questions were previously addressed by Peter Bürger in Theory of the Avant-Garde (1974), Theodor W. Adorno in Aesthetic Theory (1970), and Jay Bernstein in The Fate of Art: Aesthetic Alienation from Kant to Derrida and Adorno (1992).
The Historical Context of Autonomy
Bürger argues that the autonomy of art should be understood as a historically specific phenomenon, not an inherent quality or self-realization of art. He notes the paradox that art is more integrated as an autonomous entity within bourgeois-capitalist society than in previous social structures. Aesthetes of autonomy believe that art gains social relevance by adopting an antagonistic position toward society, which is only possible from a position of autonomy. Adorno suggests that art performs social critique simply by existing as autonomous, self-legislating entity, thereby resisting the reduction to a commodity within the total exchange society. Autonomous art, as a pure productive force, stands as an "objective counter-image to the chained."
Critique of Art's Autonomy
In contrast to Adorno, Bürger argues that the historical Avant-Garde movement of the early 20th century rebelled against art's limited function and marginalization resulting from its autonomy. The marginalization stemming from autonomy is challenging to explain theoretically. Attempts to grasp the implications of autonomy often lead to exaggerating art's self-legislation. The history, logic, and beauty of art are frequently isolated from broader social mechanisms, obscuring the contexts in which art operates. Bürger states that, even if determining art's role in bourgeois society is necessary, the concept of autonomy distorts the social conditions of art rendering them invisible. Therefore, it is crucial to move beyond the aesthetic view that understands autonomy as the essence or self-realization of art, or as something solely determined by the artist's consciousness. A materialist approach interprets autonomy in art as a historical development, mapping out the historical preconditions that enabled this change.
Autonomy as Ideology
The concept of bourgeois autonomy, which describes art's relative independence from society, can be distorted into the idea of complete independence. Autonomy then functions as ideology because it fails to recognize its historical limitations. Bürger argues that the category of autonomy contains both truth, in art's detachment from life praxis, and untruth, in the hypostatization of that autonomy.
Only art that has been completely separated from the life praxis of the existing society, which Bürger argues occurred in aestheticism, can serve as the focal point for organizing a new life praxis. Bürger views the self-critical aspect of the Avant-Garde critique as an attempt to overcome the dialectical one-sidedness in how the past is constructed as the prehistory of the present. Marx's concept of self-critique is thus relevant to the art field. Pre-Avant-Garde art movements critiqued previous art production, but this critique remained immanent within the art system, focusing solely on artistic means. Only when art becomes self-critical can it understand its development, while also acknowledging that this understanding is inseparable from the onlooker's present standpoint. As Bürger notes, this involves "insight into the collective process to the degree to which it has come to an - always temporary - conclusion in the cognitive subject's present time."
The view that the historical Avant-Garde was the first to achieve self-criticism owes much to Marx's assertion that self-criticism is possible only when the subject is completely detached and autonomous. By lacking a social function, the art production of aestheticism paved the way for the self-critique of the historical Avant-Garde.
Institutionalization of the Avant-Garde
Today, the works of the historical Avant-Garde are exhibited as art. Bürger's analysis suggests that when neo-Avant-Gardists demand that their work be received as art, they negate the original intentions of the historical Avant-Garde. The Avant-Garde becomes institutionalized, undermining its initial goals.
Autonomy and Its Exaggerations
Autonomy as ideology also involves exaggeration, which occurs across several levels: It's used to defend reactionary institutional practices (e.g., arguing that artists shouldn't be subject to minimum wage laws), to support particular conceptions of art's essence and history, and to justify unsocial practices. Andrea Fraser argues that reproducing the idea that the art world is separate from the 'real world' conceals the economic, intellectual, and political interests invested in art productions, such as works, exhibitions, books, and events. This concealment transforms artists and art workers into false beacons of neoliberalism, because of their supposed voluntary freedom, creativity, and entrepreneurship.
Reactionary exploitation of art's autonomy can only persist if we accept the exaggerated claims, and autonomy becomes an ideology. The notion that the art space is a free space in an otherwise controlled society (Adorno) needs revision. The exaggeration of art's autonomy also influences how we interpret artistic insights. It's often believed that specific works of art can be "more truthful than empirical truth […], more rational than methodical reason, more just than liberal justice, more valuable than principled morality or utility." However, by hypostatizing the autonomous status of art, it becomes difficult to demonstrate and communicate this because the aesthetic experience becomes unique. Jay Bernstein argues that art's alienation occurred the moment it became aesthetic: "it denominates art's alienation from truth, which is caused by art's becoming aesthetic, a becoming that has been fully consummated only in modern societies." For Bernstein, art's separation from religion marks its aesthetic alienation. This separation is not a simple coexistence of different modes of experience; perceiving art as alienated means experiencing it "as acting in excess of its excluded status."
Rethinking Art's Autonomy
Instead of focusing on whether art should reclaim beauty, it's important to consider the consequences of aestheticizing art's status. The multiple dimensions of the discussion around autonomy make it difficult to defend art's autonomy in itself. If Peter Bürger is correct in arguing that self-critique was possible only after the art field's total separation, and that the attempt to unite art and practice failed with the incorporation of the neo-Avant-Garde, it calls for self-critique, acknowledging both joint responsibility and complicity.
Continuing to maintain autonomy for its own sake is no longer viable today. The idea that the art world is separate from our daily lives must be reconsidered and rejected. The fact that art is now a multi-million-dollar industry makes it hard to see art production as independent from the mechanisms of capitalism. This doesn't mean art isn't distinct; it simply means that the field defining art doesn't exist outside a more 'real' world. The art field exists as one field among many other 'real' fields of praxis.