Democratic Peace

The nature of the international system is characterized by anarchy.
Regardless of a state's classification (democracy, non-democracy, or other categorizations like left-handed or right-handed states), the system's anarchic nature does not change.
The possibility of cooperation exists, complicating theories explaining state behavior, particularly in Realism which asserts why democracies tend not to engage in war with one another.

Gawas highlighted significant claims during the Cold War about democratic states having common adversaries, specifically against the Soviet Union aiming to spread communist ideology.
Statistical analysis of war probability revealed no significant relationship between the type of government (democracy vs. non-democracy) and the likelihood of conflict among democracies from 1901 to 1913 and also from 1920 to 1938, periods leading up to the two World Wars.
A notable absence of consistent significant relationships during these times supports her thesis.
In the post-World War II era (1950-1990), efforts intensified to liberate Eastern Europe from Soviet influence, shaping state interactions.
The Soviet Union's efforts to expand and conflicts influenced power dynamics among nations.

Liberalism asserts that institutions can mitigate anarchic consequences.
States adhering to institutional rules signal cooperation, while states flouting rules signal a lack of cooperation, becoming less attractive for diplomatic engagement.
Institutions can be concrete (e.g., the United Nations) or informal (e.g., norms guiding state behavior).

Democratic transitions are highlighted by parties losing power graciously as a democratic characteristic.
Examples include the resignation of Viktor Orban in Hungary, which was noted for its democratic propriety.
Democracies approach disputes with a tendency for negotiation, contrasting with approaches taken by non-democracies.
An example is a diplomatic discussion regarding maritime boundaries, where negotiation is initiated instead of conflict.

Norms tend to strengthen over time, affecting the behavior and expectations of states.
The cascading effect of norms indicates that states increasingly adhere to established conduct over time.
The structure of governance within democracies allows for shared power across different governmental branches (executive, legislative, judicial), fostering a conducive environment for cooperation.

The Realist explanation indicates limited opportunities for strategic manipulation by leaders due to governmental structure.
A shift from power transition theory to game theoretic interaction suggests that democratic leaders may strategize based on past wars and their outcome potential.
Factors like public accountability and leader culpability (the idea that leaders are judged based on their decisions, especially regarding wars) influence their willingness to initiate conflict.

The assumption underlying the strategic argument is that all leaders seek to retain their office and maintain power.
Democratic leaders may engage in conflict to win wars since they also seek to ensure their party retains power post-conflict.
Term limits create a different dynamic where leaders may act more belligerently due to impending non-reelection, as in the case of President Trump.

Leader culpability suggests that new leaders may distance themselves from unpopular wars initiated by predecessors, shielding themselves from blame (as Nixon could have done post-Vietnam).
This dynamic illustrates that some conflicts might not be initiated simply because leaders assess the likelihood of success as low.

Audience costs arise from the need for leaders to keep promises and commitments made during governance, creating a form of public accountability that discourages backtracking on agreements.
Supermajority ratification procedures for treaties in democratic systems enhance the credibility of commitments, compelling leaders to follow through on promises to avoid electoral repercussions.
This mitigates the credible commitment problem often observed in international relations, leading to less aggressive posturing between democracies.

Ultimately, democratic systems operate under certain norms and structures that favor negotiation over conflict, demonstrating a consistent pattern where democracies engage less frequently in wars against one another.
The mechanisms of governance, accountability, and strategic behavior within democracies contribute to the maintenance of peace among democratic states, illustrating a complex interdependence with broader implications for international relations and global governance.