From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime
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This page is the title page of the book "From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime: The Making of Mass Incarceration in America" by Elizabeth Hinton, published by Harvard University Press in 2016.
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This is a blank page in the book, likely for formatting purposes.
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This page contains the copyright information and publication details for the book "From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime: The Making of Mass Incarceration in America" by Elizabeth Hinton.
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This page repeats the title of the book, author, publisher, and year of publication. It serves as a secondary title page.
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This page outlines the book's table of contents, including an introduction, nine chapters, an epilogue, notes, acknowledgments, and an index. Key themes include the War on Black Poverty and Crime, Law and Order, Juvenile Injustice, Urban Removal, and the shift from the War on Crime to the War on Drugs.
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This page contains copyright information for the book.
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This page contains copyright information for the book, noting Yale's access via ProQuest.
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Origins of Mass Incarceration
Mass incarceration as a central engine of American inequality began with President Lyndon Johnson's "War on Crime" in 1964-1965, coinciding with significant civil rights legislation like the Civil Rights Act and Voting Rights Act. Johnson also introduced the Law Enforcement Assistance Act (1965) to involve the federal government directly in local police operations.
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Escalation of the War on Crime
The Law Enforcement Assistance Act marked a shift in policy. The Safe Streets Act of 1968, the capstone of Johnson's Great Society, allocated 400milliontothe"WaronCrime."TheLawEnforcementAssistanceAdministration(LEAA)grewexponentially,funding 80,000 crime control projects and awarding 155,270grantstotalingnearly10 billion (equivalent to ~25billiontoday)beforeitsdisbandmentin1981.Three−quartersofLEAAfundswenttopoliceoperations,expandingAmerica′scarceralstate.</p><h4id="3d9065ac−825c−4f83−96dd−f1ae0949f1b0"data−toc−id="3d9065ac−825c−4f83−96dd−f1ae0949f1b0"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">Page11</h4><h5id="96529986−3f44−4289−b754−874807199f29"data−toc−id="96529986−3f44−4289−b754−874807199f29"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">BipartisanPolicyandRacializedPolicing</h5><p>TheLEAA′smissionwastoexpandsupervisioninlow−incomeurbancommunities,drivenbypolicymakers′assumptionsaboutBlackAmericans,poverty,andcrime.Thoughnotexplicitlyracial,policiesinterpretedBlackurbanpovertyaspathological.WhiletheReaganadministrationisoftencreditedwithescalatingconfinement,targetedcrimecontrolbeganwithKennedy′s1961anti−delinquencyprogramsandexpandedunderJohnsonandNixon,includingdraconiansentencingreformsandincreasedprisonconstruction.</p><h4id="14fb29ee−7a73−4d96−a6b9−529ec2f27b4b"data−toc−id="14fb29ee−7a73−4d96−a6b9−529ec2f27b4b"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">Page12</h4><h5id="ca08b6df−8575−431f−803a−fed644e572e1"data−toc−id="ca08b6df−8575−431f−803a−fed644e572e1"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">EvolutionofCrimePolicy:FromDelinquencytotheWaronDrugs</h5><p>Earlycrimepoliciesshifteddefinitions,labelingurbanyouthofcolorwitharrestrecordsorpublicassistanceas"potentiallydelinquent,"whiledecriminalizingoffensesassociatedwithwhiteteenagers.GeraldFordfocusedonconfining"repeatoffenders,"andJimmyCarterintegratedcrimecontrolintourbanpolicy.Reagan′s"WaronDrugs"intensifiedthispunitiveapproach,expandingfederallawenforcement,centralizingcontrol,andextendingsurveillancetonationalborders.Theextraordinaryexpansionofthecarceralstateinthe1980swasaculminationofpoliciesinitiatedearlier,fundamentallyreshapinglawenforcementinlow−incomecommunities.</p><h4id="29179dea−74a8−4130−aa2b−5e11364c2d27"data−toc−id="29179dea−74a8−4130−aa2b−5e11364c2d27"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">Page13</h4><h5id="24ebad4e−c5d2−41b9−b484−510e4b3178e5"data−toc−id="24ebad4e−c5d2−41b9−b484−510e4b3178e5"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">TheScaleandDisparitiesofMassIncarceration</h5><p>Since1965,theAmericanprisonpopulationincreasedbyastaggering943 percent, with 2.2millioncitizenscurrentlyincarcerated,makingtheU.S.theworldleaderinincarceration.Thissystemcosts80 billion annually. Black Americans and Latinos constitute 59percentofprisonersdespitebeing 2550-50 chance of incarceration, and Black Americans born after 1965 without a high school diploma are more likely to go to prison than not.
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Questioning the Rationale for Mass Incarceration
The primary justification for the War on Crime—rising crime rates in the 1960s and 1970s—is challenged. Contrary to political rhetoric, violent crime had declined post-interwar period until federal investment in law enforcement led to increased crime reporting (e.g., New York City's robberies and burglaries increased threefold in 1966 due to reporting reforms), skewing perceptions. The FBI's Uniform Crime Rate, despite known inaccuracies, became the national standard for measuring crime, influencing policy decisions.
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Flawed Statistics and Political Motivations
The FBI's crime data and statistical measurement of crime were problematic; there is no strong correlation between incarceration and crime rates. Mass incarceration is less a response to criminality and more a reflection of changes in law, budgetary allocations, and punitive practices. Political narratives, especially Goldwater's "law and order" rhetoric adopted by Nixon, used crime control as an electoral strategy. However, the rise of punitive federal policy was bipartisan, with conservatives and liberals prioritizing punitive responses to urban problems, especially after the civil rights movement.
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Federal Role and State-Level Enforcement
Scholars underestimated the federal government's role before the 1980s. The LEAA made federal policymakers key partners in law enforcement, influencing state and local criminal justice. While state-level factors contributed to mass incarceration, federal policies were foundational. Addressing mass incarceration requires national action. Black politicians and community leaders, often overlooked, also demanded tougher crime measures, reflecting diverse opinions within African American communities.
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Divergent Visions of Crime Control in Black Communities
Black activists in the 1960s and 70s envisioned community control and oversight in urban law enforcement. However, federal, state, and local authorities imposed a different, more punitive version, leading to the rise of armed self-defense groups like the Black Panthers. By the 1980s, the absence of social service centers in vulnerable neighborhoods meant police became the primary point of contact for issues, leading to conscious decisions by some African Americans to avoid law enforcement. The role of policing in facilitating entry into the carceral state, particularly its racial dimensions, is often overlooked.
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The Deep Roots of the Carceral State
To understand mass incarceration and racial disparities, one must examine the transformation of American policing over the past five decades. Michelle Alexander's work highlighted policing during the War on Drugs but the origins are much earlier. Federal drug control efforts predate the 1968 Safe Streets Act, with agencies like the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (1930s) and the Drug Enforcement Agency (1973). The War on Drugs is a component of a larger domestic anti-crime policy suite, which began introducing surveillance into social welfare, targeting groups, running sting operations, and militarizing police against gangs before the 1980s, fueling mass incarceration.
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The Bipartisan Consensus and Drivers of Mass Incarceration
The foundation of mass incarceration was laid by a bipartisan consensus decades before the War on Drugs. It stemmed from the demographic transformation (Great Migration), civil rights movement gains, and the persistent threat of urban rebellion. Post-Civil War, 184,901Americansenteredstate/federalprisons.Post−1965,thesystemgrewmorerapidly.TheSupremeCourt′s1954<em>Brownv.BoardofEducation</em>decisiondestabilized"separatebutequal,"ignitingapowerfulAfricanAmericanprotestmovementdemandingeconomicandracialjustice.Theexodusofwhiteresidentstosuburbsaffectedmunicipaltaxbases,requiringnewpolicyapproaches.</p><h4id="653401da−e4fd−4741−b0eb−a1d1ee2c16cb"data−toc−id="653401da−e4fd−4741−b0eb−a1d1ee2c16cb"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">Page20</h4><h5id="6d73e755−f68d−4281−bfd8−9b3cc1b8f44f"data−toc−id="6d73e755−f68d−4281−bfd8−9b3cc1b8f44f"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">EntwinedGoals:Discrimination,Poverty,andCrime</h5><p>Federalofficialsmadeaddressingdiscrimination,poverty,andcrimecentraltodomesticprograms.Kennedy′s1961"totalattack"ondelinquency,throughthePresident′sCommitteeonJuvenileDelinquencyandYouthCrime,wasanearlyinterventionincitieswithhighBlackpopulations,offeringsocialwelfaretopreventyouthcrime.Johnsonexpandedthisintothe"WaronPoverty."However,concernsaboutcontrollingcrimeinBlackurbanareasnarrowedthefocus.Post−1965Wattsuprising,crimewasseenasspecifictoBlackurbanyouth,leadingtointensifiedlawenforcementandtreatinganti−povertypoliciesasameanstosuppressunrest.</p><h4id="fcaf73fb−d728−4fd2−aef2−908a77f7b2b9"data−toc−id="fcaf73fb−d728−4fd2−aef2−908a77f7b2b9"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">Page21</h4><h5id="0c336ad6−434c−46d1−b708−d852464a671f"data−toc−id="0c336ad6−434c−46d1−b708−d852464a671f"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">TheMilitarizationofUrbanPolicing</h5><p>Despitelimitedsuccessinaddressingstructuralfactorsofpoverty,federalpolicymakersincreasedpolicepresenceandmilitary−gradeweaponsinurbanareasasriotprevention.UprisingsintensifiedinNewarkandDetroit(1967).AfricanAmericanmenaged15−24,influencedbyself−determinationadvocates,becametheprimarytargetforexpandedsurveillanceandpatrolthroughpunitivepolicies.PresidentJohnsondeemedurbanpolice"frontlinesoldiers,"grantingthemnewmilitaryequipmentandadministrativerolesinsocialprograms,fillinggapsleftbyWaronPovertyinitiatives.Crimecontrolbecameacentraldomesticpolicypriority.</p><h4id="f1913f81−e575−49bb−9b4d−d79e64a28873"data−toc−id="f1913f81−e575−49bb−9b4d−d79e64a28873"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">Page22</h4><h5id="00981265−9a0a−49d5−9478−cbf2d0b5a163"data−toc−id="00981265−9a0a−49d5−9478−cbf2d0b5a163"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">TheCarceralState:AFusionofSocialWelfareandLawEnforcement</h5><p>Federalpolicymakersmandatedpartnershipsbetweenemploymentinitiatives,publicschools,grassrootsorganizations,andjuvenilecourts,police,andcorrectionalfacilitiestoreceivefunding.Thiscreatedavastnetworkforsocialcontrol,bornfromtheintegrationoflawenforcementandGreatSocietyprograms,whichmetastasizedintothemoderncarceralstate.Johnson′ssimultaneouslaunchofanti−povertyandanti−crimeinterventionsshiftedthebalancetowardspunishment,inadvertentlysettingthestageforNixonandFordadministrationstoturnanti−crimepoliciesagainstpovertyprograms.The1968SafeStreetsActintroducedblockgrants,enablingstatestocustomizecrimecontrolstrategiesandexpandpunitivecapacities,oftenchannelingfundsfromWaronPovertyinitiatives.</p><h4id="c9e04ef1−0f68−475d−b0fb−9051b400e54f"data−toc−id="c9e04ef1−0f68−475d−b0fb−9051b400e54f"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">Page23</h4><h5id="20589ff2−8f3c−4844−9cd1−72b9c8fa4404"data−toc−id="20589ff2−8f3c−4844−9cd1−72b9c8fa4404"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">BipartisanFoundationsofPunitivePolicy</h5><p>Johnson′sadministrationlaidgroundworkforconservativepoliciesbyintroducingpunitivemeasures,blockgrants,andprivatesectorparticipation.TheLawEnforcementAssistanceActof1965exemplifiedthecomplementarynatureofliberalandconservativedomesticpolicyapproaches.DemocratscontrolledCongressduringthisperiod,demonstratingthebipartisanconsensusinincreasingurbanpatrol,enactingharsh,raciallybiasedsentencing,andendorsingnewpenalinstitutions.Whileliberalsemphasizedstructuralinequalities,conservativesfavoredlimitedgovernmentandattributedcrimetocivilrightsextensions.Despiteideologicalrifts,asharedfocusonsocialcontrolledtotheexpansionofpunitivestrategies.</p><h4id="5f12ba64−25e6−4e52−a57e−688c91dfb245"data−toc−id="5f12ba64−25e6−4e52−a57e−688c91dfb245"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">Page24</h4><h5id="2d7085e1−b1bb−4e02−97df−446e700e5fbb"data−toc−id="2d7085e1−b1bb−4e02−97df−446e700e5fbb"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">Nixon′sConsolidationofPunitivePower</h5><p>Nixonutilizedexpandedfederalgrantingpowerstotransformlawenforcement.Inthe1970s,crimecontroltechniquespermeatedlow−incomeBlackurbanlife,integratingsocialprogramsintothecarceralstate,creatinga"criminalizationofurbanspace."NixonrevisedblockgrantformulastoprioritizeprisonconstructionandendorsedwiretappingfromtheSafeStreetsAct.Theright−wing′spunitiveagendaincludedextensivesurveillancebytheFBIandlocalpoliceagainstBlackradicals,drugenforcementraids,andreformsincreasingarrestsinlow−incomeurbanareas.Thesepoliciesviolatedcivillibertiesunderabipartisanconsensus.</p><h4id="dcc64d63−eb92−4576−b923−e937c0a8b589"data−toc−id="dcc64d63−eb92−4576−b923−e937c0a8b589"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">Page25</h4><h5id="a47e577f−d68d−4f21−bb70−7ef668362b42"data−toc−id="a47e577f−d68d−4f21−bb70−7ef668362b42"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">DiscretionaryFundingandtheConsensusonPunitiveness</h5><p>Nixon,despitestates′rightsrhetoric,useddiscretionarycrimecontrolfundstotargetBlackurbancommunities.DiscretionaryallocationsduringtheNixonandFordadministrationssupportedmilitarizedpoliceunits,electronicsurveillance,anddecoy/undercoveroperationsthatblurredethicallines,confirmingthefocusonsegregatedlow−incomeareas.Cartercontinuedthisbyusingfundsforpublichousingsecurity,linkingsocialprogramstolawenforcement.Abroadbipartisanconsensus,unifiedbyfearsofurbanviolence,prioritizedincreasedlawenforcementinvulnerableneighborhoodsoverprevention.AttorneyGeneralRamseyClarkarticulatedthis,aimingto"getthemstraightenedout"bymergingsocialwelfarewithpunitiveprogramstargetingBlackyouth.</p><h4id="6d4ea4ae−fff3−4221−b3ea−c3956e864e86"data−toc−id="6d4ea4ae−fff3−4221−b3ea−c3956e864e86"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">Page26</h4><h5id="f65f2a79−d003−47f9−a403−f32d24342d8c"data−toc−id="f65f2a79−d003−47f9−a403−f32d24342d8c"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">TheCriminalizationofUrbanSocialPrograms</h5><p>Policymakers,fueledbyracializedperceptionsandflawedstatistics,aimedtopoliceurbanspacesandremoveagenerationofyoungmenofcolor.Thiswasn′tareturnto"JimCrow,"butanewphenomenon:thecriminalizationofurbansocialprogramsbeforeReagan′sWaronDrugs.Thislaidthegroundworkformassincarcerationanditsracialinjusticesintothe21stcentury.</p><h4id="31a7d108−c822−4af2−b82e−3d3dc030fd57"data−toc−id="31a7d108−c822−4af2−b82e−3d3dc030fd57"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">Page27</h4><h5id="1f88af5e−d81f−44d1−93ba−8d884709a009"data−toc−id="1f88af5e−d81f−44d1−93ba−8d884709a009"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">TheCoincidenceofReformandPunitiveMeasures(1965)</h5><p>InMarch1965,PresidentLyndonJohnsonsimultaneouslyadvancedcivilrightslegislation(HousingandUrbanDevelopmentAct,VotingRightsAct)andlauncheda"WaronCrime"withtheLawEnforcementAssistanceAct.Thisactmarkedthefederalgovernment′sfirstdirectinvolvementinlocalpolicing,coincidingwithprogressivesocialchanges.Fromthispoint,nationalpunitivemeasuresdisproportionatelytargetedBlackAmericansinurbanneighborhoodswithhighreportedcrimerates.</p><h4id="80c04792−3ae5−4928−a168−f808b91af177"data−toc−id="80c04792−3ae5−4928−a168−f808b91af177"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">Page28</h4><h5id="6308602b−af99−453a−9499−a5439d1bcd67"data−toc−id="6308602b−af99−453a−9499−a5439d1bcd67"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">Post−WWIIEconomicDeclineandRacialInequality</h5><p>JohnF.KennedyrecognizedparallelsbetweenReconstructionand1960schallenges,aimingtoachievefullemancipationforBlackAmericans.TheCivilRightsActof1963soughttoendJimCrowbutcouldn′taddresscenturiesofdiscrimination.Post−WWII,BlackAmericansfaceddisproportionatelyhighunemployment(overdoublethatofwhitesbythe1960s)duetosloweconomicgrowth,recessions,andautomation,exacerbatingstructuralinequalities.</p><h4id="8ab8e6c6−fb13−48bf−8192−81f2520127d3"data−toc−id="8ab8e6c6−fb13−48bf−8192−81f2520127d3"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">Page29</h4><h5id="4ba1955b−2971−4697−9653−25963cfd4e5d"data−toc−id="4ba1955b−2971−4697−9653−25963cfd4e5d"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">"SocialDynamite"andKennedy′s"TotalAttack"</h5><p>DecliningjobprospectsledtoseveresegregationandpovertyinurbanBlackcommunities,concerningpolicymakers.Harvard′sJamesB.ConantlabeledunemployedBlackyouthas"socialdynamite."In1961,PresidentKennedyestablishedthePresident′sCommitteeonJuvenileDelinquencyandYouthCrime,framingsocialprogramsasanti−delinquencymeasures.This"totalattack"aimedtodefusepotentialchaosbyaddressingthelackofjobsforBlackurbanyouth,recognizingthelimitationsofcivilrightslawsalone.</p><h4id="9f2861bc−2c35−408f−9a71−386a52c68d30"data−toc−id="9f2861bc−2c35−408f−9a71−386a52c68d30"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">Page30</h4><h5id="a9a08518−5446−4d73−83d3−b3ef7496f7a1"data−toc−id="a9a08518−5446−4d73−83d3−b3ef7496f7a1"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">ReframingSocialWelfareasCrimeControl</h5><p>Kennedy′sadministration,followingthetraditionoftheFreedmen′sBureau,calledfor"massiveupgrading"ofpublicschoolsandnewprogramsforliteracy,vocationaltraining,andhealthcare.TheseexplicitlytargetedAfricanAmericans,whowerelargelyexcludedfromNewDealandGIBillbenefits.Insteadofpuresocialwelfare,theseinitiativeswereframedas"antidelinquencymeasures,"overseenbythePresident′sCommitteeonJuvenileDelinquencyandYouthCrime.Johnsonlaterexpandedtheseintothe"WaronPoverty,"butbothmaintainedcrimecontrolasacoreaspect.</p><h4id="a2c84a0c−bd07−4be6−a65b−6a734da5c5e7"data−toc−id="a2c84a0c−bd07−4be6−a65b−6a734da5c5e7"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">Page31</h4><h5id="33c026e8−4e34−45f2−addc−9b75d1d9da96"data−toc−id="33c026e8−4e34−45f2−addc−9b75d1d9da96"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">CulturalPathologyandthePunitiveTurn</h5><p>Amidstcivilrightsdemands,aconsensusemerged:Blackurbanpovertystemmedfrom"culturalandbehavioraldeficiencies"(socialpathology),notstructuralracism.Thisframework,embracedbyKennedyandJohnson,definedinequalityasanindividualproblem,limitingsystemicsocioeconomicchange.Theyaimedtochangethe<em>psychologicalimpact</em>ofracismonindividuals,ratherthanreformingAmericaninstitutions.Thisfocusonindividualpathologyfacilitatedapunitiveturn,suggestingthatmanagingurbanproblemsinvolvedaidinglawenforcementtocontrolsegregatedcommunities,evenwithsincereinitialintentions.</p><h4id="066dbc18−eb43−45fa−b8c1−16169204da45"data−toc−id="066dbc18−eb43−45fa−b8c1−16169204da45"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">Page32</h4><h5id="803269b6−4ab0−4572−b795−68b2253c0d8d"data−toc−id="803269b6−4ab0−4572−b795−68b2253c0d8d"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">TheWaronPoverty′sShifttowardSocialControl</h5><p>Theintertwinedanti−delinquencyandanti−povertyprograms,suchastheYouthOffensesControlAct(1961),EconomicOpportunityAct(1964),andLawEnforcementAssistanceAct(1965),reinforcedthenotionthatlow−incomeneighborhoodconditionsresultedfromindividualshortcomings,notstructuralfactors.Thefederalgovernmentsoughttomonitorandregulateindividualbehavior,ratherthanfosterfundamentalinstitutionalchanges.Thus,theWaronPovertybecamemoreaboutfearofurbandisorderandcontrollingyoungBlackAmericans′behavior,solidifyingapunitiveorientationindomesticurbanpolicy.</p><h4id="68600957−4f69−46af−9221−770420015503"data−toc−id="68600957−4f69−46af−9221−770420015503"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">Page33</h4><h5id="eea42dfa−a0d3−41a6−b996−e6c0320fb0aa"data−toc−id="eea42dfa−a0d3−41a6−b996−e6c0320fb0aa"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">Kennedy′s"TotalAttack"onDelinquency</h5><p>InMay1961,PresidentKennedylaunchedtheJuvenileDelinquencyandYouthOffensesControlAct,callingfora"totalattack"ondelinquency.Ittargeted"inner−city"youth,acknowledgingunemployment,poorhousing,andinadequateeducationascontributingfactors,andlinkedracialdiscriminationto"alienation."Theprogramfocusedonyouthalreadyincontactwithlawenforcementordeemedsusceptibletodelinquency,receiving10 million annually for three years to fund demonstration projects, training for social service personnel, and assistance to local organizations. This unified law enforcement and social welfare services, giving the President's Committee significant oversight.
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Escalating Surveillance of Black Urban Youth
Post-WWII, state and local governments expanded surveillance of Black urban youth through delinquency policies. Urban police increased patrols in low-income neighborhoods, and programs in places like Oakland integrated police officers into public schools to monitor and arrest "troublemakers." This led to a 2.5timesincreaseinyouthundercriminaljusticesupervisionnationwidebetween1949and1957.Federalconcernaboutjuveniledelinquencygrewwithchangingracialdemographicsandmediacoverage,becominga"nationalproblem"by1961,particularlyinlow−incomeurbancenters.However,youthcrimewasmoreamoralconcernrootedinracialfearsthanameasurableproblem,asrisingarrestratesreflectedimproveddatacollection,notnecessarilyactualcrimesurges.</p><h4id="7b544291−9d6a−4dca−91d7−7a0c4bdc18e8"data−toc−id="7b544291−9d6a−4dca−91d7−7a0c4bdc18e8"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">Page35</h4><h5id="d78009df−acda−40c9−b9c5−f111e609c7da"data−toc−id="d78009df−acda−40c9−b9c5−f111e609c7da"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">FlawedPerceptionsandOpportunityTheory</h5><p>Policymakerslackedconcreteyouthcrimestatisticsbutheldracialassumptions,viewingtheproblemasspecifictolow−incomeBlackurbanAmericans.TheKennedyadministration,breakingfrompriorpunitiveapproaches,soughttoreformunderlyingsocialconditionsbasedonLloydOhlinandRichardCloward′s"opportunitytheory."Thistheory,influencedbyFrankTannenbaum,arguedthatcriminal"pathology"stemmedfrominadequateresourcesandpunitiveresponses,notinherenttraits,andcouldbeaddressedbystrengtheningcommunityinstitutionsratherthantargetingindividualbehavior.</p><h4id="ea9f6c60−d776−49a3−971b−acc6a798aee9"data−toc−id="ea9f6c60−d776−49a3−971b−acc6a798aee9"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">Page36</h4><h5id="dfdaa0c9−7fc2−4ff1−80db−0cfc3908e3db"data−toc−id="dfdaa0c9−7fc2−4ff1−80db−0cfc3908e3db"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">Tannenbaum′s"DramatizationofEvil"andOpportunityTheory</h5><p>FrankTannenbaum′s<em>CrimeandtheCommunity</em>(1938)arguedagainstcriminalizingminorbehaviors,statingthatlabelingyouthasdelinquent(the"dramatizationofevil")inadvertentlyencouragedfuturecriminality.Buildingonthis,OhlinandCloward′s"opportunitytheory"positedthatcriminalpathologyderivedfrominadequateresourcesandpunitiveresponses,makingyouthmorepronetofailureandcrime.Theyadvocatedforchanging"opportunitystructures"bystrengtheningeducational,training,anddevelopmentprogramswithinpoorcommunities,ratherthanfocusingonindividuals.Theybelievedthiswouldbreak"culturalpathologies"thatseemedtobreeddelinquency.</p><h4id="441d49f5−fecb−474f−9e38−498db94d714f"data−toc−id="441d49f5−fecb−474f−9e38−498db94d714f"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">Page37</h4><h5id="acbbd237−6e14−4d23−94ae−e72d52ef4a00"data−toc−id="acbbd237−6e14−4d23−94ae−e72d52ef4a00"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">"Delinquency"ProgramsTargetingBlackUrbanYouth</h5><p>OpportunitytheoryinfluencedKennedyofficials,particularlyDavidHackett,toincorporatescholarslikeOhlinandClowardintopolicydiscussions,markinganunprecedenteduseofstatisticalevidence.Thisstrategyopenedpolicydomainsforcommunity−basedorganizationsandraciallymarginalizedcitizens,makingit"acceptableforthefederalgovernmenttodosomethingaboutpoorblackpeople."FundsweredirectedtoprogramsincitieswithhighconcentrationsofBlackandotherracialminorityresidents,likeClevelandandSyracuse,whereofficialsbelievedthesecommunitiescouldbe"saved"from"socialandbehavioralproblems"attributedtourbanyouthofcolor,preventingescalatingcrimeanddelinquency.</p><h4id="c4869de4−fc6b−460a−81f5−3f429959df45"data−toc−id="c4869de4−fc6b−460a−81f5−3f429959df45"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">Page38</h4><h5id="67e70896−7e02−47f6−bc84−3f1f12699260"data−toc−id="67e70896−7e02−47f6−bc84−3f1f12699260"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">RacializedFocusofAntidelinquencyPrograms</h5><p>Despiteawarenessofrisingdelinquencyinsuburbsandruralareas,thePresident′sCommitteedisproportionatelyinvestedinprogramsforAfricanAmericanyouth,believing"thedecayingcoreoftheinnercity"contained"themostimposingarrayofsocialpathology."IncitieslikeDetroitandWashington,DC,themajorityofyouthservedbyfederalprogramswereAfricanAmerican.EvenincitieswithsmallerBlackpopulations,Blackyouthconstitutedhalfoftheparticipants.ThisfocuswasfueledbyassumptionsaboutBlackculturalandfamilialpatternsseenasdeviant,withfearsthatthese"problems"wouldworsenacrossgenerationsifleftunaddressedbynationalprograms,despiteacknowledgingtheroleofracialdiscrimination.</p><h4id="281e6a5e−fd11−4459−8163−0357401824f3"data−toc−id="281e6a5e−fd11−4459−8163−0357401824f3"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">Page39</h4><h5id="5d017a76−6028−4060−8343−ee68a391b958"data−toc−id="5d017a76−6028−4060−8343−ee68a391b958"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">BehavioralReformFocus</h5><p>Kennedy′sadministration,whilerhetoricallyacknowledgingstructuralinequality,ultimatelyfocusedantidelinquencyprogramson"communitypathologies"astherootcauseofcrime.Thismeantlessemphasisonoverhaulingjuvenilejusticeandmoreonaddressing"socialantecedents."ProgramslikeYouthOpportunityCentersandMobilizationforYouth(MFY)aimedtofosterequalopportunityandproductivecitizenshipamong"alienated"youth.MFY,a12 million initiative in New York City's Lower East Side, became a model for Johnson's War on Poverty, offering education, job training, and social services to young Black and Latino residents, aiming to put opportunity theory into action.
Page 40
Grassroots, "Indigenous" Participation, and Social Control
Mobilization for Youth (MFY) aimed for grassroots empowerment and "indigenous social movements," believing community involvement was crucial to disrupt the "culture of poverty," influenced by Saul Alinsky's organizing methods. Ohlin argued against traditional welfare organizations as primary grant beneficiaries to prevent conservative approaches. MFY paid "troubleshooters" and recruited skilled Black professionals to organize programs. This approach aimed to heighten the "personal investment of members in the established order." However, this emphasis on grassroots participation often overlooked existing effective community-based efforts.
Page 41
Top-Down Approach to Delinquency Prevention
Despite advocating "indigenous participation," federal officials resisted funding existing, youth-led initiatives like the Boys Brotherhood Republic, which effectively prevented delinquency without adult supervision. The Republic's efforts to expand were stifled by a reluctance to support organizations not involving trained social workers. This revealed the top-down nature of MFY and national antidelinquency programs, which mainly funneled social service workers into low-income Black communities. These programs, conceived as a "domestic peace corps," aimed to promote social and economic development in "politically volatile places" by encouraging "hard-core youth" to conform to American living standards.
Page 42
"Soft Surveillance" and Behavioral Modification
The "domestic peace corps" initiatives aimed to channel Black youth's anger from "self-defeating behavior" into "constructive action." Programs like Mobilization for Youth (MFY) sought to make "disadvantaged members of minority groups more employable" by developing work-related skills and a "suitable 'work personality,'" rooted in the belief that Black cultural pathology drove inequality. MFY established "Mental Hygiene Clinics" to provide comprehensive family services, focusing on welfare eligibility, housing, childcare, and "homemaking skills." Counseling and job training aimed to arrest "self-defeating modes of behavior," rather than transforming external institutions. These were seen as "missionary work."
Page 43
Education Programs and the Imposition of Middle-Class Values
Educational measures supported by the President's Committee, including early Head Start iterations, were seen as crucial. Curricular models were developed to foster academic engagement, encouraging teachers to visit students' homes to understand their impoverished conditions. However, these reforms were shaped by concerns about "community pathology." Preschool classes aimed to "head off retardation" in "slum areas," and programs sought to establish a "middle-class environment" in segregated schools. Philadelphia's pre-kindergarten hired only male teachers to "offset predominantly female-centered families," explicitly aiming to instill dominant societal values, norms, and ways of speaking.
Page 44
Militaristic Discipline and "Soft Surveillance"
Antidelinquency programs, aiming to provide "opportunities [for vulnerable youth] to behave differently," often focused on fostering discipline. Ohlin and Cloward, influenced by Tannenbaum, suggested youth turned to delinquency for adventure and proposed "quasi-militaristic" organizations to channel this energy constructively. Mobilization for Youth's Adventure Corps, with uniforms and rank insignia, aimed to appeal to youth like "Boy Scouts do in other areas," shielding them from formal penal discipline. These "soft surveillance" methods in community settings, like MFY's coffee houses (staffed by "informed bartenders" watching youth with gang affiliations), offered an alternative to prisons but still imposed new forms of control.
Page 45
Targeted Supervision and the "Dramatization of Evil"
In places like St. Louis, "soft surveillance" emerged through gang outreach workers who aimed to guide "troublesome" Black youth, often labeled "potentially delinquent" by association, into "conventional activity." These programs, despite advocating "indigenous participation" in theory, imposed external programming under trained authorities, often overlooking existing community-led efforts. Social workers increasingly performed surveillance, while law enforcement assumed social service roles, fostering partnerships between them. This approach confirmed Tannenbaum's "dramatization of evil," where punitive responses exacerbated delinquency. Ultimately, the programs, driven by racial assumptions, resulted in "benign social control" and eased the transition to more punitive federal programs under Johnson's Great Society.
Page 46
This page is an image of police and residents from Harlem in June 1970, illustrating the increased police presence in black urban communities during the War on Crime, which often led to confrontations.
Page 47
Historical Context of Black Criminality
Post-Emancipation, disparate rates of Black incarceration were used to justify racism, with the 1890 census showing Black Americans as 12percentofthepopulationbut30 percent of prisoners. This created a "statistical discourse" of Black crime, rationalizing prison expansion and racial profiling. While poor white crime was attributed to socioeconomic factors, Black criminality was often seen as hereditary. Post-WWII, biological racism was rejected, but a new statistical discourse on Black criminality emerged, forming the intellectual basis for mass incarceration.
Page 48
The Moynihan Report and Black Cultural Pathology
Criminologists Ohlin and Cloward's "opportunity theory" (1960) explained Black and Latino youth crime as a product of social forces, not individual behavior, influencing Kennedy's anti-delinquency programs. Daniel Patrick Moynihan's 1965 The Negro Family: A Case for National Action (Moynihan Report) argued that racial discrimination and "cultural deprivation" created a "tangle of pathology" in Black urban families, leading to high illiteracy, single-parent households, and delinquency. Johnson's administration accepted this view, linking poverty to pathology and pathology to crime, shaping the national law enforcement program. FBI data, despite showing more white arrests, indicated higher rates of arrest for Black men in serious crimes.
Page 49
Targeting Black Youth and Urban Intervention
FBI data indicated that youth under 25committedthree−fourthsofcrimes,andmostcrimes(2.8 million out of 2millionreported)occurredincities.Thisledpolicymakerstoconcludethat"commonseriouscrimes"weremostfrequent"intheslumsoflargecities,"andcommittedby"boysandyoungmen."ThisprovidedaspecifictargetforAmericanlawenforcement:urbancentersandyoungmen.Followingthe1967NewarkandDetroituprisings,Moynihanandotherliberalsgrewpessimisticaboutanti−povertyprograms,advocatingdivestmentfromcommunityaction.Nixon′sadministration,influencedbyMoynihan,Banfield,andWilson,increasinglyviewedBlackculturalpathology,notpoverty,astherootcauseofcrime.Thecrimewarshiftedfromimprovingsocietytocontainingcrime,explicitlytargetingBlackyouth.</p><h4id="2d06a0e2−92e4−4207−8983−ac1ba21e81c2"data−toc−id="2d06a0e2−92e4−4207−8983−ac1ba21e81c2"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">Page50</h4><h5id="2accdc0e−242c−454b−be2e−13c215342c5a"data−toc−id="2accdc0e−242c−454b−be2e−13c215342c5a"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">The"MassIncarcerationGeneration"andPreemptivePolicing</h5><p>Thebipartisanconsensusonraceandcrimeduringthe1960sultimatelycreatedthe"massincarcerationgeneration"post−civilrights,thoughinitially,thisoutcomewaslargelyunintended.Bycontrast,theNixonadministrationdeliberatelyaimedto<em>contain</em>crime,noteliminateitsrootcauses,treatingitasasymptomofhistoricalinequalityandBlackpoverty.Inthe1970s,arrestingandincarceratingyoungAfricanAmericanmenbecameapreemptivestrategyforfuturecrimeprevention,rationalizedbynewtheories.EdwardBanfieldandJamesQ.Wilsonarguedfor"birthcontrol"orincreasedpolicingtosecure"prospectivecrime"scenes,specificallyinBlackurbanneighborhoods,leadingtobiasedarrestsandreinforcingtheassociationbetweenBlackcommunitiesandcriminality.</p><h4id="d26056af−5612−4c9a−b7ba−7601a55aad58"data−toc−id="d26056af−5612−4c9a−b7ba−7601a55aad58"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">Page51</h4><h5id="2a11236f−29b6−41df−9e06−20c8e2a8c523"data−toc−id="2a11236f−29b6−41df−9e06−20c8e2a8c523"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">PredictivePolicingandCivilLibertiesConcerns</h5><p>ResearchandpunitiveprojectsbecametightlyintegratedunderNixon,focusingonanticipatingfuturecrime.InSt.Louis,apolice−runcomputeridentificationprojectcatalogeddemographicdatafromvoluntaryinterviewswithtargetedteenagers(basedonrace,class,age),usingthistomaprelationshipsandtargetindividualsforarrest.Chargeslike"behaviorinjurioustohiswelfarebyloitering"wereapplied.This"predictivetechniques"model,basedonracialprofiling,aimedtoremove"questionable"youthandpreventcrime,foreshadowingmodernCompStat.NixonofficialGeoffShepard,thoughacknowledgingtheproject′sinherentdiscriminationandethical/constitutionalissues,concludeditwas"probablyveryeffective,"highlightingtheprevailinglogicofcontrollingBlackresidents,regardlessofthereason.</p><h4id="00762da2−312d−4347−af61−926c33a191d8"data−toc−id="00762da2−312d−4347−af61−926c33a191d8"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">Page52</h4><h5id="788f98a0−1d14−4f94−bc95−d1710b91c3b8"data−toc−id="788f98a0−1d14−4f94−bc95−d1710b91c3b8"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">FlawedCrimeStatisticsandExacerbatedCrime</h5><p>Flawedstatisticaldatainthe1960sand70sexaggeratedcrimeinAfricanAmericancommunitiesanddistortedtheoverallpicture.TheFBI′sUniformCrimeReport,whichonlymeasuredarrests(notconvictions),showedhigherarrestratesforAfricanAmericansinseriouscrimes,butthesealsohadlowprosecutionrates.Arrestratesweretiedtopolicepresence,whichwasconcentratedinBlackneighborhoods.TheFBIalsofocusedonstreetcrime,ignoringorganizedandwhite−collarcrime.Theseracializedperceptionsinformedpreemptivelawenforcementstrategiesthat,insteadofreducingcrime,normalizedpoliceandcrimecontroltechnologiesinlow−incomeurbanareas,increasingarrestsandincarceration.ThepunitiveconfinementofyoungAfricanAmericanmenoftenledtorecidivism,asprisonswereseenas"collegesofcrime"andformerprisonersfacedcivicandeconomicexclusion.</p><h4id="0d5d7ea8−f091−470f−890d−548affa9717a"data−toc−id="0d5d7ea8−f091−470f−890d−548affa9717a"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">Page53</h4><h5id="17f57606−b4b7−4382−a378−54fdd1a5d730"data−toc−id="17f57606−b4b7−4382−a378−54fdd1a5d730"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">PolicyFailureandtheCriminalizationofUrbanLife</h5><p>Federalpoliciesescalatedbothviolenceandimprisonmentwithoutpreventingcrimeorimprovingpublicsafety;theirineffectivenessseemedirrelevanttoofficials.The"crimeproblemismoreapparentthanreal,"asNixonofficialEgilKroghstated.Therealityofurbancrisis(riots,Blackpoverty,segregation)ledpolicymakerstoviewcrimecontrolandpunitivemeasuresagainstBlackurbanAmericansaspoliticallyastuteandeconomicallyviable.Theyweredeterminedtopoliceurbanspaceandremoveagenerationofyoungmenofcolor.This"WaronCrime"wasn′ta"NewJimCrow"butanewphenomenon:thecriminalizationofurbansocialprogramsinthepost−civilrightserabeforeReagan′sWaronDrugs,layingthegroundworkformassincarceration.</p><h4id="1e4ac486−662b−4dae−84fa−158cd6519437"data−toc−id="1e4ac486−662b−4dae−84fa−158cd6519437"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">Page54</h4><p>Thispageisblankandislikelyforformattingpurposes.</p><h4id="c82d5d84−002e−4988−a7e4−6b86031e0b45"data−toc−id="c82d5d84−002e−4988−a7e4−6b86031e0b45"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">Page55</h4><h5id="db25cf1c−b11a−4cbb−9060−db218920c9ce"data−toc−id="db25cf1c−b11a−4cbb−9060−db218920c9ce"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">Johnson′s"WaronPoverty":AMoreExpansiveInitiative</h5><p>LyndonJohnsonexpandedKennedy′s"totalattack"ondelinquencyintoanational"WaronPoverty,"asignificantlylargereffortfundingprogramsinmorecitieswithincreasedcongressionalallocations.RichardBooneandotherformerKennedyadministrationmembersbroughtexistingapproachestourbaninequality,includingpathologicalassumptionsaboutpovertyandcrime.Despitegrowingawarenessofjoblessness,theadministrationavoidedstructuralreform,focusingonjobtrainingratherthanlong−termjobcreation.The1964taxcutwasexpectedtostimulateprivatespendingandjobs.Johnson’sCouncilofEconomicAdvisersdraftedapolicyfocusingonpromotingopportunityin"severe"problemareasandeconomicgrowth.</p><h4id="2ff989aa−387a−4d67−9bed−2071d23f07bc"data−toc−id="2ff989aa−387a−4d67−9bed−2071d23f07bc"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">Page56</h4><h5id="aa91f313−fc12−49f2−baea−3ef3033f4ab4"data−toc−id="aa91f313−fc12−49f2−baea−3ef3033f4ab4"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">AMoralAppealandaLegislativeSuccess</h5><p>Inhis1964StateoftheUnionaddress,JohnsondeclaredaWaronPoverty,makingamoralappealforsupporttoimprovethesocialandeconomicconditionoflessfortunatecitizens.Hereframedpovertyasasymptomofdeniedopportunity(basedonrace)ratherthanalackofjobs/money.This"war"aimedtodevelopcitizens′capacitiesineducation,training,healthcare,housing,andcommunity.TheEconomicOpportunityActof1964,thefirstWaronPovertylegislation,passedswiftlyandsmoothly,signedintolawinAugust1964.</p><h4id="5a3dd921−f0f5−4498−85b5−31c77de0e32a"data−toc−id="5a3dd921−f0f5−4498−85b5−31c77de0e32a"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">Page57</h4><h5id="d0671671−2fd6−4716−99da−243c6452ad28"data−toc−id="d0671671−2fd6−4716−99da−243c6452ad28"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">TheAmbitiousScopeoftheEconomicOpportunityAct</h5><p>TheEconomicOpportunityAct,anearly1 billion social welfare program, nationalized Kennedy-era anti-delinquency methods. It created Job Corps for low-income youth (150/monthfortwoyears),WorkExperienceProgramsfor"unemployedfathers,"work−studyprograms,adulteducation,andsmallbusinessloans.VISTA(laterAmeriCorps)extendedthe"PeaceCorps"spiritdomestically.ThenewOfficeofEconomicOpportunity(OEO)spent200 million in its first 100 days across 33states,including"cityslums."Thoughnotexplicitlyracialinlanguage,theactimplicitlyrespondedtoBlackmigrationandcivilrightsprotests,with15% of the OEO's budget reserved for demonstration projects in Black urban areas like Head Start.
Page 58
"Maximum Feasible Participation" and Growing Controversy
The Economic Opportunity Act's "maximum feasible participation" principle, influenced by Ohlin and Cloward, aimed to empower local people in urban social programs. This concept, initially uncontroversial, led to power struggles as organizations like Mobilization for Youth confronted local authorities (school administrators, landlords, police). Mayors and conservative politicians feared funds were building a radical base and fueling voter registration drives for Democrats, labeling it as "fostering class struggle" and alleging communist infiltration. These allegations made community action and the War on Poverty vulnerable, diminishing the possibility of fundamental social transformations led by citizens, though the OEO initially defended grassroots representation.
Page 59
The Shift from Uplift to Behavioral Control
Despite Johnson's rhetoric of curing and preventing poverty, most War on Poverty programs took a cautious approach, focusing on vocational training and remedial education without addressing job creation or school reform. These programs aimed to combat the effects of inequality, not its root causes. Policymakers, influenced by notions of individual pathology, designed community action not for structural change but to instill "democratic values" and discipline among "deficient" low-income urban youth. The goal became to break the "cycle of poverty" through services and increased supervision, reflecting a growing focus on social control over genuine empowerment, especially after urban uprisings in 1964.
Page 60
From Urban Unrest to the War on Crime (1964-1965)
Two weeks after Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, racial unrest erupted in Harlem, spreading to other cities, protesting police brutality and structural exclusion. The "social dynamite" exploded, despite federal prevention efforts. Johnson responded by prioritizing "law and order," declaring the "War on Crime" in March 1965 with the Law Enforcement Assistance Act. This act, establishing a federal role in local crime control, was a political move to take control of the issue from conservatives, framing it as essential for "personal security" and complementing Great Society programs while extending assumptions about "culturally disadvantaged" Americans.
Page 61
Moynihan's Influence and the Racialized Basis of Crime Policy
Moynihan's research, One Third of a Nation, linking poverty, illiteracy, and national security, shaped the rationale for federal intervention. His Negro Family: A Case for National Action argued that racial discrimination and "cultural deprivation" created a "tangle of pathology" in Black families, perpetuating unemployment and delinquency. Johnson selectively adopted Moynihan's ideas, embracing the concept of Black family pathology as the root cause of crime while rejecting federal responsibility for job creation or systemic racism. This allowed the administration to direct domestic programs at Black men's plight, framing it as fixing individual and cultural issues, rather than addressing systemic injustice. Both liberals and conservatives drew on Moynihan to justify crime control, merging the War on Crime with the War on Poverty.
Page 62
The Criminalization of the Civil Rights Revolution
Federal policy, under Johnson, prioritized law and order, using social science research and embedded racism to rationalize increased patrol, surveillance, and confinement in segregated poverty as social control. Despite resistance to major structural changes in the War on Poverty, Johnson launched a significant job creation program for police and correctional officers through the War on Crime. This era saw the expansion of the welfare state coincide with a new era of American law enforcement, establishing the modern carceral state in the wake of Jim Crow's dismantling and civil rights legislation (1964 Civil Rights Act, 1965 Voting Rights Act). The crucial question was whether the administration would address the "revolution of the Negro American" with social welfare or punitive programs.
Page 63
The Reagan Era: Culmination of the War on Crime
When Ronald Reagan took office in 1981, he inherited a vastly expanded law enforcement system. His "War on Drugs" intensified this trend, driven by a bipartisan consensus since the 1960s to prioritize crime control and penal programs over social welfare. Reagan redefined governmental accountability, rejecting policies addressing unemployment or inequality, influenced by neoconservative think tanks that saw Great Society programs as undermining morality. He embraced policies that viewed "community pathology" as the root of crime, intensifying surveillance and law enforcement in urban areas to maintain "domestic tranquility" for "traditional" Americans, making the fight against urban street crime his administration's top domestic concern.
Page 64
Reagan's Intensification of Punitive Policies
Reagan's administration significantly escalated the War on Crime by implementing draconian proposals from Nixon and Ford, including domestic surveillance, expanded criminal codes, and mandatory minimum sentences. He amplified the War on Drugs by increasing raids, stings, and tactical police units, and importantly, forged new partnerships between domestic law enforcement and defense agencies. With the LEAA phased out, Reagan centralized national crime control, maintaining strong federal oversight while directly collaborating with local officials. This cemented the merger of social services and crime control, further criminalizing welfare recipients and public housing tenants. His policies continued to target Black Americans, notably through crack cocaine sentencing disparities, exacerbating racial bias.
Page 65
Racial Disparities and Judicial Complicity
By the mid-1980s, the inherent racism in the criminal justice system was undeniable. Black Americans, who constituted one-third of the prison population during the War on Poverty, became over half of those incarcerated due to the Wars on Crime and Drugs. The prison system expanded fivefold from 1965 to 1988, with two-thirds of inmates being African American and Latino. The Supreme Court, acting as a "loyal foot soldier," made challenging racial bias virtually impossible, exemplified by the 1987 McCleskey v. Kemp ruling. Democrats, including Senators Biden and Kennedy, largely supported Reagan's militaristic policing and drug war legislation, framing crime as a national defense problem. The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, passed overwhelmingly, officially launched the War on Drugs.
Page 66
Militarization of Domestic Law Enforcement
Framing federal crime control as a drug war fostered new military-justice partnerships. Reagan revised the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, allowing defense agencies to provide local police with weapons, intelligence, and bases for drug interdiction. The 1982 Department of Defense reauthorization expanded "indirect military involvement" to include sharing equipment, facilities, and manpower, integrating the Navy, Air Force, and Army with local law enforcement and the DEA. This militarization aimed to seal off the U.S. from "undesirable influences" in the Western Hemisphere, expanding border control efforts through initiatives like the South Florida Task Force and the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System under Vice President George H. W. Bush.
Page 67
The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984
The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, hailed as a monumental reform, reinstated the federal death penalty, abolished the federal parole system, and implemented punitive strategies previously rejected, such as pretrial detention. It included the Armed Career Criminal Act, imposing mandatory minimum sentences (e.g., 5yearsforfirearmuseinviolentcrime,15 years to life for a third strike), leading to a 33percentincreaseinaverageprisonsentencesfrom1980to1986.Theactalsotransformedpolicingthroughforfeitureprovisions,allowinglawenforcementtoseizeupto90 percent of cash and property from accused drug dealers, which, unlike the 1970 act, directly funded police departments, making drug forfeitures a lucrative incentive and eliminating the need for the LEAA.
Page 68
Forfeiture, Corruption, and Prison Expansion
Forfeiture practices, driven by the 1984 act, resembled entrapment and enabled mass arrests; thousands were detained, often losing property even if acquitted. This created opportunities for police corruption, with instances like FBI agent Dan Mitrione Jr. stealing cocaine and accepting bribes. Internal investigations arose. Federal policymakers, facing an influx of prisoners due to longer sentences, assisted states in expanding penal institutions with block grants and spurred the "prisons for profit" industry, with the Corrections Corporation of America opening the first private prison in 1984. By the end of Reagan's first term, the War on Crime had effectively morphed into the War on Drugs, marked by this new era of penalty.
Page 69
Punitive Urban Policy and Welfare Rollbacks
The War on Drugs disproportionately impacted segregated urban neighborhoods already facing surveillance and poverty. Reagan eliminated 500,000familiesfromwelfare,1 million Americans from food stamps, and 2.6millionchildrenfromschoollunchprograms,arguingwelfarefostereddependency.Herevitalized"NewFederalism"withblockgrants,butthesecutfederalfundingandaccountability,leadingtoa12 percent reduction in social program spending by 1981. This policy, coupled with inflation, increased the number of Americans below the poverty line from 26millionin1979to33 million in 1988, exacerbating homelessness. Reagan's policies, while pledging to uphold traditional values, prioritized military buildup over domestic social investment, exacerbating existing inequalities.
Page 70
The Crack Epidemic and Policy Neglect
Amidst high poverty and unemployment during Reagan's Cold War, crack cocaine emerged in urban neighborhoods, reflecting two decades of disinvestment and overpolicing. Crack use became visible as income inequality surpassed pre-WWII levels. Despite military involvement in border control, cocaine imports increased 50percentfrom1982to1984,drivingdownpricesandincreasingavailability.Deterioratedurbanbuildingsbecamehubsforcrackdealing,concentratingtheprobleminpublichousing.Policymakers,ignoringsocioeconomicroots,viewedcrackasthecauseofurbanviolence,decay,andsophisticatedgangs,promptingfurtherpunitivepoliciesthattargetedraciallymarginalizedAmericans.</p><h4id="ecd173ad−a899−4e2c−a18b−6db56b3231fe"data−toc−id="ecd173ad−a899−4e2c−a18b−6db56b3231fe"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">Page71</h4><h5id="68cb794d−60f7−42b1−84e8−44c811878e51"data−toc−id="68cb794d−60f7−42b1−84e8−44c811878e51"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">TheAnti−DrugAbuseActof1986andItsRacialImpact</h5><p>ReagancontinuedNixon′s,Ford′s,andCarter′spunitivepath,replacingsocialwelfarewithtargetedcrimeprograms.TheAnti−DrugAbuseActof1986,or"DrugFreeAmericaAct,"doubledfundingfordomesticcrime/drugcontrol,triplingdrugenforcementresourcestonearly3.5 billion. While rhetorically emphasizing treatment (like Nancy Reagan's "Just Say No"), the 900millionallocatedfordrugabuseprogramsprimarilyfundedhelicopters,airplanes,andintelligence−gathering.Mandatoryminimumsentencesforcrackcocaine,useddisproportionatelybyBlackAmericans,resultedin"apartheidsentencing,"leadingtomassincarcerationofBlackandLatinomen(upto90 percent of new inmates for drug offenses in some states) despite whites being majority drug users. This reflected racial biases, with the problem framed as a national crisis by media.
Page 72
Federal Grants, "Zero Tolerance," and Centralized Control
Federal policymakers imposed the War on Drugs locally by linking federal grants to drug-related arrests, training patrol officers in narcotics investigations. This built on the War on Crime's use of arrest rates to measure law enforcement assistance. Federal funding for FBI, DEA, and the U.S. Bureau of Prisons surged, with over 25,000officerstrainedin"OperationPipeline"touse"pretextstops"(manipulatingtrafficstopsintodrugsearches).WithoutLEAAoversight,theseagenciesbecamekeygrantmakers.Reagan′s1987NationalDrugPolicyBoard,comprisingcabinetofficials,centralizedcontrol.Theybypassed"restrictivecategoricalgrants"and"burdensomerequirements,"allowingstatesflexibilitywhileenforcingdrugwarobjectives.</p><h4id="0565b7a8−fed6−462b−93d2−151d6b42b72b"data−toc−id="0565b7a8−fed6−462b−93d2−151d6b42b72b"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">Page73</h4><h5id="fc834fef−5332−4d78−947c−4e9c7fd032e3"data−toc−id="fc834fef−5332−4d78−947c−4e9c7fd032e3"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">"ZeroTolerance"andtheCriminalizationofPoverty</h5><p>TheDrugPolicyBoard′srecommendations,institutionalizedinthe1988OmnibusAnti−DrugAbuseAct,focusedon"zerotolerance"andgreateraccountabilityfordrugusers.Itmandateddrugtestingforfederalemployeesandmadefederalstudentloansconditionalonanti−drugprograms,withdrawingaidfromconvictedoffenders.Thisexpandedthedrugwar′sreachintomostfacetsofAmericanlife.Critically,itdeepenedlinksbetweensocialwelfareandcrimecontrol,requiringdrug−freepublichousingandevictingtenantsforillegalactivity."High−riskyouth"(low−income,runaways,dropouts,juvenilejusticeparticipants)wereprimarytargets,reflectingtheadministration′sbeliefthatAmericawas"undersiege"andrequiringlawenforcementwith"justtheweaponstheyneed."</p><h4id="0fe051ec−74cc−4754−afc0−70aaa0254c7f"data−toc−id="0fe051ec−74cc−4754−afc0−70aaa0254c7f"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">Page74</h4><h5id="772d40c1−ded8−4eb4−bbb5−82050b4db07a"data−toc−id="772d40c1−ded8−4eb4−bbb5−82050b4db07a"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">Bush′sLegacyandtheSelf−PerpetuatingCarceralState</h5><p>GeorgeH.W.Bush,continuingReagan′slegacy,pursuednewwaystoexpandprisonswhilecuttingcosts,suchaslease−purchasearrangementswithprivatefirms.TheAnti−DrugAbuseActusedcivilpropertyseizedinforfeiturestofundprisonconstruction.Despitedecreasingcrimerates,prisonpopulationsexplodedinthe1990s,indicatingthatmassincarcerationreflectedlegalchanges,crimecontrolinvestments,andpunitivestrategies,notactualcrime.Thecarceralstatebecameundeniablyself−perpetuating,withBlackyouthremainingtheprimarytargetofnationallawenforcementstrategiessince1965.</p><h4id="3313595f−d9af−4591−acab−0289226ddd03"data−toc−id="3313595f−d9af−4591−acab−0289226ddd03"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">Page75</h4><h5id="28d2a949−196c−48f6−9c0f−343b8ef84da1"data−toc−id="28d2a949−196c−48f6−9c0f−343b8ef84da1"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">TheEscalationofGangViolenceandPunitiveResponses</h5><p>ReaganintensifiedtheassaultonBlackyouthgangsduringtheWaronDrugs.Earlieranti−gangmeasuresfromKennedy,the1974JuvenileJusticeandDelinquencyPreventionAct,andFord′sprogramshadonlyworsenedtheproblem,leadingtosophisticatedcrimenetworksandheavyweaponry.Officialsblamedpermissivelegalsanctions,notsystemicissues,demandingmorearrestsandlongerprisonsentencesasdeterrents.California′s1988STEP(StreetTerrorismandEnforcementPrevention)Actcriminalizedgangparticipation,doublingsentencesfordrugsales,andpenalizingspraypaintsalestominors.Thislegislationaimedtoensurelongimprisonmentasadeterrent.</p><h4id="a733933c−efa9−400c−8cd3−1b2d571598b1"data−toc−id="a733933c−efa9−400c−8cd3−1b2d571598b1"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">Page76</h4><h5id="777a4d09−192e−4fd9−a219−7ba7d83d27dc"data−toc−id="777a4d09−192e−4fd9−a219−7ba7d83d27dc"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">OperationHammerandtheCriminalizationofUrbanSpace</h5><p>WithSTEPandpenalreforms,theLosAngelesPoliceDepartment′sCRASH(CommunityResourcesAgainstStreetHoodlums)unitperfectedmassarrests.In1988,OperationHammersweptSouthCentralLosAngeles,arrestingover1,400 predominantly Black residents for minor offenses, primarily creating criminal records rather than securing convictions. These mass arrests, extending to other areas, ensured constant contact between youth and penal institutions. The LAPD then revived "defensible space" with "Operation Cul de Sac" in 1990, using barricades to create "artificial communities" in "high-crime" Black neighborhoods. This intensified surveillance, restricted residents' movement, and increased arrests for minor suspicions, becoming a model for other cities despite criticisms of racial profiling and civil liberties violations.
Page 77
Supreme Court Endorsement of Racial Bias in Criminal Justice
Amidst mass penal supervision, the Supreme Court, acting as a "loyal foot soldier," made challenging racial discrimination in crime control virtually impossible. In McCleskey v. Kemp (1987), the Court upheld a death sentence despite statistical evidence of racial bias, asserting offenders needed to prove deliberate discriminatory effect. This ruling legitimized racial profiling. Subsequently, cases like Florida v. Bostick (1991) and Ohio v. Robinette (1996) upheld "pretext stops"—turning routine traffic stops into drug searches—as long as a traffic violation occurred. The DEA's "Operation Pipeline" trained 25,000officersin48 states in this practice, making racial profiling a default strategy to fight the drug war.
Page 78
Racial Profiling and Amplified Gang Warfare
With the legal shield of McCleskey v. Kemp, law enforcement overtly encouraged racial profiling. The confidential 1988 California Attorney General's handbook "Crips & Bloods Street Gangs" provided strategies to identify and arrest members, effectively associating nearly all Black men in California, their partners, and families as potential gang members or criminals. This profiling extended to appearance, travel companions (flagging Black men with white women or other adults and children as suspect), and even calm responses to police interrogations. CRASH units employed tactics mirroring gang warfare, provoking rivalries and using incarceration as leverage, highlighting the mutually reinforcing relationship between paramilitary gangs and anti-gang police. This policy path exacerbated communal warfare and disproportionately targeted Black citizens.
Page 79
The Self-Perpetuating Cycle of Crime and Punishment
Even as Operation Hammer faced criticism, mass arrests persisted, primarily creating criminal records and leading to longer prison sentences rather than effectively containing violence. Critics noted that jailed youth returned "a little meaner and a lot tougher." Police forces, mirroring criminals, engaged in dubious tactics like manufacturing and distributing crack cocaine (e.g., in Southeast Florida) or encouraging undercover drug dealers to create criminal networks (e.g., Cleveland), all justified by the "zero tolerance" goals of Reagan's drug war. These extreme measures aimed to confine African American drug users and criminals by any means. The 1992 Los Angeles civil disorder reflected the punitive milieu since 1965; federal resistance to socioeconomic solutions, opting instead for detention facilities and security hardware, fueled this cycle. The lack of success and rising violence seemed irrelevant to policymakers, demonstrating the self-perpetuating nature of the carceral state.
Page 80
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Page 81
Historical Parallels and Policy Continuities
The punitive transformation of U.S. domestic policy post-civil rights mirrors post-Emancipation patterns where new criminal laws (Black Codes, convict leasing) emerged to control newly freed Black people. The "War on Crime" merged equal opportunity with crime control, initially aiming for social uplift but shifting to social control, blaming "anti-social" Black youth for urban violence. In the absence of programs providing shelter, education, and employment, poverty and crime increased during 15yearsofnationallawenforcement.Theironyisthatthesecrimecontrolstrategiesexacerbatedtheproblemsintargetedcities.</p><h4id="53981893−f284−4748−b99e−e54c70e0c802"data−toc−id="53981893−f284−4748−b99e−e54c70e0c802"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">Page82</h4><h5id="7b3cbfe3−0bcb−4be2−a18b−a852295d390a"data−toc−id="7b3cbfe3−0bcb−4be2−a18b−a852295d390a"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">TheCarceralNetworkanditsFoundation</h5><p>By1981,AfricanAmericansfacedadualstruggle:internalviolenceandpunitivepolicies.Strategieslikepreemptivepatrols,stingoperations,racializedjuvenilejustice,firearmssanctions,CareerCriminalunits,andhousingsecurityprogramsfueledinternalviolenceandincarceration.Thisprocesscreatedadistinctcarceralnetworkofpunitiveandsocialwelfareinstitutions,intellectuallygroundedinstatisticaldiscoursesofBlackcriminalityandpathologicalunderstandingsofpoverty.This"socialcontrol"regimen,markedbytargetedarrestsofraciallymarginalizedAmericansandthegrowthofprivateindustriessupportingthiscontrol,becamecentraltolate20th−centurydomesticpolicy.Policymakers′bipartisanfixationonpolicingurbanspaceandremovinggenerationsofyoungmenandwomenofcolorintoprisonshashadimmeasurable,thoughsometimesunintended,consequences.</p><h4id="1c088b58−cee7−43cd−b0df−e6b3dc07c7d6"data−toc−id="1c088b58−cee7−43cd−b0df−e6b3dc07c7d6"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">Page83</h4><h5id="ae5640c7−6c8b−4e4e−8bc5−38659c32346a"data−toc−id="ae5640c7−6c8b−4e4e−8bc5−38659c32346a"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">UnacknowledgedLegaciesandPersistentInequality</h5><p>ExcusinghistoricalactionsasproductsoftheirtimepreventsconfrontinglegaciesofenslavementthatundermineAmericanideals.ThedevastatingoutcomesoftheWaronCrime,largelyunnoticeduntilrecently,reinforcednarrativesofculturalpathologyandpersonalresponsibility,makingmassincarcerationseemnatural.DespitetheriseofaBlackmiddleclassandpoliticalrepresentation,structuralracismandinequalitypersist.Felondisenfranchisement,upheldby<em>Richardsonv.Ramirez</em>(1974),hasremovednearly6 million citizens from voter rolls, disproportionately affecting Black Americans, undoing civil rights gains. Census counts, which tally prisoners in rural counties, further skew political representation, benefiting rural (Republican-leaning) districts at the expense of urban (Democrat-leaning) ones. Public schools and neighborhoods remain segregated.
Page 84
Reimagining Public Safety: Beyond Punitive Practices
To achieve a more equitable nation, we must revisit grassroots empowerment and community representation, principles that guided early Great Society programs. Initial federal funding for grassroots initiatives diminished after the 1965 Watts uprising, shifting towards police involvement in urban social services. Imagine if "maximum feasible participation" received the same commitment as the War on Crime. Policymakers, driven by fear and racial assumptions, chose militarized policing and prisons over addressing root causes of unrest. The Office of Economic Opportunity was dismantled, and community involvement became relegated to law enforcement. Nixon's racist views on Black governance contributed to a top-down approach, with law enforcement becoming the primary social service provider in many areas by the 1980s.
Page 85
The Systemic Nature of Police Oppression
Police officers operate under different expectations for different communities: guarding property from outsiders in white/middle-class areas vs. searching for suspects and removing "offenders" in segregated low-income urban communities. This differential approach, enshrined in crime control legislation, led to disproportionate criminal records and prison sentences for African Americans. The low representation of Black officers (only 4percentinthe1960s−70s)exacerbatedpolarization.JamesBaldwin′s1961observationofoppressivepolicingintheghetto,whereofficersactasan"occupyingsoldierinabitterlyhostilecountry,"highlightsthesystemicforces,notindividualpolicemen,supportingquestionableanddeadlypractices,deeplyrootedinhistoricaldevelopmentsandsocioeconomiccircumstances.</p><h4id="55979370−b975−453a−8227−2abc05a26fe0"data−toc−id="55979370−b975−453a−8227−2abc05a26fe0"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">Page86</h4><h5id="b7f9b618−939e−4ac0−8d13−888f24b4bda5"data−toc−id="b7f9b618−939e−4ac0−8d13−888f24b4bda5"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">ACallforNewStrategiesandFundamentalChange</h5><p>Aggressivepolicingandmassincarcerationareacriticalcivilrightsissue.Insteadofcriminalizing,low−incomecitizensneedempowermentandintegrationintopublicinstitutions.Crimecontrolshouldbealocalmatter,withresidentsresponsibleforcommunitysafety.Reformslikepolicebodycams,oftenfundedbytaxpayers,onlyperpetuatemilitarizationandoverpolicing,whichareunsuccessfulcrimereductionstrategiesthatfuelmassincarcerationandracialdisparities.Newstrategiesareneeded:residencyrequirementsforpolice,civilianreviewboards,autonomousgrassrootssocialprograms,andjobcreationfor"at−risk"groups.Theseshouldconfrontsystemicinequalities,civillibertiesviolations,andpersistentinequalityintheU.S.,whichstemfromunaddressedlegaciesofenslavement.The2014Fergusondemonstrationsbroughtthistopublicattention,highlightingthedeadlyencounterswithunarmedBlackcitizensanddemandingfederalactiontoreformpunitivedomesticpolicies.</p><h4id="69cdb635−8f0e−44d3−a111−344491ed12e9"data−toc−id="69cdb635−8f0e−44d3−a111−344491ed12e9"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">Page87</h4><h5id="b3f2ec4d−2be3−4376−940d−b7d4bc0a84e2"data−toc−id="b3f2ec4d−2be3−4376−940d−b7d4bc0a84e2"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">UncoveringHistoryforaJustFuture</h5><p>UnderstandingtheintentorforesightofpolicymakersregardingtheconsequencesofurbansocialprogramsinBlackcommunitiesisonlypartiallyrelevant.ThecrucialtaskistouncoverthespecificdecisionsthatledtocontemporarymassincarcerationtotrulyunderstandAmericanhistory.Thesedomesticpoliciesprofoundlyshapedthelives,families,andcommunitiesofBlackwomenandmen,andwillcontinuetoaffectfuturegenerations.EndingtheWaronDrugsalonewon′tsolvetheproblem,astheU.S.wouldstillhavethelargestpenalsystemglobally.Aslongaslawenforcementdominatesurbanpolicyandtargetscitizensofcolor,regressionswillerodedemocracy.Fundamentalredistributivechangesatthenationallevelarenecessarytobreakthecycleofracialmarginalization,socioeconomicisolation,andimprisonment.</p><h4id="ae5f46ec−ab9a−485b−8126−fb99621a7968"data−toc−id="ae5f46ec−ab9a−485b−8126−fb99621a7968"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">Page88</h4><p>ThispageisblankandlikelyseparatesthemaintextfromtheappendixsectionslikeNotes,Acknowledgments,andIndex.</p><h4id="51a18963−0eb9−480a−9644−856aea096413"data−toc−id="51a18963−0eb9−480a−9644−856aea096413"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">Page89</h4><p>Thispageisthestartofthe"NOTES"section,providingcitationsandadditionalcontextforthecontentpresentedinthebook.ItindicatesthatthepreviouspagewastheendofthemainnarrativeandtheEpilogue.</p><h4id="00d5da02−e005−402b−b0dd−4966704e1ee5"data−toc−id="00d5da02−e005−402b−b0dd−4966704e1ee5"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">Page90</h4><h5id="ef09ee4b−d953−4c1e−b721−8e277037bc33"data−toc−id="ef09ee4b−d953−4c1e−b721−8e277037bc33"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">IntroductiontoNotesonMassIncarceration</h5><p>Theintroductiontothebook′snotesbeginsbyclarifyingthatLyndonJohnson′s"WaronCrime"isoftenoverlookedinhistoriesofhisadministration.ItciteskeyscholarslikeHeatherThompsonontheimportanceofmassincarcerationinunderstandingpostwarAmericanhistoryandDavidGarlandforthedefinitionofmassincarceration.ItalsoreferencesLawrenceD.BoboandVictorThompson′sterm"racializedmassincarceration"tohighlighttheundeniableracialdisparities.</p><h4id="215f208c−31a5−4072−b9dd−fe12cdffbcf6"data−toc−id="215f208c−31a5−4072−b9dd−fe12cdffbcf6"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">Page91</h4><h5id="6451a6bc−0eb9−4e0f−81c8−f9c1b305bd10"data−toc−id="6451a6bc−0eb9−4e0f−81c8−f9c1b305bd10"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">FundingandEvolutionoftheLEAA</h5><p>ThenoteselaborateontheLawEnforcementAssistanceAdministration(LEAA),highlightingitssignificant,thoughoftenoverlooked,role.ItcitessourcesdetailingtheLEAA′sbudgetgrowth(from10 million in 1965 to 850millionby1973),itsfundingof80,000 crime control projects, and its total outlay of nearly 10billion(equivalentto25 billion today) before its disbandment in 1981. This section also references various scholarly works discussing the evolution of the American carceral state and the criminalization of African Americans from the Civil War to the 20th century.
Page 92
Historical Context of the Carceral State
This section delves into the historical evolution of the American carceral state, referencing works by Gottschalk, McLennan, and others, tracking its expansion from the early republic to the 20th century. It also includes studies on the criminalization of African Americans and the rise of prisons in the 18th and 19th centuries, citing Blackmon, Curtin, Gross, LeFlouria, Lichtenstein, Oshinsky, Rothman, and Willrich. It also highlights the bipartisan nature of post-WWII domestic policies through the framework of consensus, as articulated by Matthew Lassiter.
Page 93
Scholarly Perspectives on Mass Incarceration
This note further details various scholarly perspectives on the political history of mass incarceration, emphasizing the role of crime control politics. It cites works by Beckett, Simon, Weaver, and Western who ground their discussions in the national politics of the 1960s. Naomi Murakawa's work pushing the timeline back to the Truman administration and highlighting congressional involvement is also noted. The section also lists scholars focusing on state-level factors contributing to mass incarceration, including Gilmore, Kohler-Hausmann, Lichtenstein, Lynch, Page, Perkinson, and Schoenfeld, and notes the Sentencing Project's work on this issue.
Page 94
Black Politicians, Community Leaders, and Crime Control
This note highlights research on the involvement of Black politicians, community leaders, and clergymen in demanding tougher crime control measures. It cites works by Forman, Fortner, and Murch that explore new dimensions of crime control politics and the diversity of opinions within African American communities. It also references studies demonstrating that white Americans generally exhibit higher levels of confidence in law enforcement and are more punitive than African Americans, citing Pew Research Center and Gallup data.
Page 95
The War on Drugs and Policing Scholarship
This note details scholarship related to Michelle Alexander's The New Jim Crow, urban policing, and the War on Drugs. It lists works by Agee, Balko, Fogelson, LeBron, Parenti, and others on urban policing and the militarization of police forces. It also provides a sampling of literature on race and American criminal justice by Bobo, Thompson, Davis, Gilmore, Mauer, Loury, Miller, Provine, Roberts, Sampson, Wilson, Western, and Petit. Finally, it mentions comprehensive accounts of the War on Drugs before the 1980s by Courtwright, Frydl, and Musto, and specific narcotic studies by Gootenberg, McGirr, and Spillane, emphasizing Matthew Lassiter's work on the suburban dimensions of the drug war.
Page 96
The Great Migration and Black Freedom Movement
This note acknowledges Isabel Wilkerson's The Warmth of Other Suns for its account of the Great Migration. It cites scholars like Robin D. G. Kelley, Manning Marable, and Nikhil Pal Singh who provide comprehensive accounts of the black freedom movement from mid-century onward. It also references works on the exclusion of African Americans from New Deal programs and the GI Bill by Fraser, Gerstle, Gordon, Katznelson, Lipsitz, and Sitkoff. The note also lists studies focusing on urban coalitions' social reforms prior to federal interventions and federal perspectives on the War on Poverty by Chappell, Gillette, Katz, Patterson, and Mittelstadt. Finally, it names scholars offering grassroots perspectives on the War on Poverty.
Page 97
Liberalism, Social Control, and Racial Hierarchies
This note discusses scholarly critiques of liberal support for racial equality in the 1960s, arguing that social welfare programs were intertwined with social control and contributed to preserving racial hierarchies. It cites Cullen, Jonson, Goldberg, Mills, Raz, Scott, and Self. The note further explores the criminalization of civil rights activists and urban civil disorder, referencing Murakawa, and the relationship between punitive policies and "social threat" (Western, Kleykamp, Rosenfeld). It also lists works examining the impact of 1960s uprisings on urban conditions and policy at federal, state, and local levels.
Page 98
The Merger of Welfare and Crime Control
This note delves into the historical intertwining of social welfare and crime control, tracing their shared goals and attitudes towards poor and marginalized communities. It explains how social welfare programs in the 19th century imposed supervision through various institutions and how reformers used punitive measures, often targeting low-income youth, to achieve social welfare goals. The note cites scholars like Chávez-García, Kohler-Hausmann, Muhammad, Platt, Ward, and Willrich, who have demonstrated these dynamics. It also highlights the specific targeting of Black men aged 15-24 in national law enforcement programs, citing key government reports like The Challenge of Crime and the Kerner Commission Report.
Page 99
Block Grants and Bipartisan Crime Control
This note specifies that the Partnership for Health Act of 1966 was the first to include block grant provisions, awarding 23milliontostatesforhealthcare.However,theOmnibusSafeStreetsandCrimeControlActof1968wasthefirstmajorinstanceofblockgrantfunding(300 million) for crime control. It also emphasizes the bipartisan nature of crime control policy, highlighting the crucial role of Democrats like Edward Kennedy, Joe Biden, Al Gore, and Charles Rangel in co-partnering with the Reagan administration during the War on Drugs. The note mentions Bill Clinton's 1994 Crime Bill and his later reflection on its negative impact, and provides a list of scholars who have discussed bipartisan collaborations in crime control.
Page 100
The Carceral State as a Network of Social Control
This note explores the understanding of the carceral state as a network of programs linked to the welfare state. It cites Garland, Foucault, Kohler-Hausmann, Wacquant, and Soss, who have written extensively on the criminalization of welfare and its ties to mass incarceration. It also mentions Gottschalk, Harcourt, Novak, Shedd, and Thompson for their contributions to understanding the broader impact and dimensions of the carceral state. The note concludes with a direct quote from Attorney General Ramsey Clark's 1967 testimony, articulating the consensus to merge social welfare and punitive programs focusing on Black youth, aiming to "get them straightened out."
Page 101
Racially Biased Understandings of Crime and Eugenics
This note refers to Khalil Gibran Muhammad's The Condemnation of Blackness for its analysis of how white social scientists used crime statistics to construct a "new understanding of black people's true racial capacity" post-Emancipation. It mentions Hoffman's Race Traits and Tendencies of the American Negro and Du Bois's counter-argument in The Philadelphia Negro. The note also discusses the legal targeting of Black Americans in both Southern (Black Codes) and Northern states (through vague infractions like "disorderly conduct"), leading to everyday surveillance. Finally, it highlights the influence of eugenics on criminal justice policies, citing Muhammad, Chávez-García, LaPan, Platt, and Selden.
Page 102
"Opportunity Theory" and the Moynihan Report's Influence
This note delves into the intellectual foundations of the Kennedy administration's juvenile delinquency programs, citing Richard A. Cloward and Lloyd E. Ohlin's Delinquency and Opportunity. It also emphasizes Alice O'Connor's work on the role of social scientists in shaping domestic policy. The note then discusses the extensive scholarship on Daniel Patrick Moynihan's The Negro Family: A Case for National Action (the Moynihan Report), including works by Geary, Katznelson, Patterson, Rainwater, Yancy, and Ta-Nehisi Coates. It highlights how Moynihan's report became influential in shaping an understanding of "pathology" as a root cause of poverty and crime within Black communities.
Page 103
Crime Data and Urban Planning
This note provides further details on the crime statistics presented in the main text, noting that 500,000crimeswerereportedinsuburbsand170,000 in rural areas. It also references Bruce Western's comparison of incarceration rates for African American men born before and after the civil rights movement, highlighting the rise of the "mass incarceration generation." Figures like William Julius Wilson showing declining employment for Black men and Devah Pager's work on employment difficulties for Black men without criminal records are also cited. The note then delves into specific federal memorandums and reports on St. Louis police programs and challenges to criminological theories by Martinson, Murray, Cox, and Wolfgang, regarding their impact on crime reduction and rehabilitation.
Page 104
Evolution of Crime Statistics and Policy Focus
This note discusses the limitations of the FBI's Uniform Crime Report, particularly its failure to measure Latino arrest rates consistently until the early 1990s, and its focus on street crime over organized or white-collar crime. It explains how this skewed data influenced federal policymakers' racialized perceptions of crime and led to strategies targeting "specific spaces and among specific groups of Americans." The note cites scholars like Rodolfo F. Acuna, Juanita Diaz-Cotto, Edward J. Escobar, Kelly Lytle Hernandez, Suzanne Oboler, and Victor M. Rios, who have worked to bridge these statistical gaps for Latino and Chicano Americans. It also addresses the ineffectiveness of preemptive strategies in reducing crime and highlights how incarceration often hardened first-time offenders. The note ends by referencing a memo from Egil Krogh to John Ehrlichman, concluding that the "crime problem is more apparent than real."
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Page 106
Law Enforcement Assistance Act and the War on Poverty
This note provides more details on the context of the Law Enforcement Assistance Act of 1965, citing Lyndon Johnson's "Special Message to Congress" on law enforcement. It also references articles from The New York Times, Christian Science Monitor, and Chicago Defender covering the disproportionate unemployment rates for Black Americans in the 1960s (11percentforBlackvs.9 percent for white in 1940; diverging significantly by the 1960s), and the concerns of figures like James B. Conant and Arthur J. Goldberg about "social dynamite" among unemployed Black youth.
Page 107
Kennedy's Civil Rights Message and Antidelinquency Programs
This note cites John F. Kennedy's 1962 Emancipation Proclamation commemoration speech and his 1963 "Civil Rights Message to the Nation," emphasizing his commitment to desegregation and acknowledging the limitations of civil rights laws alone. It references the Youth Offenses and Control Act of 1961, which initiated federal juvenile delinquency prevention programs, and the growth of youth under criminal justice supervision between 1949 and 1957. The note also discusses the lack of clear measurement for youth crime in the 1960s, despite increased media coverage, and cites Daniel Patrick Moynihan's observation that the problem assumed a "more threatening character" rooted in underlying racial assumptions.
Page 108
"Opportunity Theory" and the PCJDYC
This note elaborates on the intellectual foundations of the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime (PCJDYC), citing Richard A. Cloward and Lloyd E. Ohlin's Delinquency and Opportunity. It references Frank Tannenbaum's "dramatization of evil" concept from Crime and the Community and illustrates it with a 1961 arrest of teenagers. It explains Ohlin and Cloward's "opportunity theory," arguing criminal pathology stems from inadequate resources and punitive responses, not individual traits. The note highlights the unprecedented inclusion of scholars like Ohlin and Cloward in policy discussions, which opened up federal engagement with community-based organizations and racially marginalized citizens.
Page 109
Racial Targeting in Antidelinquency Initiatives
This note provides specific examples of federal grant allocations under the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime (PCJDYC). It cites a 1963 letter from David L. Hackett to the Attorney General, stating that "most of the programs in action or being developed will affect primarily minority youth—Negroes in almost every city, Mexican-Americans in Los Angeles and Houston, Puerto Ricans in New York, and Indians in Minneapolis." It also highlights that in cities like Detroit, Philadelphia, and Cleveland, at least 80percentofyouthservedwereAfricanAmerican,andinWashington,DC,itwas"undoubtedlyalltheyouthinvolved."Thenoteemphasizesthatdespiteknowndelinquencyinwhiteareas,thePCJDYCconcentratedfundsonBlackurbanneighborhoodsduetoperceptionsof"socialpathology."</p><h4id="13e5259e−435f−4dd9−8b34−cc3050724ace"data−toc−id="13e5259e−435f−4dd9−8b34−cc3050724ace"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">Page110</h4><h5id="fdbb8810−07da−4596−a06c−1415d81934d2"data−toc−id="fdbb8810−07da−4596−a06c−1415d81934d2"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">TheFocuson"CulturalPathologies"</h5><p>ThisnotecitesJohnF.Kennedy′s"MessagefromthePresidentRelativetoCivilRights"andotherdocumentstounderscorethattheadministration,whileacknowledgingracialdiscrimination′sroleinsocioeconomicproblems,ultimatelybelieved"culturalpathologies"hadtakenonalifeoftheirown,independentofstructuralforces.Ithighlightsthefocusofantidelinquencyprogramson"communitypathologies"(asdescribedin"Counter−AttackonDelinquency")andindividualbehaviorreform,ratherthanoverhaulingthejuvenilejusticesystemorachievingmajorsocioeconomicchange.ItalsodetailstheMobilizationforYouth(MFY)initiative,includingitsfundingsourcesandservicesofferedintheLowerEastSideofManhattan.</p><h4id="f6998084−bc3a−4032−b1e4−91dc21f2c186"data−toc−id="f6998084−bc3a−4032−b1e4−91dc21f2c186"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">Page111</h4><h5id="e3859b11−4861−4ae7−ad4a−16dd25b9c492"data−toc−id="e3859b11−4861−4ae7−ad4a−16dd25b9c492"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">MFY′s"IndigenousSocialMovement"andtheBoysBrotherhoodRepublic</h5><p>ThisnoteexpandsonMobilizationforYouth′s(MFY)aimtofoster"indigenoussocialmovements"basedonSaulAlinsky′sorganizingmethods,asexplainedbyLloydOhlin.Itcontraststhistheoreticalcommitmentwiththepracticalreality,usingtheexampleoftheBoysBrotherhoodRepublicintheLowerEastSide.Thisyouth−runorganization,whicheffectivelypreventeddelinquencywithoutadultsupervision,receivednofederalsupportdespitealigningwithMFY′sgoals.Instead,federalandlocalofficialspreferredprojectsinvolvingtrainedantidelinquencystaffandsocialworkers,highlightingadisconnectbetweentherhetoricofgrassrootsempowermentandthetop−downimplementationoffederalprograms.</p><h4id="4f3556f9−0e3e−46b6−b907−114fbc9f8cb9"data−toc−id="4f3556f9−0e3e−46b6−b907−114fbc9f8cb9"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">Page112</h4><h5id="c3d5cf03−b487−4715−b459−eaad007f4e99"data−toc−id="c3d5cf03−b487−4715−b459−eaad007f4e99"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">"DomesticPeaceCorps"andBehavioralModification</h5><p>Thisnoteelaboratesonthe"domesticpeacecorps"modeladoptedbythePresident′sCommittee,citingtheACT(AssociatedCommunityTeams)programinHarlemasanexampleofbringingoutsidevolunteerstoworkwithyouthinschoolsandchurches.Thisintervention,alongwithMobilizationforYouth,aimedtoencourage"hard−coreyouth"toadheretoAmericanlivingstandardsand"channeltheangerdirectedatsocialinjusticeawayfromself−defeatingbehavior."IthighlightsMFY′sobjectivetomakedisadvantagedminoritygroupmembers"moreemployable"bydeveloping"workpersonality"andskills.ThenotealsodetailsMFY′scomprehensive"MentalHygieneClinics"thatofferedmedical/dentalcare,welfareassistance,homemakingskills,andjobpreparation,whicha<em>WashingtonPost</em>editorialtermed"missionarywork."</p><h4id="af6ef511−82b9−4f4b−9400−633411f6e145"data−toc−id="af6ef511−82b9−4f4b−9400−633411f6e145"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">Page113</h4><h5id="1cbc1f4c−8938−4954−90e4−518108977c1d"data−toc−id="1cbc1f4c−8938−4954−90e4−518108977c1d"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">Education,Discipline,and"SoftSurveillance"</h5><p>ThisnotediscussestheeducationalcomponentsofthePresident′sCommittee′sprograms,suchaspre−kindergarteninitiatives(earlyHeadStart)andeffortstoimproveteachertraining.However,itemphasizesthatthesereformswereshapedbyconcernsabout"communitypathology,"aimingto"headoffretardation"in"slumareas"andestablisha"middle−classenvironment."Beyondremedialeducation,manyprogramsfocusedonfosteringdiscipline,includingmilitaristicframeworkslikeMFY′sAdventureCorps.Theseinitiatives,whileappearingasalternativestoformalincarceration,introduced"softsurveillance"inurbanareas,suchasthe"coffeehouses"forgang−affiliatedyouth,wheretrainedadults(like"informedbartenders")monitoredbehavior.Thisrepresentedanewlayerofcontrolinsegregatedcommunities.</p><h4id="f8f4592e−a8d0−4193−84fe−b1760667d6db"data−toc−id="f8f4592e−a8d0−4193−84fe−b1760667d6db"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">Page114</h4><h5id="7b2f18f6−e2a7−4723−be8c−5300400b1636"data−toc−id="7b2f18f6−e2a7−4723−be8c−5300400b1636"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">"SoftSurveillance"inSt.Louisandthe"DramatizationofEvil"</h5><p>Thisnotedetailshow"softsurveillance"wasimplementedinplaceslikeSt.Louis,wherecollegegraduatesworkedwithyouthgroupsassumedtobe"incipientstage…streetgangs."Thisapproach,ledbytrainedauthorities,mirroredthetop−downprogrammingofthePresident′sCommittee,evenwheneffectiveindigenouseffortsexisted.Socialworkersactedasliaisons,hostingactivitiesandspendingtimewithyouth,aimingto"givethemafocusonlife"andmakethemreceptivetoeducational/employmentopportunities.Concurrently,lawenforcementincreasinglyperformedsocialservicefunctions,collaboratingwithsocialserviceproviders.Despiteconcernsthat"Morejuvenileofficerswillproducemorejuvenilestatistics,"andthatlabelingyouthasdelinquentworsenstheproblem,thefocusremainedonindividualbehaviorreform,reinforcingTannenbaum′s"dramatizationofevil."TheKennedyadministration′s"totalattack"ondelinquency,influencedbyofficials′racismveiledas"racialpathology,"ledto"benignsocialcontrol"andeasedthetransitiontomorepunitivefederalprogramsunderJohnson.</p><h4id="c1f8d765−891b−4101−af9d−07969cf9b696"data−toc−id="c1f8d765−891b−4101−af9d−07969cf9b696"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">Page115</h4><h5id="da4fe9fe−f4b3−4471−8ca6−c150a88b1d32"data−toc−id="da4fe9fe−f4b3−4471−8ca6−c150a88b1d32"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">"WaronPoverty"andtheExpansionofKennedy′sInterventions</h5><p>ThisnotediscusseshowLyndonJohnsonexpandedKennedy′s"totalattack"ondelinquencyintoanational"WaronPoverty."RichardBoone,whoworkedinbothadministrations,notedthatthepovertyprogramsimplyprovidedalargerfundingmechanismforexistingdelinquencyinitiatives.ManyformermembersofKennedy′scommitteejoinedJohnson′sadministration,bringingsimilarapproachesrootedinpathologicalassumptionsaboutpovertyandcrime.Despiteawarenessofunemployment,theJohnsonadministrationavoidedstructuralreform,focusingonjobtrainingratherthanjobcreation,believingataxcutwouldstimulateeconomicgrowth.Thisstrategy,draftedbytheCouncilofEconomicAdvisers,aimedtopromoteopportunityinseverelyaffectedareasanduseeconomicgrowthtosolvejoblessness.</p><h4id="0bbe9f9f−094c−4998−80a7−1cfc2d521734"data−toc−id="0bbe9f9f−094c−4998−80a7−1cfc2d521734"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">Page116</h4><h5id="39449001−a42d−4419−b414−4b321687549e"data−toc−id="39449001−a42d−4419−b414−4b321687549e"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">AMoralCrusadeandtheEconomicOpportunityAct</h5><p>ThisnotehighlightsJohnson′smoralappealinhis1964StateoftheUnionaddress,framingtheWaronPovertyasacureforpoverty′ssymptomsratherthanitsrootcauses.Helinkedpovertytothedenialofopportunitybasedonrace,emphasizingeducation,training,healthcare,housing,and"decentcommunities."The"war"metaphorunderscoredtheurgency,andtheEconomicOpportunityActof1964,thefirstkeylegislation,passedsmoothly,allocatingnearly1 billion. It incorporated Mobilization for Youth methods nationwide, creating programs like Job Corps, Work Experience, work-study, adult education, small business loans, and VISTA, all administered by the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) under Sargent Shriver.
Page 117
Racial Undercurrents and "Maximum Feasible Participation"
This note highlights how the Economic Opportunity Act, though not explicitly invoking race, implicitly responded to the Great Migration and civil rights. Robert Kennedy warned that ignoring poverty and civil rights could be overwhelming. Fifteen percent of OEO's budget, directly controlled by Shriver, targeted Black urban areas for experimental social welfare, forming partnerships with grassroots organizations (e.g., Head Start, Upward Bound). The principle of "maximum feasible participation," initially a theoretical concept from Ohlin and Cloward, became enshrined in the act, aiming to empower the poor by supporting autonomous organizations to exert political influence, thereby addressing their systematic exclusion from urban social welfare programs.
Page 118
Controversy over "Maximum Feasible Participation"
This note highlights the swift political backlash against "maximum feasible participation." While activists viewed it as a radical step towards self-determination, local officials, like Syracuse Mayor William Walsh, criticized it for "fostering class struggle" and empowering campaigns against mayoral administrations (e.g., Mobilization for Youth's confrontations with school, landlord, and police departments). Republicans feared funds would build a radical Democratic base, with some alleging communist infiltration. These controversies made community action an easy target for critics of Johnson's Great Society, diminishing the program's potential for fundamental social transformations and leading to a more cautious approach focused on behavioral control rather than structural change.
Page 119
The Shift from "War on Poverty" to "War on Crime"
This note explains that despite Johnson's initial pledge to "cure" poverty, the War on Poverty primarily implemented vocational training and remedial education without addressing job creation or comprehensive school reform, thus fighting the effects rather than the root causes of inequality. The shift from social welfare to punishment intensified after urban uprisings in the summer of 1964, particularly after racial unrest in Harlem and Rochester. Johnson declared that the "preserving of law and order" was the immediate overriding issue, framing the actions of Black residents as criminal despite their responses to discriminatory policing and structural exclusion. The Law Enforcement Assistance Act of 1965, marking the federal government's "War on Crime," stemmed from this shift.
Page 120
Moynihan's Influence on the War on Crime
This note connects the War on Crime to Daniel Patrick Moynihan's influential 1965 report, The Negro Family: A Case for National Action. Moynihan, a key advisor, integrated social science (especially Gunnar Myrdal's "vicious circle" and Kenneth Clark's "tangle of pathology") to argue that historical racial discrimination and "cultural deprivation" created a self-perpetuating "tangle of pathology" in Black families. This view, selectively adopted by Johnson, became a rationale for directing domestic anti-crime programs at Black men, framing it as fixing individual pathology rather than addressing systemic racism or joblessness. This intellectual framework helped merge the War on Crime with the War on Poverty, forming a network of social service and surveillance programs.
Page 121
The Carceral State's Foundation and Racialized Policing
This note details how the War on Crime, merged with the War on Poverty, laid the foundation for the carceral state. James Scheuer and Senator Edward M. Kennedy emphasized the link between family pathology/environment and crime, advocating for social science research to "fix" community pathology. Johnson's administration prioritized law and order, rationalizing increased patrol, surveillance, and confinement in segregated communities through social science and embedded racism. While the War on Poverty provided temporary positions and training, the War on Crime focused on job creation for police and correctional officers. Thus, in the post-Jim Crow era, surrounded by civil rights reforms and anti-poverty experiments, welfare state expansion converged with a new era of American law enforcement, solidifying the modern carceral state.
Page 122
This page contains reference notes for the Introduction section of the book, citing articles, books, and government documents related to the War on Crime, mass incarceration, and historical criminalization of African Americans. These notes provide support for the arguments made in the introductory chapters.
Page 123
This page continues the reference notes for the book's Introduction, citing scholars who have examined the political history of mass incarceration, the role of federal and state policies, and the involvement of black activists in crime control discussions. It also lists various sources, including press articles and government reports, affirming the complexity and scholarly engagement with the topic.
Page 124
This page continues with the footnotes for the Introduction, referencing scholarly works on various aspects of mass incarceration, including political history, state-level factors, and the role of black activists. It cites numerous authors and publications, providing a comprehensive academic foundation for the book's arguments.
Page 125
This page continues with the footnotes for the Introduction, citing various scholarly works on the War on Drugs, urban policing, and the racial dimensions of the criminal justice system. It includes references to specific books, articles, and government reports, reinforcing the academic rigor and historical depth of the book's arguments.
Page 126
This page continues the footnotes for the Introduction, citing works on the Great Migration, the black freedom movement, and the exclusion of African Americans from New Deal programs. It also references studies on the War on Poverty from federal and grassroots perspectives, and scholarly critiques concerning the limitations of liberal support for racial equality in the 1960s.
Page 127
This page continues the footnotes for the Introduction, citing works that examine the relationship between social welfare programs and social control, the criminalization of civil rights activists, and the impact of the 1960s uprisings. It also lists studies on the historical merger of welfare and crime control functions, dating back to the American republic.
Page 128
This page continues the footnotes for the Introduction, citing references for block grant provisions, the partisan and bipartisan dimensions of crime control policy, and the role of congressional Democrats in supporting punitive measures. It also lists scholarly works on the carceral state, the criminalization of welfare, and the concept of "social threat."
Page 129
This page continues the footnotes for the Introduction, citing references about the carceral state, government surveillance, and the specific targeting of Black men in national law enforcement programs. It includes a quote from Attorney General Ramsey Clark and mentions scholarly works that analyze the criminalization of African Americans and the role of social science.
Page 130
This page contains footnotes for the first chapter, "The War on Black Poverty," citing primary sources like Lyndon Johnson's messages to Congress and reports from the President's Task Force on the Los Angeles Riots. It also references scholarly articles and books discussing the social and political climate of the 1960s, particularly regarding civil rights, crime, and urban unrest. The notes highlight specific statements made by public figures during that period.
Page 131
This page continues the footnotes for Chapter 1, "The War on Black Poverty," citing various government documents and scholarly works relevant to the social and political context of the 1960s. It references reports on the Watts uprising, Presidential statements on civil rights, and arguments about the causes of urban violence. The notes provide additional support and detail for the historical analysis presented in the chapter.
Page 132
This page contains specific footnotes related to Chapter 2, "Law and Order in the Great Society." The notes cite various official documents, reports, and academic works, providing evidence and further detail for the chapter's analysis of the civil rights movement, the War on Poverty, and the evolving federal response to urban crime and social disorder.
Page 133
This page continues the footnotes for Chapter 2, "Law and Order in the Great Society," citing various government reports, academic articles, and historical accounts of urban unrest. It includes references to the Detroit Rebellion and Stokely Carmichael, providing more detailed background for the chapter's discussion of civil disorders and the state's response.
Page 134
This page contains more footnotes for Chapter 2, "Law and Order in the Great Society," referencing government documents, media reports, and academic analyses of policing, social welfare, and the civil rights movement. It includes citations related to COINTELPRO, the role of police in urban communities, and the expansion of federal law enforcement.
Page 135
This page continues the footnotes for Chapter 2, "Law and Order in the Great Society," providing references to the Law Enforcement Assistance Act, the FBI National Academy, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and the Treasury Department's Bureau of Narcotics Training Schools. It also cites discussions on law enforcement expenditures and early federal crime control initiatives.
Page 136
This page continues the footnotes for Chapter 2, "Law and Order in the Great Society," citing reports on police programs (e.g., Project Sky Knight in Los Angeles), congressional hearings on crime, and articles discussing police training and community relations. It also references the significant federal allocations to other Great Society programs, like the Economic Opportunity Act and the Housing and Urban Development Act, in comparison to early crime control funding.
Page 137
This page primarily contains footnotes for Chapter 3, "The Preemptive Strike," citing Johnson's annual messages, internal government memos, and the report of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice. These notes support discussions on the evolution of crime control policies and their increasing focus on youth designated as "in danger of becoming delinquent."
Page 138
This page continues with the footnotes for Chapter 3, "The Preemptive Strike," referencing the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, congressional hearings, and various government reports. It cites specifics about structural racism being used to justify expanded law enforcement, school-based police programs in Los Angeles, and the commission's focus on urban crime despite broader crime trends.
Page 139
This page contains additional footnotes for Chapter 3, "The Preemptive Strike," referencing internal government memoranda, media reports, and the Kerner Commission Report. These notes provide further details on President Johnson's concerns about urban unrest, the deployment of federal troops in Detroit, and the administration's evolving understanding of the causes and demographics of civil disorders.
Page 140
This page, continuing the footnotes for Chapter 3, "The Preemptive Strike," cites various reports and testimonies, including discussions about police conduct during urban disorders (e.g., looting by officers in Newark) and federal efforts to manage public perception of police brutality. It also details the creation and purpose of the Youth Service Bureaus, a key recommendation from the Crime Commission, aimed at preventing juvenile delinquency.
Page 141
This page continues the footnotes for Chapter 3, "The Preemptive Strike," specifically detailing the Youth Services Bureaus (YSBs) programs. It cites the Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control Act of 1968, government reports on YSBs, and other documents that define "delinquency" for federal officials. The notes also include quotes from officials and experts on the impact of these programs, particularly concerning the "dangers and disadvantages of coercive power" and the voluntary nature of YSB services.
Page 142
This page contains more footnotes for Chapter 3, "The Preemptive Strike," particularly concerning the Youth Service Bureaus. It references the California Youth Authority's studies on YSBs and highlights concerns from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare about the "pathological assessments" and punitive emphasis of these bureaus, noting their oversight of middle-class and suburban delinquency. The note also cites statistics on the rising juvenile incarceration rates between 1975 and 1983, reinforcing the racial disparities within the criminal justice system.
Page 143
This page continues the footnotes for Chapter 3, "The Preemptive Strike," citing various reports and statements related to the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (Kerner Commission). It includes quotes from Johnson's address on civil disorders, discussions on police brutality, and the commission's recommendations for police departments, particularly regarding the hiring of Black officers to increase stability and comfort among residents.
Page 144
This page contains more footnotes for Chapter 3, "The Preemptive Strike," referencing reports and discussions from the Kerner Commission on civil disorder. It cites specific findings and recommendations concerning the role of police, the demographic characteristics of riot participants (e.g., Detroit's more diverse background than Watts'), and the commission's views on the social and economic conditions contributing to unrest.
Page 145
This page contains footnotes for Chapter 4, "The War on Black Crime," referencing Richard Nixon's campaign speeches and various government documents regarding block grants and criminal justice discretion. It also cites scholarly works on the politics of crime control and race, and discussions about the 1968 Republican platform's emphasis on law and order.
Page 146
This page continues the footnotes for Chapter 4, "The War on Black Crime," referencing John Dean's Blind Ambition and congressional documents related to the 1968 election. It also cites various memoranda and reports concerning the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) and its role in modernizing state and local law enforcement, as well as the states that had criminal justice planning agencies before Nixon's administration.
Page 147
This page continues the footnotes for Chapter 4, "The War on Black Crime," referencing various government reports, academic addresses, and newspaper articles. It cites discussions about the LEAA's role in law enforcement, its relationship with other federal agencies, and its funding of public relations programs promoting the crime issue. It also includes details about the LEAA's collaborations with the CIA and Army, and its educational programs.
Page 148
This page continues the footnotes for Chapter 4, "The War on Black Crime," referencing documents on the LEAA's planning processes, its consultation services, and criticisms regarding the misuse of federal funds (e.g., in Alabama). It also cites scholarly works and news reports on key LEAA administrators and their practices, including the agency's involvement in the Watergate investigation and controversial appointments.
Page 149
This page continues the footnotes for Chapter 4, "The War on Black Crime," referencing the political activities and controversies surrounding figures like Jerris Leonard. It cites his efforts to double LEAA's auditing staff and create regional offices, and the criticisms regarding financial mismanagement and political influence. The note also mentions significant events like the murder of Fred Hampton and the Kent State killings, connecting them to the broader context of federal law enforcement and domestic policy during the Nixon administration.
Page 150
This page continues the footnotes for Chapter 4, "The War on Black Crime," citing various government documents and news articles. It references criticisms of LEAA funding allocation, including mayors' petitions for direct funding to cities and concerns about federal grants being diverted to the Army for bomb neutralizers. The notes also touch upon the implementation of "Special Grants for Crime Control Projects in Largest Cities" and the initial federal focus on Washington, D.C., and its crime problems.
Page 151
This page continues the footnotes for Chapter 4, "The War on Black Crime," referencing the District of Columbia Crime Bill, Richard Nixon's State of the Union addresses, and scholarly works on the politics of crime control in D.C. It also cites discussions on pretrial detention, mandatory minimum sentencing laws, and the controversial "no-knock" and "stop-and-frisk" provisions.
Page 152
This page contains more footnotes for Chapter 4, "The War on Black Crime." It references documents related to the implementation of the "High Impact Anti-Crime Program," including the criteria for selecting cities and the program's initial goals. It cites reports, interviews, and academic works that evaluate the effectiveness and impact of these federal initiatives.
Page 153
This page continues the footnotes for Chapter 4, "The War on Black Crime," detailing the High Impact Anti-Crime Program's implementation in cities like Atlanta and Baltimore, including investments in police training, salaries, and administrative restructuring. It also discusses internal reports on the program's effectiveness, criticisms of its impact on crime rates, and the unique decline in the prison population between 1970-1971 before a subsequent rise, tying it to the history of federal prison system development.
Page 154
This page continues the footnotes for Chapter 4, "The War on Black Crime," citing various government reports and internal memos from the Nixon administration regarding the national prison system. It references discussions about prison rehabilitation, the arguments against it by figures like Carl Carlson, and the commission's predictions for the massive increase in the prisoner population by the mid-1970s. The notes also cover the establishment of the National Clearinghouse for Correctional Programming and Architecture.
Page 155
This page contains more footnotes for Chapter 4, "The War on Black Crime," primarily focusing on prison statistics, sentencing trends, and the racial composition of inmate populations. It highlights the challenges in accurately tracking Latino prisoners. The notes also reference key works on the prisoners' rights movement of the 1960s and 1970s, including scholarly books and articles detailing events like the Attica uprising and the broader fight against carceral states.
Page 156
This page continues the footnotes for Chapter 4, "The War on Black Crime," citing government documents, news articles, and academic works on prison conditions, rehabilitation policies, and judicial activism. It includes references to the "nothing works" movement, the debate over prison construction, and the lack of direct correlation between incarceration and crime rates. It also cites discussions on the economic aspects of prison populations and the Nixon administration's efforts to dismantle the Office of Economic Opportunity.
Page 157
This page continues the footnotes for Chapter 4, "The War on Black Crime," citing various government documents and reports related to the Office of Economic Opportunity, the New Federalism, and block grants. It also references scholarly analyses of Nixon's domestic policies and the decentralization of federal antiterrorism efforts.
Page 158
This page is the start of the footnotes for Chapter 5, "The Battlegrounds of the Crime War." It cites Daniel Patrick Moynihan's internal memos to President Nixon and works by Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson (The Unheavenly City, City Politics, Varieties of Police Behavior) on urban problems and police behavior, indicating their influence on the Nixon administration's crime prevention strategies.
Page 159
This page continues the footnotes for Chapter 5, "The Battlegrounds of the Crime War," citing various newspaper articles and government reports about police forces in Atlanta, New York City, and Detroit. It discusses the "decoy squad" and "plainclothes patrol" strategies, the associated controversies, and statements from police chiefs like Patrick V. Murphy, illustrating the tactics and impact of urban policing in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
Page 160
This page continues the footnotes for Chapter 5, "The Battlegrounds of the Crime War," focusing on the Detroit STRESS (Stop the Robberies, Enjoy Safe Streets) unit. It cites House Select Committee on Crime hearings, academic works like Heather Ann Thompson's Whose Detroit?, and newspaper articles detailing STRESS's controversial tactics, including mass arrests and killings, as well as the subsequent protests and calls for its abolition. Quotes from Police Commissioner John F. Nichols and citizen testimonies are included.
Page 161
This page contains further footnotes for Chapter 5, "The Battlegrounds of the Crime War," detailing issues surrounding the STRESS (Stop the Robberies, Enjoy Safe Streets) unit in Detroit. It cites news articles and testimonies regarding police misconduct, internal police conflicts (e.g., deputies mistaken for gamblers), and the political pressure from Black police officers and community leaders to abolish the unit. The notes also reference the subsequent rise in crime after STRESS was disbanded, ironically leading to a renewed call for policing.
Page 162
This page contains more footnotes for Chapter 5, "The Battlegrounds of the Crime War," referencing sources on the STRESS unit's abolition and the subsequent rise in youth crime in Detroit. It then shifts to the Nixon administration's drug control efforts, citing the creation of the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention and the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. The notes also detail the FBI's COINTELPRO program, its targeting of Black nationalist groups, and the violent confrontations with groups like the Black Panther Party in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
Page 163
This page continues the footnotes for Chapter 5, "The Battlegrounds of the Crime War," detailing the Nixon administration's "total war" on drug addiction and the rise of controversial police tactics. It cites news articles on violent drug raids and the use of decoy and "sting" operations by the LEAA and local police. The notes provide examples of specific sting operations like "Operation P.E.D.L.A.R." and "Operation Got Ya Again," highlighting how police posed as fences or criminals to apprehend suspected thieves and drug dealers in Washington, D.C.
Page 164
This page provides more footnotes for Chapter 5, "The Battlegrounds of the Crime War," specifically detailing the "Operation Sting" police tactics in Washington, D.C. It cites news articles and reports that describe how police posed as mobsters or fences to trap criminals, and the ethical controversies surrounding these forms of entrapment. It also references the spread of "sting" operations nationally and their impact on crime control, as well as the broader context of federal law enforcement programs and criticisms of their effectiveness.
Page 165
This page is the start of the footnotes for Chapter 6, "Juvenile Injustice." It references the Los Angeles Police Department's CRASH (Community Resources Against Street Hoodlums) unit, including its original name TRASH (Total Resources Against Street Hoodlums), and quotes from police officials and newspaper articles about its activities and the youth curfew policies of the time. The note also details the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, which established the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) and the National Institute of Corrections, outlining their funding and roles in the carceral state.
Page 166
This page continues the footnotes for Chapter 6, "Juvenile Injustice," citing various government reports and congressional hearings related to juvenile justice. It defines "disadvantaged" youth and highlights their overrepresentation in felony arrests, especially in cities. The notes also mention the specific targeting of urban youth and the creation of juvenile investigation units within police departments, and the work of scholars like Matthew Lassiter on how white youth were "insulated" from the carceral state.
Page 167
This page continues the footnotes relating to Chapter 6, "Juvenile Injustice," citing works by criminologists like Marvin Wolfgang (Delinquency in a Birth Cohort) and Walter Miller on Black juvenile delinquency and violence. It also references congressional hearings and reports that shaped the legislative framework for policies targeting "serious" and "hard-core" juvenile offenders, particularly through the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, and the debates surrounding the effectiveness of different approaches.
Page 168
This page contains more footnotes for Chapter 6, "Juvenile Injustice," referencing congressional debates on the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 (JJDPA), including Congresswoman Shirley Chisholm's and Representative Albert H. Quie's differing views on its implementation. It also cites reports on runaway youth, highlighting the disproportionate representation of Latino and Black youth in such statistics. The notes also cover early juvenile diversion programs and the increase in youth incarceration rates in the 1970s.
Page 169
This page continues the footnotes for Chapter 6, "Juvenile Injustice," referencing studies on the demographics of runaway youth (Latino and Black youth having higher rates) and early diversion programs. It highlights the Nixon administration's cuts to the Office of Economic Opportunity and state-level budget slashing (e.g., California under Reagan) for social programs. The notes also cite concerns about school violence, a growing blot on U.S. schools, leading to calls for increased policing and disciplinary measures in urban public schools, particularly in Los Angeles.
Page 170
This page continues the footnotes for Chapter 6, "Juvenile Injustice," citing various sources about school violence and the policing of urban public schools. It references the concept of the "School-to-Prison Pipeline" and the impact of "zero tolerance policies." The notes also include statements from public school principals and Congresswoman Shirley Chisholm on the connections between youth crime and school disciplinary measures, particularly for Black children, due to school systems' inability to cope with their unique needs.
Page 171
This page contains more footnotes for Chapter 6, "Juvenile Injustice," including references to congressional hearings on juvenile crime, the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, and evaluations of rehabilitation programs. It cites the "nothing works" movement and criticisms of its methodology by criminologists like Elliot Currie. The notes also detail the "Project New Pride" program in Denver, an initiative designed to aid serious juvenile offenders by focusing on vocational education and community-based services, and discussions on its effectiveness and challenges.
Page 172
This page continues the footnotes for Chapter 6, "Juvenile Injustice," citing government reports and various academic studies on vocational education for juvenile offenders. It references debates about the effectiveness of rehabilitation programs, statements from officials like Attorney General William Saxbe, and the arguments for focusing on "career criminals" or "repeat offenders" to reduce crime. The notes also include discussions on the targeted removal of low-income urban residents and the material impact of this process on American penal populations, citing scholars like Todd Clear and Amy E. Lerman.
Page 173
This page is the start of the footnotes for Chapter 7, "Urban Removal." It references President Gerald Ford's speeches on law enforcement and crime, particularly his emphasis on repeat offenders. The notes cite internal government memoranda and academic works by James Q. Wilson that heavily influenced Ford's crack down on "career criminals." It also includes quotes from Edward M. Kennedy and Ronald Reagan on the necessity of punishing offenders, highlighting the bipartisan consensus on punitive measures.
Page 174
This page continues the footnotes for Chapter 7, "Urban Removal," referencing various government reports, congressional hearings, and academic studies on "career criminals" and repeat offenders. It cites statements from officials like Charles Work and Earl Silbert, discussing the implementation of special units and programs to fast-track the prosecution of these individuals. The notes also includes data on the growth of the prison population and criticisms of the criminal justice system from organizations like the National Moratorium on Prison Construction.
Page 175
This page contains more footnotes for Chapter 7, "Urban Removal," specifically focusing on youth gangs, gun control, and prison overcrowding. It cites a 1973 study on firearm sources, sociological considerations of criminal law, and the federal government's efforts to regulate "Saturday Night Specials." The notes also reference research from the RAND Corporation on mandatory prison sentences and critiques of criminologist Walter Miller's methodology regarding youth gang violence in major American cities, highlighting concerns about the accuracy and implications of such data.
Page 176
This page continues the footnotes for Chapter 7, "Urban Removal," citing various reports and statements about youth gangs, gun control, and juvenile crime. It references Walter Miller's estimates of gang members in major U.S. cities, calls for adult punishment for juveniles, and criticisms of the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. The notes also discuss the dramatic increase in U.S. state and federal prison populations from 1962 to 1976 and the growing problem of prison overcrowding, including the Supreme Court's ruling in Rhodes v. Chapman (1981) regarding double-celling.
Page 177
This page, continuing the footnotes for Chapter 7, "Urban Removal," references the rising rates of victimization for African Americans and connects it to crime control policies. It cites President Carter's statements on urban crime, the need for law and order, and his administration's focus on public safety. The notes transition into the themes of Chapter 8, "Crime Control as Urban Policy," by addressing the deteriorating conditions in public housing (e.g., Pruitt-Igoe) and the shift towards a more punitive urban strategy during the Carter presidency.
Page 178
This page is the start of footnotes for Chapter 8, "Crime Control as Urban Policy." It cites various sources regarding the failure of public housing projects (e.g., Pruitt-Igoe) and President Jimmy Carter's urban policies. The notes detail the high unemployment rates for Black Americans in the late 1970s and the demographic profile of women prisoners. It also references the growth in criminal justice spending between 1965 and 1977 (4.6billionto23 billion) and the increasing influence of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) in allocating funds.
Page 179
This page contains more footnotes for Chapter 8, "Crime Control as Urban Policy," citing various government documents and news articles related to the LEAA's budget, influence, and eventual reorganization/elimination under the Carter administration. It details the complaints about LEAA's grant-making practices, the concerns about the accuracy of FBI crime data, and the growing political consensus on the need to dismantle the agency despite calls for its re-authorization. The notes also reference Carter's focus on public housing and urban anti-crime initiatives.
Page 180
This page continues the footnotes for Chapter 8, "Crime Control as Urban Policy," referencing various government reports and internal memoranda related to Carter's Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program and public housing security. It cites the Public Housing Security Act of 1978 and details how the program aimed to reduce crime in public housing through funding security forces, tenant patrols, and architectural modifications, while also linking criminal activity to eviction and loss of federal benefits.
Page 181
This page continues the footnotes for Chapter 8, "Crime Control as Urban Policy," discussing Oscar Newman's "defensible space" theory and its influence on public housing design. It cites his arguments about architectural environments contributing to crime and how his ideas were implemented in housing projects across the country. The notes also detail the federal government's financial support for these security initiatives, including grants for security guards and tenant patrols in cities like Atlanta and Baltimore.
Page 182
This page contains more footnotes for Chapter 8, "Crime Control as Urban Policy," specifically detailing the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program in Baltimore. It describes the integration of contractual security guards and resident security aides (screened by Housing Authority) and the increasing collaboration between law enforcement and social service providers. The notes also reference crime statistics within altered housing projects in Baltimore and New York City, and the growth of tenant patrols as a community-based strategy to fight crime.
Page 183
This page continues the footnotes for Chapter 8, "Crime Control as Urban Policy," citing various reports and memoranda on tenant patrols and community anti-crime programs in cities like Chicago and Baltimore. It details the types of activities undertaken by these patrols (e.g., walkie-talkie equipped volunteers) and their reported impact on crime. The notes also mention the broader shift of the Department of Defense and other agencies towards urban policy goals and the rising trend of arson in urban areas, particularly during the late 1970s.
Page 184
This page contains more footnotes for Chapter 8, "Crime Control as Urban Policy," referencing government reports and newspaper articles on arson epidemics in cities like New York and Los Angeles during the late 1970s. It cites Daniel Patrick Moynihan's observations on the tripling fire alarm rate in New York City. The notes also transition to the Miami riot of 1980, discussing police violence, unemployment rates (higher for Black Americans under Carter), and the socioeconomic context of the uprising. It highlights the criticisms of Carter's "paternalistic racism" and the economic shifts of the 1970s.
Page 185
This page continues the footnotes for Chapter 8, "Crime Control as Urban Policy," referencing reports and academic works on the Miami riot of 1980, unemployment rates, and criticisms of Carter's economic policies. It also cites scholarly works on deindustrialization, the "Age of Fracture," and the development of the carceral state, particularly in California. Finally, the notes reference the outcomes of the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program in Dade County and the long-term impact on public housing in cities like Chicago.
Page 186
This page is the start of the footnotes for Chapter 9, "From the War on Crime to the War on Drugs." It cites scholarly works on the rise of conservatism in the 1960s and 1970s, including Lassiter, McGirr, and Self. The notes also reference Ronald Reagan's campaign speeches and statements on crime, emphasizing his belief that poverty was not the root cause of crime and his alignment with neoconservative thinkers like Edward Banfield and Charles Murray who critiqued welfare programs.
Page 187
This page continues the footnotes for Chapter 9, "From the War on Crime to the War on Drugs," citing various government documents and academic works on Reagan's crime control policies. It references Deputy Attorney General Stanley Morris's comments on the LEAA's dissolution and the dramatic increase in the prison population. The notes also detail the bipartisan support for Reagan's "War on Drugs," including quotes from Senators Joe Biden and Glenn English, and the passage of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984. It also discusses Reagan's revision of the Posse Comitatus Act, allowing military involvement in domestic drug enforcement.
Page 188
This page continues the footnotes for Chapter 9, "From the War on Crime to the War on Drugs," referencing government documents and news articles on the militarization of domestic law enforcement, border control initiatives (e.g., National Narcotics Border Interdiction System), and the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984. It cites the act's provisions, including the federal death penalty, obliteration of parole, mandatory minimum sentences, and forfeiture clauses, highlighting their impact on increasing prison sentences and funding for local law enforcement. The notes also cover early instances of police corruption related to forfeiture powers.
Page 189
This page contains more footnotes for Chapter 9, "From the War on Crime to the War on Drugs," detailing the financial incentives of forfeiture provisions for police departments and instances of officer corruption. It cites books like Christian Parenti's Lockdown America and Michelle Alexander's The New Jim Crow. The notes also discuss the massive increase in prison populations, the launch of private prisons (Corrections Corporation of America), and Reagan's rollback of social welfare programs, including cuts to AFDC payments and child nutrition, leading to a rise in poverty and homelessness. Reagan's rhetoric of preserving "traditional American values" is also referenced.
Page 190
This page continues the footnotes for Chapter 9, "From the War on Crime to the War on Drugs," referencing government reports and news articles on the emergence of crack cocaine, the increase in cocaine imports, and the social consequences of disinvestment and overpolicing in urban areas. It cites the "Just Saying No" campaign and the significant federal spending on drug control programs under Reagan. The notes also detail the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986's impact, particularly its mandatory minimum sentences for crack cocaine offenses, which led to "apartheid sentencing" due to racial disparities.
Page 191
This page continues the footnotes for Chapter 9, "From the War on Crime to the War on Drugs," citing various reports and academic works on racial disparities in drug arrests and incarceration rates. It details how federal grants were tied to drug-related arrests, militarizing police departments. The notes also discuss the increased funding for the FBI, DEA, and U.S. Bureau of Prisons, and the formation of the National Drug Policy Board, which centralized crime control under a small group of officials without strong congressional oversight. The Board's recommendations, institutionalized in the Omnibus Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, expanded drug testing and linked federal benefits to drug-free status.
Page 192
This page contains more footnotes for Chapter 9, "From the War on Crime to the War on Drugs," referencing government reports and news articles on the targeted criminalization of "high-risk youth" through programs like Project New Pride and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act. It cites calls for increased police presence and new weapons for law enforcement, and discusses Vice President George H. W. Bush's focus on prison construction through lease-purchase arrangements and forfeiture funds. The notes also discuss the rise of youth gangs and their increasing sophistication with weaponry, framing gang violence as a result of permissive legal sanctions and leading to new penal code revisions in California like the STEP Act.
Page 193
This page continues with footnotes for Chapter 9, "From the War on Crime to the War on Drugs," detailing the implementation of mass arrests, such as the Los Angeles Police Department's "Operation Hammer," and controversial "defensible space" programs like "Operation Cul de Sac." It cites news articles and reports on their impact on residents in black "high-crime" neighborhoods, including racial profiling and civil liberties violations. The notes also discuss key Supreme Court rulings like McCleskey v. Kemp, Florida v. Bostick, and Ohio v. Robinette, which upheld racial bias in sentencing and allowed "pretext stops," and the DEA's "Operation Pipeline" training officers in such tactics.
Page 194
This page provides more footnotes for Chapter 9, "From the War on Crime to the War on Drugs," detailing the systemic racism within police departments, exemplified by the California Attorney General's "Crips & Bloods Street Gangs" handbook. It discusses how the handbook's profile characteristics effectively criminalized virtually all Black men in California, including those traveling with white women, and made Black-owned businesses suspect. The notes also reference CRASH unit tactics that exacerbated gang warfare, police departments manufacturing and distributing crack, and the 1992 Los Angeles civil disorder. It discusses how the federal government's resistance to socioeconomic solutions led to increased violence and incarceration.
Page 195
This page is the start of the footnotes for the Epilogue, "Reckoning with the War on Crime." It cites J. Phillip Thompson's work on Black mayors and Christopher Uggen, Sarah Shannon, and Jeff Manza's research on felon disenfranchisement, particularly its disproportionate impact on Black and Latino prisoners. The notes also reference Heather Ann Thompson's work on how prison census counts skew political representation and Erica Frankenberg's work on persistent school segregation. It highlights the diminished "maximum feasible participation" in community action programs after the Watts uprising and the shift to punitive federal policies, which prioritized militarized police over addressing root causes of unrest.
Page 196
This page continues the footnotes for the Epilogue, "Reckoning with the War on Crime," citing H. R. Haldeman's The Haldeman Diaries and James Baldwin's Nobody Knows My Name on the nature of policing in the ghetto and racial disparities in law enforcement. It also references statistics on the low percentage of African American police officers and DEA agents relative to the Black population. The notes conclude with calls for new strategies beyond militarized policing, such as residency requirements for police and civilian review boards, to address systemic inequalities and the ongoing erosion of American democracy by the carceral state.