Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) — Comprehensive Study Notes
Background: Post–Civil War Constitutional Amendments and Black Codes
- 13th Amendment (1865)
- Formally abolished slavery but did not grant full civil or political equality.
- Immediate Southern reaction: enactment of “Black Codes”
- Statutes restricted movement, labor, and legal autonomy of freedpeople.
- Extra-legal terror: rise of the Ku Klux Klan—harassment, brutality, murders.
- Congressional response (1866–1870)
- Civil Rights & Enforcement Acts to protect freedmen.
- 14th Amendment
- Citizenship by birth or naturalization.
- States forbidden to abridge “privileges and immunities,” deny “due process,” or deny “equal protection.”
- Section 5 (enforcement clause) empowered Congress to legislate.
- 15th Amendment
- Prohibited racial discrimination in voting.
- Northern fatigue by the 1870s → military withdrawal (1877) & resurgence of white southern political control.
The Civil Rights Cases (1883): Erosion of Federal Protection
- Five consolidated suits testing 1875 Civil Rights Act’s bar on racial discrimination in “public accommodations.”
- Government argument
- 13th: Abolishing slavery implicitly conferred full civil rights.
- 14th §5: Congress may enact affirmative legislation to secure those rights.
- Majority (Justice Joseph Bradley, 8−1) findings
- Not every form of discrimination equals slavery ⇒ 13th inapplicable.
- Congress under 14th may only enact remedial laws against state action—not private conduct nor state inaction.
- Practical effect: gutted federal power; invited states to tolerate or encourage private discrimination.
- Lone dissent: Justice John Marshall Harlan
- Introduced “state-action” theory: businesses “affected with a public interest” (e.g., railroads, hotels) operate with state consent ⇒ actionable under 14th.
- Became doctrinal seed for mid-20th civil-rights jurisprudence.
Early Segregation & Transportation
- Pre-War: Slavery made formal segregation unnecessary; free blacks in North often faced stricter separation.
- Reconstruction fluidity
- Patchwork of practices: Some integrated schools/juries (New Orleans until 1877; North Carolina juries), partial segregation elsewhere.
- Lynching spiked in 1880s–early 1890s; demagogues (e.g., Tom Watson) fueled white resentment.
- Supreme Court signals
- Hall v. DeCuir (1878): States cannot forbid segregation on carriers ⇒ protected companies that chose segregation.
- Louisville, New Orleans & Texas Ry. v. Mississippi (1890): Upheld mandatory segregation on intrastate trains. Only Bradley & Harlan dissented citing commerce hindrance.
- Wave of “Separate Car” statutes 1887–1892 in 9 states; typical penalties
- Railroad fines/jail for non-enforcement.
- Passenger fines (in 5 states) for defying racial assignment.
Louisiana Separate Car Act (1890)
- Purpose clause: “promote the comfort of passengers.”
- Mandate: “equal but separate accommodations for the white and colored races” on intrastate rail lines.
- Criminal sanctions for employees & passengers violating assignments.
Socio-Cultural Context in Louisiana/New Orleans
- Tri-racial order: whites, blacks, and gens de couleur libre (Creoles—free, mixed-race descendants of French/Spanish colonists & enslaved Africans).
- Historically enjoyed rights: intermarriage with whites, court testimony, property inheritance.
- Post-1877 white redemption governments collapsed this middle status; Creoles legally reclassified as “colored.”
- American Citizens Equal Rights Association (Creole-led). Key figures:
- Dr./Atty. Louis A. Martinet—editor, New Orleans Crusader.
- Albion W. Tourgée—white N.Y. lawyer, novelist (A Fool’s Errand), founder of National Citizens’ Rights Association; volunteered pro bono.
- Citizens’ committee raised $3,000; retained local white counsel James Walker for $1,000.
- Strategic goals
- Deliberately craft a test case triggering arrest ⇒ judicial review.
- Select a passenger of 81 African ancestry (octoroon) to spotlight the ambiguity of racial classification.
The First Attempt: Daniel Desdunes (1892)
- Feb 24: Desdunes (21) bought first-class ticket New Orleans → Mobile (interstate).
- Arrest executed as planned; plea: Separate Car Act violates Commerce Clause & fails to define race scientifically.
- April 19: Presiding judge Robert Marr disappeared → case stalled.
- May 25: Louisiana Supreme Court in Abbott v. Hicks held Act inapplicable to interstate passengers.
- June: Judge John Ferguson dismissed Desdunes case. Martinet’s Crusader: “Jim Crow is as dead as a door-nail.” (Premature.)
Enter Homer Adolphe Plessy
- Light-skinned Creole shoemaker; self-identified “87 Caucasian, 81 African.”
- Civic résumé: vice-president, Justice Protective Educational & Social Club; member of Société des Francs-Amis; family ties to Unification Movement.
- Chosen to test intrastate application of the law.
June 7, 1892 — The Arrest
- Purchased first-class ticket Press St. Depot → Covington (in-state).
- Conductor queried, “Are you a colored man?” — Plessy affirmed, refused relocation.
- Train halted; Detective Christopher Cain arrested & removed him.
- Bond: $500 posted by committee; night in jail.
State-Court Proceedings
- October 1892 arraignment before Judge Ferguson; information did not state race.
- Defense plea (Martinet/Walker/Tourgée):
- Race determination too complex for railroad staff ⇒ violates due-process.
- Act perpetuates “badges & incidents of slavery” ⇒ 13th violated.
- Creates unconstitutional racial caste ⇒ 14th privileges/immunities, due-process, equal-protection breached.
- Ferguson refused to dismiss.
- Louisiana Supreme Court Ex parte Plessy (1893):
- Cited Civil Rights Cases to reject 13th claim.
- Adopted “equality, not identity” doctrine: segregated but ostensibly equal facilities satisfy 14th.
Appeal Strategy & Delay
- Tourgée’s private letter: Only 1 Justice surely sympathetic; hoped Court composition might change with time—but it hardened.
- Writ of error filed 1893; oral argument set April 13, 1896 (three-year interim).
Argument Before the U.S. Supreme Court (Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537)
- Tourgée’s key contentions (19 points condensed):
- “Reputation of being white” = valuable property; deprivation without due process violates 14th.
- Racial classification scientifically indeterminate after generations of “race-intermixture.”
- Statute enforces caste: denies equal travel rights, contravenes privileges & immunities.
- Famous metaphor: “Justice is pictured as blind, and her daughter the Law ought at least to be color-blind.”
- State’s reply (Atty.-Gen. Milton Cunningham)
- Relied mainly on Louisiana Supreme Court opinion & Civil Rights Cases precedent.
Supreme Court Decision — May 18, 1896
- Vote: 7−1 affirm (Justice David Brewer absent).
Majority Opinion (Justice Henry Billings Brown)
- Issues of race determination deemed irrelevant: Plessy’s counsel failed to raise at trial.
- Admitted “racial reputation” as property; remedy would be civil damages, not constitutional invalidation.
- Core holding:
- 14th assures legal equality, not social equality; did not intend to abolish all color-based distinctions.
- Separation ≠ subordination; any sense of inferiority arises because “colored race chooses to put that construction upon it.”
- Legislation cannot “eradicate racial instincts.”
- Phrase “separate but equal” implied—not literally used—but doctrine born.
- Consistent with Brown’s states-rights jurisprudence (Lawton v. Steele, Holden v. Hardy).
Dissent (Justice John Marshall Harlan)
- Constitution is “color-blind” and “neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.”
- Statute’s real aim: exclude blacks from white cars; badges of servitude violate civil freedom.
- Warned slippery slope: could justify segregated streets, courtrooms, even religious sect divisions.
- Pointed irony: Chinese (ineligible for citizenship) could ride with whites; black citizens criminalized for same act.
- Predicted decision “will prove as pernicious” as Dred Scott; sows “seeds of race hate.”
- Northern reaction muted—contrast with 1883 uproar.
- Case virtually disappeared from textbooks until NAACP litigation campaign 1940s.
- Southern legislatures invoked Plessy to codify segregation (1896–1920):
- Signs “Whites Only” / “Colored”; theaters, restaurants, water fountains, schools, hospitals, factories.
- E.g., South Carolina textile mills: separate rooms, entrances, toilets.
- Mississippi hospitals: whites nurses barred from attending black patients.
- Laws = minimum; social practice often exceeded statutes in severity.
Personal Codas
- Homer Plessy: pled guilty, paid $25; lived quietly as laborer/insurance collector; died 1925, buried St. Louis Cemetery No. 1.
- Justice Harlan: died 1911; Justice Brown later conceded Harlan “perhaps” had been right about subordination motive.
Long-Term Legacy
- Plessy doctrine stood 58 years until Brown v. Board of Education (1954) repudiated “separate but equal.”
- Harlan’s dissent and Tourgée’s “color-blind” ideal became cornerstones of civil-rights constitutional argument.
- “State Action” Doctrine: Private discrimination actionable when business is “affected with a public interest.”
- “Equal vs. Identical”: Segregationists’ formula—equality assessed by tangible facilities, not intermingling.
- Property in Whiteness: Economic & social value > mere intangible reputation.
Numerical / Statistical References
- 8−1 split in Civil Rights Cases (1883).
- 9 states with Separate-Car laws 1887–1892.
- Desdunes committee fund: $3,000; Walker’s fee: $1,000; Plessy bond: $500; fine: $25.
- Court vote in Plessy: 7−1 (Brewer absent ⇒ 8-member bench).
Principal Cases Cited
- Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1878)
- Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877)
- Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883)
- Louisville, N.O. & Texas Ry. v. Mississippi, 133 U.S. 587 (1890)
- Ex parte Plessy, 45 La. Ann. 80 (1893)
- Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)
- Later repudiation: Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
Ethical & Philosophical Implications
- Constitution’s promise vs. societal prejudice: Law’s complicity in enforcing race hierarchy.
- “Color-blind” ideal vs. practical invisibility: absence of state neutrality fosters caste.
- Role of judiciary: when deference to states’ police powers masks moral abdication.