9/15 MP
Two sentences on the Blackboard
Sentence 1: “Every sentence on this blackboard is false.”
Sentence 2: “Being born is not a harm.”
These are the only two sentences written on the Blackboard.
Core question discussed: can one of these sentences be true?
The class considers these as the two sentences to evaluate whether one of them can be true; they attempt to prove that sentence 2 is true, but the discussion leads to examining the logical status of sentence 1.
Reason given for why sentence 1 cannot be true: if every sentence on the blackboard is false, then sentence 1 would be false as well, which contradicts it being true; but the explicit reasoning in the transcript is: if every sentence on the blackboard is false, then sentence 2 would also be false, undermining the premise that both can be false. The dialogue moves through a basic Liars’ paradox flavor exercise.
Stakes: this sets up a context about truth, self-reference, and evaluation of statements, which then segue into broader discussions of utilitarianism and value.
Utilitarianism: overview and key concepts
The instructor transitions from the paradox to a discussion of utilitarianism as presented in a reading/article.
Task-led shift: discuss what utilitarianism is and then explain a version known as classical utilitarianism.
The reading distinguishes two close concepts: aggregationism vs total well-being. An important footnote clarifies aggregationism by restricting attention to a fixed population.
Aggregationism (as described): discussion of well-being is restricted to a setting with a fixed population; you aggregate well-being across the same set of individuals across outcomes.
Total well-being (as described): removes the fixed-population constraint and allows comparisons across outcomes where populations differ (e.g., more people in one outcome than another).
Concrete example used to illustrate the difference:
Scenario A: population includes individuals 1 through 10.
Scenario B: population includes individuals 1 through 100.
Total well-being would compare the overall level of well-being across these outcomes, even if the sets of people differ.
Classical utilitarianism question: should we create more people if doing so increases overall happiness, even if it means altering the population composition?
Republican conclusion (foreshadowed): under some readings of utilitarianism, one might favor outcomes with many more people if the total happiness rises; this raises significant ethical implications and potential objections.
Beyond pleasure/pain: the discussion expands to other kinds of value that might matter in ethical assessment, including aesthetic value, epistemic value (knowledge), and other objective values.
Values beyond pleasure and pain: aesthetic, epistemic, and more
Aesthetic value: there are objective or perceived values in beauty or artworks that may contribute to well-being.
Example notion: pleasure derived from a piece of art contributes to overall well-being, but the existence of beauty interacts with preferences and experiences.
Epistemic value (knowledge): knowing facts can be good in itself because not knowing those facts means certain values are lost (e.g., valuable knowledge contributes to well-being by preventing losses).
If someone forgets facts, something of value is lost because those facts contributed to the overall good.
Global utilitarianism (a term used in the lecture): the degree to which an action increases pleasure and/or reduces pain should be the standard by which value is assessed, across all domains of value.
The idea conveyed: for any type of value (aesthetic, epistemic, etc.), something is valuable to the extent that it promotes pleasure and/or prevents pain.
A potential objection: epistemic and aesthetic value could conceivably be independent of pleasure/pain, which would challenge a strict global utilitarian view.
The lecture then emphasizes a broader claim: for any value you can think of, something is valuable if and only if it contributes to increasing pleasure and/or decreasing pain (or some combination that makes the world better off in those respects).
Hybrid utilitarianism: a position where an agent might act with the expectation of very good results, but the action’s ethical status is judged by outcomes (pleasure/pain) rather than the agent’s explicit reasons for acting.
Example: someone sets up a charitable donation with the intention of helping in good faith, but the money ends up funding something harmful (e.g., a bomb). The discussion examines how to evaluate the act from a utilitarian perspective.
The example emphasizes: even if the outward motive seems praiseworthy, what matters for utilitarian evaluation is the actual or expected consequences in terms of pleasure/pain, not the stated intention alone.
The “giving money to a charity that funds harm” scenario introduces a concern about rational expectations and the probability of good outcomes versus bad outcomes.
Expected value discussion: the instructor notes that the class will eventually address expected value to formalize how to weigh uncertain outcomes.
The intrinsic vs instrumental value distinction: under some moral theories, the value of an action or a thing can be intrinsic (valuable in itself) or instrumental (valuable because it leads to other good outcomes). In a pure utilitarian framework, instrumental value linked to pleasure/pain often dominates, but the discussion shows nuance via praiseworthiness and rational expectation.
Praiseworthiness, rules, and the consequences-versus-rules debate
Intrinsic reward vs consequences: utilitarian evaluation typically emphasizes outcomes (pleasure/pain) rather than rule-following per se.
Praiseworthiness can be independent of whether the action actually has good outcomes (a separate ethical lens): an action might be praiseworthy for the agent’s virtue or intentions, even if the consequences are bad.
Rule-utilitarian contrast (briefly touched): some ethical theories evaluate actions by their conformity to rules that generally maximize well-being, rather than evaluating each act by its contingent consequences. The transcript hints at considering whether actions align with rules that tend to maximize happiness, not only immediate outcomes.
Impartiality, aggregation, and population considerations
Impartiality principle: in utilitarian thinking, the welfare of all beings matters equally (e.g., the pain of a bear counts as much as a human’s pain in the weighing process).
Aggregation vs averages: the discussion centers on summing well-being across individuals (aggregation), which is one way to measure total well-being. Alternatives include averaging or other aggregation methods.
Aggregation (sum): add up all individuals’ well-being levels to obtain total well-being.
Average: compute the mean well-being per person, which can yield different incentives than a sum when population size changes.
The three major conceptions of well-being discussed (as inputs to a utilitarian framework):
Hedonistic well-being: pleasure minus pain as the primary metric.
Preference-satisfaction well-being: the degree to which individuals’ satisfied preferences contribute to their well-being, possibly including scenarios where preferences involve causing pain or avoiding pleasure (subject to the overall optimization).
Objective-list theory: a fixed inventory of goods that count as well-being (e.g., health, knowledge, friendship, autonomy) and maximizing the extent to which people obtain items on that list.
Compatibility across theories: each of these conceptions can be aligned with the first four points (i.e., a total/aggregated approach to well-being) while still allowing for different notions of what counts as well-being.
Variable populations and outcomes: a central methodological issue is how to compare scenarios where different outcomes involve different people, potentially including people who are not present in the other scenario.
Example framing: comparing a world with the same people in two scenarios versus a world where one scenario includes many additional people who will experience well-being gains.
The question becomes: should we sometimes create additional people simply because their presence adds to total well-being via their happiness, even if those people would not exist in the alternative scenario?
The discussion foreshadows population ethics debates: when comparing outcomes with different populations, how should we weigh adding new lives? Are there moral limits to increasing population if the added lives have good welfare overall, even if it means displacing existing populations?
Practical and ethical implications: these questions tie into debates about population policy, reproductive choices, resource allocation, and the moral status of future generations.
Specific formulations and illustrative concepts (with mathematical-like structure)
Total well-being across a fixed population (aggregationist frame):
If the population is fixed, total well-being can be represented as a sum of individual well-being values:
W{ ext{A}} = igg(igcup{i
eq j} w_i^{(A)}igg), ext{where }P(A) ext{ is the set of people in outcome A}W{ ext{B}} = igg(igcup{i
eq j} w_i^{(B)}igg), ext{where }P(B) ext{ is the set of people in outcome B}E =
abla ext{?} = [ ext{placeholder for generic EV}In standard form: where is the probability of outcome and its utility (e.g., pleasure minus pain).
Praiseworthiness vs outcomes (a distinction showcased by the bomb-example):
Action A: donate $1000, intending good; actual impact: funds used to build a bomb.
Utilitarian evaluation would weigh the actual/predicted consequences: if the expected increase in pleasure minus pain from the bomb scenario is negative, the action is bad under utilitarian assessment, regardless of the donor’s good intentions.
Impartiality and equal weighting of pains: for any two beings, if their pains are subjectively similar, their pains are given equal moral weight in aggregations.
The “three people at five” illustration for well-being states:
A simple toy example: three people each with a well-being level of 5, yielding a total
This can be used to compare with other distributions, e.g., two people at 7 and one at 1: , highlighting that different distributions can yield the same total.
Preference satisfaction vs aggregation: a scenario where the sum of satisfied preferences is maximized, even if some preferences involve harming others; the utilitarian framework would require evaluating the net pleasure/pain consequences rather than just counting satisfied preferences.
Objective list theory: emphasis on an explicit list of goods (e.g., health, autonomy, knowledge, friendship) and measuring the extent to which individuals obtain items on the list; the aim is to maximize the degree to which people receive those goods, which may align or conflict with pure pleasure/pain calculations.
Epistemic and aesthetic values under a utilitarian lens: the value of knowing facts or appreciating beauty is tied to how those values contribute to overall well-being, either directly via pleasure or pain, or indirectly by promoting further beneficial outcomes.
Hybrid utilitarian considerations: the possibility that people act for reasons other than strictly maximizing pleasure/pain yet may still be judged by utilitarian standards because the observable consequences align with or diverge from the expected utility.
Summary of the practical implications and connections
Population ethics: The discussion connects to long-standing debates about whether we should create new lives to maximize total well-being, and whether “more people” is always better when the added lives experience positive well-being.
Ethical tensions: Citing the Republican conclusion and related ideas foregrounds tensions between maximizing total happiness and other values (e.g., justice, rights, distributional fairness, environmental concerns).
Real-world relevance: These ideas underlie debates over reproductive policies, space/resource allocation, and technologies with wide-reaching consequences (e.g., potential for large-scale harm or benefit via population shifts).
Critical questions to study further:
How should we weigh total well-being against average well-being?
When is it permissible to create or increase population for the sake of greater aggregate happiness?
Can non-pleasure values (knowledge, art, autonomy) be fully subsumed under a pleasure/pain calculus, or do they require a hybrid framework?
How do rule-based ethics interact with outcome-based ethics in the context of population ethics and public policy?
Quick reference recap (key terms to memorize)
Aggregationism: well-being measured over a fixed population by aggregating across individuals.
Total well-being: allows comparisons across outcomes with different population sizes, summing well-being across the actual population in each scenario.
Fixed population vs variable population: crucial distinction that changes how we evaluate actions and outcomes.
Impartiality: equal weight to the welfare of all beings involved.
Hedonistic well-being: pleasure minus pain as the primary metric.
Preference-satisfaction well-being: aggregated satisfaction of preferences as a metric.
Objective-list theory: a catalog of goods that constitute well-being.
Epistemic value: value derived from knowledge or information.
Aesthetic value: value derived from beauty or pleasing perception.
Hybrid utilitarianism: combines elements of virtue, intention, and outcome-based utility.
Expected value: (formal form of the uncertainty-weighted sum of utilities).
Population ethics question: how to weigh creating new persons when their well-being contributes to total happiness.
Republican conclusion (hinted): in some views, we should prefer worlds with more people if the total well-being rises, raising profound ethical questions.