Case studies
Pearl Harbour:
What happened?
war on US and British Empire
90-minutes surprise aerial attack on 7 December 1941:
over 2400 Americans killed and over 1100 wounded;
18 ships sunk or damaged;
165 aircraft destroyed
US Pacific Fleet severely affected (except for aircraft carriers)
“most devastating sudden attack in history” (McDermott & Bar-Joseph 2016)
Where did failure occur?
Planning and direction -> (different choices- different allocation of resources, could of reduced the magnitude of the disaster" (Dorn report)
errors made here affected the entire cycle.
Collection failure -> due to allocations of resources Hawaii commanders didn’t receive the full picture.
Analytical failure: analysts did not interpret Japan's actions as an imminent attack on Hawaii.
+ policy failure: decision makers underestimated Japanese capability and will to strike directly at US territory (mirror imaging rationality, cultural bias)
Dissemination failure: Intelligence was fragmented between Navy, Army, and diplomatic channels; no central body analyzed or shared all-source intelligence.
Why was it an IF? Was it preventable?
There was evidence that japan was building up air forces + carrier fleets had gone silent. Japanese embassies ordered to destroy codes…
+ on eve of attack US army intel intercepted a message= war imminent.
Roosevelt knew that an attack would likely occur but not where.
→ strategic warning? didn’t know where or when.
Scenario of Japanese attack made little sense to US decision makers. → mirror imaging: wrong assumption of rationality
Why wasn’t it prevented?
Cognitive biases: Analysts assumed Japan would attack British or Dutch colonies, not U.S. bases.
Lack of central analysis: No single authority integrated all intelligence (military, naval, diplomatic).
Communication delays: Key warnings sent to Hawaii were delayed due to encryption and transmission issues.
Complacency: Hawaii commanders underestimated the feasibility of a long-range carrier attack.
What can we learn from the case?
Political implications:
NSA: new department of defence with military intelligence & creation of CIA.
institutionalization of warning reports: establishment of director of central intelligence → national intelligence estimates.
shaped a whole new discipline of strategic warning analysis.
justified the development of global surveillance systems (SIGNIT, global bases, satellite networks…)
Led to doctrine of forward defence (proactive engagement abroad to avoid surprise attacks at home)
Led to battle of midway (intel success)
Whether formal post-mortem inquiries have been held?
Most studied event in US history → lasting impact on US foreign policy ever since.
calls for inquiry within days
7 investigations before end of WW2
Controversies: records far from complete, findings not conclusive (39 volumes!)
Errors of judgement by commands in DC and Hawaii, inder-departemental misunderstandings.
Investigations did not conclude responsible but put the blame on Admiral Kimmel & General short.
Formal inquiry left many unanswered questions.
1995 Dorn Report, US DoD:
sole responsibility shouldn’t fall on Kimmel & Short but finds no basis to change the conclusion that they made errors of judgement.
bureaucratic rivalries between the Army and Navy meant that only the President could ensure they were working together.
Post November 27 warning → thought the attack would occur in Pacific Asia not Hawaii.
Officials in Washington did not send intel from “Magic” project which could have given them a greater sense that Hawaii was a likely target.
Intelligence was sufficient to justify a higher level of vigilance than they chose to maintain.
Today's insights:
by autumn 1940: US gov cryptanalysts had solved some of Japanese foreign office higehst grade cryptographic systems (MAGIC)
BUT: not enough people had been assigned to naval code breaking → hadnt made enough progess.
→ misalocation of resources.
Authors:
Roberta Wohlsetter 1962: "never before had so complete an intelligence picture of the enemy”
failure to distinguish signal from noise?
Dahl (2013) → Modern interpretation of leadership receptivity.
Villa & Wilford (2006) → Technical/organizational detail for preventability.
Kahn (1991) → Concise synthesis for writing conclusions.
(Optional) Use Congress Report (1946) for factual citations on post-mortem inquiry.
Yom Kippur War:
What happened?
Israeli PM Golda Meir warned by Mossad on early morning of 6 October 1973 (Jewish holiday)
Hours later Egypt & Syria attacked Israel: crossing ceasefire lines into Sinai and Golan Heights → strategic surprise
Perception of existential threat for Israel: 2800 Israeli casualties
IDF gained military victory after 19 days of fighting; but: huge trauma
Response to Six Days War (1967): swift Israeli victory over Egypt & Syria (surprise attack) → Israeli occupation of territories (Golan Heights, West Bank, Sinai, parts of Gaza); part of Arab-Israeli conflict
Was it an IF?
False alarm in May 1973 by Ashraf Marwan: Israel raised state-of-readiness (costly); war didn’t happen (military exercise)
Deception by Egypt & missed signals re. Syria (troop movements; cancelled leaves; mobilisation of reserves) → threat not identified
Warnings in September not heeded (e.g. by King Hussein of Jordan to Golda Meir)
Israeli defence intelligence (IDI) judged chance of war very low (even 1 week before); but sent some reinforcement to Golan Heights
Claims that Mossad knew about imminent attack a week before; but again misled by Egypt; Mossad chief Zvi Zamir convinced late on 5 Oct.
Mounting evidence on 4-5 Oct
Israeli defence minister did not trust Mossad’s source
Israel prepared only on morning of 6 Oct: decision against preemptive strike; US and Soviet negotiations to try and avert war
Consequences of Israeli hubris, not taking Arab plans to avenge 1967 defeat sufficiently seriously; little international pressure on Israel to renegotiate borders
Israeli IC didn’t consider Egypt and Syria capable of attack
Bar Lev Line (along eastern flank of Suez Canal) considered impenetrable by Israel but overrun by Egypt in under two hours
Policy failure?
1970: Meir rejected defence minister Moshe Dayan’s proposition to pull back 20 miles from Suez canal to enable reopening & demotivate Egypt to go to war
Claims that Meir could have avoided the war had she not rebuffed Egyptian
President Anwar Sadat’s overtures for peace: unwillingness to restore pre-1967 borders; no reconciliatory gesture
Overconfidence that Israel’s geopolitical situation had never been better
Although Meir had the power to do so, she didn’t mobilise IDF early
Meir didn’t challenge her generals’ assessment
On morning of 6 Oct, defence minister Moshe Dayan still argued that war was unlikely, while IDF Chief of Staff David Elazar asked for full-scale mobilisation and preemtive strike against Syria.
Was it preventable?
According to Bar-Joseph → YES
because of how the intelligence was processed, interpreted and dismissed → failure was analytical and cognitive not informational (lack of intel)
“The concept”= entrenched belief that “Egypt will not go to war until it acquires long-range aircraft capable of striking Israel’s heartland.”
specific indicators:
Egyptian and Syrian force mobilization far beyond normal exercises.
Evacuation of Soviet families from Cairo and Damascus (a classic pre-war indicator).
Human intelligence (HUMINT) from Ashraf Marwan, Egypt’s high-level Mossad source, who warned war was coming.
Interception of Egyptian communications about war preparations and bridge deployments across the Suez.
Massive logistical buildup on both fronts clearly visible to Israeli reconnaissance.
What can we learn from the case?
Improving analysis & early warning
Avoid overreliance on raw information (narrow perspective)
Focus on change & anomalies (rather than continuity and confirmation) → “cornerstone of strategic early warning” (p. 989)
Diversify/improve methods for intelligence analysis: towards abductive reasoning (best available & most likely explanation)
Estimates must include assessments of both capabilities & intentions
Encourage contrarian thinking
Diversify sources of early warning; include broader perspectives
→ Study of lessons to be learn’t from Yom Kippur was missing until July 2023.
Whether formal post-mortem inquiries have been held?
Agranat Commission (1974-75)
Meir cleared of direct responsibility for failure; her decision (no preemptive strike but full mobilization) was judged as wise
IDI failed to provide early warning
Wrong assumption that Egypt would only attack if its air power matched those of the Israeli Air Force
Complacency & dismissal/ignorance of evidence on Egypt’s war preparations by IDI leaders (e.g. on 1 and 3 October)
Lack of civilian control of Israeli Defence Forces
Insufficient analysis: only relying on military intelligence
→ Sharp public debate until today: report too uncritical of political leadership, esp. defence minister
Later analysis ( Uri Bar- Joseph, 2005)
Failure of strategic intelligence analysis & early warning; but intelligence system did not fail as a whole: Mossad provided high- quality warnings
Context of intelligence failure: public atmosphere of self-assurance and complacence →failing to recognize deterioration of Israel’s deterrence
Contributing to failure: cover & deception; cry wolf syndrome (1971,1972, spring 1973); compartmentisation; overconfidence in quality of intelligence sources; fear of destabilising status quo; various bureaucratic obstacles; groupthink in IDI; individual psychological shortcomings (confirmation bias, cognitive dissonance, heuristic judgements)
→ main cause of failure= Failure of two individuals (pp. 248-251):
Eli Zeira, director of Israel’s military intelligence: overstepped his responsibility, ignored & failed to collect intelligence and lied to his superiors (IDF Chief of Staff + Defence Minister), thus distorting their intelligence picture.
Yona Bandman, chief estimator of Egyptian affairs: ignoring assessments by other analysts, silencing opposition to his estimates; fixated on notion that Egypt was incapable of launching war; highly authoritative style
Authors:
Bar-Joseph, Uri. 2005. The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise of Yom Kippur and Its Sources. SUNY Press. (book)
connects the organizational, psycological and political roots of failure.
Iranian Revolution:
What happened?
Event: In 1978–79, the Shah of Iran’s pro-Western regime collapsed and Ayatollah Khomeini’s Islamic Republic emerged.
Failure: The U.S. (CIA, State Department, and others) did not foresee either the Shah’s fragility or the revolutionary strength of the clerical opposition.
Implications: One of the most consequential strategic surprises of the Cold War — loss of a key ally, rise of anti-U.S. regime, and decades of regional instability.
Was it an IF?
Lack of attention to Shah’s political mistakes
Failure to see Khomeini’s charisma & ability to mobilize masses
Mistaken belief that Shah’s regime was secure and stable in 1978
Intelligence reports on protests existed but did not stress severity: failure at the reporting stage
U.S. National Security Archive with declassified document
Was it preventable?
Jervis (2011) argues the failure was not data scarcity but misinterpretation under political pressure and failure to challenge assumptions.
analytically preventable but organizationally unlikely (like yom kippur)
Post-mortem investigations?
No public congressional commission but formal internal CIA post mortem.
Jervis, why intelligence fails.
Analysis of the CIA’s internal post-mortem review in 1979.
Intelligence judgements were based mostly on their inherent plausibility
Alternative judgements not seriously considered
Analysts didn’t understand nature of opposition, esp. religious dimension: considered anachronistic
False expectation that Shah would crack down protests (at odds with U.S. advice)
Analysts didn’t challenge their contextual framework.
Connelly, 2021:
CIA analysts in Iran lagging behind: could have stressed revolutionary/religious nature of situation and pressed for response by their superiors
Lack of timely and accurate assessment of seriousness of crisis & range of possible outcomes
Senior U.S. policymakers were paying less attention to Iran during crucial period; slow reaction once high-level warnings came in
Overall unawareness by policymakers of key aspects of situation; lack of preparedness
Lack of understanding of why Shah did not respond more forcefully to protests (intelligence producers and policymakers
What can we learn from case?
importance of contextual based analysis
intelligence must guard against cultural mirror-imaging and policy confirmation bias.
Strategic surprise can stem from politicization as much as from lack of data.
lack of translators, only used government sources…
Authors:
Jervis
Connelly, 2021