International Order & Power Dynamics: From League of Nations to Post-Cold-War Unipolarity

League of Nations (founded after World War I) intended to prevent “another world war,” yet failed; served as cautionary tale for post- $1945$ planners.
United Nations created after World War II; similarly designed to halt great-power conflicts, but by lecturer’s judgment, has also struggled to achieve founding aim.
Ethical implication: Even well-intended international institutions can under-deliver when member states will not enforce norms.

Why some scholars call it a peaceful era:
• Bipolar balance: Two superpowers (U.S. & USSR) deterred each other (“mutually assured destruction” ⇒ neither could bully the other without self-destruction).
• “Stand-down”/“grace” period—constant tension but limited direct confrontation.
Why others dispute the “peace” narrative:
• Numerous proxy wars (Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Angola, etc.) with superpower funding/arming opposite sides.
• Internal conflicts in third-party states often intensified by external aid.
• Human cost & regional instability undermine idea of genuine peace.
Philosophical point: How we define “peace” matters—absence of world-wide great-power war ≠ absence of large-scale violence.

Soviet collapse left the U.S. as sole superpower; intuition says unipolarity should be most stable, but class lists counter-arguments:
• “Power scramble”: Secondary states arm & assert themselves to climb hierarchy or balance U.S.
• Smaller or developing states feel need to be “extra-assertive” to oppose U.S. ideology/military.
• Rise in internal conflicts; civil wars multiply when external patronage patterns change.
• U.S. interventions in $1990s$ (e.g., bombing Serbia $1999$ ; various Middle-East actions) demonstrate that dominance can still mean coercive force, not tranquility.
Ethical/Practical takeaway: Unchecked power can breed resistance and resentment, undermining long-term order.

Late $1980s$ → early $2000s$ : Japan’s GDP growth spark fears it would overtake U.S. economy.
• Anti-Japanese sentiment rises in American media/politics (movies, books highlighting “Japan Inc.”).
• Paradox: U.S. itself had rebuilt Japan post- $1945$ , yet cultural/political otherness persisted.
• Hypothetical appeal: Other nations could choose Japanese market over American one, threatening U.S. economic hegemony.
Outcome: Japanese boom stalls (asset bubble burst $1990$ , “Lost Decade” $1990s$ ); never supplants U.S., but episode illustrates economic power as source of geopolitical tension.

Student query: Are modern institutions “standing by” like the League of Nations did pre-World War II?
Lecturer’s mixed answer:
• Signs of institutional fatigue—rules ignored, limited enforcement.
• Yet simultaneous “backlash to the backlash”: EU states recently recommitting to alliances & liberal norms (esp. past $2021–2022$ ).
• Emerging multi-block order:
– U.S. (partly alone)
– Europe (increasingly cohesive)
– China plus associated regions
• Projection: If U.S.–China war erupted, unlikely to mirror World War II; duration & scope would differ due to tech, nukes, global interdependence.

Next lecture will cover Liberalism (cooperation, institutions, interdependence) vs. Realism (power, anarchy, state interest).
Informal poll: Few students self-identify clearly with either; many “in the middle” or unsure—signals need for conceptual clarity.
Administrative note: Online discussion posts (“usually rubbish” per student) still helpful—turn assigned readings into graded participation.

Stability claims must account for hidden violence (proxy wars, interventions).
Polarity (bi-, uni-, multi-) influences but does not determine peace; domestic politics, economics, and ideology interact.
Economic power (Japan $1990s$ ) can threaten geopolitical order just as military power does.
Institutional resilience depends on member commitment; current era shows both erosion and renewal.
Upcoming Liberalism–Realism debate will frame how scholars explain these patterns.