Example: If a 1/lbtaxontofureducesquantitytradedtoQ2,thentaxrevenuesare1 imes Q2.</p></li><li><p>Thebuyer′sshareoftaxrevenue=Buyer′sportionoftaxperunit imes Q2.</p></li><li><p>Theseller′sshareoftaxrevenue=Seller′sportionoftaxperunit imes Q2.</p></li></ul></li></ul><h4id="0a118731−0428−4de0−a763−ae7d3b480619"data−toc−id="0a118731−0428−4de0−a763−ae7d3b480619"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">TaxIncidence:WhoPaystheTax?</h4><ul><li><p><strong>Definition:</strong>Taxincidenceistheultimateeconomicburdenofatax,regardlessofwhoislegallyrequiredtosendthetaxpaymenttothegovernment.</p></li><li><p><strong>GraphicalRepresentation:</strong></p><ul><li><p>Whenataxisplacedon<strong>suppliers</strong>,thesupplycurveshiftsupwardbytheamountofthetax.Thenewequilibriumresultsinahigherpricepaidbybuyersandalowerpricereceivedbysellers.</p></li><li><p>Whenataxisplacedon<strong>buyers</strong>,thedemandcurveshiftsdownwardbytheamountofthetax.Thenewequilibriumresultsinalowerpricereceivedbysellers,whilebuyerseffectivelypaymoreperunit(price+tax).</p></li><li><p><strong>Crucially,thefinalpricespaidbybuyersandreceivedbysellers,andthusthetaxincidence,arethesameregardlessofwhetherthetaxislegallyleviedonbuyersorsellers.</strong>Whatmattersisthetaxwedgeitself.</p></li></ul></li><li><p><strong>EffectofElasticityonIncidence:</strong></p><ul><li><p><strong>Demandmoreelasticthansupply:</strong>Sellersbearmoreofthetaxburden.</p></li><li><p><strong>Supplymoreelasticthandemand:</strong>Buyersbearmoreofthetaxburden.</p></li></ul></li></ul><h5id="dbd02299−9a0d−4ea2−8c82−d0687b813542"data−toc−id="dbd02299−9a0d−4ea2−8c82−d0687b813542"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">PolarCasesforTaxIncidence(PerfectElasticity)</h5><ul><li><p><strong>PerfectlyElasticDemand:</strong>Ifdemandisperfectlyelastic(horizontaldemandcurve),buyerscanperfectlyescapethetax.Theentiretaxburdenfallsonthe<strong>sellers</strong>.</p></li><li><p><strong>PerfectlyElasticSupply:</strong>Ifsupplyisperfectlyelastic(horizontalsupplycurve),sellerscanperfectlyescapethetax.Theentiretaxburdenfallsonthe<strong>buyers</strong>.</p></li><li><p><strong>PerfectlyInelasticDemand:</strong>Ifdemandisperfectlyinelastic(verticaldemandcurve),buyershavenoescape.Theentiretaxburdenfallsonthe<strong>buyers</strong>,andthequantitytradeddoesnotchange.</p></li><li><p><strong>PerfectlyInelasticSupply:</strong>Ifsupplyisperfectlyinelastic(verticalsupplycurve),sellershavenoescape.Theentiretaxburdenfallsonthe<strong>sellers</strong>,andthequantitytradeddoesnotchange.</p><ul><li><p><strong>HistoricalFootnote:</strong>Thisconceptled19th−centurysocialreformerslikeHenryGeorgetoadvocatefortaxesonland,aslandislargelyinelasticallysupplied,ensuringtheburdenfallsonlandowners.</p></li></ul></li></ul><h5id="5e01c5ac−8511−471a−ac4e−4cb92d6e909f"data−toc−id="5e01c5ac−8511−471a−ac4e−4cb92d6e909f"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">PracticalApplicationsofTaxIncidence</h5><ul><li><p><strong>CigaretteTaxes:</strong>Ifcigarettemanufacturerscaneasilymoveproductionoravoidstatetaxes,alargerportionofthetaxwillfallonsmokers.Highstatetaxesmayalsoleadtoconsumerspurchasingcigarettesinotherstates,reducingtheeffectivenessofthetaxasasmokingdeterrentwithinthatstate.</p></li><li><p><strong>HealthInsuranceMandates:</strong>Mandatesrequiringemployerstoprovidehealthinsuranceeffectivelyactasataxonlabor.Thiswilltendtoreducewages,withtheshareofthecostbornebyemployeesdependingontherelativeelasticitiesoflaborsupplyanddemand.Firmsmayalsohaveincentivestoreplaceworkerswithmachines.</p></li><li><p><strong>Analogy:</strong>Inalong−distancerelationship,thepartnerwhoismorecommitted(lesselasticintheirwillingnesstoenduretravel)willdomoreofthedriving,bearingalarger"tax"oftravelcosts.</p></li></ul><h4id="7fce9f3f−0625−4842−89f9−a69fac4d4e6a"data−toc−id="7fce9f3f−0625−4842−89f9−a69fac4d4e6a"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">DeadweightLossofTaxes</h4><ul><li><p><strong>Definition:</strong>Deadweightloss(DWL)occursbecauseataxdistortsmarketincentives,leadingtoareductioninthequantitytradedbelowtheefficientlevel.Itrepresentsthelossintotalsurplus(consumersurplus+producersurplus)thatisnotoffsetbygovernmentrevenue.</p></li><li><p><strong>GraphicalExplanation:</strong></p><ul><li><p><strong>WithoutTax:</strong>Consumersurplus(CS)andproducersurplus(PS)aremaximized.</p></li><li><p><strong>WithTax:</strong>Themarketshrinks.CSandPSbothdecrease.Partofthislossiscapturedbythegovernmentastaxrevenue.However,aportion(theDWL)issimplylostwelfare.Thesearetradesthatwouldhavebeenmutuallybeneficialbutnolongeroccurduetothetax.</p></li><li><p>Forexample,inadiagramwhereinitialCS=A+B+CandPS=D+E+F,afteratax,CS=A,PS=F,andTaxRevenues=B+D.TheareasC+Erepresentthedeadweightloss.</p></li></ul></li><li><p><strong>RelationshipwithElasticity:</strong></p><ul><li><p>Deadweightlossesare<strong>larger</strong>whendemandand/orsupplycurvesaremoreelastic,becausethequantitytradedismoresensitivetothepricechangecausedbythetax,resultinginalargerreductionintrades.</p></li><li><p>Ifdemandand/orsupplycurvesareinelastic,ataxwilldeterfewertrades,leadingtoa<strong>smaller</strong>deadweightloss.</p></li></ul></li><li><p><strong>The"BucketLeaks"Metaphor:</strong>Thisimpliesthatforeverydollaroftaxrevenueraised,thereductioninoverallwelfare(consumerandproducersurplus)isgreaterthanonedollar.</p></li></ul><h5id="224ea8a1−6a3d−4ec4−8412−ae7f26e36f9d"data−toc−id="224ea8a1−6a3d−4ec4−8412−ae7f26e36f9d"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">WhenaTaxCausesNoDeadweightLoss</h5><ul><li><p>Ataxwillnotcauseadeadweightlossifeitherthesupplycurveorthedemandcurveis<strong>perfectlyinelastic</strong>(vertical).</p></li><li><p><strong>Reason:</strong>Whensupplyordemandisperfectlyinelastic,thequantitytradeddoesnotchangeinresponsetothetax.Whilebuyersand/orsellersstillbearthetaxburden,noefficienttradesareprevented,thusnodeadweightlossoccurs.</p></li><li><p>ThisprovidesanotherargumentforaGeorgian−stylelandtax,aslandisconsideredtohaveperfectlyinelasticsupply.</p></li></ul><h5id="5e645f39−59b6−4778−aa48−bb07e242b6e3"data−toc−id="5e645f39−59b6−4778−aa48−bb07e242b6e3"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">DeadweightLossandZeroTaxRevenue</h5><ul><li><p>Itis<strong>false</strong>thatifataxraisesnorevenue,itwillproducenodeadweightloss.</p></li><li><p>Asufficientlyhightaxcanreducethequantitytradedto<strong>zero</strong>,resultingin0taxrevenue(Tax imes 0 = 0).</p></li><li><p>However,asignificantdeadweightlosswillstillexistbecauseallthepotentiallybeneficialtradesthat<em>wouldhaveoccurred</em>intheabsenceofthetaxarenowprevented.</p></li></ul><h5id="6d914187−e096−45d3−b1aa−28cf63c155b3"data−toc−id="6d914187−e096−45d3−b1aa−28cf63c155b3"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">OtherImplicationsofHighTaxes</h5><ul><li><p>Sufficientlyhightaxescanleadtotheemergenceof<strong>illegalorblackmarkets</strong>toavoidthetax.</p><ul><li><p>Example:Discrepanciesincigarettetaxesbetweenstates(e.g.,Missouri:0.17/pack vs. New York: 5.35/pack)canincentivizesmugglingorsalesofsinglecigarettes("loosies").Thisalsopresentsdifferentialimpactsonlawenforcement.</p></li></ul></li></ul><h4id="fbafc92c−1e4d−4194−a544−9420313957c8"data−toc−id="fbafc92c−1e4d−4194−a544−9420313957c8"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">Subsidies</h4><ul><li><p><strong>Definition:</strong>Asubsidyisessentiallyareversetax,wherethegovernmentdirectlygivesmoneytoconsumersorproducersforeachunittraded.</p><ul><li><p>Subsidy=Price{received by sellers} - Price{paid by buyers}.</p></li></ul></li><li><p><strong>ImpactofSubsidies:</strong></p><ul><li><p>Similartotaxes,whoultimatelybenefitsfromasubsidy(orbearsitscost)doesnotdependonwhoreceivesthecheckfromthegovernment.</p></li><li><p>Whobenefitsdependsonthe<strong>relativeelasticitiesofdemandandsupply</strong>.</p></li><li><p>Subsidiesincreasethequantitytradedbeyondtheefficientlevel(thequantitythatwouldbetradedwithoutgovernmentintervention).</p></li><li><p>Subsidiesmustbepaidforbytaxpayers.</p></li></ul></li><li><p><strong>DeadweightLossofSubsidies:</strong></p><ul><li><p>Despitebenefitstoproducersandconsumersthroughincreasedquantityandmorefavorableprices,subsidiesalsocreatea<strong>deadweightloss</strong>.</p></li><li><p>Thisisbecausethegovernmentincursacostgreaterthanthecombinedincreaseinconsumerandproducersurplus.</p></li><li><p><strong>GraphicalExplanation:</strong>Thecosttothegovernmentisthetotalsubsidyamount(Subsidy imes Q_{after-subsidy}).Thegainsinconsumersurplusandproducersurplusarelessthanthistotalcost,withthedifferencebeingthedeadweightloss.</p></li></ul></li></ul><h5id="54ffb421−a376−4bd7−81d1−82904d5f1a6c"data−toc−id="54ffb421−a376−4bd7−81d1−82904d5f1a6c"collapsed="false"seolevelmigrated="true">ApplicationsofSubsidies</h5><ul><li><p><strong>AgriculturalWaterSubsidies(e.g.,California′sCentralValley):</strong>Farmersoftenpaysignificantlylessforwaterthanitsactualcost(20-$30/acre-foot vs. 200-$500/acre-foot). If the demand for California cotton is more elastic than the supply of cotton from farmers (meaning farmers' ability to adjust their production in response to price changes for water is limited), the benefit of these water subsidies largely accrues to the cotton sellers (farmers).