Trade and Conflict in the South China Sea: Portugal and China, 1514-23
A Global History of Trade and Conflict Since 1500: Trade and Conflict in the South China Sea: Portugal and China, 1514-23
Challenging Traditional Views of China and Foreign Trade
Traditional "Truth" Challenged: It was a long-held belief that the Chinese state was historically hostile to foreign trade, and that Chinese people desired trade freedom. This view has anchored perceptions for five centuries that China needed to be "knocked out of its complacency." For two centuries, it supported the argument that capitalism arose in Europe because European states promoted foreign trade, unlike China which was seen as its antithesis.
Chapter's Counter-Argument: This chapter argues against these assumptions, proposing that early modern world history should be seen not as a polarity of East and West, but as a joint process where both sides struggled over the relationship between foreign trade and the state, with violence alternately destabilizing and maintaining this relationship.
Roots of Prejudices: Biases against this view stem from:
Western hostility to Communist China's command economy.
Earlier Western belief that China needed to be "opened up" (a phrase paradoxically revived by Chinese reformists in the ).
Imperialist conviction that only force could overcome China's isolation.
Mercantilist notion of China as a benevolent autocracy protecting domestic assets by demeaning merchants and centralizing decisions in "mandarins" (a Portuguese loan-word from Sanskrit).
Similarities in State Behavior: While China didn't unconditionally open its borders, neither did most European states. The trade-state relationship is not as cleanly bisected as neoliberal ideology suggests, where the state is an arm's-length regulator. In practice, the state is crucial for infrastructure, legal regulation, and security for trade.
Re-examining Early Encounters: The chapter focuses on the first encounters between Portuguese merchants and Chinese officials in the , suggesting that previous historical readings might have rushed to confirm later events, obscuring what actually happened. By observing Chinese officials' actions, a trade-state logic closer to European norms of the time emerges.
Dynamic Chinese Context: Rather than portraying China as passively continuing age-old proclivities, the chapter presents the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) context as dynamic and changing. When the Portuguese arrived, Ming officials were actively revising institutional arrangements governing maritime trade. This revision was disrupted later, leading to a different narrative about China's hostility to trade.
Primary Source: The principal source for this chapter is the Veritable Record (specifically, of the Zhengde Emperor, r. -), an internal summary of daily court deliberations. Unlike the standard Ming dynastic history (compiled much later), it reveals real-time policy debates and the state as a field of action, not a monolithic entity. It shows officials grappling with conflicts arising from trade demands.
Trade and Tribute in the Ming Dynasty
Portuguese Arrival: Portuguese mariners reached China's south coast in . Their journey eastward was remarkably quick—about three decades from their Atlantic forays to Canton, thanks to piggybacking on existing trade networks.
Ming Institutions: Portuguese were unprepared for the institutional complexity of Ming China, having mostly encountered smaller littoral sultanates in the Indian Ocean.
Historical Chinese Maritime Trade Policies:
Song Dynasty (960-1279): Exhibited little anxiety over maritime trade, only requiring foreign traders to report cargoes to the Supervisorate of Maritime Affairs.
Yuan Dynasty (1271-1368): Khubilai Khan initially interdicted maritime trade in the to prevent Song loyalists from receiving foreign aid. In , he imposed a monopoly for revenue, which was relaxed within a year. A complete state monopoly was imposed in and alternated until its lifting in .
Ming Dynasty Founder, Zhu Yuanzhang (r. 1368-98): Ended inconsistent policies by prohibiting private foreign trade for both Chinese and foreign merchants. All foreign trade was channeled through diplomatic, tribute missions.
Tribute System: Foreigners allowed to trade only as members of carefully regulated tribute missions. Their formal purpose was to present tribute to the emperor and receive imperial gifts.
Consensual Fiction: On the Chinese side, it was a fiction that the emperor ruled the world on Heaven's behalf, and other rulers submitted to his authority. Foreign rulers accepted this to gain diplomatic access and trade opportunities.
Strategic Purpose: Zhu Yuanzhang aimed to control coastal comings and goings to consolidate power, viewing absolute prohibitions on overseas contact as fundamental.
Comparative Systems: Since the century, the tribute system (regional hegemon) has been counterposed to the Westphalian system (formal equality of nations). The chapter suggests viewing them as outcomes of different state contexts: Westphalian in a hostile multistate European context, tribute system in a regional system with one superstate.
Shift in Ming Policy Regarding Wealth from Trade:
Profitability: Maritime trade was known to be hugely profitable, attracting commercial families and sailors.
Zhu Yuanzhang's Motive: He sought to monopolize trade not for revenue generation or "growth," but to prevent individuals from amassing wealth that could challenge his state.
Zhengde Emperor's Reign (r. 1506-21): Officials began to suggest that the state could generate fiscal income from the monopoly. Informal coastal trade had increased since the , popularizing the idea of legitimate, taxed foreign trade over the old tribute system.
Contradictions and Institutional Landscape of Ming Trade Policy
Ming Statecraft Philosophy: The state's primary role was to ensure the physical and moral well-being of the people, not necessarily to maximize revenue extraction.
Revenue Sources: Land taxes were the foundation of fiscal income, considered adequate. Commercial taxes were modest ( to percent) and a minor budget item. The tribute system was solely diplomatic, often costing the government more than it received.
Pressure for Revenue from Trade: The lavish profits of maritime trade gradually encouraged officials, especially in Guangdong province, to consider increasing revenue through trade, necessitating its detachment from the tribute system. This was a challenging proposition as the Ming founder explicitly forbade altering basic dynastic institutions.
Institutional Framework for Foreign Relations:
Office of Commercial Shipping (Shibosi / Supervisorate of Maritime Affairs): Handled foreign envoys and initially managed foreign trade. By the early century, it was controlled by eunuchs, who formed a parallel administration loyal to the imperial household, protecting the emperor's financial interests.
Ministry of Rites: Oversaw diplomacy and protocol for foreign relations.
Ministry of War: Responsible for border security.
Provincial Level (Guangdong): Tribute missions arriving by ship were managed by officials in Guangdong.
Grand Coordinator (civil bureaucrat) and Grand Defender (eunuch) supervised Guangdong and Guangxi.
Canton Leadership: Divided among an Administration Commissioner (often dealt with problems from seaborne foreigners), a Surveillance Commissioner/Censor, and a Military Commissioner.
Central Ministry Involvement: Ministries of Rites and War had no direct provincial appointees; they could only review regional decisions or petition the throne.
Early Attempts to Generate Revenue from Trade (Eunuch Activism):
1509 Incident: Siamese ships discovered off Guangdong coast, claiming to be blown off course (likely excuse for unauthorized trade). The grand defender and grand coordinator advised permitting cargo unloading but charging an import duty for the regional military budget (to control smuggling costs).
Eunuch Intervention (Xiong Xuan): Xiong Xuan, director of the Maritime Supervisorate, sought to intervene, requesting full authority to collect duties on irregular cargoes for personal gain or his office. The Ministry of Rites strenuously objected, arguing the supervisorate's role was tribute, not revenue. Emperor Zhengde sided with the Ministry, recalled Xiong.
Bi Zhen's Request (1510): Xiong's replacement, Bi Zhen, requested the exact same authority—levying duties on non-tribute vessels and diverting revenue to the imperial household. The Ministry of Rites again objected, stating the supervisorate's function was "to manage local products brought as tribute" and not to meddle with regulations. The emperor again sided with precedent.
Liu Jin's Influence: The Veritable Record implies Bi Zhen was pressured by chief eunuch Liu Jin (c. -), who was later arrested and executed for massive corruption. This context suggests a transformation was underway on the south coast, with officials seeking to alter the maritime import monopoly to benefit the state.
Debates Over Trade Policy and the Role of Wu Tingju
1514 Criticism of Wu Tingju: Assistant Administration Commissioner Chen Boxian accused his superior, Administration Commissioner Wu Tingju, of allowing maritime trade to get out of hand.
Chen's Concerns: Commodities (pepper, sappan-wood, elephant tusks, tortoise-shell) were not daily necessities. Permitting ad valorem taxes led to "evil persons" building huge ships, purchasing arms, illicitly linking with foreigners, and causing harm. He demanded an immediate stop.
Ministry of Rites' Response (June 27): Supported Chen, insisting foreign ships outside tribute regulations should not be taxed because they shouldn't be allowed to land. Called for punishment of colluding individuals.
Wu Tingju's Stance: Wu Tingju became a "touchstone" for opponents of liberal trade. He was seen as arguing for the fiscal benefits of foreign trade, advocating for "separating trade and diplomacy." He reportedly argued "plausibly for the benefits to be gained and requested that all ships be received," a proposal approved by the grand coordinator, regional inspector, and Ministry of Revenue.
Wu Tingju's Background and Conflicts: Wu Tingju's biography portrays him as an incorruptible official who revitalized his county and resisted corrupt superiors. He had a history of conflict with the eunuch establishment, even being imprisoned by chief eunuch Liu Jin. He was eventually promoted to Left (Senior) Administration Commissioner of Guangdong within a year, despite opposition, suggesting significant support for his policies at higher levels.
The Paradox of Wu Tingju and Pan Zhong: Wu Tingju's adversary, Grand Defender Pan Zhong (a eunuch), also relaxed trade restrictions. The puzzle is resolved by suggesting Pan acted for personal/Supervisorate benefit, creating a precedent. Wu, upon returning to Guangdong in , leveraged this precedent to reallocate collected duties to the provincial budget, away from the eunuchs.
Complexity of Ming Foreign Trade Politics (1510s): The politics were not united against trade. Two main views contended:
Maritime trade should be restricted to authorized tribute missions.
Maritime trade should be recognized as a useful source of state revenue, permitting overseas traders to unload cargoes (regardless of tribute status) upon payment of import duties.
A third, unapproved practice also existed: traders outside the tribute system paying fees to unauthorized agencies (corruption).
Refuting Stereotypes about Ming China: The chapter critiques interpretations (e.g., Paul Kennedy) that paint Ming China as less vigorous or characterized by "sheer conservatism of the Confucian bureaucracy." It asserts that Ming China's political regime, particularly regarding maritime trade and its taxation, was in flux. Even the Ministry of Rites vacillated. This "flux" reveals the actual thoughts and actions of people at the time, debunking stereotypes of inherent state hostility to trade or that pro-trade officials were necessarily corrupt.
Portuguese Unawareness: The Portuguese arrived utterly unaware of this complex and evolving internal Ming context, leading to regrettable impacts.
The Escalation of Conflict (1517-1523)
Early Portuguese Voyages Unnoticed: The first Portuguese voyages to Canton in and did not receive court attention or mention in the Veritable Record.
First Official Mention (June 15, 1517): The Veritable Record first references the "Franks" (Folangji) as an appendix to a directive:
Directive: Ships from foreign countries sending tribute and carrying trade goods were to be taxed at percent, with portions for the capital and local military expenses. This was presented as "keeping with old regulations" (though these were imprecise on import duties).
Significance: This directive recognized the revenue value of allowing full cargo imports, a step towards a serious revision of maritime trade policy.
Retroactive Editor's Note: The Veritable Record compiler inserts a later development (the naval stand-off between Vice Commissioner Wang Hong and Duarte Coehlo, which occurred on June 27, 1521). This anachronism blames "Wu Tingju's fault" for the troubles with the Franks, showing later political interpretation.
Fernão Peres's Mission (1517):
Arrival: Two months after the Veritable Record entry, Fernão Peres led a fleet of eight armed ships to Guangdong, requesting permission to land as a tribute mission.
Hostile Actions: Peres grew impatient and moved ships into the Pearl River mouth (viewed as hostile). He moored at the courier station, flying the Portuguese flag and firing a salute (both seen as inappropriate assertion of foreign sovereignty and a military threat).
Wu Tingju's Response: Wu Tingju rebuked Peres, fearing his conduct would jeopardize the delicate policy shift towards maritime trade. Peres apologized, explaining his actions due to ignorance.
Tribute Request: Peres was allowed to present Portugal's case to the grand coordinator, who forwarded the appeal to Beijing, leaving behind an "ambassador," Thomé Pires.
The Malacca Stumbling Block: The Ming court's main concern was Portugal's forceful ousting of Sultan Mahamet of Malacca in . Malacca was a legitimate Ming tributary, and the Ming felt obligated to support it.
Grand Coordinator's Memorial (February 11, 1518): Revealed the grand coordinator was not sympathetic, noting "Franks" were unknown in Chinese records, lacked documents, and could not be trusted. Recommended detaining envoys.
Ministry of Rites' Decision: Advised against enfeoffing Portugal as a tributary state, ordering the Portuguese to return home.
Portuguese Misconduct (Simão d'Andrade, 1519): Fernão Peres's brother, Simão d'Andrade, captained the next mission. His "outrages" (e.g., executing someone on Ming territory, blocking other ships) destroyed amicable relations, turning Chinese into "deadly enemies."
Debate Intensifies (January 1521):
Qiu Daolong (Moderate Censor): Argued against recognition until the Malacca situation was resolved, suggesting a military solution was unlikely. He advised refusing tribute but explicitly left the door open: "only after they have returned the territory of Malacca [to its ruler] will they be allowed to come to court to offer tribute." Qiu had earlier served as magistrate in Shunde, like Wu Tingju, potentially exposing him to the possibilities of maritime trade.
He Ao (Harsher Censor): Described Franks as "infamous for their cruelty and guile," with superior weapons. Recalled Peres's cannon salute, noting it "shook the city." He advocated for a "final solution": expel all non-tribute foreigners and restore original rules, again blaming Wu Tingju.
Ministry of Rites' Vacillation: Surprisingly, the Ministry sided with Qiu Daolong, suggesting recognition after a thorough Malacca investigation. It still singled out Wu Tingju and emphasized border security but called for no further measures. No action was ever taken against Wu Tingju despite repeated demonization. The possibility of open maritime trade was still alive.
The Crushing Blows (First Half of 1521):
Sea Battle (June 27, 1521): The naval conflict between Wang Hong and Duarte Coelho proved the Portuguese a direct military threat. This provided concrete justification for their exclusion.
Emperor Zhengde's Death (April 20): The emperor's death and the subsequent complex succession to his 13-year-old cousin Jiajing (r. -) suspended court business for half a year. The ensuing political polarization at court halted any moves to liberalize policy, especially on maritime issues, of which the young emperor had no grasp or interest.
Reinforced Ban: In summer , Martim Affonso's request to unload cargo was rejected. The Ministry of Rites hardened its stance, charging the Portuguese with espionage (which was true) and ordering their expulsion. The Ministry of War advised rebuking Portugal over Malacca but stopped short of a naval expedition.
Skirmishes and Ban: After considerable losses in two engagements against the Ming Navy, the Portuguese were banned. This effectively shut down all maritime trade, forcing European (and Chinese) traders into smuggling.
Wu Tingju's Fate: Despite his advocacy, Wu Tingju was promoted to Minister of Works by the new emperor. However, the poisoned political climate reverted policy to a conservative interpretation of tribute trade, and the emperor showed no interest in the issue.
Later Restrictions: In , the court responded to smuggling and piracy by banning all ships of two masts or greater, except authorized tribute embassies.
Attempts to Revive Trade: In , a new grand coordinator attempted to reopen trade, estimating a potential monthly customs revenue of several tens of thousands of taels of silver. This led to a relaxation of trade restrictions, but only for tribute missions.
Reopening in 1567: The coast was not fully reopened until by a newly enthroned emperor, in response to growing Spanish trade demand from Manila.
Consequences and Historiographical Re-evaluation
Immediate Consequence: Banning the Portuguese from trading in China.
Broader Consequences:
Impact of Portuguese Misconduct on Ming Policy:
Disruption of Policy Shift: Canton officials in the had been successfully shifting maritime relations towards more open trade for revenue. Portuguese misconduct, particularly their resort to violence, destroyed these diplomatic efforts, providing clear justification for conservative factions.
Ming Trade Monopoly: Ming officials understood international trade as a state monopoly, requiring registration, inspection, and taxation. This view was shifting from a diplomatic to a revenue-based logic but remained a monopoly, similar to European states of the time (e.g., Portuguese Crown's monopoly).
Portuguese Misjudgment: The Portuguese had grown accustomed to using coercion against smaller, weaker states. They misjudged Ming China, which expected its monopoly to be observed and had the naval capacity to enforce it. The Ming even quickly acquired Portuguese cannon technology through an enterprising police officer, He Ru, in .
Mistimed Violence: Portuguese violence at Malacca and on the China coast was "spectacularly mistimed," preventing their entry into Ming trade. While Macao was eventually acquired as a trading base in , Portugal lost the opportunity for a more effective commercial relationship that might have prolonged its brief Asian empire.
Legacy of Misunderstanding in Chinese Foreign Relations:
"Original Sin" Narrative Critique: The shutting out of the Portuguese has been wrongly portrayed as the "original sin" of Chinese foreign relations, used to support claims of Ming China's "consciously anachronistic grandeur" and its inability to respond intelligently to Europeans. This is dismissed as "hilariously silly nonsense" rooted in anachronistic -century anti-opium rhetoric.
Pervasive Textbook Stereotypes: This misunderstanding continues to pervade modern textbooks, leading to persistent stereotypes: that China has an arrogant foreign policy, is inherently hostile to foreign trade, favors monopoly over free trade, imposes unfair disadvantages, and that any policy deviation is due to factional interests or corruption.
Chapter's Argument for Fluidity: Chinese trade policy in the mid-Ming was fluid and sensitive to global shifts. The virtue or vice of trade depended on whether it generated or minimized conflict. Officials like Wu Tingju saw revenue benefits that could strengthen government capacity and security, while others saw only violence and disorder.
Irony of Portuguese Disruption: Short-term anxiety over Portuguese disruption of both trade and diplomatic relations in the ultimately scuppered a policy change that could have placed China-Europe trade on a very different, more propitious, footing.
Conclusion on Historical Comparison: The Ming state's actions to protect its borders and interests in the were not significantly different from what European states would have done. Ming China is not a counterexample to Renaissance Europe. Significant differences in maritime policy only emerged after the mid-$17^{th}$ century, as global empires shifted and European military technology advanced, enabling unequal terms of trade.
The chapter centers on Portugal.
Question: Would Ming officials have reacted differently if the first Europeans they met were the Spanish, Dutch, or English—who sometimes used diplomacy more carefully?
Chinese merchants’ role:
The text focuses a lot on officials and state policy.
Question: How did Chinese private merchants themselves push back against the trade restrictions? Could their underground trade have shaped policy more than court debates?