Campbell

Selfhood and Godhood

Overview of the Lecture Series

  • Title: Selfhood and Godhood

  • Gifford Lectures at the University of St. Andrews

  • Presented by: C. A. Campbell, Professor of Logic and Rhetoric

  • Years Delivered: 1953-54

  • First Published: 1957

  • Published by: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. and The Macmillan Company in New York.

Lecture IX: Has the Self 'Free Will'?

Introduction to Free Will

  • The lecture builds on earlier discussions regarding self-activity and moral decision-making.

  • It addresses the fundamental question: What is the Free Will problem?

  • Importance of Formulation: Clear definition of the problem is crucial for its solution, as many arguments fail due to lack of precise definition.

Types of Freedom

  • Distinction between various kinds of human freedom.

  • Many debates in philosophy confuse these different types of freedom, leading to inconclusive discussions on Free Will.

Moral Responsibility Connection

  • The central type of freedom discussed is essential for moral responsibility.

  • Free Will as a Precondition: The idea is linked integrally to moral responsibility which makes it a key issue in ethics.

Critical Exploration of Freedom

  • Moral Judgment Mechanics: Analysis of circumstances when moral judgments of praise or blame are appropriately assigned to agents.

  • Role of Inner Acts: Freedom relates not to overt acts but to inner acts reflecting choice; moral responsibilities concern these inner decisions.

Challenges of Authors in Actions

  • Moral freedom requires the individual to be seen as the sole author of their actions.

  • Recognition of external factors like heredity and environment complicates assessments of moral responsibility.

Implications of Sole Authorship

  • One's capacity to be the sole author of actions must be scrutinized to attribute moral blame or praise adequately.

  • Characters influenced by external determinants raise critical inquiries about authorship and moral agency.

Nature of Free Will

Categorical vs. Hypothetical Claims

  • Common belief that moral responsibility implicates the ability "to have acted otherwise".

  • Questioning assumptions about character influencing decisions creates conflict with perceptions of moral responsibility.

Evaluating Philosophical Positions

  • Consideration of philosopher Professor Broad’s work revealing the complexity of defining the Free Will problem.

  • Dismissal of superficial interpretations of freedom that fail to engage with its moral implications.

The Necessity of Moral Freedom

  • Moral praise or blame requires an acknowledgment that an agent could have acted differently.

  • Exploration of common affirmations regarding agents lacking sufficient freedom or different conditions required for accountability.

Evaluating Objections to Free Will

Inner Experience and Moral Decision-making

  • Phenomenological Analysis: Emphasizes the lived experience of moral agents making decisions in moments of temptation.

  • Free will is perceived in scenarios where individuals exert or withhold moral effort to act against their desires.

Distinct Claims Against Free Will

  • Criticisms often revolve around predictability and the perceived meaninglessness of acts if they do not derive from self-character.

Explanation of Free Will

  • Distinction Between Determinism and Libertarianism: Free will doesn’t equate to acting without any influence from established character traits.

  • Betwixt Choice and Nature: The self is thought to possess the ability to act against established traits when facing moral dilemmas.

Conclusion on Free Will

Summary of Key Points

  1. Moral Responsibility vs. Freedom: Explores the presupposition of moral responsibility with respect to acts of genuine choice.

  2. Essential Characteristics of Freedom: Required for moral responsibility entails being the sole author of one's choices and the capacity to choose differently.

  3. Experience of Moral Agents: Agents convinced of their moral capacity deeply informs the understanding of free will.

Addressing Determinist Critiques

  • Critique on predictability does not undermine a Libertarian framework that restricts free will to particular moral situations.

  • Elements of a free act appearing meaningless to external evaluators must be reassessed considering subjective experience; inner experiences provide essential insights into the nature of decisions made.

Final Reflection

  • Real consideration of free will involves acknowledging the interdependence between character, liberty, and moral action across life’s complexities.