US Intelligence in the Cuban Missile Crisis

Introduction

The main question regarding US intelligence during the Cuban missile crisis revolves around the failure to anticipate the Soviet deployment of strategic missiles to Cuba.
Successful detection and identification of missiles in Cuba allowed the US to take the initiative for their removal.
Reasons for the erroneous estimate made before the missile discovery are often overlooked.
Intelligence identified missiles in time for successful American action, despite criticism of reconnaissance flight delays.
Shortcomings existed in identifying other Soviet military elements, including tactical nuclear weapons.
These shortcomings were revealed later through Russian sources and access to Soviet archives in the early 1990s.
This inquiry aims to clarify the historical record using new Russian disclosures and declassified US intelligence materials.
Another aim is to understand the reasons behind the errors and shortcomings in US intelligence.
The impact of more accurate intelligence on the crisis is considered; it is argued that more information could have complicated resolution.
The inquiry seeks to generalize lessons from the American experience regarding the relationship between intelligence and policy.

The US Intelligence Community

The 'intelligence community' comprised independent agencies besides the CIA, with the DCI having a coordinating role.
The Department of Defense housed the largest elements, including the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) created a year before the crisis, and the traditional service intelligence organizations of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
The National Security Agency (NSA) was responsible for signals intelligence (Sigint), particularly communications intelligence (Comint).
The Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) of the Department of State was also a member.
The United States Intelligence Board (USIB), chaired by the DCI, coordinated the intelligence community.
The USIB coordinated National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), drafted by the Office of National Estimates (ONE) in CIA, with input from USIB member agencies.
Dissenting USIB members could include a footnote in the Estimate.
Technical committees and organizations like CIA's National Photographic Intelligence Center (NPIC) provided intelligence support.
Intelligence collection included human intelligence (Humint), such as debriefing Cuban refugees in Opa-Locka, Florida.
No CIA agents in Cuba or the Soviet Union provided firm evidence of the missile deployment.
US military intelligence agencies tracked Soviet arms shipping to Cuba.
Aerial reconnaissance by CIA, and later the US Air Force and US Navy, was the most crucial way to monitor the military buildup, including missile base construction.
Seven U-2 missions targeted Cuba in September and early October.
There were 20 more missions during 15-22 October after missile discovery, and over 400 air reconnaissance flights during the crisis.
Satellite photographic reconnaissance was not directed at Cuba in 1962.
US military intelligence supported military implementation of policy in the field, including the quarantine operation and buildup for potential intervention.

Collection, Analyses, and Estimates

A Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE 85-3-62) was issued on September 19, 1962, concerning the military buildup in Cuba.
The estimate considered the possibility of Soviet deployment of medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs and IRBMs) but concluded against it.
Deployment was deemed to confer 'considerable military advantage,' but risks were considered 'incompatible with Soviet practice to date and with Soviet policy as we presently estimate it'.
The estimate stated that 'this contingency [missile deployment] must be examined carefully, even though it would run counter to current Soviet policy'.
DCI John A. McCone was not present when the SNIE was issued, but his dissent was known.
Acting Director Marshall S. Carter and intelligence community chiefs approved the estimate without dissent.
Some authors of the SNIE argued that the Estimate had been correct and that Khrushchev had been mistaken.
While the American estimators had a better grasp of Soviet interests than Khrushchev did, the estimate incorrectly predicted Soviet actions.
There was insufficient evidence in September 1962 to conclude that Soviet missiles would be placed in Cuba.
The estimate had to rest on an assessment of Soviet intentions, and the past record suggested against deploying strategic nuclear missiles in Cuba.
In retrospect, the SNIE probably should have concluded that the Soviet leaders probably would not place nuclear missiles in Cuba.
It should have given more weight to the possibility that they would do so.
President Kennedy's public statements in early September asserted that the US had no evidence of strategic missiles in Cuba and warned of 'the gravest consequences' if deployment occurred.
These statements aimed to reassure the public and warn the Soviet leaders.
A more cautionary SNIE would not have made a difference, as an effective warning should have preceded the Soviet decision.
An intelligence alert should have been made in the spring of 1962, before Moscow's decision, along with a policy decision to warn Khrushchev.
In early 1962, there was no evidence of possible Soviet deployment of missiles to Cuba.
In March, Castro purged old Moscow-line communist leaders, potentially causing a rift in Cuban-Soviet relations.
Military shipments from the USSR were lower in the first half of 1962.
Evidence before July 1962 suggested that a major Soviet military buildup in Cuba was not likely.

Monitoring the Soviet Buildup in Cuba

Most criticisms have centered on the reluctance (except for DCI McCone) to recognize a higher likelihood of Soviet missile deployment with the buildup of other arms from July to October.
McCone linked his suspicion to the appearance of surface-to-air anti-aircraft missile (SAM) complexes, though there was no direct link.
Castro had sought air defense missiles as early as September 1961, and Moscow decided to send them in April 1962, before considering nuclear-armed medium-range missiles.
The overall buildup of weapons delivery to Cuba beginning in July 1962 was detected and reported, leading to President Kennedy's warnings in early September.
There were reports from agents and refugees of suspicious military activities, including possible missiles, but most were unreliable.
Thousands of reports of missiles in Cuba preceded any actual missile deployment.
Only in late September and early October were a few reports received in Washington that probably were valid sightings of the medium-range missiles, but this couldn't be confirmed at the time.
The existence of many false reports made it difficult to credit the few true ones.
Other intelligence bits were noted, leading to continuing aerial reconnaissance efforts.
Only direct evidence like aerial photographs could be convincing.
Some ambiguous intelligence indications in September-October didn't get enough attention.
Several Soviet merchant ships with large hatches were riding high in the water, indicating bulky, light cargo like missiles.
Some ships unloaded normal cargoes, but others unloaded at night, suggesting special sensitivity.
After missile discovery, it was realized that these ships had brought in the missiles in early to mid-September.
The most significant report came from a recently arrived refugee in mid-September who saw a convoy of SS-4 missiles near Havana on 12 September.
The refugee accurately described and identified the SS-4 missile.
These were evidently SS-4 missiles unloaded from the Omsk, which arrived in Cuba on 9 September.
The screening center sent its report immediately, and it was received by key analysts on 21 September, with general distribution on 27 September.
DIA analysts evaluated it as 'potentially significant,' although not sufficient for a firm conclusion.
A second report, of the sighting by another source on 17 September of the same or another convoy with possible SS-4 missiles, was received on 27 September (with general distribution on 1 October).
Both CIA and DIA analysts then took seriously the possibility of SS-4 missiles in Cuba.
Coupled with suspicions in DIA regarding the pattern of SA-2 surface-to-air missile sites in Western Cuba and other unconfirmed reports, these reports contributed to targeting the area around San Cristobal in the Pinar del Rio province.
On 3 October, the San Cristobal area was given top priority for attention.
The interagency Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR) agreed to fly U-2 reconnaissance over that area as soon as weather permitted.
On 14 October, a U-2 photographed the first MRBM sites under construction at San Cristobal.
There were delays in flying U-2 reconnaissance missions over Cuba in the period from September 6 to October 14, due to Secretary of State Dean Rusk's concerns about a U-2 being shot down and bad weather.
Secretary Rusk requested peripheral flights with slant photography, which proved ineffective.
The weather was very bad during most of September and the first half of October, causing many planned flights to be canceled or postponed.
There was also a transfer of responsibility for flights from the CIA to the US Air Force, but it did not cause delays.
At best, the missile sites would only have been discovered a few weeks earlier, as coverage in September would have shown nothing identifiable as missile site construction.
Discovery a week or two earlier in October wouldn't have changed the situation faced by the President and his advisers.

Assessing Soviet Motives

The real shortcoming was not in collection or analysis, but in assessments of Soviet intentions and motivations for placing missiles in Cuba.
New material from former Soviet sources sheds light on Soviet motivations.
Nikita Khrushchev had three considerations in view: a need to shore up the strategic balance with the United States, a perceived need to deter an attack by the United States on Cuba, and a belief that a successful missile deployment would have a positive impact on world politics.
Historians' judgments vary on the relative weight of these considerations.
President Kennedy, his advisers, DCI McCone, and National Intelligence Estimates focused on Khrushchev's desire to enhance the Soviet strategic position and global political standing.
CIA analysts gave attention to deterring an American attack on Cuba, but this was absent from the National Intelligence Estimates and discussions by policymakers.
A CIA memorandum on October 16 expressed the belief that 'The Soviet leaders' decision to deploy ballistic missiles to Cuba testifies to their determination to deter any active US intervention to weaken or overthrow the Castro regime'.
It also suggested that the unexpected Soviet 'willingness to accept the risks involved in deploying missiles to Cuba … underscore^] the importance Moscow attaches to demonstrating the alleged shift in the world balance of power in favor of the bloc', and the Soviet expectation that this shift 'will eventually oblige the West to come to an accommodation on Berlin'.
In a memorandum prepared for Director McCone's presentation to the ExComm discussion on 17 October, two objectives were identified for the Soviet missile deployment: to 'provide Cuba with an offensive or retaliatory power for use if attacked', and to 'enhance Soviet strike capability against the United States'.
McCone emphasized the latter objective and never mentioned the former in the ExComm discussions.
Most discussions in the ExComm centered on Khrushchev seeking to bolster his stance militarily and politically.
The central concern for the President and most of his advisers was a renewed Soviet push to eject the West from Berlin.
The dominant consideration was the test of credibility of commitment and determination for the United States and President Kennedy personally.
Hence the consensus that the United States must stand firm and get the Soviet missiles out of Cuba.
Two Special National Intelligence Estimates were prepared after discovery of the missile deployment on 19 and 20 October.
These estimates were to aid policy makers in gauging probable Soviet reactions to alternative American actions.
The first estimate said a 'major Soviet objective in their military buildup in Cuba is to demonstrate that the world balance of force has shifted so far in their favor that the US can no longer prevent the advance of Soviet offensive power even into its own hemisphere'.
Two paragraphs later, it remarked that 'They would probably expect their missile forces in Cuba to make some contribution to their total strategic capability vis-a-vis the US'.
The second estimate upgraded its evaluation of the military contribution of the deployment, adding along with the prior sentiment: 'At the same time, they expect their missile forces in Cuba to make an important contribution to their total strategic capability vis-a-vis the US.'
The second estimate stated more strongly the likelihood of a further continuing missile buildup if the United States acquiesced.
In the first ExComm meetings on October 16, several participants referred in passing to the inadequacy of Soviet intercontinental missile forces as a likely motivation.
Little attention was given to this factor.
The SNIEs recognized the Soviet purpose of enhancing their strategic forces in the intercontinental balance but did not note the balance was heavily tilted in favor of the United States and that the Soviet leaders might have a defensive motivation in seeking to redress the strategic imbalance.
Only the offensive side of this motivation was recognized, particularly in the October 20 estimate that 'A major immediate consequence [of US acquiescence in the missile deployment in Cuba] would be that the Soviets would probably estimate lower risks in pressing the US hard in other confrontations, such as Berlin.