Saul Kripke's Naming and Necessity - Detailed Notes

Preface of Naming and Necessity

The preface serves as an introduction to the re-publication of Saul Kripke's influential work, discussing its impact on analytic philosophy upon initial release. Kripke notes his initial intention to revise the lectures but decided against extensive changes as a way to preserve the original spark of ideas. He only made minor corrections and clarifications.

He highlights the origins of his ideas from earlier work in modal logic during the 1960s. The prevailing ideas he abandoned primarily revolved around Frege and Russell's theories of meaning. One significant realization was the distinction between using a description for meaning and using it to fix a reference. This led to the realization that names in natural language could be seen as rigid designators, which contrasts with the notion that identities involving ordinary names are contingent.

Kripke emphasizes that identity is an internal relation, and discusses how rigid designators inform philosophical discourse. He admits weaknesses in his earlier arguments and expresses a desire to clarify any misconceptions in the text but maintains that the principal theses of his original work hold firm.

Lecture I: January 20, 1970

The first lecture introduces the distinction between names and definite descriptions, positing that proper names refer directly to objects without the need for descriptive content. Kripke argues against the view that names are merely shorthand for a cluster of properties associated with the objects they refer to. Instead, he posits that names serve as rigid designators, referring to the same object in every possible world, thus exemplifying necessity in identity statements.

Identity statements involving names, such as "Hesperus is Phosphorus," reflect a necessary truth when both are understood as referring to Venus. The distinction between rigid and non-rigid designators becomes crucial: while rigid designators always refer to the same object across all possible worlds, non-rigid designators depend on the conditions described, which may change across different possible worlds.

This rigidity means that, for instance, if we consider hypothetical scenarios, Hesperus cannot both be and not be Phosphorus; thus, the identity statement must hold in all cases where both entities exist within the same context. Kripke critiques the classical description theory of names which suggests that identifying descriptions suffice to understand reference.

Lecture II: January 22, 1970

The second lecture focuses on identity statements between names, exploring their implications for the understanding of necessity and a priori knowledge. He contends that while practical usages of names often involve descriptions, true identity seems to defy empirical verification and should be accepted as necessary.

Kripke examines the implications of such identity claims in scientific contexts, contrasting them with the flexible nature of common name groupings within our nomenclature systems. He introduces the idea that correlations observed in empirical contexts do not imply necessary truths about identity within those contexts.

He navigates through essential properties of names and their meanings and emphasizes the necessity of philosophical clarity in discussing them. The implications for theories about natural kinds become central as these considerations challenge previous philosophical assumptions about language and reference.

Lecture III: January 29, 1970

In the final lecture, Kripke further develops his argument, noting that while empirical truths might be contingent, necessary truths about identities, particularly in the realm of rigid designators, contribute significantly to our philosophical understanding. The interplay between identity, reference, and necessity becomes a focal point as he critiques the established notions allowing for ambiguity in identity claims.

He presents examples of terms-to-objects identification, illustrating how various references can exist without violating logical or philosophical clarity. This materially supports his broader conclusions on identity's necessity and insists on clear demarcations between epistemology and metaphysics regarding claims about existence and identity.

Finally, he asserts his stance against contemporary philosophical narratives adopted by previous theorists, advocating for a more nuanced understanding that refutes mere cluster descriptions as sole determinants for naming and identifies the functions of proper names as core to their essential identities.

Summary Points

  1. Rigid Designators: Names refer to the same object in every possible world, making identity statements necessary when true.

  2. Distinction between Names and Descriptions: Names do not merely abbreviate descriptions; they establish direct references, necessitating clear understanding in philosophical terms.

  3. Scientific Context: While theoretical identifications show relations between entities, they hold necessary values rather than being arbitrarily defined through common usage.

  4. Identity Statements: True identity involving names is necessary, reflecting a deeper philosophical understanding of reference.

This work has reshaped discourse in semantics, identity theory, and the philosophy of language, encouraging rigorous examination of existing theories.