Benitez, R. 2016 - PLATO AND THE SECULARISATION OF GREEK THEOLOGY
Mythical Theology vs. Philosophical Theology
Marsilio Ficino defines the human soul as divine and indivisible, created by an incorporeal creator.
Ficino identifies ancient theologians (theologi) such as Zoroaster, Mercury, Orpheus, Aglaophemus, Pythagoras, and Plato.
Aristotle is distinguished as a natural philosopher (physicus), separate from the theologians.
Aristotle observed a distinction between theologians (θεόλογοι) and natural philosophers (φύσικοι, φυσιολόγοι).
Many natural philosophers were concerned with gods and divine things.
Thales: "all things are full of gods".
Anaximander: Time as the assessor and punisher of cosmic wrongdoing.
Heraclitus: References to gods (generic and specific) appear more than twenty times.
Parmenides: Mythological imagery with deities like Heliades, Nux and Hemar, Dike, Ananke and Eros.
Empedocles: Mentions 'the gods' frequently, referring to Zeus, Poseidon, Ares, Aphrodite, Cypris, Nestis, Charis, Cydoemus and Calliope.
New Gods:
Anaximander and Anaximenes: May have referred to τὸ ἄπειρον and αἔρ as divine.
Heraclitus: Speaks of ὁ θεός.
Fragment 67: 'day night winter summer war peace satiety hunger'.
Xenophanes: Describes ‘one God, greatest among gods and men, similar to mortals in neither body nor mind’.
*Fragment 23.Empedocles: Refers to the sphere of all things as a 'holy mind'.
Fragment 134.
Anaxagoras: Made νοῦς 'infinite', 'unmixed', 'self-sufficient', 'all-knowing' and 'greatest in strength'.
Fragment 12.
Aristotle acknowledged natural philosophers' interest in theology, construing their investigations of first principles in terms of the 'understanding of divine things'.
God is considered among the causes of all things and a first principle (ἀρχή).
Aristotle coins the term θεολογική to describe divine science.
Metaph. 1026a19 and 1064b3.
Aristotle's distinction between θεόλογοι and φύσικοι is based on the manner of representation, not the objects targeted.
θεόλογοι speak 'mythically' (μυθικῶς), in a way that is 'beyond us' (ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς).
Aristotle considers mythical subtleties not worthy of serious consideration.
Mythical theology is about thinking about the gods expressed in esoteric terms.
Philosophical theology is about thinking about the gods expressed in clear and univocal terms.
Zoroaster, Mercury, Orpheus, Aglaophemus, and Pythagoras belong on the mythical side.
Aristotle belongs on the philosophical side.
Two Tendencies in Philosophical Theology
Doxographic tradition presents philosophical theology with secular features, including:
Omission of mythological material.
Demythologisation ('de-theologization') of concepts like gods, the divine, and soul.
Two tendencies in the philosophical secularisation of theology:
Metaphysical reduction: Reducing gods from persons to abstract principles, ultimately referring to one primary principle (divine ἀρχή).
Meta-ethical reduction: Reducing gods from agents to a standard of teleological perfection, providing direction for the universe.
Aristotle's Theology:
Metaphysical reduction:
God is described as 'eternal', 'substance', 'actuality' (ἀΐδιον καὶ οὐσία καὶ ἐνέργεια, 1072a25), and 'first principle' (ἀρχή, 1072b11).
God is 'substance and eternal and motionless and separate from perceptible things' (οὐσία τις ἀΐδιος καὶ ἀκίνητος καὶ κεχωρισμένη τῶν αἰσθητῶν, 1073a4–5).
God 'has no size … but rather is without part and indivisible' (μέγεθος οὐδὲν ἔχειν … ἀλλ’ ἀμερὴς καὶ ἀδιαίρετός ἐστιν, 1073a5–7).
Meta-ethical reduction:
Rejection of imperfect gods of poetry.
'It is not possible for the divine to admit of envy' (983a2–3).
Consideration of God's thinking: 'if [God] thought nothing, what would be the dignity (τὸ σέμνον) in that?' (1074b17–18).
God 'thinks what is most divine and most honourable, and that does not change; for any change would be change for the worse' (1074b25–7).
Aristotle's first principle:
Incapable of agency, but provides direction.
Moves things 'ὡς ἐρώμενον' (1072b4) - 'beloved' in the sense of being a 'that towards which', a teleological principle.
Evidence of metaphysical and meta-ethical reduction in the Presocratics
Plato and Secularised Theology
Republic (377–83): Central theological passage.
Concerned about tales of gods usurping their fathers and committing barbarous acts.
Condemnation of Homer and Hesiod's stories about the gods (377d).
Emphasis on portraying God 'such as he really happens to be' (οἷος τυγχάνει ὁ θεὸς ὤν, 379a7).
God's attributes include moral perfections ('good', 'beneficial', 'best', 'fairest') and reductive ontological properties ('simple', 'unaltering').
Shift from plural οἱ θέοι to singular ὁ θεός.
Indicates an abstract theology focusing on the nature of divine being as a whole.
God is described as:
'Simple' (ἁπλοῦν) and 'least of all able to depart from his own form (ἰδέα)' (380d1–6).
'Each of them, being as fair and good as possible, abides forever simply in his own form (ἕκαστος αὐτῶν μένει ἀεὶ ἁπλῶς ἐν τῇ αὑτοῦ μορϕῇ)' (381c7–9).
Meta-ethical reduction:
Insistence that God is the cause (αἴτιον) exclusively of good things.
'Then the good isn’t the cause of everything, but rather the cause of good things, not the cause of bad ones' (Οὐκ ἄρα πάντων γε αἴτιον τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν εὖ ἐχόντων αἴτιον, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἀναίτιον, 379b15–16).
Form of the Good:
Replaces god in Plato’s philosophy.
The Demiurge of Plato’s Timaeus is viewed as a mythical stand-in for the Form of the Good by some scholars.
Plato's dialogues express more religious and mythical ideas, including the existence and actions of the gods.
Socratic dialogues maintain a commitment to the gods.
Middle dialogues argue for the immortality of the soul, often with eschatological myths.
Phaedo (63b5–c7): Socrates expects to enter the company of wise and good gods after death.
Late dialogues exhibit piety.
Plato’s characters make prayers.
Expressions of religious beliefs:
Recognition of divine inspiration as the source of vision and understanding.
Bonds of friendship and love between men and gods.
Commitment to the value of service to the gods.
John Mikalson details Plato's adherence to traditional Greek religious beliefs and practices.
Mythical theology and religion appear in Plato’s dialogues as homily for the masses.
The Republic and Laws stress the importance of pious myths told to children.
Myths instill faith in the existence of the gods.
Accompanying Plato’s myths, a pragmatic coda emphasizes the usefulness of belief.
Plato's Philosophical Mythology
Laws X: Athenian reviews early accounts about the gods.
Anticipates Aristotle’s distinction of θεόλογοι from φύσικοι.
The older, versified λόγοι discuss theogony (θεογονίαν, 886c3).
Athenian contrasts these with λόγοι of contemporary thinkers, who assert that Sun, Moon, Stars and Earth are merely earth and stones (886d6).
Contemporary thinkers generate things by nature or chance (φύσιν καὶ τύχην, 889a5).
The Athenian describes his attack on the natural philosophers as 'dispassionate' and 'sufficiently probative'.
Plato has more affinity for the older, mythical theology than for the new theology of the natural philosophers.
He opposes the θεόλογοι because their stories are false and the φύσικοι because their entire approach to theology is wrong-headed.
In many dialogues, Plato expresses difficulty knowing or expressing anything accurate about the gods.
Cratylus: 'of the gods we know nothing, either about them or their names' (400d7–8).
Timaeus: 'the father and maker' of the universe is 'a task' to discover and impossible to explain to all (28c3–5).
Xenophanes: ‘Indeed not from the beginning did gods intimate all things to mortals, but as they search in time they discover better’.
*Fragment 18.Socrates in the Meno: 'if we think we must seek what we don’t know, we will be better, braver and less dull (ἀγροί) than if we think that what we don’t know we cannot discover, and nor must we look' (86b7–c2).
In the Phaedrus, Socrates dismisses demythologising.
Demythologisation pretends to replace a myth with a logos that is fully rectified, but it really only replaces one picture with another.
With regard to the gods and the forms, the beautiful lie and the likely story are all we have: 'because we don’t know the truth about antiquity, we liken the false to the true as much as possible and so make it useful' (R. 382d1–3).
DIRECT QUOTES
Mythical theology and philosophical theology
Aristotle is too well aware of these views to suggest that the natural philosophers were not interested in theology.
On the contrary, he construes their investigations of first principles in terms of the ‘understanding of divine things’ ( τις τῶν θείων [sc. ἐπιστήμη ], 983a7) – ‘for God seems to be among the causes of all things and to be a fi rst principle ( ἀρχή )’ (983a8–9) – and he treated this understanding as ‘most honourable’ (983a4) and ‘second to none’ (983a11).
Evidently, Aristotle considers himself to be following in their footsteps (and taking a few of his own) in the passages of Metaphysics where he discusses divine science. He even coins a new term, θεολογική , to describe it.
So his distinction between θεόλογοι and φύσικοι cannot be that the former were concerned with the gods and divine things, while the latter are concerned only with nature and natural things.
Aristotle’s distinction is not based on the objects targeted, but rather on the manner in which those objects are represented.
While it is difficult to be sure exactly who Aristotle would identify as οἱ θεόλογοι , it seems likely that they do not include the most ancient poets or the natural philosophers, but certain men in between, who spoke ‘mythically’ ( μυθικῶς ), either in whole or in part.
To speak mythically about the gods, however, is not simply or not even to use poetic language.
It is, Aristotle says, to speak in a way that is ‘beyond us’ ( ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς , 1000a15). For that reason, he concludes that the ‘mythical subtleties’ of the θεόλογοι are not worthy of serious consideration (1000a18–19).
The English words ‘theologian’ and ‘natural philosopher’ present the distinction found in Ficino and Aristotle in a distorted way. The theologians and the natural philosophers both have much to say about the gods.
The distinction is rather between ‘mythical theology’, understood as thinking about the gods expressed in esoteric terms, and ‘philosophical theology’, understood as thinking about the gods expressed, as far as possible, in clear and univocal terms.
Expressed this way, Aristotle’s and Ficino’s distinctions match up rather neatly: Zoroaster, Mercury, Orpheus, Aglaophemus and Pythagoras all belong on the mythical side, while Aristotle himself belongs on the philosophical side. But where does Plato belong?
Ficino may have been mistaken to place him in such a fantastic succession. Plato has too much in common with philosophical theology for that.
Yet he is not a ‘natural philosopher’ – in some places he reacts against natural philosophy – and he resists taking the final steps towards the philosophical theology represented in Aristotle and the doxographic tradition. To see that, however, we first need a clearer picture of the main trends in that tradition.
Two Tendencies in Philosophical Theology
The most complete narrative of philosophical theology comes from Aristotle and the doxographic tradition.
Jaap Mansfeld and David Runia have argued that ‘[r]ight from its origin in the writings of Aristotle and Theophrastus the doxographical tradition was a body of doctrine with pronounced “secular” features’
These secular features include the omission of mythological material (Runia, 1997 : 103), and the demythologisation (Mansfeld: ‘de-theologization’, 2013: 331) of concepts such as god, the divine and soul.
In particular, we can observe two tendencies in the tradition.
First, there is a tendency to regard philosophical theology as reducing the gods from persons to abstract principles. This ‘metaphysical’ reduction also generally involves a reduction in the number of divine beings, ultimately referring them to one primary principle: a divine ἀρχή .
Secondly, there is a tendency to regard philosophical theology as reducing the gods from agents to a standard of teleological perfection. This ‘meta-ethical’ reduction stems from refl ection about what is befi tting the nature of (a) god. Such reflections lead to ideas of goodness and perfection that provide direction for the universe.
Both tendencies can be observed in Aristotle’s theology.
He clearly regards metaphysical reduction as progress.
Well before he uses the name ‘God’ for the fi rst unmoved mover, he calls it ‘eternal’, ‘substance’, ‘actuality’ ( ἀΐδιον καὶ οὐσία καὶ ἐνέργεια , 1072a25) and ‘first principle’ ( ἀρχή , 1072b11, cf. ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ὄντων , 1073a23). After a brief five lines in which he reassigns the name ‘God’ to this object (1072b25–30)
Aristotle returns to abstract descriptors. It is ‘substance and eternal and motionless and separate from perceptible things’ ( οὐσία τις ἀΐδιος καὶ ἀκίνητος καὶ κεχωρισμένη τῶν αἰσθητῶν , 1073a4–5). It ‘has no size … but rather is without part and indivisible’ ( μέγεθος οὐδὲν ἔχειν … ἀλλ ’ ἀμερὴς καὶ ἀδιαίρετός ἐστιν , 1073a5–7).
Aristotle admits that the most venerable ancients were right to think that the first substances were gods ( ὅτι θεοὺς … τὰς πρώτας οὐσίας εἶναι , 1074b9), but apart from that, he says, ‘this is the only one of their beliefs that is clear to us’ (1074b13–14).
There is also evidence of the meta-ethical reduction in Aristotle.
Some of it is littered in statements that imply a rejection of the imperfect gods of poetry.
For example he says that ‘it is not possible for the divine to admit of envy’ (983a2–3, evidently because envy would not befit a god). Elsewhere, he asks, ‘how can gods who need food be eternal?’ (1000a17–19).
There is some direct evidence of metaphysical and metaethical reduction in the Presocratics, though whether there was really anything like a consistent secularisation of mythical theology is difficult to tell.
What we can say, however, is that Aristotle and the doxographic tradition generally represent Presocratic theology that way, and that puts us in a sufficient position to ask what Plato’s place in such a progression would be.
This could have important consequences for a history of theology. If Plato fits snugly into the progression, there is reason to treat philosophers’ secularisation of theology as more than just a construal by Aristotle and the doxographical tradition.
If he does not, the story of philosophers’ involvement with theology is more complex than the tradition acknowledges.
Plato and Secularised Theology
It is not hard to find support in Plato for the two tendencies in philosophical theology just described. In fact, both the metaphysical and the meta-ethical reductions figure prominently in a central theological passage of the Republic (377–83).
The context is a concern that Socrates has about tales of gods usurping their fathers and committing barbarous acts.
Socrates and Adimantus condemn the stories of Homer and Hesiod about the gods (377d), particularly for ‘picturing [the gods] badly’ ( εἰκάζῃ τις κακῶς , 377e1).
Socrates says that by ‘picturing badly’ he means inaccurately, like painters who make their paintings ‘nothing like’ ( μηδὲν ἐοικότα , 377e2) their models.
Acceptable stories must, he insists, portray God ‘such as he really happens to be’ ( οἷος τυγχάνει ὁ θεὸς ὤν , 379a7).
This shows that the passage is metaphysical as well as meta-ethical: it is concerned with the moral propriety of Greek myths, but it is also concerned with the being of God and his attributes.
These attributes include not only moral perfections like ‘good’ (ἀγαθός , 379b1), ‘beneficial’ ( ὀφηλιμόν , 379b11), ‘best’ ( ἄριστα , 381b4) and ‘fairest’ ( καλλιστος , 381c8), but also reductive ontological properties like ‘simple’ ( ἁπλοῦν , 380d5) and ‘unaltering’ ( οὔτε αὐτὸς μεθίσταται , 382e9).
Because God is already always ‘the best in every way’ (381b4), he has no desire to change (381c). In fact, it is only a short inference from here to the conclusion, drawn elsewhere in Plato, that the gods do not feel any desire at all.
Moves like those in Aristotle’s metaphysical reduction are plain to see in this passage. There is first of all a startling switch from the plural οἱ θέοι to the singular ὁ θεός .
. The plural alone is used in the introduction of the theme, from 377e to 379a. Then, immediately after Socrates asks, ‘What would be the patterns for [sc. correct] theology?’ ( οἱ τύποι περὶ θεολογίας τίνες ἂν εἶεν ; 379a5–6) he begins to use the singular.
The plural reappears frequently when referring to the content of particular myths or to directions for mythmakers, but Socrates consistently returns to the singular when referring to what should be said, or when drawing theological inferences.
While this need not indicate a monotheistic tendency, it suggests an abstract theology in which the nature of divine being, considered as a whole, is the focus.
Furthermore, in the central part of the passage (380d1–6) Socrates asks Adimantus: ‘Do you think that God is … capable of making himself appear … now in one form ( ἰδέα ), now in another, instantly changing himself and altering his own shape (εἶδος), into many forms (μορφάς) … or that he is simple (ἁπλοῦν) and least of all able to depart from his own form (ἰδέα)?’
After a few short exchanges they conclude (381c7–9): ‘It is impossible … even for [a] god to want to alter himself ( αὑτὸν ἀλλοιοῦν ), but, so it seems, each of them, being as fair and good as possible, abides forever simply in his own form (ἕκαστος αὐτῶν μένει ἀεὶ ἁπλῶς ἐν τῇ αὑτοῦ μορ ϕ ῇ ).’
Although the subject of this passage is theology, the language is the same as that used elsewhere of Platonic forms, and clearly exhibits a tendency towards metaphysical abstraction
The meta-ethical reduction is evident in the same passage. Consider Socrates’ insistence that God is the cause ( αἴτιον ) exclusively of good things.
This assertion is repeated twelve times in a little over one Stephanus page (379b–380d). At the heart of the repetition is an intriguing alteration of expression.
Socrates drops the concrete subject ‘God’ and instead uses the abstract subject ‘the good’ ( τὸ ἀγαθόν ): ‘Then the good isn’t the cause of everything’, he says, ‘but rather the cause of good things, not the cause of bad ones’ ( Οὐκ ἄρα πάντων γε αἴτιον τὸ ἀγαθόν , ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν εὖ ἐχόντων αἴτιον , τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἀναίτιον , 379b15–16).
This little instance of the meta-ethical reduction looks forward to Book VI and the discussion of the Form of the Good
According to many secularising Plato scholars, the Form of the Good replaces god in Plato’s philosophy. These scholars even view the Demiurge of Plato’s Timaeus just as a mythical stand-in for the Form of the Good
It is impossible to read Plato’s dialogues, however, and turn a deaf ear to all the passages that express something altogether more religious and mythical.
The dialogues of all periods are filled with assertions both about the existence and the actions of the gods. The Socratic dialogues maintain a peculiar but discernable commitment to them.
The middle dialogues argue repeatedly and earnestly for the immortality of the soul, often affixing eschatological myths to the arguments.
In the Phaedo (63b5–c7), Socrates speaks of his expectation to enter the company of wise and good gods after his death, and he asserts with extraordinary confi dence that he will find in the other world divine masters who are supremely good.
The late dialogues exhibit a fervent piety, from the invocation of the gods by Timaeus at the start of his speech, to the pilgrimage to the cave of Zeus in the Laws. Indeed, we often find Plato’s characters making prayers and occasionally even having them answered
Moreover, across the whole corpus there are expressions of religious beliefs to which Plato seems to have more than a little attachment.
These beliefs, which ostensibly depend on mythical theology, include: a recognition of divine inspiration as the source of vision and understanding, a supposition of bonds of friendship and love between men and gods and a commitment to the value of service to the gods.
Recently, John Mikalson ( 2010 ) has detailed Plato’s adherence to a whole range of traditional Greek religious beliefs and practices. The evidence is thorough enough to place a burden of explanation on those who regard Plato as secularising theology
According to the most common explanation, mythical theology and the religion that stems from it appear in Plato’s dialogues as homily for the masses.
Some evidence for this view comes from the programmes for education outlined in the Republic and Laws . Both dialogues stress the importance of pious myths told by mothers and nurses to their children. These tales should have a genuine likeness to their subjects ( R. 377e), and should be sung over infants ‘like charms’ ( Lg. 887d4).
They should be heard again in sacrifi ces and prayers, and seen in the spectacles that accompany them, and treated with utmost seriousness ( Lg. 887d7).
And their effect should be to instil faith that the existence of the gods is beyond a shadow of a doubt. And it is not just the young who would benefi t from such beliefs. It is regular to fi nd, accompanying Plato’s myths, a pragmatic coda emphasising the usefulness of belief, whether or not the story is actually true.
In short, according to this explanation, mythical theology operates, just as Aristotle says it does, ‘with a view to persuasion of the many and to legal and pragmatic utility’ ( Metaph. 1074b4–5). On this view, the true theology is the philosophical, secularised one; mythical theology is for the masses
Plato’s Philosophical Mythology
There is good evidence, however, that this was not Plato’s approach. It comes from a passage in Laws X , where the Athenian reviews some of the early accounts about the gods. (Pl. Lg . 886b10 – e2, trans. A. E. Taylor)
Here we see that Plato anticipated Aristotle’s distinction of θεόλογοι from φύσικοι . Importantly he regards them all as being concerned with the gods
The Athenian speaks of certain accounts about the gods ( λόγοι … περὶ θεῶν , 886b10–c1), some in verse and some in prose. The older, versifi ed λόγοι discuss theogony ( θεογονίαν , 886c3).
Although the Athenian scorns these λόγοι , he contrasts them with the even more objectionable λόγοι of contemporary thinkers, who assert that ‘Sun, Moon, Stars and Earth’ (886d6) are merely ‘earth and stones’ (886d8).
These are later described as generating things not by theogony, but ‘by nature or chance’ ( φύσιν καὶ τύχην , 889a5). 36 The speeches that follow report the views of various Presocratics, albeit anonymously (esp. 889b–890b).
There are echoes of Anaxagoras and Empedocles, but the language seems designed to roll the views of many into one.
At any rate, the contemporary thinkers are ultimately said to include ‘all who have ever engaged in inquiry about nature’ ( ὁπόσοι πώποτε τῶν περὶ φύσεως ἐφήψαντο ζητημάτων , 891c8–9).
The Athenian describes his attack on the natural philosophers as both ‘dispassionate’ ( μὴ θυμῳ , 887c7) and ‘suffi ciently probative’ (cf. τεκμήρια … ἱκανά , 885e2–3).
Consequently, the passage suggests that Plato cannot have too much sympathy with the Aristotelian approach to theology, despite the many things he says elsewhere that seem to lend support to it.
While we need not agree with Solmsen ( 1936 : 208) that ‘[i] t seems certain that what Plato aims at in this book is a restoration of the gods to their old position and dignity’, it seems clear that he has much more affinity for the older, mythical theology than for the new theology of the natural philosophers.
He opposes the θεόλογοι because their stories are false, but he opposes the φύσικοι because their entire approach to theology is wrong-headed.
But why should Plato have more affi nity for the θεόλογοι than the φύσικοι? The answer comes from an unexpected quarter.
In many dialogues, he expresses difficulty in coming to know or express anything accurate about the gods.
In the Cratylus Socrates says that ‘of the gods we know nothing, either about them or their names’ (400d7–8).
A little later he says that ‘knowing nothing of the truth about them [sc. the gods] we picture them according to human beliefs’ (425c1–3).
It is clear from the sequel, however, that Socrates treats our state of unknowing as contingent; he does not say the gods are unknowable.
Similarly, at Timaeus 28c3–5, Timaeus declares that ‘the father and maker’ of the universe is ‘a task’ ( ἔργον ) to discover and, having discovered him, he is impossible to explain to all.
Yet this statement does not imply the impossibility of having any understanding, or of being able to communicate what little one understands to others.
That would defy Timaeus’ entire subsequent discourse. Rather, these statements reflect a theological uncertainty like that previously expressed by Xenophanes, a poet who seems not to be included in the Athenian’s diatribe against natural philosophy in the Laws , and who is treated rather ambiguously by Aristotle.
Xenophanes had said, ‘Indeed not from the beginning did gods intimate all things to mortals, but as they search in time they discover better’ (fr. 18, trans. Lesher).
This statement does not express agnosticism about the gods so much as a faithfulness in their benevolent reward for our hard work. It is reminiscent of the attitude of Socrates in the Meno that ‘if we think we must seek what we don’t know, we will be better, braver and less dull ( ἀγροί ) than if we think that what we don’t know we cannot discover, and nor must we look’ (86b7–c2).
This is not homily for the masses so much as heuristics for everyone.
When, in the Phaedrus , Socrates dismisses the activity of demythologising, he does so because it would require the ‘full rectifi cation’ (cf. ἐπανορθοῦσθαι , 229d6) of the ‘defi nition’ ( εἶδος , d6) of centaurs and chimerae and all sorts of other beings – and that, he observes rather drily, would ‘require a lot of time’ ( πολλῆς … σχολῆς δεήσει , 229e3–4).
The problem with the demythologisation is that it pretends to replace a myth with a logos that is fully rectified, but it really only replaces one picture with another.
However more detailed or likely the rectification is, there are necessarily (as the Athenian in the Laws says, speaking specifically about the rectification of pictures) ‘countless omissions’ ( πάμπολλα ἀνάγκη παραλείπεσθαι τοιαῦτα , 769d5–6).
Plato is not really one of Ficino’s theologi . But it is not quite accurate to say, either, that in Platonic theology myth is inherently inferior to secularised logos.
Like Aristotle’s θεόλογοι he does speak μυθικῶς , but he does so with good philosophical reason. With regard to the gods and the forms, the beautiful lie and the likely story are all we have: ‘because we don’t know the truth about antiquity, we liken the false to the true as much as possible and so make it useful’ ( R. 382d1–3).