Executive-Legislative Relations Notes

Executive-Legislative Relations

  • Readings:
    • Fagan and Kopecký CH 5-6
    • Gryzmala-Busse CH 3

Guiding Questions

  • What does the executive do?
  • What does the legislature do?
  • What is presidentialism?
  • What is parliamentarism?
  • What is semi-presidentialism?
  • What patterns do we see in terms of structuring the executive? The legislature?
  • How does robust competition shape executive-legislative relations?
  • How does Europeanization shape executive-legislative relations?

The Executive and the Legislature

  • Executive branch “enforces the laws”
    • Includes president and/or prime minister, cabinet, and the bureaucracy
    • Constitutes “the government”
  • Executive fulfills two critical roles:
    • Head of state: Epitomize nation/represent the state; “Dignified” aspects of the executive
    • Head of government: Administer the state/preside over cabinet; “Efficient” aspects of the executive
  • Legislative branch "makes the laws"
    • Includes: parliament

Separated Powers: Presidentialism

  • President as head of state and head of government
  • Separate origin
    • Executive and legislature elected separately.
  • Fixed terms
    • Cabinet members do not sit in the legislature
  • Separate survival
    • Neither branch can remove the other except in extraordinary circumstances.

Fused Powers: Parliamentarism

  • Prime Minister: head of government
  • Prime Minister and Cabinet constitute a Collective executive
  • Monarch/president: head of state
  • Shared origin: Only the legislature is directly elected.
    • Prime Minister and the Cabinet come from the legislature (fused power-shared origin).
  • Terms are not fixed.
  • Shared survival: Confidence relationship between executive and legislative branches

Confidence Relationship

  • Governments stay in office until:
    • They lose a vote of confidence
    • The PM dissolves parliament
    • The upper bound of parliament is reached
      • Usually four to five years depending on the state
  • PM and his or her government must have the confidence of the chamber (majority support)
  • Legislature possesses authority to express no confidence
  • Governments must resign if they lose
  • Executive (PM) typically has powers of dissolution
  • PM can dissolve parliament at any time and call for new elections

Crafting the Executive (Sedelius and Äberg 2018)

  • Parliamentarism relatively common throughout the region
  • Semi-presidentialism also relatively common throughout the region
  • Semi presidentialism is defined by:
    • President directly elected for a fixed term
    • Prime Minister + Cabinet possess executive power + accountable to parliament
  • Two types of semi presidentialism exist
    • Premier-Presidentialism (PM/Cabinet accountable to parliament)
      • Most common form in ECE
      • NOTE: Some scholars classify as parliamentary not semi-presidential
    • Presidential-Parliamentarism (PM/Cabinet accountable to parliament + president)
      • Limited to Russia and some Post Soviet states
  • Pure presidentialism is rare in the region; Limited to Soviet successor states

Crafting the Executive (Sedelius and Äberg 2018)

  • President is WEAKEST under parliamentarism (i.e., ceremonial) and STRONGEST under pure presidentialism (i.e., authoritative)
  • Semi presidentialism occupies a middle category
  • Presidents WEAKER under premier-presidentialism and STRONGER under president-parliamentarism
  • In ECE, strongest presidencies associated with autocratic regimes (e.g., Belarus)
  • Most ECE reforms IN DEMOCRACIES associated with weakening the presidency

Crafting the Executive (Sedelius and Äberg 2018)

  • Concerns over the possibility of overlapping authority between President and Prime Minister often associated with semi- presidentialism
  • Direct election of president could boost representation and stability
  • The “apolitical” voice of the nation reinforcing the constitution
  • Personality/charisma of directly elected president could promote destabilization
  • Presidents often more popular than prime ministers, giving the president leverage
  • President could try to consolidate power by undermining the legislature and judiciary
  • Deadlock could occur under cohabitation (president and prime minister coming from different parties)
  • In ECE, concerns over destabilizing aspect of semi-presidentialism are more often heard

Crafting the Executive (Sedelius and Äberg 2018)

  • Regardless of whether the president is “authoritative” (presidentialism) or “ceremonial” (parliamentarism), his/her power is constrained
  • Exceptions: Ukraine, Belarus
  • Prime ministers typically the most authoritative executive actors
    • Strengthened by EU membership
      • Role in EU institutions boosts power vs. president
    • Weak political longevity
      • Typically serve one term and lose next election

Crafting the Legislature

  • Most ECE legislatures are unicameral
  • Belarus, Bosnia, Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, and Slovenia are bicameral
  • Bicameralism: legislature with two chambers. Federal systems are typically bicameral
    • First (lower) chamber: represents national level
    • Second (upper) chamber: represents subunits. Only Bosnia is considered federal
  • What do second chambers typically do?
    • Critical role in policy refinement
    • Alternative venue to introduce legislation
    • Represent minority rights
    • Focus on local/regional issues
  • Second chambers in ECE exhibit same tendencies

Crafting the Legislature

  • In MOST bicameral parliamentary systems, confidence relationship exists between the government and the first chamber
  • ECE constitutions follow this pattern
  • Where governments have disagreements with the second chamber, second chamber leverage varies
    • Strong veto: Bosnia and Romania
      • Can defeat legislation
      • Defeat inflicts policy costs on governments
    • Suspensory veto: Czech Republic, Poland, Slovenia
      • Can delay legislation
      • Defeat inflict agenda costs on governments

Professionalization and Legislative Institutionalization (Andrews 2018)

  • Legislative institutionalization linked to “capacity for consistent and effective policymaking”
  • Linked to: professionalization of members/staff, internal rules/structures (i.e. party cohesion and committee system), and autonomy from the executive branch
  • On member/staff professionalization…
    • High levels of electoral volatility and effective number of parties lead to high levels of turnover in parliament
      • Associated with lower levels of professionalization
    • BUT, members are now more likely to have previous political experience
      • Associated with higher levels of professionalization
    • …so levels of professionalization rising, but lower than their Western counterparts
    • Turnover levels are decreasing, but are still high AND vary by country

Parties, Committees, and Legislative Institutionalization (Andrews 2018)

  • Political parties critical for organizing legislative debates
    • In line with most democracies
  • Chamber leadership shapes the agenda and government legislation is privileged
    • In line with most democracies
  • Most work occurs in committees which allow members to…
    • Cultivate expertise and link expertise to policy
    • Scrutinize budgetary proposals
    • Examine and pass a budget
    • Conduct executive oversight
    • …committee system centrality to policymaking in line with most democracies
  • Strength of committee system varies by system
  • Internal organization of parliament consistent with legislative institutionalization
  • BUT party discipline could be stronger

Concerns Over Democratization (Zielonka 1994)

  • Strength of a constitution lies in ability to work when state is stressed
  • Can “channel and constrain the struggle for power” when crafted correctly OR exacerbate political and institutional challenges if crafted incorrectly
  • Andrews 2018
    • Concerns over vitality/future of democracy as well as combating corruption (i.e., state exploitation) frequently raised throughout region
    • Especially given the Hungarian experience

Case Study: Hungary (Gryzmala-Busse 2007)

  • Hungary an early adopter of monitoring/oversight
  • Crafted strong Constitutional Court with judicial review
  • Orban I government (1998-2002) sought to alter system
  • Used agenda control to:
    • Hold plenary sessions less frequently
      • Tougher to monitor
    • Prevent opposition from initiating inquiries
      • Tougher to investigate
    • Consolidated public television resources
      • Use to laud party accomplishments
    • Used bureaucratic positions to reward loyalists
  • Opposition parties used available resources to publicize party transgressions (e.g., questioning, press leaks, etc.)

Case Study: Hungary (Gryzmala-Busse 2007)

  • Public criticism resulted in some concessions…
    • Attempts to reduce size of the parliament failed
    • Several Fidesz sponsored bureaucrats/cabinet members forced to resign
    • State Audit Office pressured government to explain state spending patterns
      • In particular, why were some regions receiving more funding than others
    • Also triggered a change in strategy from Fidesz
      • Sought to create a grassroots network independent of state
      • Paid for by higher funding allocations to pro-Fidesz regional governments
      • Adopted two year budget to protect against confidence vote
      • Politicized public television to boost image of Fidesz AND demean its opponents
  • Hungarian voters turfed out Orban I government in 2002
  • MZSP successfully used governmental arrogance/corruption to win

Case Study: Hungary

  • Attempt to insulate Fidesz from robust competition failed in 2002…
  • …Orban bided his time
  • MSZP won elections in 2002 and 2006
  • Medgyessy, Gyurcsány I, Gyurcsány II, and Bajnai governments associated with cabinet instability AND an economic downturn
  • Leaked speech from Gyurcsány indicating he lied about deficits was “death knell”
  • Gyurcsány resigns in 2009; Enter PM Bajnai
  • Bajnai refused to be MSZP’s prime ministerial candidate in 2010
  • Government coalition divided entering the 2010 elections
  • Left wing parties in Hungary have never recovered

Hungary: Elections 2010

  • Orban and allies won majority in first round
  • And a supermajority in the second round
  • Despite winning around 53% of the vote
  • Sought to utilize supermajority by:
    • Creating media council linked to Fidesz
      • Could supervise and fine media outlets
    • Banning marriage equality
    • Restricting judicial review/lowering retirement age for judges
      • Weaken judicial independence
    • Tightening funding to universities
      • Particularly those critical of him
    • Reducing size of parliament/changing the electoral system
    • Boosting SMD and changing redistricting process
  • International pushback resulted in some concessions on media freedom and restoration of judicial authority

Hungary: Elections 2014, 2018, and 2022

  • Government maintained two-thirds majority
  • Despite only winning 45% of the vote
  • Insulated by gerrymandering, one round SMD and media control
  • Increasingly nationalist, anti-transparent, Eurosceptic policies triggered conflict with EU
  • Threatened to invoke Article 7
  • Fidesz has been sanctioned by the EPP (and pushed out in 2021)
  • Orban has not toned down his rhetoric
  • 2018: Kept supermajority with 49% of the vote
    • Opposition deeply divided
  • 2022: Kept supermajority with 52% of the vote
    • United opposition block divided over ideological differences
    • Fidesz control over media and Ukraine situation boosted Orban
  • Unclear Fidesz can be defeated
  • 2023: EU withholding funding from Hungary under the “Rule of Law” mechanism

Oversight and Exploitation (Gryzmala-Busse 2007)

  • Where “robust competition” existed:
    • Monitoring and oversight built into the system
    • Independent national accounting offices
    • Non-partisan securities and exchange commissions
    • Civil service laws promote meritocracy
    • Legislative resources for oversight
    • Ombudsman can initiate legal proceedings
    • Timing of decisions is key to pervasiveness
      • “Authentic” if crafted before EU pressure
      • Tougher to unpick AND allows institutions to “keep up” rather than just “respond”
  • Formal role for opposition parties and early adoption of institutions impeding state exploitation tied the hands of governing parties in Hungary, Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, and Slovenia
  • Does not suggest politicians were “angels”, but corruption easily observed and rooted out

Oversight and Exploitation (Gryzmala-Busse 2007)

  • Where “robust competition” was absent:
    • Monitoring and oversight not built at all OR delayed until subject to EU pressures
      • Easier to unpick AND prevents institutions from “keeping up with” events
    • Political actors could politicize institutions
    • Co-opted national accounting offices
    • Captured securities and exchange commissions
    • Stacked civil service with political cronies
    • Provided little legislative resources for oversight
    • No ombudsman to initiate legal proceedings
      • Or has no enforcement authority
    • No formal role for opposition parties and late adoption of institutions impeding state exploitation created greater opportunities for exploitation in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Latvia and Bulgaria
  • Corruption/graft go unobserved and anti-corruption laws go unenforced

Oversight and Exploitation

  • But Hungary had “robust competition” and built institutions to combat corruption
  • Yet we still observed the dismantling of institutions and backsliding
  • Is “robust competition” at the time of transition “enough” to boost democracy?
  • Or does it have to be maintained for its effects to be protected?
  • Andrews 2018
    • Joining the European Union requires adherence to liberal democratic norms
      • Shaped parliamentarism, civil rights/liberties, and market reforms
    • Requirement to adopt EU laws (i.e., the Acquis Communautaire) also played a role in fostering greater legislative institutionalization within parliament
    • Boosted judiciary, bureaucracy AND required crafting of oversight institutions
    • But the EU has less leverage over members once they join
    • … Europeanization fundamental in SHAPING institutions
    • Europeanization weaker in MAINTAINING institutions

Oversight and Exploitation

  • Andrews 2018
    • In terms of promoting good governance (i.e., promoting health/education, engaging in oversight, combating corruption, etc.), ECE legislatures tend to lag behind their Western counterparts
    • Although we see significant variation
    • Notice a pattern as states increasingly push back against corruption DURING accession, but this tends to taper off AFTER accession
    • EU should require more administrative reform PRIOR TO accession
      • To boost transparency post accession
    • EU REQUIRES creation of oversight institutions prior to accession
    • Perhaps the EU should engage in more oversight, monitoring, and accountability AFTER accession

“Rule of Law” Mechanism

  • Last cycle’s budgetary framework initially delayed due to opposition to the “Rule of Law Mechanism”
  • Allows for suspension of EU funds to member states who pass laws that violate EU norms (e.g., democracy, transparency, etc.)
  • Hungarian and Polish governments threatened to veto any budget including the mechanism and delay COVID stimulus
  • Both governments guilty of violating key EU norms
  • …. And have successfully scuttled previous “rule of law” proposals…

“Rule of Law” Mechanism

  • Both governments need COVID stimulus AND other EU member states willing to work around them rather than directly challenge them
  • But the EU finally called their bluff
  • “Compromise” resulted in an agreement for the mechanism to start from 1 January 2021, but required ECJ to review terms before sanctions can be imposed
  • ECJ ruled the mechanism was constitutional
  • Mechanism initiated against Hungary and Poland
  • Remains to be seen if it will be fully implemented or if one side will back down
  • Elections in Poland ushered in new governing coalition
    • Ditched previous government’s “reforms” and are no longer subject to this mechanism
  • Elections in Hungary maintained current government
    • Has not fully backed down yet

Conclusions

  • Tentative consolidation linked to struggles over separation of powers
  • Striking the right balance between executive and legislature remains elusive in the face of state exploitation and “illiberal democracy”
  • Robust competition during transition is not enough, because if competition wanes, a dominant party can unravel oversight
  • Schumpeter 1976
    • “Competitive elitism” gives electorate ability to select a government
    • Once that government is selected, citizen’s role essentially ends
    • If one party can shape preferences at election time, it can undermine opposition and then extend control by tweaking electoral system AND/OR weakening checks and balances
  • EU monitoring of oversight during accession alone, is also not enough
  • Continued accountability post accession is critical to maintain democratization

Conclusions

  • Jury remains out over which factors BEST explain efforts to combat state exploitation
    • Is it robust competition?
    • Europeanization?
    • Something else?
  • Debates on consolidation of democracy occur within a context where electorates and more VOLATILE, effective number of parties remains HIGH, and where cabinet instability is also HIGH
  • Can create challenges for good governance, particularly for combating state exploitation
  • Increasing legislative professionalization would boost oversight and expertise
  • Increasing party control over legislators may reduce cabinet instability
  • Raising thresholds to reduce effective number of parties may reduce cabinet instability
  • Zielonka 1994
    • ECE states dealing with issues many advanced industrial states face…
    • But without “adopt[ing] clear rules of the institutional game and respect[ing] the separation of powers principle”, consolidation will be difficult