Environmental Ethics
Argument: Attempt to persuade someone of something by giving them reasons
Conclusions: What you're trying to convince them of
Premises: The reasons you present to do so
2 ways of criticizing an argument:
Show that one of the premises is false
Show that even if all the premises were true, they wouldnt guarantee that the conclusion is true.
Normative Ethics
Normative vs. Descriptive
Normative Claims prescribe (say what should be done) or evaluate (say what’s good/bad).
Examples:
It’s wrong to lie.
You shouldn’t tell a lie.
Lying is bad.
Normative Questions ask for prescriptions or evaluations.
Examples:
Is it wrong to lie?
Should I tell a lie?
Is lying really bad?
Descriptive Claims describe (say how the world in fact is/was/will be).
Examples:
75% of Canadians believe that it’s wrong to tell a lie.
One of the beliefs I have is that lying is bad.
I want to lie.
The Ten Commandments tell us not to lie.
People who lie are held in low esteem by others.
Descriptive Questions ask for descriptions.
Examples:
Do Canadians think that lying is wrong?
Do you think that lying is bad?
Do you want to lie?
What do the Ten Commandments tell us about lying?
What consequences usually befall people who lie?
Normative Ethics ask normative questions
Not “what do people think is right?”
But rather “What IS right?”
Values: Beliefs about which things are good/bad
Science should be value-free/ objective.
Why would we want it to be?
Lysenkoism: Trofim Denisovich Lysenko USSR 1898-1976
Was an enthusiast of Lamarckism (the notion that an organism can pass on to its offspring physical characteristics that the parent organism acquired through use or disuse during its lifetime)
Context of Discovery: → Reichenbach: Values are okay
(Decides what hypotheses to test)
Context of Justification: → Reichenbach: Values are not okay
(The later or final phase of research when evidence is applied to and compared with a hypothesis)
Hardequin: Uses Helen Longin’s Philosophy
Contextual (Context of Discovery): She argues values are inevitable
Constitutive (Context of Justification): She argues values are ALSO inevitable
Arguments:
Values affect scientific methodology
Values affect our standards of evidence
Questions and things to consider to not get stuck with Lamarckism!
But which values are affecting our standards of evidence?
We need to do some critical thinking of our values and how they are affecting our methodology and standards of science.
Evolution Naturalness
Natural = good
Unnatural = bad
↳John Stuart Mill
All things in the universe
All things in the universe except humans and their works
Natural = What it evolved to do; What was selected for by natural selection
Criticisms
Need to know which traits exist because they were selected for.
Fitness is a matter of fit between the organism and the environment. When the environment changes the adaptive traits can become maladaptive.
Saying that morality is an evolved trait doesn’t mean the content of morality is all explained as an adaptation.
Assumes that the ultimate moral good is having as many progeny as possible.
Metaethics relativism and objectivism/ realism
Individual moral relativism (“subjectivism”). What is right/wrong/good/bad is a matter of each individuals own moral opinion (If I believe that X is bad, then X is bad, for me)
Cultural moral relativism(“relativism”). What is right/wrong/good/bad is a matter of each cultures/ societies moral views (If my society believes that X is bad, then X is bad, for my society)
Moral Objectivism (“moral realism”): there are objective moral truths
Inability to criticism horrible things individuals/ societies believe
Theories of punishment - desert
Under IMR/ CMR it doesn’t make sense to question our/our society’s moral beliefs
Disagreements don’t make sense under IMR/CMR
Evaluative Standards
Factual mistakes/correctness
Mistakes/correctness in reasoning
No argument for it/only bad arguments for it
Reflective equilibrium
Narrow make the actual judgments about cases that you endorse consistent with the principles you accept wide: make the actual and possible judgments you might endorse consistent with actual or possible principles you might accept
Normative ethics: Which features make a thing right/ wrong/ good/bad and why?
Schools of Thought in Normative Ethics
Normative ethical theories are often divided into two main categories:
Consequentialism: The rightness/ wrongness of a course of action is determined by the goodness/ badness of its consequences.
What feature of the consequences makes them good/bad?
- The answer to this question → different types of consequentialism
Nonconsequentialism: The rightness and wrongness of a course of action is determined by something other than the goodness/badness of its consequences.
What is the "something other" that determines the rightness/ wrongness of a course of action?
- The answer to this question → different types of nonconsequentialism
Within these two categories, there are three standard theories:
Utilitarianism (consequentialist): Starts with the question: "What sort of a world would be best?"
There are many versions of utilitarianism, but all have two components:
Theory of the good: What makes one state of the world better/ worse than another?Utilitarianism has a welfarist theory of the good: what's good is just what's good for someone or something. What's good for someone or something is called welfare, well-being, or utility.
Different forms of utilitarianism adopt different theories of welfare. They include: pleasure; happiness (hedonism); satisfaction of desires; satisfaction of preferences (desire/ preference satisfaction); satisfaction of rational desires/ preferences (rational desire/ rational preference); etc.
Different forms of utilitarianism often get their name from the theory of welfare they accept: hedonist utilitarianism, preference utilitarianism, etc.
Rules for action: How should we act, given what is good?
General idea: the more good, the better. Act to produce as much goodness (welfare/ well-being/ utility) as possible in the world.
Method for determining the right action: utilitarian calculus. Basic strategy: figure out the total net amount of welfare well-being utility that each possible course of action would produce - then choose the course of action that produces the greatest amount.
A "preference satisfaction theory" in philosophy, often associated with the concept of "welfare" or well-being, essentially states that what constitutes a good life for an individual is the fulfillment of their personal preferences; meaning that the more their desires and choices are satisfied, the better their life is considered to be, according to their own subjective perspective.
Kantianism/ deontology (nonconsequentialist)
Starts with the question "What actions should/ shouldn't I perform?"
Kant: don't make exceptions for yourself to rules that you want others to follow; treat the rationality of all rational beings with respect; act in ways that respect the autonomy of other people; etc.
Most deontological theories make claims about rights and duties
Autonomy: the ability to govern oneself, or make independent decisions.
Virtue Ethics (nonconsequentialist, though there are a few consequentialist versions too)
Starts with the question "What kind of person should I aim to be?"
Aristotle: a good life for a human being involves reasoning well; reasoning well about ethical issues requires practical wisdom; practical wisdom is developed through practice
virtue is about a person's character: what one does, why one does it, how one feels about it: patterns of behavior, not single acts
developing the virtues takes practice: to become more generous, start by performing generous actions, eventually generous feelings will follow
- Virtues: good ways a person could be
- Vices: bad way people can be
How CBA works:
Cost Based Analysis (CBA) has basis in preference in utilitarianism
Determine who affected parties will be (stakeholders)
Determine how their preferences will be affected by each policy
Determine valence (for or against) of preferences
Determine the strength of the preferences
Stated preferences vs. Revealed preferences : Stated preferences are what people say they want, while revealed preferences are what people actually do
Market goods (market prices) vs Non market goods
↳a non-market good or service is something that is not bought or sold
directly
Direct: Stated Preferences
↳ Contingent valuation : 1. Willingness to pay
2. Willingness to Accept
Indirect: Revealed Preferences
↳ Hedonic pricing/ shadow pricing
Future benefits and costs are discounted in comparison to current ones
↳ 5% per year
WTP or WTA value
———————— years in the future
(1 + discount rate)
Objections to CBA:
Come from preference - satisfaction theory of welfare
Irrational preferences
Come from preference utilitarianism
No actions ruled out in principle
Utilitarianism aims to maximize total utility, distribution doesn't count
Incommensurability of preferences
Come from CBA methodology
Non-market values → contingent valuation is unreliable
WTP is limited by ability to pay
Not all preferences get measures by CBA
Discounting the future → undervalues future costs and benefits
Anthropocentrism:
Human - centeredness
Considerability → Moral Considerability = Moral Standing = Moral Status = Moral Patienthood
↳ Whether an entity “counts” morally
↳ Yes → Morally Considerable
Value
Moral agent vs. moral patient
Agent : someone/thing that can make decision about what to do on the basis of moral considerations
Patient : someone/thing whose interests ought to be taken into account by moral agents when those agents make decisions about what to do
What must a thing like to be a moral patient?
↳ Do you need to be a moral agent in order to be a moral patient? (Common View: No)
↳ Anthropocentrist: human being
Legal considerability/ legal standing
↳Whether an entity “counts” legally
Value ethics is the study of the right/ wrong/ good/ bad
(positive) value = goodness (of some kind)
Good in its own right: Intrinsic value
Good because of its relation to some other good thing: Extrinsic value
Good as a means to some good end: Instrumental value
Do only humans have intrinsic value? → No!
↳ Anthropocentrist: Yes!
Anthropocentrist of value vs considerability : An "anthropocentrist of value" believes that only humans have intrinsic value, meaning they are the only beings worth considering for their own sake, while an "anthropocentrist of considerability" would still prioritize humans in ethical considerations but might acknowledge that some non-human entities could have a degree of moral standing based on their ability to experience suffering or their role in the ecosystem, not solely for their usefulness to humans.
Humans Nonhumans
- People - Things
- No Cages? - Cages → Innocent
- No Eating - Eating (usually) ok
- Experimentation - Experimentation
↪Consent benefit ↪No consent benefit context
- Sport hunting not ok - Sport hunting ok
What quality/qualities must a thing have in order to count as a moral patient?
Singer →(hedonist utilitarian): Being sentient (= being able to suffer)
↳Animal welfare
Speciesism:
Singer’s response to anthropocentrism: There's no species-level difference between individuals that can justify ignoring/discounting the pain of nonhuman animals.
Regan→(modified Kantian; “the rights view”): Being an “experience subject of a life”
↳Animal rights → “I”
He thinks that utilitarians values happiness, but not individuals as “receptacles”
Values individuals → “inherent value”
↳the right to be treated with respect→ not as a mere resource for others
Palmer:
Duties not to harm: sentience (same as Singer)
Duties to help: relationship to us - we’ve caused them to be vulnerable/dependent on us
Palmer: relationships matter too
Palmer’s Criticisms: Both Singer and Regan have capacity oriented accounts- how we ought to treat animals is a matter of their capacities and their capacities alone.
Wild animal suffering
Oscar Horta
↳ He argues against the “idyllic view of nature”- (nature is more pleasure than pain)
Why do we think this? (Bears, beavers, etc.)
Is it true? → No
K-strategists: These organisms occupy stable environments, tend to be larger in size, and have longer life expectancies. They are generally stronger or better protected and more energy-efficient. They produce fewer offspring over their lifetimes but invest more in each one.
R-strategists: These organisms typically live in unstable, unpredictable environments where rapid reproduction is crucial. They have high fertility but invest little in individual offspring. As a result, they are often weaker and more vulnerable to predation and environmental fluctuations.
Jeff McMahan
↳He challenges the idea that nature provides a moral justification for eating meat. He
argues that just because something is "natural" does not mean it is morally right. He
applies this reasoning to both human consumption of meat and the suffering that exists
in nature, particularly predation.
Compassionate conservation:
A movement that combines animal welfare and conservation to create an ethical framework that prioritizes the health of ecosystems and the well-being of animals
The political turn
Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka Zoopolis
↳ Their view on animals: Domesticated animals → “citizens”
↪“Denizens” - as having political rights