American Revolution, Part 2: Northern War, Trenton, Saratoga & Southern Campaign
Initial Assumptions Held by Both Sides
England expected that a modest display of force would end the rebellion quickly, believing colonial resistance to be shallow. Conversely, the Patriots believed a limited resistance would be enough to make Britain back down, just as Parliament had relented during earlier imperial crises (e.g.
Stamp Act protest, Townshend Duties backlash). Both assumptions proved false.
Early Engagements in New England (1775‒1776)
Lexington & Concord (April 1775) and Bunker Hill (May 1775) forced Britain to evacuate Boston. Actual large-scale combat in New England largely ended 15 months before the Declaration of Independence.
Minor skirmishes occurred along the Canadian border but had little strategic impact.
August 1775: Parliament and King George III formally declared the colonies in rebellion. London identified New England as the supposed “heart” of insurrection and planned to isolate it.
Ideological Watershed and the Declaration of Independence
Thomas Paine’s pamphlet Common Sense (Jan. 1776) portrayed monarch and Parliament as incurably corrupt, dismissed economic necessity of empire, and labeled continued union “dangerous.”
Common Sense rapidly shifted public opinion toward outright independence.
Second Continental Congress (May 1776) debated treason vs. freedom; some delegates walked out.
Thomas Jefferson, guided by John Locke’s natural-rights theories and Paine’s rhetoric, drafted the Declaration. Final version adopted 07 July 4 1776.
British Headquarters Chosen: New York City
Reasons Britain picked NYC for its base:
Centrally located in the colonies.
Deep, wide, ice-free harbor able to berth scores of naval vessels.
Existing docks/warehouses splice seamlessly with military logistics.
Significant Loyalist population could provide intelligence and manpower.
Battle for New York (Aug.–Nov. 1776)
• Britain dispatched regulars plus German Hessian mercenaries under Gen. William Howe.
• Washington mustered ≈ Continentals + NY militia but anticipated defeat.
• Sequential retreats:
– Brooklyn Heights → Harlem Heights → White Plains → across the Delaware into New Jersey.
• First large-scale American defeat illustrated that conventional field battles favored Britain.
Washington’s Strategic Pivot
Lesson learned: America could not win via head-to-head European tactics. New strategy:
Hit-and-run raids (guerrilla style).
Surprise attacks.
Prolong the conflict so costs rise and British public opinion erodes.
"We don’t have to win, we only have to avoid losing.”
Winter Quarters Tradition vs. Washington’s Bold Move
• European armies customarily suspended operations in winter to resupply and train.
• Christmas 1776: Washington stationed at Newton, NJ (≈ men). Hessians celebrating at Trenton.
• He stretched troops along the Delaware with extra campfires to inflate perceived strength, then secretly ferried units north of Trenton, crossed icy river overnight 25–26 Dec., and struck at dawn.
Battle of Trenton (26 Dec. 1776)
• Hessians hung-over, caught in pajamas; ≈ prisoners taken.
• Militarily minor yet brought priceless psychological victory: morale revived, Continental enlistments extended, validated Washington’s new strategy, and arguably saved the revolutionary cause.
Myth-Busting: “Washington Crossing the Delaware” Painting (Emanuel Leutze, 1851)
– Washington improbably stands heroically (unsafe in a skiff).
– Flag shown did not exist until mid-1777.
– Icebergs depicted, but rivers freeze in sheets, not titanic floes.
– Scene is midnight, yet visibility in the painting is daytime-clear.
The image functions as nationalist propaganda portraying courage and resolve.
Campaign of 1777 and the Turning Point at Saratoga
Britain planned a three-pronged thrust to sever New England:
Gen. Howe up Hudson from NYC.
Gen. John Burgoyne south via St. Lawrence → Lake Champlain → Saratoga.
Gen. Barry St. Leger east from Ontario region.
Problems:
Howe chased Washington around PA, never moved north.
St. Leger repelled by Benedict Arnold.
Burgoyne slogged mile/day, felling trees, ambushed by VT & NY militia.
At Saratoga, Gen. Horatio Gates surrounded the isolated British. Burgoyne surrendered (Oct. 1777).
Significance:
First decisive U.S. battlefield victory.
Persuaded France that Americans could win, triggering formal alliance.
Winter at Valley Forge (1777-78)
• Washington’s camp displayed severe shortages, disease, and logistical nightmare yet held the army intact.
• Baron von Steuben’s drilling began professionalizing Continental troops.
Franco-American Alliance (Early 1778)
• France officially recognized U.S. independence, motivated by revenge for Seven Years’ War losses.
• Promised , matériel, troops, and—crucially—a blue-water navy.
• Dutch Republic and Spain soon declared war on Britain, converting the conflict into a global struggle that diverted British resources.
Stalemate of 1779 and British Strategy Shift
• Despite troop superiority, Britain couldn’t force a knockout.
• French supplies let Patriots keep fighting; British taxpayers tired of expenses.
• New British plan: exploit supposed heavy Loyalist sentiment in the South, subdue those colonies sequentially, then move north—Phase Two.
Phase Two: War in the South (1779-1781)
British Assumptions vs. Reality
• Belief: Southern colonies = Loyalist strongholds.
• Reality: Many Southerners were neutral until war arrived at their door; harsh British tactics radicalized them into Patriots.
Key Southern Engagements
Capture of Savannah & Georgia (1779) – easy British success.
Siege of Charleston, SC (May 1780)
– Worst U.S. defeat; ≈ Continentals killed/wounded/captured.Battle of Camden, SC (Aug. 1780)
– Continental recruits sick (food poisoning), retreated; further British confidence.Battle of Cowpens, SC (Jan. 1781)
– Gen. Nathanael Greene used militia as bait, British followed into cross-fire by Continentals on valley flanks → crushing U.S. victory; seized supplies, damaged Cornwallis’ army.Battle of Guilford Courthouse, NC (Mar. 1781)
– Tactical U.S. loss yet pyrrhic British win; high casualties forced Cornwallis to pull back toward Virginia.
Backcountry & Frontier Warfare
• Native tribes fought on both sides, largely neutralizing each other.
• Loyalist & Patriot militias skirmished; British habit of abandoning Loyalist towns to Patriot reprisals undermined Loyalist morale.
• By early 1781 Patriots held most frontier areas.
Larger Connections & Implications
Washington’s asymmetric strategy and French naval entry foreshadow modern insurgency-plus-alliance models.
British failure illustrates limits of imperial power when facing extended supply lines, hostile populace, and multi-front wars.
Political morale—both colonial and British—proved as decisive as battlefield metrics.
Ethical overtones: British wartime harshness backfired, expanding Patriot support; Paine’s argument on “danger” of empire echoed throughout.
Numbers, Dates, and Figures (Quick Reference)
\begin{aligned}
&40{,}000\;\text{British regulars sent to NYC (Aug. 1776)}\
&10{,}000\;\text{Hessian mercenaries}\quad \text{+}\quad 19{,}000\;\text{American defenders}\rightarrow \text{Battle for New York}\
&8{,}000\;\text{Washington at Newton, Dec. 1776}\
&2{,}000\;\text{Hessians captured at Trenton}\
&24\times12\;\text{ft – dimensions of Leutze painting}\
&5{,}000\;\text{U.S. casualties Charleston (May 1780)}\
\end{aligned}
Where We Leave Off
By early 1781 Cornwallis, battered, withdraws into Virginia, setting stage for Phase Three (Yorktown and conclusion), to be covered in the next lecture. Independence remains uncertain but British prospects have dimmed.