Detailed Study Notes on Ludwig Wittgenstein's On Certainty

Bibliographic Information and Context

Source Material: Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, edited by G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, translated by D. Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell, 1969.
Author: Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951), an Austrian-born philosopher whose primary interest was the theory of meaning.
Early Work vs. Later Work: - Early: Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921), influenced Logical Positivists and focused on a general criterion of meaningfulness based on formal features of propositions. - Transition: By the 1930s, Wittgenstein abandoned this formal approach for the concept of "language-games." - Later: Philosophical Investigations and On Certainty. The focus shifted to how speakers "play" various language-games (e.g., commanding, joking, praying) where utterances derive sense from their specific roles and contexts.
Epistemological Shift: In his final years, Wittgenstein focused on epistemological issues, prompted by G. E. Moore’s articles ‘Proof of an external world’ and ‘A defence of commonsense’.
The "Death of Epistemology": Wittgenstein is often grouped with those declaring the end of traditional epistemology if defined as the search for a set of absolutely certain propositions that serve as the foundation for all other beliefs.

The Critique of G. E. Moore and the Logic of Doubt

Moore’s Argument: Moore claimed to know certain common-sense truths (e.g., "I have two hands") to rebut skepticism and idealism.
Wittgenstein’s Rebuttal: - Knowledge-claims are context-bound. Enumerating a list of certain propositions per se (as Moore did) is considered an misuse of the expression "I know." - Doubting, making mistakes, and knowing must engage with actual behavior and lives to be significant ( $§6$ ). - If someone says "I don’t know if there’s a hand here," the appropriate response is "Look closer." This possibility of satisfaction is essential to the language-game ( $§3$ ).
The Paradox of Certainty ( $§1-§2$ ): - Even if a proposition cannot be proved, it can be derived from others, though those others may be no more certain than the original ( $§1$ ). - From the fact that it "seems" to everyone to be so, it does not logically follow that it "is" so ( $§2$ ).
Doubt and Grounds ( $§4$ ): - Grounds for doubt are often lacking. For example, regarding the proposition "I know I have a brain," everything speaks in its favor and nothing against it, yet it is imaginable (though not suggested) that a skull could be empty.

The Grammar of "I Know" vs. "I am Certain"

Functional Difference ( $§8$ ): The difference between "knowing" and "being certain" is only important where "I know" is meant to imply "I cannot be wrong."
Objective vs. Subjective Certainty ( $§15-§16, §194$ ): - Giving an assurance ("I know") is merely a subjective assurance that one cannot be making a mistake ( $§15$ ). - Objective certainty requires that a mistake be logically excluded and must be "objectively established" ( $§16$ ). - Subjective certainty is a complete conviction/absence of doubt used to convince others ( $§194$ ).
Non-Descriptive Utterances ( $§10$ ): - In many contexts, "I know that there’s a sick man lying here" is nonsense because the situation makes it as matter-of-course as saying "I am here." - Truths like $2 \times 2 = 4$ are true propositions of arithmetic, but their spoken or written sense exists only in their use ( $§10$ ).
Knowledge as Proper Grounds ( $§18$ ): "I know" often functions to say "I have the proper grounds for my statement." If a listener is acquainted with the language-game, they admit the knowledge.

The World-Picture (Weltbild) and the River-bed Analogy

Inheritance vs. Justification ( $§94$ ): One does not acquire a world-picture by satisfying oneself of its correctness. It is the "inherited background" against which we distinguish truth from falsehood.
Mythology ( $§95$ ): The world-picture functions like a mythology or the rules of a game, learned practically without explicit instruction.
The River-bed Metaphor ( $§96-§99$ ): - Some propositions (empirical in form) are "hardened" and function as channels for fluid propositions. - The "river-bed" of thoughts can shift. While the waters (fluid empirical propositions) move, the bed itself (the hardened logic/mythology) can also shift over time, though the division is not sharp. - The bank consists of hard rock (subject to no/imperceptible alteration) and sand (washable/depositable).
Conversion vs. Argument ( $§92$ ): If someone held a contradictory world-picture (e.g., a king believing the world began with him), Moore could not "prove" him wrong through logic. He could only "convert" or persuade him to a different way of looking at the world.

The Systemic Nature of Conviction

Interconnectedness ( $§102, §225$ ): Convictions do not exist in isolation; they form a "nest" or a system/structure.
The Foundation-Wall Analogy ( $§248$ ): The "foundation-walls" of convictions are actually carried by the "whole house" of the system.
Implicit Foundations ( $§103$ ): Convictions like "the earth existed long before my birth" are not arrived at through thought but are "anchored" in all questions and answers.
Testing within the System ( $§105$ ): All testing, confirmation, and disconfirmation of hypotheses takes place within a system. The system is the "element in which arguments have their life."

The End of Justification and the Role of Acting

Justification Limits ( $§192, §204, §212$ ): - Justification eventually ends. The end is not a "seeing" of truth, but "our acting" at the bottom of the language-game ( $§204$ ). - Somewhere we must be finished with justification, and what remains is simply "this is how we calculate" ( $§212$ ).
Evidence as Groundless ( $§197, §205$ ): - It is nonsense to say we regard something as sure evidence because it is "certainly true." - If the true is what is grounded, then the ground itself is neither true nor false ( $§205$ ).
The Reasonable Man ( $§219-§220$ ): A "reasonable man" does not have certain doubts (e.g., that he has never been in the stratosphere). Doubting without end is viewed as madness ( $§281$ ).

Language-Games in Practice and Human History

Learning and Training ( $§233, §283$ ): - Imparting a world-picture to a child is like teaching a mountain is higher than a house ( $§233$ ). - A child who immediately doubted what they were taught would be incapable of learning certain language-games ( $§283$ ).
Physical Objects ( $§35-§36$ ): - The term "physical object" is a logical concept (like color or quantity), not an empirical one. - "A is a physical object" is instruction on the use of words, not a discovery.
Nature of Evidence ( $§240, §275$ ): - Beliefs (e.g., "all human beings have parents") are based on a vast web of experience, including physiology, anatomy, and collective human history ( $§240$ ). - Knowledge is derived not just from personal experience but from other people and sources like textbooks, which we trust because the trust is backed up by specific experiences ( $§275$ ).
Religious Contexts ( $§239$ ): - Differences in belief structures (e.g., Catholics believing a wafer changes nature or Jesus having no human father) show that what counts as "evidence" can vary between different systems of belief.

Summary of Key Examples and Analogies

Calculations: We treat certain calculations as "absolutely reliable" not because of a rule, but because of a practice in specific circumstances ( $§38-$ §39 $).</li><li>The Earth’s Existence: A fundamental scaffolding thought ($ §209-§211 $). Does not need to be confirmed by a phone call to New York; it is already "shunted onto an unused siding" in our logic.</li><li>Sawdust in Heads: Wittgenstein expresses certainty that his friend does not have sawdust in his head ($ §281 $). To doubt this would be madness, yet there is no direct sensory evidence to the contrary.</li><li>The Stratosphere/Moon: The impossibility of having been there without knowing it is a "reasonable" certainty ($ §218, §222, §269).

Source Material: Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, edited by G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, translated by D. Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell, 1969.
Author: Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) was an influential Austrian-born philosopher who made significant contributions to the philosophy of language, the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of mathematics. He is known for his rigorous examination of how meaning is derived from language use, examining both logical structures and everyday language.
Early Work vs. Later Work:
  - Early: Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921), where he introduced his conception of logical space and the picture theory of meaning, asserting that propositions are meaningful if they can represent states of affairs in the world. His early work heavily influenced the Logical Positivist movement, which sought to establish a scientific approach to philosophy based on empirical verification.
  - Transition: By the 1930s, Wittgenstein underwent a significant philosophical transformation. He recognized limitations in his early ideas and shifted towards the concept of "language-games," understanding that meaning is largely context-dependent and tied to social interactions. This represents a move away from rigid formalism towards a more nuanced view of language.
  - Later: In his later works, particularly in Philosophical Investigations and On Certainty, Wittgenstein concentrated on the fluid and dynamic aspects of language. He argued that words gain meaning through their use in various contexts rather than from inherent definitions, emphasizing the roles of different types of utterances in everyday conversations (commanding, joking, praying, etc.).
Epistemological Shift: During his later years, Wittgenstein focused on epistemological issues—how we know what we know—largely prompted by G. E. Moore’s influential articles ‘Proof of an external world’ and ‘A defence of commonsense.’ He explored commonsense beliefs as foundational and examined the implications for skepticism and idealism in knowledge.
The "Death of Epistemology": Often categorized alongside thinkers who claim a philosophical crisis in traditional epistemology, Wittgenstein argued that if epistemology is understood as the quest for foundational certainties upon which all beliefs rest, such pursuits are misguided. He proposed a framework that scrutinized the grounds for belief rather than aiming to find indubitable truths.

The Critique of G. E. Moore and the Logic of Doubt

Moore’s Argument: G. E. Moore famously asserted that he could know certain common-sense truths (such as the claim "I have two hands") as an effective rebuttal against skepticism and idealism, advocating for an unwavering belief in the observable world.
Wittgenstein’s Rebuttal:
 - Wittgenstein criticized this approach, positing that knowledge claims are inherently context-bound. Merely listing certain propositions—as Moore endeavored to do—is a misapplication of the expression "I know."
 - Doubt, error, and assertion of knowledge must be meaningful only when they are articulated in relation to actual behaviors and the lived experiences of individuals; otherwise, they lack significant grounding (see §6).
 - If a person declares, "I don’t know if there’s a hand here," Wittgenstein suggests that the proper response is, "Look closer," emphasizing that the possibility of verification is crucial to engaging in the relevant language-game (see §3 $).</li><li>The Paradox of Certainty ($ §1-§2):
 - Wittgenstein explores the notion that some propositions, while not empirically provable, can still be inferred from other premises. Yet, this leads to a paradox: the inference does not provide any absolute certainty, as the propositions from which conclusions are drawn may themselves lack definitive proof (see §1).
 - Furthermore, the fact that many people might agree on an assertion does not necessarily entail that the assertion is true; thus, consensus does not equate to certainty (see §2 $).</li><li>Doubt and Grounds ($ §4):
 - Wittgenstein highlights that the underpinnings for doubt are often absent. For example, when confronted with the proposition, "I know I have a brain," various factors corroborate that claim, yet one could still entertain the improbable scenario of having an empty skull. This illustrates the inherent uncertainties underpinning many of our beliefs and assertions.

The Grammar of "I Know" vs. "I am Certain"

Functional Difference (§8 $): The distinction between "knowing" and "being certain" holds significance particularly in contexts where stating "I know" implies the assertion that one cannot be wrong. The two concepts, while closely related, occupy different functional roles in our language.</li><li>Objective vs. Subjective Certainty ($ §15-§16, §194):
 - When one says, "I know," it is merely a subjective assurance regarding the claim, suggesting that the speaker believes they cannot err (see §15).
 - True objective certainty, on the other hand, necessitates that any potential mistakes are logically excluded from consideration and must be established through objective standards (see §16).
 - Subjective certainty conveys a sense of complete conviction and an absence of doubt, often employed to reassure others (see §194 $).</li><li>Non-Descriptive Utterances ($ §10):
 - Wittgenstein points out that many assertions, such as claiming, "I know there’s a sick man lying here," become nonsensical in some situations, akin to stating, "I am here," because these utterances do not carry meaningful content in specific contexts.
 - Similarly, mathematical truths like 2 imes 2 = 4 $serve as true propositions within their domain but must be interpreted appropriately to derive sense (see$ §10 $).</li><li>Knowledge as Proper Grounds ($ §18 $): The phrase, "I know," often functions to communicate that one possesses adequate grounds for a statement. A listener who is familiar with the relevant language-game generally accepts this affirmatively, recognizing the interaction's underlying rules.</li></ul><h4 id="5ddf7022-7a07-4024-b295-450c899f83a7" data-toc-id="5ddf7022-7a07-4024-b295-450c899f83a7" collapsed="false" seolevelmigrated="true">The World-Picture (Weltbild) and the River-bed Analogy</h4><ul><li>Inheritance vs. Justification ($ §94 $): According to Wittgenstein, individuals do not adopt a world-picture merely through verification but rather through an ingrained "inherited background," which ultimately shapes how truth and falsehood are distinguished from one another in daily life.</li><li>Mythology ($ §95 $): The notion of a world-picture parallels the functioning of mythology or a set of game rules that individuals learn through practical engagement rather than explicit instruction, highlighting that most backgrounds are accepted without conscious analysis.</li><li>The River-bed Metaphor ($ §96-§99):
 - Wittgenstein employs the river-bed analogy to describe how certain propositions remain fixed while others flow and change over time. Some empirical statements become solidified in belief, orchestrating the direction of more fluid concepts.
 - The riverbed symbolizes a structural foundation for thought—the shifting sands represent changing empirical theories or beliefs, while the underlying bedrock signifies more enduring principles. The distinction, nevertheless, may not always be apparent.
Conversion vs. Argument (§92 $): Engaging with someone who holds a fundamentally different worldview (like a king believing everything resets with his reign) illustrates that logical argumentation may not persuade them, warranting only the potential for "conversion"—shifting perspectives through dialogue rather than proof.</li></ul><h4 id="87e858cb-7873-4c93-9400-bbfd473a4f08" data-toc-id="87e858cb-7873-4c93-9400-bbfd473a4f08" collapsed="false" seolevelmigrated="true">The Systemic Nature of Conviction</h4><ul><li>Interconnectedness ($ §102, §225 $): Convictions are not isolated entities; they intertwine to form a nested system or structure where one's belief inevitably relates to others. </li><li>The Foundation-Wall Analogy ($ §248 $): Wittgenstein compares the foundations of convictions to the walls of a house; the integrity of convictions is collectively supported by the entire system of beliefs, rather than solely dependent on one particular element.</li><li>Implicit Foundations ($ §103 $): Many convictions, like the belief that "the earth existed long before my birth," are not arrived at through conscious thought; rather, they are anchored firmly within our understanding and frameworks of knowledge.</li><li>Testing within the System ($ §105 $): Wittgenstein stressed that testing and evaluating hypotheses must transpire within a system; the system itself provides the context in which arguments are comprehensible and make sense, defining the landscape of knowledge.</li></ul><h4 id="2c688018-67ad-412f-a3be-39aa3d2ab68d" data-toc-id="2c688018-67ad-412f-a3be-39aa3d2ab68d" collapsed="false" seolevelmigrated="true">The End of Justification and the Role of Acting</h4><ul><li>Justification Limits ($ §192, §204, §212):
 - The process of justification inevitably ceases at some point. The culmination of justification does not equate to achieving an ultimate insight into the truth but rather reflects a settled mode of action within the norms of the language-game (see §204). - At some level, the discourse must conclude; what persists are established practices on how calculations or beliefs are processed, not a quest for an ultimate truth (see §212 $).</li><li>Evidence as Groundless ($ §197, §205):
 - It becomes nonsensical to classify something as unequivocal evidence solely because it appears to be "certainly true." Instead, if truth is defined through foundational grounds, the grounds themselves cannot be considered as possessing inherent truth or falsehood (see §205 $).</li><li>The Reasonable Man ($ §219-§220 $): A truly reasonable person embodies certain doubts; for example, they would not question claims of never having been in the stratosphere, as ceaseless doubt verges on madness (see$ §281 $).</li></ul><h4 id="c1cd5368-9aff-4af9-b50a-daba0a14f2df" data-toc-id="c1cd5368-9aff-4af9-b50a-daba0a14f2df" collapsed="false" seolevelmigrated="true">Language-Games in Practice and Human History</h4><ul><li>Learning and Training ($ §233, §283):
 - The process of instilling a world-picture in children mirrors foundational teachings, such as a child learning that mountains are taller than houses. If a child were to question these lessons immediately, the child might find themselves unable to effectively engage in certain language-games (see §233 $,$ §283 $).</li><li>Physical Objects ($ §35-§36):
 - Wittgenstein professes that the term "physical object" is a logical construct rather than an empirical one; in saying, "A is a physical object," one is instructing on language usage rather than unveiling a discovery of reality.
Nature of Evidence (§240, §275):
- Beliefs, such as the assertion that "all human beings have parents," rest upon an intricate web of experiences, encapsulating physiology, anatomy, and collective human history (see §240 $). Real knowledge thus transcends personal experience, arising instead from community knowledge and narratives, often delivered through educational mediums like textbooks (see$ §275 $).</li><li>Religious Contexts ($ §239):
- The varied belief systems, such as Catholics contemplating the transformation of nature in communion or differing views regarding the nativity of Jesus, demonstrate that the criteria for what constitutes valid evidence can vary significantly between diverse cultural frameworks.

Summary of Key Examples and Analogies

Calculations: Certain calculations maintain a status of reliability, not due to formal rules but as a result of established practices in contextual situations (see §38- $§39$ ).
The Earth’s Existence: This proposition serves as a foundational thought that does not rely on external confirmation (e.g., not needing validation through a call to New York) but instead occupies an inherent place within our rational logic (see $§209-$ §211 $).</li><li>Sawdust in Heads: Wittgenstein articulates his certitude regarding the nonsensical nature of suspecting that his friend has sawdust in his head, suggesting that doubting this scenario veers into madness. Yet there lacks empirical evidence directly disproving this assertion (see$ §281 $).</li><li>The Stratosphere/Moon: The notion that one cannot have occupied the stratosphere or visited the Moon without conscious awareness exemplifies a form of reasonable certainty that one can accept as logically sound (see$ §218, §222, §269$$).