Comprehensive Introduction to Political Science: Power, the State, and Political Behavior

Epistemology and the Definition of Political Science

Political science is defined not as a political method of doing science nor as a training program for future politicians, but as a scientific approach to political facts. It is a social science that treats politics as a social object to understand the mechanisms and dynamics of power and social organization. The discipline sits at the crossroads of several social sciences, including sociology, epistemology, and law. In France, political science has increasingly evolved into a form of political sociology. A distinction must be made between social sciences and human sciences: social sciences like political science are positive sciences, meaning they study what "is" or what is actually happening. In contrast, human sciences like law are often normative, focusing on what "should be" or identifying ideal projections. Because it operates at the intersection of various social sciences, political science does not claim a strictly proprietary object but rather a specialized focus on the political dimensions of social life.

The Polysemy and Terminology of "The Political"

The term "politics" is characterized by polysemy and androgyny. It is polysemic because it carries several meanings and androgynous because in the French language it can be used in both the masculine and feminine forms. Etymologically, the word stems from the Greek word "polis," which refers to the city or the political unit. In practice, the term covers vastly different activities. Max Weber, in "The Scientist and the Politician," notes that the concept is extraordinarily broad and encompasses all types of autonomous directive activities. This implies a form of direction, constraint, or the exercise of power over individuals or groups. In English, the concept is divided into three distinct terms: "polity," "politics," and "policy." "Polity" relates to the masculine sense (le politique) and is the abstract, normative object of political philosophy. "Politics" represents the positive action, interactions, and relationships structuring the pursuit and exercise of power (la politique). Finally, "Policy" or "policies" refers to the specific acts and products resulting from political actors' efforts to meet objectives, such as economic, social, or foreign policies.

Politicization and Unidentified Political Objects

A central tenet of political science is that no social fact is political by nature; however, any social fact is "politicizable." This constructivist approach suggests that politics is built by social groups. Even a lack of interest in politics, such as abstaining from voting, has direct political effects by reinforcing the positions of those active in the game. Phenomena that appear autonomous, such as religion or economy, can have significant political implications. For example, before the $1960$s, environmental issues were not considered political, but through the process of politicization, they became a central political concern. Denis-Constant Martin theorized the idea of "Unidentified Political Objects" ($UPO$) to describe non-political social practices that acquire political dimensions in specific contexts, such as carnivals serving as sites for political contestation in authoritarian regimes. Michel Foucault emphasized that "where there is power, there is always resistance to power," noting that power also operates through symbols, myths, and emotions. Symbols like flags are objects overloaded with value that give meaning to human action, and myths of origins are universal components of political societies.

Theories and Dimensions of Power

Historically, political science fluctuated between being a science of the State ($scatology$) and a science of power. Defining it strictly as a science of the State is considered ethnocentric because political power relationships existed long before the modern State emerged. There are three primary ways to define power: the substantialist definition treats power as a substance or a thing that exists in itself; the institutionalist definition assimilates power into the State and public institutions; and the interactionist (or relational) definition posits that power only exists within power relations. This latter view, dominant today and supported by Foucault, describes power as "actions on actions." Max Weber defined power as the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out their own will despite resistance. Robert Dahl formalized this by stating that agent $A$ exerts power over agent $B$ to the extent that they obtain from $B$ an action $Y$ that $B$ would not have otherwise performed. These power relations are inherent in almost all social interactions and raise the question of why individuals consent to obey.

The Logic of Obedience and Voluntary Servitude

The question of why humans obey power was famously explored by Étienne de La Boétie, born in $1530$, in his "Discourse on Voluntary Servitude." Written during the religious wars of the $16th$ century, his text—later published by Protestants as "Le Contr'un" in $1574$—argues that no power can be exercised without a minimum will to obey. According to La Boétie, humans are naturally free, yet they abandon their liberty and participate in their own domination. He proposed three sociological hypotheses for this behavior. First, rulers use "drugs" or stratagems to distract the populace, such as theaters, spectacles, circuses, or even religion, which Marx later termed the "opium of the people." Second is the "weight of habit," where individuals are socialized into obedience from a young age until it feels natural. Third is the "pyramid of domination" (the pyramid of petty tyrants), where everyone in a hierarchy accepts being dominated by those above because they enjoy exercising power over those below them. This pyramid structure was later used by Albert Memmi in "The Colonizer and the Colonized" to describe how colonial power used indigenous populations to maintain control.

Weberian Legitimacy and Symbolic Violence

Max Weber argued that every relationship of domination requires a belief in its legitimacy. He identified three "ideal types" of legitimate domination. Traditional legitimacy rests on the sanctity of traditions and customs, such as a hereditary monarchy where the ruler is naturally accepted. Charismatic legitimacy depends on the belief in an individual's exceptional talents or qualities (charm), though this is often a social construct triggered by specific historical circumstances, seen in figures like De Gaulle, Mussolini, or Hitler. This must eventually undergo "routinization" into other forms of authority to survive. Legal-rational legitimacy is the foundation of the modern State, where authority is based on impersonal laws and rules, and individuals obey the function or the office rather than the person. Pierre Bourdieu added to this with the concept of "symbolic violence," a soft form of violence exercised with the complicity of the dominated. Bourdieu distinguished between methodological individualism (individuals as rational actors making cost-benefit calculations) and methodological holism (individuals as products of their social environment). Émile Durkheim’s study on suicide demonstrated that even the most intimate acts obey social determinants. Bourdieu argued that gender or class domination often relies on symbolic violence, where victims internalize their status as "natural" due to biased education and socialization.

The Milgram Experiment and the Social Roots of Authority

To understand how individuals could commit atrocities, such as those in Nazi Germany, Stanley Milgram conducted experiments on obedience. Participants were told to administer electric shocks of increasing intensity to a person in another room for wrong answers. Milgram found that $\frac{2}{3}$ of participants were capable of inflicting potentially lethal shocks because they felt "de-responsibilized." In this "agentic state," the individual views themselves as a mere instrument of a higher authority or a cog in a mechanical system, thus shifting the moral responsibility of their actions onto the person giving the orders. This experiment highlights the frightening degree to which individuals surrender their autonomy to perceived authority figures.

Philosophical and Anthropological Origins of the State

The State is a socio-historical construction, not an universal or natural necessity. Thomas Hobbes, in "Leviathan," proposed an absolute contract of submission. He hypothesized a "state of nature" where men, driven by egoism, were in a war of "all against all." To survive, they rationally agreed to a horizontal pact to transfer their power to a sovereign entity—the Leviathan—to ensure security. John Locke proposed a "contract of deposit" where the State exists solely to protect natural rights. Jean-Jacques Rousseau saw the state of nature as a paradise corrupted by the "accident" of private property. However, anthropology reveals societies without States, which Edward Evans-Pritchard called "acephalous" or anarchic societies. Studying the Nuer people, he found they were ordered despite having no central power, often using "chiefs with no power" (Leopard-skin chiefs) as mediators. Pierre Clastres, in "Society Against the State" ($1974$), argued that these societies actively organize themselves to prevent the emergence of a central ruler. They maintain equality through rituals, such as body scarring/torture, to ensure every individual is marked as equal, preventing any one person from claiming superiority.

Sociogenesis of the Western State according to Norbert Elias

According to Norbert Elias in "The Civilizing Process" (or "The Dynamics of the West"), the Western State resulted from two processes: centralization and secularization. Following the breakdown of the Carolingian Empire in the $9th$ century, political authority was fragmented into hundreds of fiefs transmitted by heredity. Between the $12th$ and $14th$ centuries, these units were reduced through alliances and wars. The "Maison de Paris" eventually imposed two monopolies: a fiscal monopoly (the power to levy taxes) and a military monopoly (the monopoly of legitimate physical violence). The fiscal monopoly allowed the king to pay representatives (the King's bailiffs) in money rather than land, stabilizing central power. Secularization involved the State's autonomy from religion. This was marked by the "Two Swords" theory and historical conflicts between the Pope and Kings, reaching a turning point with the Protestant Reformation and the Act of Supremacy in $1534$ by Henry $VIII$. Charles Tilly defined the State as an organization that controls a population within a defined territory, characterized by its differentiation, autonomy, centralization, and coordinated subdivisions.

Key Theoretical Perspectives on the State

There are three major perspectives on the State. First, Max Weber viewed the State as an institution that successfully claims the monopoly of legitimate physical violence and operates through a rational, bureaucratic administration. Second, the Marxist perspective, led by Karl Marx, sees the State as an instrument in the hands of the dominant bourgeois class. Marx argued that the economic "infrastructure" (relations of production) determines the "superstructure" (the State and laws). Third, Michel Foucault challenged the view of the State as a centralized entity, arguing that power is diffuse and circulates throughout all social institutions, such as schools and hospitals. He described a shift from the old "art of governing" (spectacular power to "make die and let live") to "governmentality" or "biopower," which focuses on the control and management of life itself ("to make live and let die"), or the microphysics of power.

Function and Typology of Political Parties

Political parties are the central collective actors of pluralist democracies. Joseph La Palombara and Myron Weiner ($1966$) established four criteria for a political party: organizational continuity (survival beyond current leaders), a permanent local structure, the objective of conquering power (as opposed to just exerting pressure), and the search for popular support. Parties perform functions of recruitment, programming (defining the political agenda), coordination of government agents, and integration of individuals through social identification. Maurice Duverger ($1951$) distinguished between "cadre parties" (led by notable elites, decentralized, born from limited suffrage) and "mass parties" (based on high membership, central organization, and born from universal suffrage). Jean Charlot noted that these models have converged into the "catch-all party" (Kirchheimer), which dilutes ideology to appeal to the widest audience. Richard Kartz and Peter Mair furthered this with the "cartel party" model, where parties increasingly rely on State public funding rather than militant dues, effectively becoming agencies of the State.

Pressure Groups and Action Repertoires

Unlike political parties, pressure groups (or interest groups) do not seek to conquer power but to influence it. They may be institutional (civil or military) or associative (unions, NGOs, consumer groups). Key French unions include the CGT (created in $1895$, later splitting into CGT-FO in $1947$/$1948$) and the CFDT (created in $1964$). Charles Tilly popularized the concept of the "action repertoire," referring to the historically situated tools available to groups for protest, such as strikes or petitions. He identified three modes of action: institutional (direct lobbying of decision-makers), external/indirect (pressuring public opinion through media or boycotts), and non-conventional/radical (civil disobedience, blockades, or sabotage). These choices are not purely strategic but are learned and transmitted behaviors adapted to historical contexts.

Elites, Professionalization, and Representation

Political professionalization means that politics has become an autonomous social space occupied by specialists. Historically, and in Ancient Greece, politics was for all citizens (excluding women, slaves, and children), but modern democracy has created a divide. Max Weber distinguished between those who live "for" politics (vocation/financially independent notables) and those who live "of" politics (individuals who derive their income from it). Robert Michels identified the "Iron Law of Oligarchy," where even democratic organizations succumb to control by a minority leadership seeking self-reproduction. Modern discourse often points to a "crisis of representation" because the social properties of elected officials do not match the population; for example, workers are significantly underrepresented compared to higher professionals. This has spurred the return of alternative democracy models: participatory democracy (neighborhood councils, budgets), deliberative democracy (reasoned debate, citizen conventions), and consultative democracy (asking public opinion without binding results).

Public Opinion, Polls, and Voting Determinants

Public opinion is often invoked as a collective actor, yet scholars like Loïc Blondiaux describe it as a manufactured

artifact. Historically, polls began as US "straw votes" in the $1930$s before George Gallup invented representative sampling, correctly predicting the $1936$ US election. In France, Jean Stoessel founded the $IFOP$ in $1938$. Bourdieu ($1972$) argued that "public opinion does not exist" because polls impose a framework, assume everyone has an opinion, and mask social inequalities. Regarding voting, the "Ecological Model" by André Siegfried ($1913$) showed that geography determines voting behavior: granite soil (isolated farms, strong clergy) led to right-wing voting in Western France, while limestone soil (large villages, secular) led to republicanism. The Columbia School ($1944$) emphasized that we think politically as we are socially, while the Michigan School ($1960$) focused on inherited partisan identity. Individualist models, like Anthony Downs' "An Economic Theory of Democracy" ($1957$), treat the voter as a rational consumer performed a cost-benefit analysis. This leads to the "paradox of voting," where the cost of voting is perceived as higher than the potential benefit, leading to abstention. Abstention can be systematic or intermittent, with Daniel Gaxie noting a "hidden census" where those with less education abstain due to a "feeling of incompetence."