Security and Governance in the Great Lakes Region

The Great Lakes Region: Progress, Problems, and Prospects

• Goal for Durable Peace: Achieving lasting peace in the Great Lakes region necessitates concerted actions across all levels. Priorities include:     * Addressing immediate problems of order and security.     * Maintaining a long-term focus on democratic governance and economic opportunity.     * Recognizing the centrality of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to the region's geography, politics, security, and economy.
• Demographics and Scale of Human Impact:     * The Great Lakes region is home to approximately $127,000,000$ citizens.     * Historical conflicts over power, ethnic identity, citizenship, land, and resources have caused immense loss of life.     * The 1972 Burundian Genocide: Resulted in the deaths of between $200,000$ and $300,000$ people.     * The 1994 Rwandan Genocide: Resulted in an estimated $800,000$ deaths.     * DRC Insecurity: Persistent instability in the DRC has led to over $3,000,000$ deaths.
• Regional State Involvement in Congo's Wars:     * Direct Combatants: Angola, Burundi, Chad, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.     * Indirect Involvement: Congo-Brazzaville, Libya, South Africa, Sudan, and Tanzania.     * This involvement destabilized security complexes across Central, Eastern, and Southern Africa.
• Current Obstacles to Stability:     * Poverty and weak state/regional institutions.     * Failure to execute effective Security Sector Reform (SSR).     * Autocratic practices within formal multi-party democracies, including restrictions on media freedom and suppression of political opposition.     * Socio-economic marginalization and violence targeting women and sexual minorities.
• The Peace, Security, and Cooperation (PSC) Framework:     * Signed in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on $24\text{ February }2013$.     * Signatory States: DRC, Angola, Congo-Brazzaville, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Central African Republic (CAR), Burundi, Rwanda, South Sudan, and Zambia.     * Witnessing Organizations: The United Nations (UN), Southern African Development Community (SADC), African Union (AU), and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR).
• The "Five Cs" Framework for Conflict Resolution:     * Consolidation: Strengthening state control over territory.     * Citizenship: Creating inclusive political identities.     * Constitutionalism: Establishing equitable power sharing and accountability.     * Capitalism: Building fair economic systems and managing natural resources.     * Contiguity: Addressing the cross-border nature of regional challenges.

Consolidation and Security Sector Reform (SSR)

• Territorial Control: Support is required for all regional states, especially the DRC, to extend effective control over their sovereign territories.
• MONUSCO and the SADC Intervention Brigade:     * In $\text{March }2013$, a $3,000$-strong SADC-led intervention brigade was formed within the existing $20,000$-strong UN mission (MONUSCO).     * Involved Nations: South Africa, Tanzania, and Malawi.     * Mandate: A shift toward peace enforcement, as traditional peacekeeping was insufficient where no peace existed to keep.
• Limitations of Military Force:     * Aggressive stances by MONUSCO are not long-term solutions for a two-decade war.     * Armed Groups in Eastern Congo: Includes the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), Mai-Mai "self-defence" groups, and the Raia Mutomboki.     * Lack of local relevance: Many citizens do not see MONUSCO impacting their daily lives.     * State consolidation requires the delivery of basic services such as education and protection from crime, not just the defeat of rebels.
• Challenges Facing Security Sector Reform (SSR):     * Under-resourcing: Reforms in the DRC have been significantly under-funded.     * Lack of Ownership: Initiatives are often driven by outside donors rather than local actors.     * Integration Controversies: Strategies involving integrating former armed groups into the national army or politics are unpopular. For example, the March 23 Movement (M23) was defeated in $\text{December }2013$ but allowed to remain a political entity.     * Kabila's Rapid Reaction Force: President Joseph Kabila aims to create a nucleus for a reformed army, but this requires long-term investment.     * Broad Definition of Security Sector: Must include the police and judicial systems, not just the military.

Citizenship and Constitutionalism

• Inclusive Political Systems: Citizens must be treated as equal stakeholders within a common political community.
• Marginalization: Contested citizenship has birthed rebel movements among those excluded from political systems and fueled genocides in Burundi and Rwanda.
• Definitions of Constitutional Order: A constitutional order is "characterised by equitable sharing of power, as well as institutions of participation and accountability."
• Militarization of Politics: The region is described as a "militarised space" that must purge autocratic influences.
• Leadership and Term Limits:     * Rwanda: Paul Kagame has been president since $\text{April }2000$ and was previously the power behind the throne as Vice-President and Minister of Defence under Pasteur Bizimungu ($1994$-$2000$).     * Uganda: Yoweri Museveni has ruled since $\text{January }1986$.     * Stagnant Leadership: Leaders in Uganda, Burundi, the DRC, and Rwanda have signaled an unwillingness to cede power, often disregarding constitutional term limits or the will of the people.     * In Burundi and the DRC, this has led to violent protests.     * Term limits serve to prevent leaders from being identified with the state itself.

Capitalism and Economic Management

• Resource Paradox: The region suffers from extreme poverty despite plentiful natural resources.
• Illicit Exploitation: Violence is funded by DRC's natural resources, exploited by neighboring countries (Rwanda, Uganda), non-state armed groups, and international corporations.
• Resource Governance Models:     * The Kimberly Process ($2002$), originally for diamonds, is suggested as a model for monitoring coltan, gold, and charcoal.     * Implementing such regimes is noted as both technically and politically difficult.
• Private Investment and the Developmental State:     * UN Special Envoy Said Djinnit has worked to spur private investment in conjunction with public institutions.     * Verbatim Definition: A "developmental state" is a "state that can harness the power of markets for the benefit of its people by intervening to foster the development of internationally competitive industries."     * This requires accountability to the citizens to avoid the benefit of patronage networks centered in Kinshasa.

Contiguity and Regional Institutional Dynamics

• Contagion of Problems: State borders intersect transnational ethnic groups and difficult terrain, causing problems to spread between states.
• Refugee Crisis Statistics (as of June 2015):     * Total refugees fleeing Burundi due to election unrest: $144,000$.     * Tanzania: $66,612$ refugees.     * Rwanda: $56,508$ refugees.     * DRC: $11,500$ refugees.     * Uganda: $9,038$ refugees.     * Zambia: $400$ refugees.
• The Role of Regional Institutions:     * ICGLR: Important for creating the PSC Framework, initiating discussions for the MONUSCO brigade, and sponsoring the Kampala talks ($\text{December }2012$ to $\text{December }2013$) with the M23.     * Recommendation: Shift support toward better-established regional economic communities like SADC and the East African Community (EAC).     * EAC Member States: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda.     * SADC Proposals: Establishing liaison offices in Kinshasa and Goma (capital of North Kivu).
• Proposed Peace Infrastructure:     * A regional joint verification mission for the PSC Framework.     * A regional joint intelligence facility to track non-state groups and illicit economic activity.
• External vs. Local Initiatives:     * The group of special envoys (South Africa, AU, UN, EU) has seen success, but over-reliance on external actors is dangerous.     * External actors may have parochial interests and can inadvertently block local/regional projects.     * Regional institutions currently lack effective internal funding and the ability to enforce democratic norms.

Participants and Contributors

• Key Academic Figures mentioned in the Cape Town Seminar:     * Professor Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja: Professor of African Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.     * Dr. Miria Matembe: Founder Member of the Centre for Women in Governance (CEWIGO), Kampala, Uganda.     * Professor Gilbert Khadiagala: Professor of International Relations at the University of the Witwatersrand (Wits), Johannesburg, South Africa.