Procedural Criminal Law: Exhaustive Guide to Stopping, Frisking, and Reasonable Suspicion

Core Concepts of Procedural Criminal Law: Chapter 4 Continued

• The Ongoing Consideration of Balance: In procedural criminal law, the courts must continuously apply a reasonableness test from the Fourth Amendment. This involves weighing the interests of the government (often related to officer safety and crime prevention) against the rights and considerations of the individual.

• Fourth Amendment Stops (Terry Stops):

  • Verbatim Definition: A brief, on-the-spot detention that freezes suspicious situations so the police can determine whether to investigate further.

  • Nature: This is intended to be a "gray, flexible standard" applied on a case-by-case basis. It is an invented term from the landmark case $Terry \, v. \, Ohio$ to address the middle ground between doing nothing and making a full arrest based on probable cause.

• Reasonable Suspicion:

  • Verbatim Definition: The totality of articulable facts and circumstances that would lead an officer, in light of training and experience, to suspect a crime may be afoot.

  • Key Components:

    • Totality: A consideration of all circumstances combined, rather than isolated facts.

    • Articulable Factors: The facts must be able to be explained or named; a mere "hunch" is insufficient.

    • Training and Experience: The court weighs the officer’s background. For example, a veteran of $30$ years may be able to articulate suspicion based on patterns that a rookie on their first day might not recognize.

    • Suspicion vs. Belief: Reasonable suspicion requires an officer to suspect a crime is afoot, whereas probable cause requires an officer to believe a crime is afoot.

Race and Reasonable Suspicion

• Buffkin v. Omaha (Eighth Circuit, 1990):

  • Case Facts: Police received a tip about a Black individual on a plane carrying drugs. They singled out and searched the only Black person on the plane ($Mr. \, Buffkin$), who was found to have no drugs. Buffkin sued for a violation of his civil rights.

  • Legal Outcome: The court ruled that using race as one reason for identification is permissible, but using race as the only reason is unconstitutional.

  • Implication: There must be additional articulable facts beyond race to justify an intrusion. In this case, the lack of other facts meant there was no reasonable suspicion.

The Mechanics and Legal Scope of a Terry Stop

• Justification: An officer must directly observe suspicious behavior or corroborate information (such as an anonymous tip) to justify the initial stop.

• Characteristics of a Lawful Terry Stop:

  • Duration: Must be brief.

  • Location: Must occur at the location of the stop or very nearby. (Note: Removing someone from the spot due to immediate danger has been held as reasonable).

  • Invasiveness: Must be mild; it is not an arrest or a full interrogation.

• Suspect Conduct During a Stop:

  • There is a degree of freedom for a suspect to walk away or remain silent in a free country, as they are not under arrest.

  • However, running away (as seen in cases like $Hodari$ and $Wardlow$) or walking away may be articulated by an officer as suspicious behavior that justifies escalating the intrusion.

• Officer Options After a Stop:

  1. Let the individual go.

  2. Conduct further investigation if new facts are discovered (the "continuum" of investigation).

  3. Make an arrest if the investigation leads to probable cause (e.g., finding drugs or weapons or obtaining an admission).

The Fourth Amendment Frisk (Terry Frisk)

• Verbatim Definition: A once-over lightly pat down of outer clothing by officers to protect themselves.

• Purpose and Limits:

  • The sole purpose is to find a weapon for officer safety. It is not a general search for evidence.

  • A frisk is not automatic. To perform a frisk, the officer must have a reasonable suspicion that the person is armed or dangerous.

• The Violent Crime Automatic Frisk Exception:

  • Verbatim Definition: If the Terry stop is based upon reasonable suspicion of a violent crime to begin with, the officer does not need additional evidence of a weapon to perform a frisk.

  • Examples: Suspected robbery, physical assault, or murder cases allow for an automatic frisk because violence is inherent to the suspicion.

• Standard for Reach-In: During a pat down, an officer may only reach into a pocket if they feel something that reasonably feels like a weapon (e.g., a knife or syringe) or clearly identifiable contraband (under the "plain feel" doctrine).

Case Law on the Expansion of Terry Stops

• McCargo (Court of Appeals):

  • The court upheld a frisk based on departmental policy. If a policy requires a suspect to be placed in a patrol car for investigation, the officer may frisk them first because a person inside a police car poses a higher danger than someone on the street.

• Minnesota v. Dickerson (Supreme Court):

  • Case Facts: Police frisked an individual leaving a "crack house." They felt an object and determined it was cocaine.

  • The "Plain Feel" Doctrine: The court ruled that if an officer is conducting a lawful Terry frisk for weapons and feels something that is immediately apparent as contraband, they may seize it.

  • The Violation: In this specific case, the search was ruled a violation because the officers did not have a specific reasonable suspicion that Dickerson was armed. They were conducting a drug investigation, not a weapons frisk. You cannot frisk solely to look for drugs.

Automobiles and Stop and Frisk Law

• Pennsylvania v. Mimms:

  • Ruling: During a valid traffic stop (e.g., for expired plates), police may lawfully order the driver out of the car.

  • Rationalization: Officer safety is a high-ranking government interest that outweighs the minimal intrusion of asking a driver to step out.

• Maryland v. Wilson ($1997$, approximately $20$ years after Mimms):

  • Issue: Can a passenger be ordered out of a validly stopped car if they are not the one who committed the traffic violation?

  • Ruling: Yes. Passengers present a "greater degree of danger" and the intrusion is considered minimal.

  • Dissenting View: Justices argued this violates the need for individualized suspicion—defined as facts that point to suspecting a particular individual of illegal activity. The dissent argued that routine stops vastly outnumber risky stops, making the blanket rule unnecessary.

• Massachusetts State Exception:

  • States can "raise the bar" for individual rights. In Massachusetts, police can only remove a passenger if they reasonably believe their safety is in danger, maintaining the Terry standard specifically for the passenger.

Border Searches and Sobriety Checkpoints

• United States v. Montoya de Hernandez ($1985$):

  • Case Facts: A Colombian woman was detained at the border (LAX) on suspicion of being an "alimentary canal smuggler" (swallowing cocaine balloons). She was given the option to be x-rayed, return to Colombia, or wait for a bowel movement. She was held for a long period until she passed the drugs.

  • Rule: Border stops are not subject to the Terry reasonable suspicion standard for the initial stop. The U.S. government can stop anyone at the border. However, the subsequent search must still be "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment. The court found her detention reasonable because she was provided alternatives.

• Michigan v. Sitz:

  • Issue: Are sobriety checkpoints constitutional if there is no individualized suspicion?

  • Ruling: Yes. The court applied a three-way balance: (1) Government interest in stopping drunk driving (very high), (2) Individual interest (minimal intrusion), and (3) Effectiveness of the program. Because the checkpoints were shown to be effective at reducing drunk driving, they were upheld.

Limits of Frisking and Associational Suspicion

• Pennsylvania Supreme Court Case (Multiple Suspects):

  • Police stopped two men for a robbery. They frisked both; one had drugs, the other had nothing. Police then re-frisked the first man. The court ruled this second frisk illegal. Finding drugs on a companion does not create reasonable suspicion to repeatedly frisk the other individual.

• US v. Robinson (Sixth Circuit, $1998$):

  • Case Facts: Two members of the Hells Angels were stopped. One had a gun. Police automatically frisked the second biker and found drugs.

  • Ruling: The second frisk was illegal. The court stated there was no suspicion for the second man other than his "unfortunate choice of associates," which is not a legal basis for a frisk.