What is meant by good is the defining question in meta ethics

cognative approaches - ethical naturalism + intuitionism

non cognative approach - emotivism

neither of these really create a communial explanation as to why good is, but rather give us pratical and reflective methods that we can take into our moral decision making. Meta ethics explores the concept of good, but it would be useless if it did not develop this theorteitcal approach further and create a pratcial aspect to it. Therefore the question of what good is, is one of the defining questions in meta ethics, but we shouldnt simply rely on the theoretical side of meta ethical debates but rather it what we can know about good further into our own ethical decision making.

ARG → what is meant by good is sigifncant within the exploration into metaethics, but ultiatemly our key take aways should be how we can use our knowledge about good in our pratical ethical decision making

PARA 1 → ethical naturalism

  • ethical naturalism supports that what is meant by good should be the defining question in meta ethics, this is because EN’S believe that good can be seen empirically within the world.

  • Mill and Bentham adopt such principles in their normative ethical theory of ultilitrianism where every human strives to minismse pain.

  • good is therefore the defining question because EN’s are right to focus on a conecpt that we see within our actions, they also help to break down down what good is and how it participates differently in everyday experiences

  • COUNTER → Issuses with mill + benthams approach, just because something feels good or is pleasureable it does not mean that it is ultimately good for us e.g - eating sweets. May end up removing support for good being the defining question of meta ethics since EN does not have the correct understanding of good

  • COUNTER → hume would develop this further in the is ought gap, as we cannot just infer goodness from facts, as we can clearly see above with the sweet example, since this leads us to jump from an is to an ought. This diminishes the idea of goodness being at the centre of metaethical debate, since cognative theories like naturalism fail to actually explain the goodness in question. - should goodness then ultimately be the defining question if we cannot deduce it from metaethical studies.

  • OVERALL → clear through the EN’s approach that actually trying to define what good is very hard, as it is difficult to jump from an is to an ought. Through mill and bentham’s theories however we can see the importance of developing goodness into a more pratical and proactive approach within our decision making.

PARA 2 → intutionism

  • goodness is the defining issuse for meta ethics, but GE Moore, is strengthed because he does not try and define the undefinable but rather establish it as a rational and fundemental qualitly

  • strength → the fact that he does not undermine goodness yet still attempts to make factual claims about goodness is a key strength (e,g GE Moore and the colour yellow)

  • it is what is ment by goodness but holistically to society

  • the signifcance of goodness is seen through the cross cultural moral agreements, for example stealing murderding are all consdiered wrong

  • randall - if we know something is right then we are going to fufil it… so good is the defining question, but it is not broken down just kept at what it is

  • COUNTER → major pratical issuses, good may be the defining question in meta ethics but it is ultimately useless if it cannot be applied within our normative ethical experiences. Ge moore never explains how intutionism works, how to develop it, we are left with no real clear answer as to what good really even is. Warnock develops how inutuinision ultimately is just a sense of bewilderment towards goodness that is built to look like a meta ethical discussion.

  • OVERALL → JL mackie highlights how initutionism is ultiamtely useless if it cannot pratically help us with ethical decsion making, even if it aims to define goodness. thus, goodness isnt the the only question in meta ethics and any theory that does not recognise this is ulitamtely of very limiteted.

PARA 3 → Emotivism

  • goodness is not a fact, but rather a moral judgement that is personal to ourselves

  • strength → seems to fit best with how we as individuals actually experience the phenomon of goodness, therefore keeping goodness the defining question of meta ethics whilst simlitansouely helping people better understand their own pratical approach to moral decision making

  • CL stevenson - the dynamic and descriptive meaning of words, highlights the non cognativism of goodness yet its pratical signficance within its use

  • COUNTER → danger of good being definied as meaningless, which racheal argues, should not be the defining feature of metaethics and goodness. we may end up reducing goodness and ethical meaning. ‘e.g - i hate marmite + i hate genocide’, clearly these are meaningless and meaningful… may lead to everyones concept of good to be valued when it shouldnt

  • thus goodness may be the defining question of meta ethics but it may in the process end up dimishing the meaning of goodness in trying to make it more taliored to our individualistic and pratical approach.

  • OVERALL → emotivism puts good at the centre of metaethical dicsussions but does not ignore the pratical elements of it that are important questions in meta ethics too. Although the theory iself may have pratical limiations towards how we use and recognise goodness, it does however show how we need to consider goodness from both a theoretical and pratical standpoint, and how both are signifcant within meta ethics