Functionalism

What does functionalism claim about mental states [3]

All mental states can be characterised in terms of functional roles which can be multiply realised.

What is a functional property [3]

A functional property is a relational property that has responds to certain inputs, such as stimuli, senses and other mental states, and produces certain outputs, such as behaviour and other mental states.

Explain the ‘inverted qualia’ objection to functionalism [5]

The ‘inverted qualia’ objection is a thought experiment which challenges functionalism. The Inverted Qualia objection creates a scenario in which there are two people who are functional duplicates in every way, but they have different qualia. This is a problem for functionalism because if we have functional duplicates who are not identical in every way - they have different qualia - then not all mental properties can be understood in terms of functional properties and functionalism is false.

The inverted qualia objection goes as follows: two people have grown up their entire lives in the same linguistic community, calling colours by the same names and so forth. When looking at a group of trees (the same input), they both call the trees green (the same output). So, they are functional duplicates, producing the same output from the same input. However, the phenomenal qualities of their experience (their qualia) are different — person A experiences the trees as being the colour green whilst person B experiences the trees as the colour red. Therefore, person A and person B are identical functionally, but have different qualia. Therefore, functionalism is false, as not all mental states are functional states.

Explain how Block’s china thought experiment can be used to argue against functionalism [5]

Functionalism claims that if two things are functionally identical then they must be mentally identical. The China thought experiment aims to show that something that is functionally identical to a human brain/mind can lack qualia. This means that functionalism cannot account for qualia (phenomenal properties cannot be reduced to functional properties)

Block’s china brain though experiment attempts to show the possibility of a functional duplicate with no qualia. Qualia are problematic for functionalism as they are intrinsic and non-Intentional, and therefore cannot be understood or analysed in terms of their functional properties. Ned Block wants to demonstrate the possibility of an exact functional duplicate that lacks any qualia.

The china brain goes as follows: imagine the entire population of China (chosen because its about the same number as the number of neural connections in your brain) are connected to each other via radios, and the entire connected population are also connected to a body. The population of China all play functional roles identical to that of the brain - for example, they would all realise the state of pain. But, we wouldn’t say that the China Brain undergoes the experience of pain - it lacks these qualia.

Explain how the knowledge argument can be used against functionalism

The Mary’s Room argument is a thought experiment used to challenge physicalism and functionalism (if we take it in a physicalist form). The knowledge argument challenges the claim that a complete analysis of mental states can be given in physical and functional terms. The thought experiment goes as follows: Mary is a neuroscientist specialising in colour vision, who knows all the physical facts that a completed physics would discover, and all of the functional facts that are entailed by hose fcts. there are to know about how the brain, and colour vision, works. However, she has lived her entire life in a black and white room. One day, Mary sees a tomato for the first time - the question posed here is does she learn something new? If we say she does, then there are facts which cannot be explained physically or functionally, therefore challenging functionalism. The knowledge argument is a problem for functionalism because it claims that a complete functional analysis of mental states is not a complete analysis — Mary learns something new (the phenomenal experience of ‘what it is like to see red’) which cannot be analysed functionally. Therefore, functionalism cannot give a complete account of mental life.

Explain the inverted qualia and one response to the objection [12]

Response: Patricia Churchland responds to the ‘inverted qualia’ objection, arguing that it would not actually produce functional duplicates. For example, if Person B, who experiences the tree as red, sees the tree next to an orange flower, they would say “those two plants are similar colours”, whereas Person A, who experiences the tree as green but the flower as orange would disagree. Therefore, whilst both person A and person B have the same inputs, they produce different outputs. Therefore, they are not functional duplicates. This responds to the claim posed by the inverted qualia objection

Explain Block’s china brain and one response [12]

Response: one response to block’s china brain

Functionalism is the claim that mental states can be understood in terms of functional states which can be multiply realised: to be a mental state is just to be a functional state with certain input and output relatiosn to stimuli, behaviour and other mental states. According to functionalism, if two things are functional duplicates then they are duplicates in all regards and they must have the same mental states. We can conceive of a being who is my functional duplicate but who has different (inverted) mental states from me, and therefore mental states cannot be understood in terms of the functional role they play. The inverted qualia objection challenges this claim by highlighting a scenario where two people are functional duplicates in all regards, but have different qualia. This means that qualia (which are non-Intentional and introspectively accessible) cannot be understood as functional properties, and therefore functionalism is false.

The inverted qualia objection goes as follows: two people, person A and person B, have grown up their entire lives in the same linguistic community. When they look at the same group of trees [same functional input] they both respond ‘those trees are green’ [same functional output]. However, the phenomenal properties of their experience are different because person A and person B have different qualia. Person A experiences the trees as green, whilst person B experiences the trees as red (but calls them green, because that is how they have been taught to describe the colour they see within their linguistic community). Therefore, person a and person B are functional duplicates but are not identical. This scenario is conceivable, and is therefore metaphysically possible, and if this scenario is metaphysically possible then phenomenal properties are not functional properties and so functionalism is not a complete account of the mind.