Religion and Politics in Iran: How Theocratic Is the Islamic Republic?

Theocracy in Iran: An Examination of Religion and Politics in the Islamic Republic

Theocracy Defined

Theocracy arises when a religious institution assumes temporal power, merging spiritual and secular authority.
In its purest form, God is the immediate ruler, with laws administered by holy men as His agents.

Historical Context: Shi'ism in Iran

The Safavid dynasty (1502-1722) established Shi'ism as the official religion of Iran, leading to the emergence of a powerful clergy.
The Iranian Shi'ite clergy gained independence from the state, allowing individual clerics to influence the country's affairs.
The clergy in Iran does not constitute a church in the sociological sense, lacking a strict hierarchy.
Shi'ite clerics emphasize that "the order of the clerical hierarchy is its disorder," indicating a lack of centrally ordained promotion procedures.
Not all religious activities are controlled by the clergy.

Marja's: Sources of Imitation

At the highest level are the marja's, or sources of imitation, each believer must follow one.
Marja's are typically the recipients of religious tithes, chosen freely by believers based on learning.
Multiple marja's can exist simultaneously.
The most learned clerics are not allowed to follow others in religious matters, preventing a strict pecking order.

Khomeini's Challenge: Creating a Theocracy

The absence of a clear hierarchy complicated Khomeini's attempt to establish a theocracy.
In a true theocracy, the religious institution as a whole exercises power.
Khomeini would have needed to reform the clergy's inner workings to create a genuine "church."

Religion and Politics in Pahlavi Iran

Following the constitutional revolution of 1906, the clergy largely withdrew from politics as secularism gained prominence.
An exception was Seyyed Hassan Modarres, a major political figure in the 1920s who opposed Reza Shah's dictatorship.
After Reza Shah's abdication in 1941, competitive politics returned, with the official clerical position being abstention from politics.
A 1949 conference in Qum concluded that clerics should abstain from political affairs.

Politically Active Clerics

Despite the official position, some clerics remained politically active, including Ayatollah Abolqasem Kashani, an ally of Mohammad Mossadegh.
Kashani organized mass support for Mossadegh's Nationalist government until a split in late 1952.
The Devotees of Islam, an extremist organization led by Nawab Safavi, carried out political assassinations.
In the 1952 parliamentary elections, pro-Mossadegh candidates supported by Kashani outperformed secular and conservative candidates in Tabriz.

National Resistance Movement (NRM)

After Mossadegh's ousting in a Western-backed coup, some followers formed the underground National Resistance Movement (NRM), dominated by religiously inclined individuals.
Ideologically, they were modernists who sought to reconcile Islam and liberal democracy.
They criticized the clergy's apolitical stance and backwardness, urging Ayatollah Borujerdi to help rid the country of illegitimate government.

Liberation Movement of Iran (LMI)

In the early 1960s, veterans of the NRM founded the Liberation Movement of Iran (LMI), advocating for the constitution and opposing political privileges for the clergy.
The LMI, led by Mehdi Bazargan and Seyyed Mahmud Taleqani, demanded the application of the constitution and opposed political privileges for the clergy.

Key Observations

The religious institution, led by Ayatollah Borujerdi, generally frowned upon political activism.
Clerics who defied this rule typically worked within existing state institutions.
Religiously motivated laymen formed the LMI, operating within the constitutional framework but maintaining strained relations with much of the clergy.
If Iranian politics had developed in a pluralist direction, the LMI and supporting clerics might have formed an Islamic equivalent of Christian Democracy.

Shift Towards Autocracy

The Shah's increasingly autocratic regime after 1963 limited the appeal of constitutionalist opposition and increased support for revolutionary alternatives.

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini

In January 1963, the moderate political opposition was disarmed as the Shah prepared for his "White Revolution."
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini emerged as a key opposition figure, advocating for clerical control over secular government.
Khomeini had been politically active in the 1940s, advocating for clerical control without direct rule, but abstained from politics in the 1950s.
After Ayatollah Borujerdi's death, Khomeini rose to prominence, criticizing government policies and abuses.
His criticism of the security forces' attack on Qum seminaries in March 1963 led to his arrest in June 1963, sparking widespread riots.
Khomeini's opposition to diplomatic immunity for American military experts in 1964 further solidified his image.
The Shah exiled him to Iraq until October 1978.

Khomeini's Doctrine: Velayat-e Faqih

During his exile in Iraq, Khomeini developed the doctrine of velayat-e faqih (mandate of the jurist), asserting that authority devolved on the clergy in the absence of the twelfth Imam.
This doctrine had historical roots in Safavid times but remained a minority view.
Mulla Ahmad Naraqi had previously elaborated on the clergy's judicial authority in the early nineteenth century.
Khomeini extended Naraqi's analysis to include the clergy's exercise of political power.
Khomeini argued that Muslims should establish Islamic government even in the twelfth Imam's absence.

Clerical Dissatisfaction

Most other marja's did not share Khomeini's doctrinal views, but dissatisfaction with the regime grew among the clergy.
The political abstinence of other marja's allowed Khomeini's views to prevail politically.
The Shah attempted to limit Khomeini's appeal by maintaining relations with other marja's, such as Ayatollah Muhsin Hakim and Ayatollah Kazem Shariatmadari.
Khomeini criticized apolitical peers, denouncing their lack of action and those who cooperated with the regime.

Growing Popularity

Khomeini's popularity increased as the Shah's legitimacy declined.
A vast network of religious associations emerged, becoming centers of oppositional activity.
Khomeini's grass-roots support network penetrated more deeply into society than the secular opposition, which had been severely repressed.

Revolution of 1978

When the revolution began in 1978, Khomeini quickly overshadowed secular political leaders.
Modern communications facilitated the spread of his messages.
While in 1978 he appeared to retreat from his theocratic blueprint, this was a tactical maneuver, and by 1978 the existing political system had lost its legitimacy.
The religious activism leading to the revolution was a symptom of "Praetorian politics," where social forces directly confront each other due to destroyed political institutions.

Institutionalization of the Islamic Republic

Given the extreme personalization of power under the Shah, his departure in 1979 precluded an orderly transfer of power.
A provisional government led by Mehdi Bazargan, a Muslim liberal, was installed but faced attacks from both the Left and fundamentalists.
Bazargan's government resigned following the seizure of American hostages in November 1979.

Ideological Diversity

The Islamic movement was ideologically and socially diverse, including socialist Mojahedin, liberal LMI, progressive ulema, constitutionalists, and radical clerics around Khomeini.
The original program of the Islamic Republican Party (IRP), founded by younger clerics, called for a centralizing reform of the clergy.
Differences of opinion emerged over Iran's new constitution.

Khomeini's Vision

Khomeini's 1971 blueprint involved experts running the government supervised by a faqih, with no need for a true parliament.
In January 1979, Khomeini stated that parliament's role was to supervise, not legislate, concerning itself only with minor matters.
Publicly, Khomeini endorsed liberal democracy while in Paris seeking international sympathy.
Later, he accepted a semipresidential constitution, leading to debates between secularists and Islamists.

Assembly of Experts

An assembly of experts was elected in the summer of 1979 to amend the constitution.
The majority of successful candidates were clerics, particularly founding members of the Islamic Republican Party.
Khomeini expected the assembly to create a "100 percent Islamic constitution."

Separation of Religion and Politics

Militant Islamists argued that separating religion and politics was a Western imperialist plot.
The Assembly of Experts eliminated the separation of religion and politics by superimposing the principle of velayat-e faqih on the draft, with Khomeini as the supreme religious leader.
The Islamic republic became a dyarchy, affirming popular sovereignty while enshrining Khomeini's vision of a faqih as the successor to the Prophet and the Imams.

Theocratic Elements

The constitution placed the judiciary under clerical control and provided for revising legal codes to render them Islamic.
The supreme religious leader had to be a marja possessing leadership qualities and accepted by the majority, fitting only Khomeini.
The constitution provided for an elected assembly of experts to choose a leader, representing an attempt at church building.
However, the clergy would have to change its traditional ways, requiring a bureaucratizing reform that was not attempted.

Opposition to the Constitution

The constitution of 1979 excluded a large part of the ulema, including most of the highest authorities besides Khomeini.
Ayatollah Shariatmadari opposed restricting popular sovereignty and interfering in state affairs.
Shariatmadari called for a boycott of the referendum to approve the constitution in December 1979.
Shariatmadari's followers rioted in Tabriz but were quickly defeated when he wavered in his challenge.

Impediments to Theocracy

Two trends impeded the establishment of a true theocracy: Iran's constitutional tradition and the ideological competition among various groups.
The theocrats had to use the language of constitutionalism, grafting a theocratic component onto the semipresidential draft.
This theocratic component did not engage the entire clergy.
The segment of the clergy that claimed the right to oversee public life was termed the clerisy.
The attempt to establish a theocracy could not fully succeed due to the clergy's unwillingness to assume political power.
As long as Khomeini was alive, the rule of the clerisy was sanctioned by his being a marja'.

Politicization of Religion

Contrary to radical Islamists' wishes, religion and politics did not merge; instead, politics became religious, and religion became politicized.

Theocracy and its Limits

The provisional government faced interference from individual clerics, creating chaos.
After the fall of the monarchy, Iran needed institutions to foster stable government.
The hybrid constitution of 1979 was ill-suited for providing a framework for stable governance.

Political Struggles

President Abolhasan Banisadr, a modernist Islamic layman, faced a hostile IRP majority in parliament.
Khomeini sided with the IRP and removed Banisadr from office in June 1981, paving the way for the clerisy's total assumption of power.
The clerisy eliminated other political forces and disregarded the constitution.

Islamization Efforts

The clerisy began reshaping Iranian society in 1980, purging ministries and educational establishments.
An Islamic cultural revolution was launched in April 1980, making Islamic ideology compulsory in schools.
Legal reform aimed to make God's law the legal code, defining an Islamic society as one governed by Islamic values.
This effort faced problems stemming from the nature of Islamic law, particularly disagreements among jurists.

Implementation of Divine Law

Implementing divine law (sharī'a) was challenging due to disagreements among jurists and the decentralized administration of law in premodern Iran.
The clerisy's task of Islamizing the judiciary could not be accomplished by simply reverting to the old system.
The sharī'a had to be codified for a modern nation-state, but even among the ruling clerisy, disagreements persisted.
This shifted the burden of creating laws to parliament, which became a legislative body.

Agrarian Property Relations

Disagreements were particularly paralyzing in the field of agrarian property relations.
The Islamic Republic had an ideological commitment to social justice, necessitating land distribution, but Islam also safeguarded property rights.
Parliament passed laws that were often rejected or modified by the Council of Guardians, which ensured conformity with Islam.

Factionalism within the Clerisy

These disagreements led to factions within the clerisy, with observers attempting to identify "moderates."
However, factionalism was often driven by personalism, confusing observers with shifting alliances.

Institutional Deadlock

By the end of 1987, disagreements within the regime and institutional deadlock between parliament and the Council of Guardians paralyzed government decision-making.
Khomeini issued an edict giving unconditional authority to the Islamic state, undermining the theocracy he had hoped to establish.
Instead of a society governed by Islamic laws, citizens were given the duty to obey an absolute ruler.

Limited Pluralism

Within the narrow range of tolerated opinion, the institutions of the Islamic republic allowed for a degree of pluralism and dissent.
The practice of the Islamic republic resembled Mao Zedong's idea of nonantagonistic contradictions among the "people."
This limited pluralism made the Islamic Republic more authoritarian than totalitarian.
The religious sphere maintained a certain independence from state interference.

Religious Opposition to the Islamic Republic

The clerisy's attempts to constitute a church and rule theocratically met with resistance among the clergy.
In early 1981, Ayatollah Reza Zanjani criticized the monopoly of judicial and theological decision-making.
Ayatollah Hasan Qomi criticized the government for being un-Islamic.
In 1982, Ayatollah Shariatmadari was "defrocked" following allegations of conspiracy.

Clerical Opposition

Opposition of the traditional clergy was not always synonymous with opposition to velayat-e faqih.
Some accepted the principle but objected to the personalization of power.
Grand Ayatollah Golpayegani of Qum exemplified this tendency.
Khomeini began appointing imam jom'ehs to lead Friday prayers and preach velayat-e faqih.

Political and Religious Clergy

The Islamic Republic's attempt to overcome the separation of religion and politics led to the emergence of a political and a "purely religious" clergy.
The clerisy, close to power, faced criticism similar to that faced by procourt clerics under the monarchy.
The proclamation of the absolute mandate of the jurist in 1988 alienated many, including religious modernists.

Silence of the Clergy

The clergy did not always speak out forcefully against the clerisy for various reasons, including the advantages of belonging to the ruling stratum, fear of reprisal, and a belief that the people would eventually realize the spuriousness of the theocratic enterprise.

Lay Opposition

On the lay side, religious opposition to the Islamic regime manifested itself through modernists like Mehdi Bazargan.
Their collaboration with the clergy was impeded by their suspicion of all clerics.

Post-Khomeini Developments

Charismatic authority faces the problem of routinization.
Weber identified various ways this can be accomplished.
Khomeini chose Ayatollah Montazeri, a former student with impeccable revolutionary credentials.
For a while it seemed as though the succession was assured, but Montazeri became increasingly critical of the regime and its arbitrary policies.

Constitutional Revision

Within the clerisy, no one was left who could fulfill the constitutional conditions for the position of supreme religious leader.
This, plus the unwieldiness of the constitution, led to a constitutional revision in the summer of 1989 which streamlined institutions.
Most important, the constitutional provision that required the supreme religious leader to be a marja' was eliminated.
Also eliminated was the position of prime minister, which strengthened the presidency that Rafsanjani coveted.

Bifurcation of Authority

When Khomeini died on June 3, 1989, the regime was prepared. The Assembly of Experts quickly moved to elect President Ali Khameneh'i to the position of faqih; Rafsanjani later became president.
It was clear that Khameneh'i could not inherit Khomeini's religious authority as marja', the regime's decision to make him an instant Grand Ayatollah notwithstanding.
Therefore, a nonagenarian cleric of whom very few people had heard before, Ayatollah Araki, was presented to the people as the new marja'.
First, it is an implicit admission that state and church are separate, as Khomeini's political authority was vested in Khameneh'i and his religious authority in Araki.
Second, the regime now "designated" the marja' much more blatantly than the Shah had ever done with his discreet hints as to his government's preference on this matter.

Future of the Clergy

The clerisy's rule has not succeeded in eliminating it.
As if to underline his contempt for the clergy, he wrote mystical love poems in his last months that mock traditional religiosity
Velayat-e faqih had triumphed, however, Khomeini's death complicated matters.
This means that the legitimacy of the Iranian regime is now in doubt on its own terms.
Today most pious Iranians follow Ayatollah Kho'i in Iraq, while the constitutional supreme religious leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khameneh'i, is clearly subordinate in terms of actual power to President Ali-Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani.

Conclusion

The attempt to found a theocracy in Iran has been only a superficial success. Only a sector of the clergy took power in 1981.
At the heart of Iran's political system lies a doctrinal aporia, which will sooner or later lead to a legitimacy crisis.
There has been a certain laicization of the regime, as technocrats have increasingly replaced clerics in key positions.
If these ulema link up with marginalized, and therefore resentful, members of the clerisy, the stage could be set for a renewal of tension between state and church.
The degree of religiosity in a society is not constant.