Pragmatics Notes: Huang 2007 – Introduction, Implicature, Presupposition (Pages 1–8)

Page 1–2

Publication context and structure
- The material is from Yan Huang (2007) Pragmatics, part of the Oxford Textbooks in Linguistics series.
- Series editors: Keith Brown; Eve V. Clark; April McMahon; Jim Miller; Lesley Milroy.
- The series provides introductions to main subfields of linguistics, with titles such as:
- The Grammar of Words (Geert Booij)
- A Practical Introduction to Phonetics (J. C. Catford, 2nd ed.)
- Meaning in Language (Alan Cruse)
- Principles and Parameters (Peter W. Culicover)
- A Semantic Approach to English Grammar (R. M. W. Dixon)
- Semantic Analysis (Cliff Goddard)
- Pragmatics (Yan Huang)
- Diachronic Linguistics (Ian Roberts)
- Cognitive Grammar (John R. Taylor)
- Linguistic Categorization (John R. Taylor)
- Copyright and publication details: Yan Huang, 2007. The book is published by Oxford University Press. Includes standard front matter (preface, acknowledgements, contents, symbols/abbreviations), and a note about rights and reproduction.
- Printing and bibliographic notes follow the typical academic publication format (cataloguing data, printing location, ISBNs).
Contents (highlights)
- 1. Introduction
- Part 1: 1.1 What is pragmatics?
- 1.1.1 A definition
- 1.1.2 A brief history of pragmatics
- 1.1.3 Two main schools of thought: Anglo-American vs. European Continental
- 1.2 Why pragmatics?
- 1.2.1 Linguistic underdeterminacy
- 1.2.2 Simplification of semantics and syntax
- 1.3 Some basic notions in semantics and pragmatics
  - 1.3.1 Sentence, utterance, proposition
  - 1.3.2 Context
  - 1.3.3 Truth value, truth condition, entailment
- 1.4 Organization of the book
- Exercises and essay questions
- Further readings
- Central topics in pragmatics (page reference given as 21)
- 2. Implicature
- 2.1 Classical Gricean theory of conversational implicature
  - 2.1.1 The cooperative principle and the maxims of conversation
  - 2.1.2 Relationship between the speaker and the maxims
  - 2.1.3 Conversational implicature (distinct section)
- 3. Presupposition
Context for the excerpt
- The notes cover the initial chapters of Huang’s Pragmatics, focusing on: (i) an overview of pragmatics, its history and schools of thought; (ii) the notion of implicature (Gricean theory); and (iii) the core topic of presupposition with definitions, properties, and analyses.

Page 2

Organization and scope of the book (continues from Page 1)
- The book is organized to present central topics in pragmatics, with dedicated chapters on implicature and presupposition, followed by analyses of theoretical approaches.
- There is an emphasis on bridging semantics and pragmatics, contextual effects, and how meaning is conveyed beyond literal sentence content.

Page 3–4

3. PRESUPPOSITION

3.1. What is presupposition?

Definition (informal): A presupposition is an inference or proposition whose truth is taken for granted in the utterance of a sentence. It functions as a precondition for the appropriate use of that sentence and remains in force when the containing sentence is negated.
Triggers: Presupposition triggers are lexical items or linguistic constructions that engender presuppositions. These triggers can be lexical or constructional/structural.
Examples of presupposition triggers (lexical):
- (3.1) Definite descriptions
- The king of France is/isn't bald. >> There is a king of France
- (3.2) Factive predicates
- a) Epistemic or cognitive factives: John knows/doesn't know that Baird invented television. >> Baird invented television
- b) Emotive factives: John regrets/doesn't regret that he has said the unsayable. >> John has said the unsayable
- (3.3) Aspectual/change of state predicates
- Mary has/hasn't stopped beating her boyfriend. >> Mary has been beating her boyfriend
Examples of presupposition triggers (constructional/structural):
- (3.4) Iteratives (verbs): John returned/didn't return to Cambridge. >> John was in Cambridge before
- (3.4) Iterative adverbs: The boy cried/didn't cry wolf again. >> The boy cried wolf before
- (3.5) Implicative predicates: John managed/didn't manage to give up smoking. >> John tried to give up smoking
- (3.6) Temporal clauses: After she shot to stardom in a romance film, Jane married/didn't marry a millionaire entrepreneur. >> Jane shot to stardom in a romance film
- (3.7) Cleft sentences: a) It was/wasn't Baird who invented television. >> Someone invented television
- (3.7) Pseudo-cleft: What Baird invented/didn't invent was television >> Baird invented something
- (3.8) Counterfactual conditionals: If an ant were as big as a human being, it could/couldn’t run five times faster than an Olympic sprinter. >> An ant is not as big as a human being
Key note:
- In (3.1)–(3.5), triggers are lexical. In (3.6)–(3.8), presuppositions arise from constructions/structures (temporal clause, cleft, counterfactual).

Have a look at Exercises 1 and 2 on p. 91.

Page 4

3.2. Properties of presupposition

Presuppositions have several distinctive properties, notably:

(i) Constancy under negation
(ii) Defeasibility or cancellability
Additionally, some defeasibility cases give rise to the projection problem.

3.2.1. Constancy under negation

Concept: A presupposition generated by a lexical item or syntactic structure remains the same when the containing sentence is negated.
Formal diagnostic (cf. Beaver 1997, 2001):
- (3.9) An utterance of a sentence S presupposes a proposition p iff
  a. if S is true, then p is true
  b. if S is false, then p is still true
Formalization:
ext{(3.9) } ext{An utterance of a sentence } S ext{ presupposes a proposition } p ext{ iff } egin{cases} ext{if } S ext{ is true, then } p ext{ is true}\ ext{if } S ext{ is false, then } p ext{ is still true} \ ext{(i.e. } p ext{ remains true under negation)} \ ext{(definitional schematic)} \ ext{ } \ ext{ }
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Practical implication: Constancy under negation is a diagnostic for classifying presuppositions, but it is not the sole criterion (see later examples).
Caveats:
- Some sentences are hard or impossible to negate yet carry presuppositions (Green 1996).
- Constancy under negation may not be sufficient to identify presuppositions; some constructions yield felicity conditions or conventional implicatures despite constancy (e.g., (3.11)–(3.12)).
Examples illustrating constancy and complications:
- (3.10) Long live the king of France! >> There is a king of France
- (3.11) Do/don't bring the digital camera here. >> The digital camera is not here
- (3.12) (Chinese) nin yongyuan shi wode laoshi. 'You will always be my teacher' >> The addressee is socially superior to or distant from the speaker

Exercise 3 (pp. 91–92) develops these points further.

Page 5

3.2.2. Defeasibility

Presuppositions can be canceled if they clash with background assumptions, conversational implicatures, or certain discourse contexts. This is a core property distinguishing presuppositions from semantic entailments.
Defeasibility types and examples:
- (3.13) John got an assistant professorship before he finished his Ph.D. >> John finished his Ph.D. (presupposition remains but can be canceled if inconsistent with knowledge)
- (3.14) John died before he finished his Ph.D. ~>> John finished his Ph.D. (cancelling the presupposition due to world knowledge that one cannot do anything after death)
- These illustrate that a presupposition can be cancelled when it conflicts with real-world knowledge.
Interaction with conversational implicatures:
- (3.15) If John is organizing a stag night, Mary will be angry that he is doing so. + perhaps John is organizing a stag night, perhaps he isn't
- ~>> John is organizing a stag night
- The presence of a conversational implicature (perhaps) can defeat the presupposition; the defeasibility is guided by context and the speaker’s intent.
Individual speaker variability and alternative phrasing:
- Some speakers cannot cancel certain presuppositions in (3.14) depending on the formulation (e.g., using a non-finite version can defeat the presupposition, whereas the finite version may not).
- A neo-Gricean pragmatic explanation suggests that if the speaker wanted to suspend a presupposition, they would have chosen the form that allows cancellation (e.g., (ii) John died before finishing his Ph.D.). If (3.14) is used instead, the inference may reveal the speaker’s stance about suspension.
Factive predicates and presupposition with expression of attitude:
- The use of a factive predicate like angry can introduce a presupposition (John is organizing a stag night), but a conflicting conversational implicature (perhaps not) can override it.
The role of the discourse context and counterfactual reasoning:
- (3.16) There is no king of France. Therefore the king of France isn't bald. ~>> There is a king of France
- Contextual inconsistency blocks the presupposition, showing defeasibility in action.
- (3.17) A, noticing the open door: Was it you who opened the door to the porch? I closed it at lunch time. ~>> Someone opened the door to the porch
- This example demonstrates how a speaker’s broader discourse goal can override a lower-clause presupposition.
Theoretical perspective on cancellation:
- Some cases show overt denial of presupposition in a coordinated structure (3.19–3.21), where the presupposition seems to be overridden by the act of denial.
- Conversely, positive sentences often resist overt denial of presupposition (3.22–3.24), leading to an entailment analysis: presupposed content may become entailed rather than merely presupposed.
Explicit suspension via conditionals and the role of world-creating verbs:
- (3.25)–(3.27) show presuppositions can be suspended by an if-clause; and (3.28)–(3.29) show that saying verbs (say, mention, tell) and attitude verbs (believe, think, imagine, dream, want) can evaporate presuppositions in certain contexts. These verbs are sometimes called world-creating.
- Examples: (3.28) John said/mentioned/told Bill that Mary managed to speak with a broad Irish accent. ~>> Mary tried to speak with a broad Irish accent
- (3.29) Mr Wang believed/dreamed/imagined that he is the emperor of China. ~>> There is an emperor of China
Summary of reduction and world-creating behavior:
- World-creating verbs can define alternative worlds where presuppositions may evaporate.
- This leads into how presuppositions are treated within discourse and historical developments in presupposition theory (Langendoen & Savin; Levinson).

Page 6

3.2.3. The projection problem

The projection problem concerns how presuppositions of component sentences behave when embedded in larger, more complex sentences. It is a central issue in presupposition theory and relates to the Fregean principle of compositionality: the meaning of a complex expression as a function of its parts.
Two directions in projection:
- Projection of presuppositions can fail: the presuppositions of a part may not project to the whole (the “curse”).
- Projection of presuppositions can succeed: the presuppositions of a part may survive in the whole (the “blessing”).
Examples showing non-projection (loss) or blocked projection:
- (3.30) If the bishop promotes the politically incorrect, then he will regret doing so. ~>> The bishop will promote the politically incorrect
- (3.31) Either the bishop will not promote the politically incorrect, or he will regret doing so. ~>> The bishop will promote the politically incorrect
- In both cases, the presupposition of the embedded clause fails to project to the whole conditional or disjunction.
Examples showing projection in negation and under modal operators:
- Negation: (3.32) It was/wasn't John who hadn't been out of his house for a month. >> Someone hadn't been out of his house for a month
- Modals: (3.33) It's possible/there's a chance that the nursery teacher sold nine Christmas raffle tickets. >> There is a nursery teacher
- (3.34) The nursery teacher could/should/ought to have sold nine Christmas raffle tickets. >> There is a nursery teacher
More robust projection under certain contexts:
- When presuppositions are embedded under modal operators, the presupposition can survive (unblocked) as shown in (3.33) and (3.34).
Higher-level projection via embedding of presupposed clauses:
- (3.35) If Susan returned to England, (then) she would be arrested. >> Susan was in England before
- (3.36) Either Susan returns to England, or she will flee to Spain. >> Susan was in England before
Overall: The projection problem is central to modern presupposition theory and has been described as both a curse and a blessing: it provides a way to identify a presuppositional component and a means to test compositionality, but it remains difficult to solve completely (Beaver 2001).

Page 7–8

3.3. Analyses

A very broad landscape of theoretical approaches to presupposition exists:
- Treating presupposition as a kind of anaphora (e.g., Soames 1989; van der Sandt 1992; Geurts 1998, 1999; Krahmer 1998).
- Probabilistic and deterministic accounts (Merin 2003).
- Cognitive/experiential analyses (Fauconnier 1985; Marmaridou 2000).
The field includes a mix of formal, semantic, and pragmatic perspectives, with ongoing debates about whether presuppositions are best modeled as stable semantic commitments or context-dependent pragmatic inferences.
The excerpt notes that little current work relies on a purely non-theoretical neutral framework; most approaches integrate semantics with pragmatics, context, and discourse dynamics.

Key concepts and connections

Pragmatics vs semantics: Pragmatics concerns context-dependent aspects of meaning, including what is implied rather than what is literally stated.
Implicature (to be covered in Chapter 2): Gricean notions of how speakers convey meaning beyond the literal content via cooperative principle and maxims; crucial for understanding how speakers infer intended meaning.
Presupposition: Background assumptions that must be true for a sentence to be used appropriately; triggered by lexical items or constructions; interacts with negation, questions, modals, conditionals, and discourse context; subject to defeasibility and projection effects.
The projection problem is central to understanding how presuppositions behave when sentences are embedded in larger structures; it highlights the contrast between what is implied by component clauses versus what persists in larger utterances.
World-creating verbs (e.g., say, believe, imagine) demonstrate that language can evoke alternative discourse worlds in which presuppositions may not hold, illustrating flexible interpretive environments.
Practical and philosophical implications:
- The treatment of presupposition informs discussions about reference, truth-conditions, and meaning in linguistics and philosophy of language.
- The behavior of presuppositions under negation, questions, and various syntactic constructions impacts how listeners interpret utterances in real communication.
- The debate over projection vs non-projection informs models of compositionality and the interface between semantics and pragmatics.

Notation and references (from the excerpt)

Presupposition trigger notation:
- (3.1) Definite descriptions; (3.2) Factive predicates; (3.3) Aspectual predicates; (3.4) Iteratives; (3.5) Implicative predicates; (3.6) Temporal clauses; (3.7) Clefts; (3.8) Counterfactuals.
Key formalization:
- (3.9) An utterance of a sentence S presupposes a proposition p iff
  egin{cases} ext{if } S ext{ is true, then } p ext{ is true} \ ext{if } S ext{ is false, then } p ext{ is still true} \ ext{(constancy under negation)} \ ext{with } p ext{ as the presupposed proposition.}
  ext{(Beaver 1997, 2001)} \ ext{(Translation of the idea: presupposition survives negation.}
  ext{)} \
  ext{ }
  ext{ }

ight.

References for theoretical background and examples mentioned in the text include works by Levinson (1983), Soames (1989), Horn (1983, 1985, 1989), Atlas (2004, 2005), Green (1996), Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet (2000), Gazdar (1979), Langendoen and Savin (1971), and others cited in the excerpt.
Exercises are referenced throughout (pp. 91–92 for exercises related to presupposition; 2 and 4 for other chapters), indicating an active practice component in the book.

Summary for exam-ready notes

Pragmatics studies meaning in context; key notions include sentence vs utterance, context, truth conditions, and entailment.
Implicature (Gricean): meaning conveyed beyond literal content via cooperative principles and maxims; crucial for distinguishing explicit meaning from inferred meaning.
Presupposition: background assumptions triggered by lexical items or constructions; remains under negation but can be canceled or blocked by context, discourse, or particular constructions; projection problem concerns how presuppositions project from parts to wholes in complex sentences.
Triggers of presupposition span lexical (definite descriptions, factives, aspectuals, iteratives, implicatives) and constructional (temporal clauses, clefts, counterfactuals) domains.
Constancy under negation is a key diagnostic but not sufficient alone for identifying presuppositions; defeasibility is common and interacts with world knowledge and discourse context.
Defeasibility types include cancellation due to world knowledge, conversational implicatures, or contextual mismatch; certain uses (e.g., with “world-creating” verbs) can evaporate presuppositions.
The projection problem remains central and controversial; presuppositions may or may not project depending on negation, modality, or discourse structure.
A wide range of analytical approaches (anaphora-based, probabilistic, cognitive/experiential) exists to account for presupposition, reflecting ongoing debates about the interface of semantics and pragmatics.

If you’d like, I can reorganize these notes into a condensed cheat-sheet or expand any particular example (e.g., working through (3.10)–(3.16) in more detail) for targeted exam practice.