Notes on Evil, Omnipotence, and the Free Will Defense
Denial of Evil and Privation Theory
The opening question: can we deny that the world contains evil? Some try to deny or redefine evil.
One approach: view the world as largely illusory; suffering is not real in some sense (Christian science, some strands of Buddhism argue suffering results from a mistaken view of reality).
The speaker notes this as a hard route and suggests it’s not clearly compelling.
Privation theory of evil: evil is not a positive entity but the privation (absence) of good.
Historical reference: medieval discussions about evil as privation.
The dialogue asks: what does it mean to say evil is a privation? How should we understand privations?
The privation analogy (two classic pairs)
Darkness vs light: darkness is not a positive thing; it is the absence of light. If there is no light, it is dark, not a thing called darkness in its own right.
Heat vs cold: cold is the absence of heat; there is only heat as a positive, while cold is the privation.
Applying this to evil: evil could be understood as the absence of goodness (the absence of God).
Some would claim hell is a state of complete privation (absent of God).
The speaker cautions against over-committing to the privation view, but presents it as one way to deny evil as a positive thing.
The discussion then shifts to how we understand the presence of suffering if evil is only a privation.
Omnipotence, Omnibenevolence, and Logical Possibility
Question: when we say God is omnipotent, are we talking about everything that is logically possible, not just everything physically possible?
God could in principle violate physical laws (e.g., lift a building with a snap of the fingers), but cannot violate logic itself because contradictions (A and not-A) are incoherent.
If something entails a logical contradiction, it’s not a genuine possible task for any being, including God.
Therefore, omnipotence means God can do all that is logically possible.
The paradox: can God create a world without evil?
If creating a world with free beings who have genuine free will is logically possible, then omnipotence would include that; if not, maybe not.
This raises a familiar problem: does the possibility of free will restrict what counts as an omnipotent act?
The classic paradox example: the stone paradox
Can God create a stone so heavy that God cannot lift it?
If yes, there exists something God cannot do (lifting that stone), which seems to contradict omnipotence.
If no, then there exists something God cannot create or do (a stone He cannot lift) — again a puzzle about omnipotence.
The point, echoed here, is that this paradox points to limitations that are not real limits on power but are a result of trying to frame omnipotence as performing logical impossibilities.
A related challenge: can God create beings with genuine free will who are beyond His control after creation?
If yes, then God’s power is limited by those beings’ autonomy; if no, then there may be a constraint on God’s power to create fully autonomous agents.
The discussion points toward a defense: the true limits of omnipotence are logical (i.e., the impossibility of making contradictions true), not about creating creatures with free will.
The upshot: omnipotence is about what is logically possible; the question of whether God could or should create a world with free will (and with or without evil) is tied to the nature of logical possibility and the coherence of the world God would create.
The Free Will Defense and the Balance of Goods
The key premise in Leibniz’s broader discussion: if God is omnipotent and perfectly good, He would create the best of all possible worlds.
The argument structure (Leibniz, reframed in classroom):
Premise 1: If God is omnipotent, He could create the best of all possible worlds.
Premise 2: If God is perfectly good, He would create the best of all possible worlds.
Conclusion: Therefore, if God exists with these properties, He would create the best of all possible worlds.
Premise 3 (a posteriori): The actual world contains both moral evil and natural evil (Holocaust, diseases).
Premise 4: There exist possible worlds with less or no evil.
Conclusion (from 1–4): The actual world is not the best of all possible worlds.
The spokespersons (Leibniz and supporters) defend that even with evil present, the world could still be the best due to a net balance of goods.
Net goodness is not simply Good minus Evil; it’s the overall balance when considering the amount and kinds of goodness enabled by free will and other goods.
Example used to illustrate net balance:
World A: Good = 1000, Evil = 0 → Net =
World B: Good = 10000, Evil = 1000 → Net =
The claim: even though World B has more evil, it may still be morally better if it yields far more goodness overall (net balance).
The Free Will Defense claims that free will is a tremendously valuable feature that justifies the presence of evil when it leads to greater overall goodness (moral responsibility, meaningful choice, love, etc.).
The challenge remains: natural evil (suffering not caused by human choices) is not fully explained by free will; the defense is not a complete explanation for natural evil.
The Garden of Eden narrative is used to connect human free will with the origin of evil, while also acknowledging natural evil that predates humans or arises beyond moral agency (e.g., animal suffering).
The discussion frames two main tasks for evaluating the theodicy:
Can a world with free will and moral evil still be the best possible world?
Can free will and omnipotence together account for natural evil, or is additional harm or explanation needed?
A living counterpoint in the session: some participants find the free will defense compelling, especially for moral evil, while recognizing it does not fully resolve natural evil.
Adam’s Challenge: No Obligation to Create the Best World
The supplementary reading by Adams (Robert Adams) argues against the premise that God has an obligation to create or maximize goodness.
Core claim: God does not necessarily owe us the best possible world; existence itself can be preferable to non-existence for beings who do exist.
The Prodigal Son analogy is used to illustrate a benevolent form of love: a parent loves imperfect beings and does not require them to be perfect to be worthy of love.
The argument contends that creating imperfect beings can be a display of divine love; such beings may still thrive and be morally significant even if there is significant suffering.
The speaker emphasizes the intuition that existence with faults may still be better than non-existence for those who exist, and that God’s loving act of creation need not be obligated to instantiate the perfect world.
The IVF embryo thought experiment (and the ethical reflection) is used to probe this stance:
An embryo with a defect could develop into a child who would have a life worth living.
Implanting such an embryo may raise questions: is it wrong to bring a severely handicapped child into existence if life is still worth living?
The discussion notes that if the life is worth living, implanting the embryo may not be wrong, even if it results in disability.
The group is invited to respond: does such a choice harm the child, or is it a morally permissible or even praiseworthy act if the child’s life is worthwhile?
The Adam view is presented as a challenge to the inference that because the actual world contains evil, it cannot be the best possible world; Adams argues that the existence and love involved in creation can justify creating such a world even if it includes suffering.
The conversation connects Adams’ view to broader questions: if God loves imperfect beings, does that license or require creation of a world with “faults” rather than a flawless one? And does it reconcile with the intuition that evil is a price worth paying for meaningful existence?
Garden of Eden, Animal Suffering, and Natural Evil
The discussion acknowledges a common objection: even with free will, natural evils (earthquakes, diseases, tsunamis) remain unexplained by human moral evil.
Some propose the Eden narrative as a framework where pre-fall humans had special protections from natural Evil, which later came after the fall due to human choices.
There is a suggestion to view animal suffering in the natural order (e.g., animals preying on each other) as part of the broader problem of natural evil, potentially pre-dating human existence.
The dialogue recognizes that free will explains moral evil but does not automatically explain natural evil; the question remains how these forms of suffering fit within the best possible world defense.
The Probing Questions and Student Reactions
The session includes interactive prompts from students:
Jamila expresses that the free will defense helps when the focus is on moral evil and the value of free will.
Maggie supports the idea that free will is a source of moral responsibility and a significant component of a good world.
The class explores whether the presence of free will and moral evil can be justified by the greater good produced, even if natural evil remains problematic.
The lecturer highlights the ongoing debates and the existence of objections from four and five to six (i.e., premises about evil and the best possible world) and the replies that defend the view that a world with free will could still be the best.
A recurring motif is whether it’s coherent to claim that the best possible world must minimize evil to the absolute extent possible, given the value of freedom and responsibility.
Closing Thoughts and Historical Context
Leibniz and theodicy: the best-of-all-possible-worlds argument situates the problem of evil within a broader tradition that seeks to reconcile divine omnipotence, omniscience, and goodness with the existence of evil.
The discussion includes a brief historical aside about Leibniz (often credited with co-inventing calculus alongside Newton) and the role of this line of thought in the development of modern philosophy of religion.
The conversation closes by returning to practical questions about how to reason about evil, free will, and the nature of divine perfection, acknowledging both the persuasive power and the limits of the defense.
Key Formulas and Numerical References
Net goodness comparison (illustrative example):
Let Good and Evil denote amounts of goods and evils in a world.
Net Goodness in a world W:
World A: Good = 1000, Evil = 0 → .
World B: Good = 10000, Evil = 1000 → .
The discussion treats the balance of goods and evils as a determinant of whether a world is the best possible world, rather than simply whether evil exists.
Connections to Foundational Principles and Real-World Relevance
The problem of evil connects to larger questions in philosophy of religion about:
The coherence of omnipotence, omnibenevolence, and omniscience with evil.
The value of free will and moral responsibility as reasons for the existence of evil.
The distinction between moral evil (caused by free choices) and natural evil (non-moral sources of suffering).
Ethical and practical implications discussed include:
Whether it’s permissible to create beings with potential for significant suffering if it also yields meaningful goods.
How to assess the morality of actions like implanting an embryo with defects when the life could still be worth living.
The role of love and responsibility in creation, and whether a compassionate creator would or would not create imperfect beings.
Philosophical implications include debates about whether the world must be the best possible world given known constraints, or whether God’s nature allows for a morally sufficient world that includes evil as a byproduct of freedom.
Real-world relevance emerges in ethical decision-making, debates about theism, and how to interpret suffering within a framework of love, responsibility, and freedom.
Summary of Debates Highlighted in the Transcript
Denial of evil: evil as illusion or as privation.
Privation theory: evil as absence of good; darkness and cold as analogies.
Omnipotence constrained by logic, not by physical laws; the stone paradox as a demonstration.
Free will defense: moral evil explained by genuine free will; the world’s balance of goods may justify evil.
Natural evil remains a challenge; Eden narrative and animal suffering discussed as potential explanations.
Adams’ challenge: no obligation to create the best possible world; existence can be valuable even if imperfect.
IVF embryo thought experiments used to probe the ethics of creating imperfect lives.
The dialogue emphasizes both the persuasiveness and limits of the defenses, and invites further inquiry and discussion.