Democratic Aristocracy - Notes

Democratic Aristocracy

One dominant trend in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was the extension of the right to vote. Wealth requirements for representatives disappeared, leading to the identification of free elections with democracy. The American debate of 1787 was the last time consideration was given to aristocratic features in systems based on free elections.

Both the Anti-Federalists and Federalists believed that elections select individuals superior to those who elect them, viewing election as aristocratic in itself. The American debate identified the beneficiaries of the elective system as conspicuous citizens, those in prestigious professions, the talented, or the wealthy.

Representative government might become more popular and democratic, but would retain an aristocratic dimension, as those elected would not be similar to those electing them. The position of representative would be reserved for persons regarded as superior or for members of higher social classes. In governments based solely on election, not all citizens would have an equal chance of holding public office.

Aristocratic Character of Election: A Pure Theory

Aristotle, Montesquieu, and Rousseau stated that elections were intrinsically aristocratic, resulting from the very nature of election. The inegalitarian and aristocratic effects of election are due to four factors: unequal treatment of candidates by voters, the distinction of candidates required by a situation of choice, the cognitive advantage conferred by salience, and the cost of disseminating information.

Citizens are politically equal as choosers, but choosing is only one aspect of citizenship. The possibility of holding office remains one of the components of citizenship. Candidates may be treated in an inegalitarian fashion. Positions are allocated according to preferences held by the sovereign people for this or that particular individual, not according to abstractly defined attributes or actions.

Free elections cannot preclude partiality in the treatment of candidates. Voters may discriminate among candidates on the basis of individual characteristics. The voter is sovereign: "Sic volo, sic jubeo, stat pro ratione voluntas" ("Thus I wish, thus I ordain, my will takes the place of reason").

The elective procedure is not necessarily meritocratic and does not strictly guarantee equality of opportunity. Under an elective system, the standards are not defined in an abstract manner and announced in advance. There is no guarantee that, when casting their votes, electors will take even partial account of the efforts, actions, and choices of the candidates.

To be chosen, a candidate must display at least one characteristic that is positively valued by his fellow-citizens and that the other candidates do not possess, or not to the same extent. An elective system leads to the self-selection and selection of candidates who are deemed superior.

Cognitive psychology shows that attention primarily focuses on salient items or individuals. Candidates have to stand out by virtue of a positively valued characteristic. Election campaigns were in fact instituted (among other reasons) to counteract the advantage that the elective procedure, considered in itself, confers on the particular form of eminence represented by notability.

Candidates need to make themselves known which is expensive, meaning that it favors those able to mobilize greater resources. Inherently, then, the elective procedure favors the wealthier strata of the population. This one could be eliminated entirely by having campaigns publicly financed and electoral expenses strictly regulated.

To elect a person, voters do not have to believe that person to be better in every respect; they may despise one or even most of his character traits. Voters must regard him as superior in the light of the quality or set of qualities that they consider politically relevant.

The elective principle does not guarantee that true political excellence gets selected. Elections operate on the basis of a culturally relative perception of what constitutes a good ruler.

Two Faces of Election: Benefits of Ambiguity

Elections give each citizen an equal say in the choice of representatives. Elections are simultaneously and indissolubly egalitarian and inegalitarian, aristocratic and democratic.

Schmitt argues, can be a democratic method if those elected are regarded as "agents, proxies, or servants/' that is, if they are treated as "dependent delegates."

The specific form of the aristocratic component of election probably accounts for much of the exceptional success of this method for selecting rulers. The advantages of wealth can be mitigated or even abolished. The unavoidable constraint of distinction further allows for some flexibility and leaves a margin of uncertainty, even within the limits of a given culture.

Because of its dual nature, election also gives to such ordinary citizens powerful motives for supporting its use. It constitutes a point of argumentative equilibrium.

Election could, by analogy, be termed a mixed institution. The two dimensions of election (aristocratic and democratic) are objectively true and both carry significant consequences. The properties are so tightly interwoven that they cannot possibly be separated from each other.

Election and the Principles of Modern Natural Right

Modern natural right theory acknowledges that many inequalities of strength, ability, virtue, or wealth separate human beings, but it holds that none of these inequalities gives by itself to those who are superior in one respect or another the right to rule over others.

Saying that, in an elective system, only those who are objectively different and perceived as superior can reach positions of power, is not the same as saying that objectively superior individuals alone can reach power.

The response to the first problem, it must be noted that the constraints of distinction and salience do not in fact abolish voters' freedom. They merely imply that voters are only able to choose individuals who (1) possess a distinctive trait, that (2) is judged favorably, and (3) provides a criterion of political selection.

The elective method sets no objective limits on what may be judged favorably and serve as such a criterion, voters retain a broad measure of freedom.

This compatibility, however, is actually achieved only if one crucial condition is met: voters must be free to determine which qualities they value positively and to choose from among those qualities the one they regard as the proper criterion for political selection.