PURSRO-2v1
Schopenhauer’s Rejection of the Moral Ought
Introduction
The prescriptive view of morality:
Associated with Kant, claiming morality provides laws of what ought to happen.
Suggests moral imperatives bind us categorically or absolutely.
Schopenhauer's critique:
Presents a descriptive conception of ethics.
Argues against the prescriptive nature of moral oughts.
Main Arguments of Schopenhauer's Critique
Section 1: Kant’s Petitio Principii (Begging the Question)
Kant assumes morality must have a prescriptive legislative form.
Schopenhauer questions this assumption:
Ethics can also be descriptive and explanatory.
Focus on understanding moral phenomena exists,
Instead of prescribing actions.
Schopenhauer's approach:
Investigates actions to discern genuine moral worth.
Section 2: Binding Oughts
Schopenhauer’s principle: A binding ought requires a threat of punishment or promise of reward.
Without these conditions, demands of an ought lack meaning.
Supports with quotes from:
John Locke: Laws must have enforcement to have significance.
Pufendorf and Austin emphasize punishment as essential to obligation.
Section 3: Loss of Intelligibility of Moral Ought
Schopenhauer anticipates Anscombe’s claim:
The moral ought requires a divine law framework.
Without this, the moral ought loses sense and coherence.
Schopenhauer posits:
Morality cannot be independent of theological foundations.
Section 4: Contradictory Nature of Moral Law
First contradiction: The moral law as a law of freedom is self-contradictory.
A free will cannot be simultaneously bound by moral laws.
Second contradiction: The categorical imperative is implicitly conditional.
Arises from the necessity of threats or rewards to bind actions.
Section 5: The Role of Self-Interest in Moral Ought
Schopenhauer's assertion:
Actions driven by self-interest cannot have moral worth.
Contradiction arises:
A moral ought binds through self-interest yet claims to oppose it.
The formulation of the argument:
A moral ought is binding.
It binds through threats of punishment.
Compliance comes from self-interest.
Actions rooted in self-interest lack moral worth.
Thus, a binding ought devoid of moral worth, is not truly a moral ought.
Conclusion
Schopenhauer raises serious doubts about Kant's prescriptivist view.
The critique focuses on:
The absence of grounding for obligations without divine law.
The contradictions inherent in strict interpretations of moral law.
Suggests a shift towards a descriptive-explanatory approach to ethics.