Notes on The Institutional Presidency and Executive Branch Development
The Institutional Presidency: Core Idea
The chapter argues that when one actor has the authority and incentive to act unilaterally in a way that affects another, the second actor has an incentive to ensure the first has the information needed to make a desirable choice from the second actor’s point of view.
This logic has decisive consequences for the development of the executive branch, especially the institutional presidency. The institutional presidency is described as the clustered organizational resources attached to the presidency across administrations, enabling the holder to formulate policy strategies, evaluate policy alternatives, and oversee implementation.
At Theodore Roosevelt’s inauguration, the institutional presidency did not exist as we understand it today; the president’s staff was small. From those beginnings has emerged the executive office of the president (EOP), a dense network of policy advisors with expertise across national security, international trade, domestic policy, economic policy, program implementation, and more.
The traditional focus has been on the presidents’ incentives to create these organizational supports (the “demand side”). Moe’s notion of an “incongruence” between the demands of the job and available resources is central: presidents seek immediate, direct control over policy-advising staff to meet challenges rather than delegating everything to the vast bureaucracy (e.g., the State Department).
But the demand side is only part of the story. The institutional presidency also requires implicit (and explicit) support from Congress for its existence: Congress initiates, funds, and can constrain administrative organizations, and executive orders can be based on statutory authority granted by Congress. Some orders bolster the institutional presidency, and some are constrained or countered by Congress.
James Sundquist’s view underscores the “supply side” of the story: the modern aggrandizement of the presidency resulted from deliberate legislative decisions. There is a supply side alongside the demand side—the institutional machinery exists because Congress supports it, consciously or implicitly.
The institutional presidency hosts the resources that position the president as a national agenda setter and policymaker-in-chief, a role that belongs to the president even as Congress can fight for its turf.
The Demand Side vs. the Supply Side
Demand side: presidential incentives to fashion organizational support to meet political and policy challenges.
Supply side: Congress’s ongoing support and funding of the institutional presidency through law and, at times, executive orders grounded in statutory authority.
The analysis emphasizes that both sides matter: the president’s authority and Congress’s backing interact to create and sustain the institutional presidency.
The central puzzle is why Congress would enable institutions that could overshadow Congress in policy-making; the authors argue the answer lies in the logic of presidential authority and the informational needs of decision-making, not in a desire to empower Congress over the presidency.
The Model: Information, Authority, and Case-Selection Logic
The core premise: executive branch discretion to act precedes the information needed to act wisely. Delegation theory ( Holmström-style) that information and expertise precede authority is insufficient to explain institutional evolution. In development terms, executive authority emerges first, and information is gathered/constructed to use that authority effectively.
This yields a “supply side” to the institutional presidency: Congress supports the organizations that empower the president to act, especially when the president has strong policy authority in a given domain.
The chapter sets up a careful note on case selection and interface with theory: it focuses on cases where Congress granted the president tight control over informational/advisory institutions that support the president’s role relative to Congress. The cases compare areas of foreign policy and defense with domestic policy, or examine early 20th-century congressional responses to presidential reorganizations.
The theory allows analysis of when Congress is willing to fund/shape advisory bodies, especially when presidential authority in a domain is credible and not easily rescinded by Congress.
A Note on Presidential Policy Discretion
A key presumption is that the president has some discretion to affect policy in ways that matter to both the president and Congress, and this discretion cannot always be rescinded by Congress.
The source of this authority can be de jure (constitutional or statutory) or de facto (presidential claims under political necessity or strategic statecraft).
Statutory authority can be rescinded by Congress, but in practice this is often costly politically; thus statutory authority can supply presidential policy discretion where Congress cannot easily eliminate it.
The authors acknowledge disagreement about the constitutional basis for presidential policy discretion, especially in foreign policy and other sensitive areas, but argue that the presence and use of discretion matters regardless of its precise constitutional source.
The central point: presidents can and do make claims of policy discretion (e.g., national emergencies, mobilization) and Congress has never fully forced presidents to act only with Congress-approved actions, particularly in foreign policy.
The broader claim is not about a normative constitutional theory but about a functional dynamic: presidential authority exists in certain areas and Congress responds by supplying information/institutional structures to support or constrain that authority.
The Federalist Era and the Emergence of an Institutional Presidency (1789–1801)
The legislature’s role in creating institutions to supply high-quality policy information dates to the first Congress (1789).
Four executive departments were created between 1789 and 1798:
Foreign Affairs (later State)
War
Navy
Treasury
These departments provided advisory functions and had much closer relationships with the president than modern cabinet secretaries, showing an early form of presidential-advisory capability.
Scholars argued that cabinet departments did not contribute to the institutionalization of the modern presidency; the attachment of the institutional presidency to the presidency itself (e.g., the EOP) did not exist yet, and line implementation in departments created a separate bureaucratic logic focused on program execution.
The federal constitutional framework shaped the linkage between the president and senior executive officers via appointment with the advice and consent of the Senate, which was intended to ensure high-quality information flows to the president.
Philadelphia framers emphasized that the heads of the departments should provide useful information when the president sought it, with appointment mechanisms designed to secure trustworthy information.
Administrative institutions were considered largely creatures of Congress, and Congress had a free hand in organizing administrative structure.
The early Congress designed weak linkages between the chief executive and administrative officers in many models, given internal competition and conflicts between branches.
Despite early conflict, Congress consciously provided the president with a group of expert advisors to secure trustworthy information and improve decision-making, recognizing the president’s policy discretion.
Appointment and Removal Authority: The Constitutional Linkages and the 1789 Decision
The Constitution’s appointment power (Article II, §2) granted the president appointment authority with Senate advice and consent, but removal procedures were debated.
The removal of senior officers (e.g., cabinet secretaries) became a major constitutional and administrative issue in the spring of 1789.
The debate centered on whether removal authority should belong exclusively to the president (executive power) or require Senate involvement.
The “Decision of 1789” established that the president could remove secretaries unilaterally by implication through recognizing events that would occur if presidential removal happened. This design was intended to maximize presidential trust in the cabinet and ensure accountability.
Washington prioritized adversarial trust and the ability to remove ministers whom he could not trust; the president sought personal reliability and loyalty of senior advisors.
The Adams administration later used removal power to manage cabinet dynamics, illustrating how partisan politics can influence the use of removal authority.
The debate and subsequent practice were framed by arguments that removal authority strengthened presidential linkage and accountability, but concerns about faithful execution and inter-branch conflict persisted.
The “zero dissonance” concept appears: a loyal executive cadre is more useful, and removal is a tool to maintain alignment with presidential policy objectives.
Harper’s 1798 remarks reiterated the idea that presidents should be able to choose advisors who share the president’s views to ensure effective policy action, linking removal rights to policy action under the constitutional framework.
The Evolution Through the 19th Century: From Jackson to Johnson
Over time, Congress began to vest officers with specific duties beyond advisory roles, giving them policy-implementation authority. This broadened the discretionary power of subordinate officers and reduced the president’s ability to control policy unilaterally.
Jackson’s 1833 removal of Treasury Secretary Duane over policy disagreements highlighted the risk to policy implementation if the president cannot keep trusted subordinates.
The Tenure of Office Act (1867) restricting removals and the impeachment of President Andrew Johnson illustrate the growing congressional pushback against unilateral presidential control.
Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes (1838) warned against vesting the president with a dispensing power that would effectively control congressional legislation.
As executive officers gained policy-implementation duties, the “informational” and “trust” links between president and subordinates weakened, and the model’s predictive power about a tight linkage diminished in some periods.
Yet, even in the 19th century, presidents occasionally asserted initiative in national policy (e.g., Jackson, Polk, Lincoln), but such initiatives were more the exception than the rule.
The late 19th century is often described as a nadir for presidential power, with presidents appearing ceremonial and primarily focused on patronage, except for a few strong leaders who asserted policy initiative (e.g., Polk in the Mexican War).
The Roosevelt Transformation: Stewardship and the Emergence of the Modern Presidency
Theodore Roosevelt catalyzed a fundamental change in presidential policy leadership, embracing a stewardship model that held the president to be empowered (and perhaps obligated) to act in the national interest unless forbidden by law or the Constitution.
Roosevelt pursued expansive policy initiatives in economic policy, natural resource conservation, and foreign affairs, often without established support institutions.
His unilateral move, such as the 1902 Justice Department antitrust action against the Northern Securities Company (before the Antitrust Division existed), exemplified the president taking initiative in policy areas with little formal advisory structure.
The Northern Securities case spurred Congress to create the Antitrust Division, signaling a shift toward greater presidential initiative backed by evolving institutional resources.
The period revealed a mismatch between presidential initiative and available presidential-support institutions, prompting Congress to consider new advisory bodies to back presidential leadership.
The Early 20th Century: Reorganization, Budget Reform, and the Birth of the Modern Support System
As the 20th century opened, executive branch reform debates intensified, with Congress and presidents clashing over how to structure and fund the presidency’s informational resources.
Presidential reorganization planning and the push for a formal budget process became central to strengthening presidential control over the executive branch.
Presidents Taft, Harding, Roosevelt, and Truman oversaw major reorganization efforts; congressional commissions on executive branch organization emerged as focal points of institutional contest between the presidency and Congress.
The Payoff and difference between congressional commissions and presidential commissions: Congressional commissions on retrenchment aimed at cost savings were separate from commissions aimed at reorganizing and strengthening the presidency’s policy-information capabilities.
The Keep Commission (1905) under Theodore Roosevelt analyzed administrative practices and advocated centralization of authority under the president, aiming to reduce fragmentation and enhance macro-administration.
The Taft-era Commission on Economy and Efficiency recommended a unified executive branch with centralized authority, streamlining the hierarchy, and reforming the budget. It argued that the fragmentation of authority impeded the president’s ability to direct policy; centralization was necessary to improve monitoring and control.
The Commission also called for changes in the federal budget process: a genuinely executive budget to improve information flow from agencies to the president and from the president to Congress. It proposed a new classification system for budget items, including organizational units, capital outlays, functions, objects purchased, and appropriation bills.
Taft proposed two budgets in 1912: one in the traditional form and one in the new form; Congress rejected the new form, preferring the established process. The extent of any new substantive authority under the alternative budget procedure remains unclear, as Congress retained substantial control over appropriations.
The Bureau of Efficiency (BOE) was created in 1913 as a congressional division of the Civil Service Commission to study organizational efficiency, administrative needs, duplication, and business methods across the executive branch. It was funded to evaluate and propose improvements but remained primarily a legislative staff agency within the executive branch.
The BOE’s mandate was to inform Congress and the president; however, its recommendations languished, partly because of its distance from the president and its congressional linkage. The BOE’s failure to become a trusted presidential advisory instrument highlighted the importance of tight institutional linkage to be useful to high-level decision-makers.
The Bureau of the Budget (BOB) emerged as a more successful presidential-support institution, absorbing the BOE’s functions and becoming the first durable edifice of the modern institutional presidency. The BOE’s inability to gain presidential trust contrasted with the BOB’s effectiveness, illustrating the critical role of institutional alignment with the president.
The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 formalized the president’s role in budget planning and reporting, marking a watershed in the development of the institutional presidency. It created a framework in which the president would prepare and present an annual budget to Congress, enabling centralized planning and consolidated information flows between agencies, the president, and Congress.
The broader political economy context: the federal debt grew dramatically, reaching roughly between and , intensifying congressional demand for budget discipline and reform. The modernization of budgeting also responded to this fiscal pressure.
The post-1921 period established the modern administrative state’s budgeting and information architecture, setting the stage for the NSC later and for ongoing reform era after reform era.
The ongoing tension remained: Congress desired to control spending and administrative design, while presidents sought to modernize the executive’s information flows and policy execution. The Budget and Accounting Act represented a major institutional achievement for the presidency, creating enduring structures that strengthened presidential informational capacity and policy influence.
Key Thematic Connections and Implications
Information and trust are central to the functioning of the institutional presidency: credible, reliable information from trusted subordinates strengthens presidential control over policy and reduces interbranch conflict.
The model challenges simple delegation theories by showing that executive authority often precedes the information that makes that authority effective. The president’s ability to act—and to mobilize information—can be as crucial as the information itself.
The development of the institutional presidency is not a linear or universal process; it reflects historical moments when presidential initiative, congressional receptivity, and the political environment align to create new advisory and informational structures.
The tension between the branches persists: Congress can both enable and constrain the president’s information networks. The arrangement of advisory bodies and the flow of information between the president and Congress shape the effectiveness of presidential leadership and policy outcomes.
The emergence of the modern institutional presidency in the early 20th century demonstrates how a combination of executive advocacy, strategic use of information, and legislative reform can reconfigure the balance of power in American governance.
Real-world relevance includes understanding how presidents build staff and information infrastructure to implement policy, how Congress negotiates funding and authority, and how reforms to budgeting and management reshape political incentives and accountability.
Ethical and practical implications: the design of information flows and advisory structures affects accountability, the speed of decision-making, and the balance between executive autonomy and legislative oversight. In foreign policy, where unilateral action is more feasible, the need for credible information and trusted advisors is especially pronounced; in domestic policy, the dynamics may differ given stronger legislative checks and the dispersed nature of implementation.
Notable People, Cases, and Dates (Highlighted References)
Constitutional/Founding-era anchors:
Four departments (Foreign Affairs/State, War, Navy, Treasury) created between 1789 and 1798.
Appointment with advice and consent of the Senate; removal debates; the 1789 Decision on unilateral removal by the President.
Notable individuals and sources:
James Wilson, Oliver Ellsworth, James Iredell – advocates for appointment linkage and trustworthy information to the president.
James Madison, Elias Boudinot, John Laurance – arguments about removal and executive accountability.
Alexander Hamilton – emphasized presidential responsibility and the usefulness of trusted advisers.
Key cases and acts:
Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes (1838) – cautioned against an unchecked dispensing power.
Tenure of Office Act (1867) – congressional constraint on removals (Johnson impeachment context).
Northern Securities Case (1902) – catalyzed later institutional development by prompting creation of the Antitrust Division.
Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 – formalized presidential budgeting and information flows.
Milestones in reform and organization:
Taft’s Commission on Economy and Efficiency (1905) – advocated macro-administration and unified executive power; introduced the idea of an executive budget.
Keep Commission (1905) – Theodore Roosevelt’s initiative with Frederick Cleveland and Frank Goodnow to study administrative practices and promote centralized authority under the president; emphasized centralized control and macro-administration.
1916–1918 Appropriations Acts – directed the Bureau of Efficiency to study and report on administrative practices across agencies.
1912 budget proposal and congressional response – attempt to formalize an executive budget was rejected by Congress, illustrating the political friction around reform.
1920s–1930s: the Bureau of the Budget becomes a durable instrument of the modern presidency, the BOE’s failure compared to the BOB highlights the importance of alignment with the president.
Summary Takeaways
The institutional presidency is not merely an add-on to the presidency; it is a functional response to the need for high-quality information, executive control, and policy coordination.
Both the demand side (presidential initiative) and the supply side (Congressional backing) are essential for creating and sustaining presidential advisory institutions.
The evolution from early cabinet structures to a modern, information-rich presidency was driven by strategic considerations about authority, information, trust, and the practicalities of governing a large, complex state.
Budget reform and executive organization reforms in the early 20th century culminated in the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, a watershed that institutionalized the president’s role in budgeting and information management, laying groundwork for the modern institutional presidency.