Euthyphro Notes
Characters
Socrates: A philosopher known for his method of questioning.
Euthyphro: A self-proclaimed expert on religious matters and prophecy.
Meletus: The young man who is indicting Socrates on charges of corrupting the youth and not believing in the city's gods.
Setting
The King-Archon's court in Athens.
Euthyphro's Dilemma
Euthyphro is at the court to prosecute his own father for murder.
His father had bound a servant who killed another slave, and the bound servant died of hunger and cold before religious guidance could be sought.
Euthyphro believes it is his religious duty to prosecute, regardless of familial ties, to cleanse the pollution caused by the murder.
Socrates' Predicament
Socrates is at the court because he is being indicted by Meletus for corrupting the youth and creating new gods while disbelieving in the old ones.
Socrates sees Meletus's concern for the youth as a positive thing, comparing him to a good farmer who takes care of the young plants first.
Socrates ironically suggests that if Euthyphro is indeed wise in religious matters, Meletus should indict Euthyphro instead of him or acknowledge Socrates' right beliefs as a pupil of Euthyphro.
Socrates' Request to Euthyphro
Socrates seeks to become Euthyphro's pupil to learn about piety and argue against Meletus' charges.
He asks Euthyphro to define piety and impiety in a universal sense, applicable to all actions.
Socrates wants a definition that can serve as a model to judge whether an action is pious or not.
Euthyphro's First Definition: Piety is prosecuting the wrongdoer
Euthyphro defines piety as prosecuting wrongdoers, regardless of who they are (father, mother, etc.), and impiety as not prosecuting them.
He cites the example of Zeus binding his own father, Cronus, as evidence that even the gods punish their parents for wrongdoing.
Socrates questions whether Euthyphro truly believes these stories about the gods, expressing his own difficulty in accepting them.
Socrates' Criticism of the stories about the gods
Socrates finds it hard to accept the myths and stories about the gods, such as wars and enmities among them.
He contrasts his skepticism with Euthyphro's apparent acceptance of these stories, which include surprising and amazing tales.
Socrates Seeks a Universal Definition
Socrates clarifies that he doesn't want just examples of pious actions but the universal form or essence of piety itself.
He wants a single form that makes all pious actions pious and distinguishes them from impious actions.
Euthyphro's Second Definition: Piety is what is dear to the gods
Euthyphro proposes that what is dear to the gods is pious, and what is not is impious.
Socrates points out that the gods are in a state of discord and have enmities with each other.
Socrates raises the question of whether the gods' disagreements extend to matters of justice, beauty, and goodness.
Contradiction in the Second Definition
If the gods differ on what is just, beautiful, and good, then the same things would be considered just by some gods and unjust by others.
This leads to the conclusion that the same things would be both loved and hated by the gods, and therefore both pious and impious.
Socrates argues that this contradicts the initial goal of finding a universal definition of piety.
Euthyphro's attempt to refine his position
Euthyphro asserts that at least all the gods would agree that someone who has killed unjustly should pay the penalty.
Socrates remarks that the disagreement is not about whether the wrongdoer should be punished but about who the wrongdoer is and what they did.
Socrates presses Euthyphro for proof that all the gods consider his father's actions unjust in the case of the murdered servant.
Socrates Raises the Deeper Issue about God's Love
Socrates introduces a critical question: Is the pious being loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is being loved by the gods?
He uses analogies of carrying, leading, and seeing to illustrate the difference between something being acted upon and the quality that causes the action.
He asserts that something is being carried because it is something in the state of being carried, not the other way around.
Questioning the Essence of Piety
Socrates and Euthyprho review the nature of piety. The following points come to light:
The pious is being loved because it is pious, not pious because it is being loved by the gods.
The god-loved is god-loved because it is being loved by the gods.
Therefore, the god-loved is not the same as the pious.
The Definition Goes in a Circle
Socrates accuses Euthyphro of not making the nature of piety clear but only describing a quality (being loved by the gods).
Euthyphro admits that their discussion seems to go in circles, with every proposition failing to stay put.
Socrates jokes that Euthyphro's statements are like the works of his ancestor Daedalus, who made things move and run away.
Piety as a Part of Justice
Socrates asks Euthyphro whether all that is pious is also just as a means to narrow down the qualities of piety, since their previous attempts at defining piety have not worked out.
Euthyphro initially struggles to follow Socrates’ line of reasoning, but Socrates reframes the question by using the example of fear and shame.
Further attempts to define piety
Socrates and Euthypro come to a consensus that Piety is a subset of justice. The key points worth extracting from this part of the conversation includes:
All that is pious is just, but not all that is just is pious.
The pious is a part of justice.
The godly and pious is the part of the just that is concerned with the care of the gods.