Purpose, Rationality, and Moral Justification: From Teleology to Hume's Skepticism
The Teleological Argument and Purpose in Nature
The Definition and Premise of Purpose:
A common response to the fundamental question of what philosophy is or what it does is that it represents the search for the meaning of life.
The premise that life possesses a meaning or purpose inherently presumes that life was initially designed to serve that specific purpose.
Accepting the concept of design leads directly to the question of who or what was responsible for creating that design.
For those who embrace a higher creational power, this progression leads to the conclusion that only God could be responsible for such a design.
This line of reasoning naturally aligns with and provides proposed confirmation for the scholastic Teleological argument (or proof) for the existence of God.
Aquinas' Teleological Argument:
The Teleological argument (teleological meaning relating to purpose or end) is recognized as perhaps the least viable of Thomas Aquinas' Quinque Viae (Five Ways) or proposed proofs of God's existence.
Structure of the Argument:
When examining a complex artefact, such as a fine watch movement, an observer is struck by its beauty, efficiency, and intricacy.
One quickly realizes that the watch was designed and constructed by a skilled watchmaker and functions according to that explicit design.
When observing the perfection, beauty, and utility of nature, one must similarly acknowledge that nature did not simply appear in its current form for no reason.
The logical conclusion is that nature must have been designed and created by an intelligent being and intended to function according to a pre-ordained design.
Consequently, nature—including human beings and all that exists—could only have been planned, designed, and created by the ultimate being, God.
William Paley and the Concept of Universal Purpose
Paley's Watch Analogy:
The Teleological argument is commonly referred to as the "argument from Paley's watch," following the analogy presented by William Paley in his 1802 treatise, Natural Theology or Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity.
Paley equated the evidence of intelligent design found in the beauty and intricacy of a pocket-watch with the evidence of intelligent design found in the beauty and functionality of nature, concluding that God exists.
Philosophical Criticism:
Paley's argument begs the question by positing the notion of intelligent design as a precursor to reach the desired conclusion that God exists.
Beyond doctrinal motivations, asking "What is the meaning or purpose of life?" may not make cognitive sense.
Asking for the purpose of life is equivalent to asking for the purpose of nature as a whole, in the same way one might ask about the purpose of a specific artefact or deliberate action.
Individual Choices versus Universal Purpose:
While humans can adapt or utilize specific aspects of the natural world in pursuit of practical goals, nature itself is not an artefact or an action, nor is human existence as a whole.
Devoting an individual life to specific endeavors, such as teaching philosophy or caring for family welfare, reflects individual purposive choices about how to live.
These individual choices do not establish or describe a universal purpose inherent in human existence as a whole.
Human Purposiveness versus Animal Instinct
Purposive Action in Human Society:
Human individual and collective lives and actions are inherently purposive.
Daily activities serve basic survival needs: humans work throughout life to procure food, clothing, and shelter, satisfying immediate needs, passions, and desires.
Throughout history, human knowledge acquisition has driven the development of language and technology, facilitating communication and inter-societal agreements to distribute necessary goods and artefacts.
Human actions are explicitly goal-directed: walking is done to arrive at a specific destination, and talking is done to ask questions or convey information.
Contrast Between Animal Instinct and Human Cognition:
Animals display a degree of purpose in their movements and crude communications when responding to natural instincts (e.g., migrating, hunting, grazing, seeking shelter, avoiding predators).
Crucial Differences:
Animals act strictly according to pre-determined behavioural drives.
Animals are unable to consider the potential long-term outcomes of their activities or evaluate whether actions will prove beneficial under changing circumstances.
Animals cannot question or justify why they perform actions as a means to a specific end ("as a means to what end? - to what purpose?").
Animals cannot link an action to its ultimate outcome, preventing them from recognizing their motivations or contemplating the apparent futility and absurdity of their condition.
Human Reason, Curiosity, and Free Will:
Humans possess selective modes of behaviour governed by cognitive faculties: reason, recall, planning, envisioning, instigating, and communicating.
From childhood, humans apply the question "Why?" to every situation, viewing activities strictly in terms of their intended purpose.
Upbringing and societal structures guide humans to act not merely on personal inclinations, but within a rigid framework of rational justification—evaluating acceptable means in pursuit of desired ends.
While animal behaviour reflects brute behaviourism constrained to immediate needs and moods, human curiosity probes beyond immediate appearances to explore underlying causes, effects, and relationships.
Knowledge gained through individual curiosity, shared via language, contributes to the universal progress of humanity toward the ultimate ideal of absolute freedom.
By virtue of reason, humans possess a strong, justified conviction of having freedom of will—a capacity vastly superior to that of animals.
Moral Justification and Materialism: Thomas Hobbes
The Problem of Justifying Ends:
Applying free will in rational pursuit of a desired end raises a fundamental ethical question: does reason justify the end itself, or merely the action taken toward that end?
Evaluating whether actions are moral requires identifying their true underlying motivation.
Thomas Hobbes and Psychological Egoism:
The 17th-century philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) was observed by a passing clergyman giving alms to a starving beggar on the roadside.
Commending Hobbes' apparent altruism, the clergyman asked: "Do you give to the poor because Jesus commands us to do so?"
Hobbes replied: "Not at all, I helped him in order to alleviate my own discomfort at witnessing his plight."
Philosophical Implications:
This exchange illustrates the difficulty in separating seemingly altruistic actions from egoistic motives.
As a materialist, Hobbes viewed human existence as directed toward material survival and freedom from personal discomfort.
Hobbes rejected Platonic notions of absolute values of good or evil, evaluating moral decisions through a purely pragmatic lens.
Deontology, Teleology, and David Hume's Regress of Reasons
Deontological and Teleological Traditions:
Despite diametrically opposed approaches to moral justification, both Deontological and Teleological traditions broadly agree that ethical judgments reflect a conflict between blind inclination and reason.
Both traditions acknowledge that taking a rational course of action serves human ends far better than following emotional impulses.
Human reasoning and communication allow individuals to weigh all potential outcomes of a proposed activity before deciding whether to engage in it.
The Problem of Justifying Ends:
From a strictly teleological perspective, any activity not designed toward an end is pointless.
Deontologists question end-directed activities if the goal itself cannot be justified by reference to a moral law or standard.
Actions often serve goals that are merely stepping-stones to further goals, creating an extended series of ends where none are independently justified.
David Hume's Argument on Ultimate Ends:
The 18th-century philosopher David Hume (1711–1776) argued that while reason can explain intermediate actions or chains of actions, ultimate ends lie completely beyond rational explanation.
Hume's First Illustrative Chain (Exercise and Avoidance of Pain):
Question: Why take regular exercise? Reason: To stay healthy.
Question: Why stay healthy? Reason: To avoid becoming ill.
Question: Why avoid illness? $ ightarrow$ Reason: Illness is attended by pain.
Question: Why avoid pain? $ ightarrow$ Result: No further reason can or needs to be given, as avoiding pain is an ultimate fact of human nature.
Hume's Second Illustrative Chain (Employment and Pleasure):
Question: Why stay healthy? Reason: To meet the demands of a job.
Question: Why keep a job? Reason: To earn a salary.
Question: Why want money? Reason: Having lots of money brings pleasure.
Question: Why seek pleasure? Result: It is an absurdity to ask for a reason to seek pleasure; pleasure is desirable purely on its own account.
Summary: Reason can be assigned to the means in anticipation of ends, but ultimate ends cannot appeal to rational justification.
Emotion, Reason, and Moral Sentiment in Hume's Philosophy
Hume's Skepticism and Moral Theory:
David Hume, as a supreme skeptic, rejected both divine design and rational deduction as valid justifications for moral principles.
Hume argued that moral judgments are driven entirely by momentary emotions—instinctive judgments of approval or disapproval arising from sentiments of pleasure or pain (experienced directly or vicariously).
Empathy and Moral Reaction:
When observing an action, humans experience an immediate reaction deeming it praiseworthy or blameworthy based on the non-rational emotion of pleasure or displeasure it instills.
When observing actions affecting others, humans instinctively empathize with the recipient and reflectively share their pleasure or pain.
Fact versus Moral Wrongfulness:
When examining a crime scene (such as a murder), reason applied by an investigating detective or forensic scientist can uncover factual aspects of the crime.
Reason alone can never reveal the moral wrongfulness of the act.
The judgment of moral wrongfulness originates exclusively from human emotion, conditioned by experience and personal opinion.