CIA Assassination Plots – Essential Review Notes

Scope of Investigation

• Presidential commission examined CIA’s role in plots to kill foreign leaders.
• Focus: Fidel Castro (Cuba) & Rafael Trujillo (Dominican Republic); checked but found no confirmed CIA role in deaths of Patrice Lumumba or President Achmed Sukarno.
• Inquiry driven by staff discovery of past CIA discussions; jurisdiction accepted because overt acts occurred in the United States.

Key Participants & Offices

• CIA: Richard Bissell (Deputy Dir. for Plans), Col. Sheffield Edwards (Office of Security), Richard Helms (successor to Bissell & later DCI), John McCone (DCI after Nov 1961).
• U.S. Government: Attorney General Robert Kennedy, McGeorge Bundy & Walt Rostow (NSC staff), Sec. Defense Robert McNamara, Gen. Maxwell Taylor, Gen. Lyman Lemnitzer.
• Oversight bodies: Special Group / Special Group (Augmented); later 303 Committee & Forty Committee.

Castro Operations – Three Phases

• Phase I – late 1960 – spring 1961
– Goal: poison Castro with botulinum pills.
– CIA produced pills; passed via mob contacts (Sam Giancana & associates) through cut-out Robert Maheu.
– Two deliveries reported; no evidence pills reached or were used on Castro.
– May 7, 1962: Edwards & CIA counsel brief AG Robert Kennedy; May 14 memo documents operation.

• Phase II – 1962 – mid-1963
– New case officer directed to review “executive action” capacity.
– Mob channel re-engaged; rifles, handguns, fresh poison pills covertly funded (<5000).
– Case officer judged chances poor; wound down activity spring 1963.
– Aug 10, 1962 Special Group(A) meeting: idea of “liquidation” raised; McCone objected.

• Phase III – 1963 – 1965
– Outside Cuba contact (Cuban official turned dissident) discussed coup; asked for weapons, not poison.
– CIA offered gadget (pen-syringe) in Nov 1963; rejected.
– One–two weapon caches (scoped rifles) dropped inside Cuba; support ended 1965.

Misc. Ideas 1963–1964

• Unimplemented schemes: contaminated scuba suit, booby-trap seashell.
• 1964 reports of exile & Mafia plots; 303 Committee referred them to DOJ as law-enforcement matters.

Dominican Republic – Trujillo

• 1960–1961: U.S. policy sought moderate successor, not direct coup.
• CIA & Consulate engaged dissidents aware of assassination intent.
• Weapons supplied: three revolvers, three carbines (Mar 1961) despite Special Group limits; request to add sub-machine-guns ultimately denied.
• Trujillo assassinated May 30, 1961; no evidence U.S. directed the act, but U.S. contacts & limited arms shipments acknowledged.

Oversight & Documentation Highlights

• Nov 3, 1960 Special Group minutes discuss possibility of action against Castro, Raul, Che; deemed beyond capacity.
• Taylor Report (Jun 13, 1961) on Bay of Pigs—no explicit assassination text.
• Aug 16, 1963 Helms memo briefs McCone after press leak on Giancana link.
• FBI memoranda (May 22, 1961 & Mar 6, 1967) record Agency-Mafia contacts and DOJ concern.

Commission Findings

• CIA actively planned but never successfully executed assassination of Fidel Castro; compartmented, poorly documented, sometimes contrary to top-level knowledge.
• CIA shipped limited arms aiding plotters against Trujillo, blurring U.S. non-involvement posture.
• No verified CIA role in killings of Lumumba or Sukarno.
• Authorization trail unclear—conflicting testimony on White House awareness; Robert Kennedy warned CIA not to use Mafia again without DOJ clearance.

Policy Conclusion

• Commission affirms President Ford’s stance: assassination must never be a U.S. policy instrument; recommends safeguards to prevent any future intelligence participation in such plots.