Notes on the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA)

1.4. The Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement

1.4.1. Background

1.4.1.1. Roots and Influences

In the late 1950s, several militants from the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA), led by lawyer Luis Felipe de la Puente Uceda, left its ranks criticizing its reformist positions, founding the Rebel APRA. In 1962, this dissident group self-identified as the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR) and adopted Marxism-Leninism as its ideology. The MIR was the first party of the so-called "new left", characterized by its criticism of the Peruvian Communist Party (PCP) for following directives from the Soviet Communist Party (PCUS) and of APRA for abandoning its original insurrectionary theses; its commitment to making a revolution in the country through armed struggle; and its refusal to align itself with the “lights of revolution” at the time, namely, the USSR or People’s Republic of China, thus avoiding subjugation to their respective Communist Parties.

The MIR initiated a guerrilla war in the country on June 9, 1965, designating the departments of Piura, Junín, and Cuzco as the main battlegrounds for the uprising. However, its forces only saw action in Junín (Túpac Amaru Front) and Cuzco (Pachacútec Front), where they were defeated by the Army in just six months. Key leaders, including Luis de la Puente Uceda, Guillermo Lobatón, and Máximo Velando, were eliminated.

In the following years, the few surviving members of the MIR attempted to rebuild their organization, inspired by De la Puente's words: "the revolutionary path is the only path left for our people." In 1967, a diaspora occurred among the original MIR militants, who later formed various organizations denoted by the MIR acronym, including MIR El Militante (MIR EM), MIR Voz Rebelde (MIR VR), and MIR IV Etapa (MIR IV), all of which acknowledged the enduring relevance of De la Puente Uceda’s thoughts and actions.

Simultaneously, in 1976, radicalized youth from the Christian Democracy and Velasquista military founded the Revolutionary Socialist Party (PSR), claiming nationalism and reforms during the government of General Juan Velasco Alvarado (1968-1975). The PSR’s discourse appealed to various population sectors, including fishermen, metalworkers, university students, and other leftist organizations.

1.4.1.2. The PSR's Structure and Conflicts

The PSR organized itself on two levels: a public one where prominent militants performed party tasks, and a clandestine one known as the "Orga," where other militants handled conspiratorial work and party leadership. In 1978, irreconcilable differences emerged between the "public" cadres and the members of the "Orga,” leading the latter, including some from the Constituent Assembly, to leave the PSR, accusing the former of privileging legal work over the party’s insurrectional military efforts. These individuals subsequently founded the PSR Marxist-Leninist (PSR ML).

Both MIR EM and PSR ML claimed to be part of the proletarian and socialist Latin American movement, noted for their political diversity, socialist stance, and legitimacy of violence as the sole means to "conquer power.” They incorporated Che Guevara’s thoughts, the examples of the Cuban and Vietnamese revolutions, and various political and military experiences from groups such as the Chilean MIR, the Uruguayan Liberation Movement - Tupamaros, the Argentine Revolutionary Workers’ Party (PRT), and the People’s Revolutionary Army (ERP), its armed wing.

This perspective was broadly shared by other political organizations and parties in the Peruvian left during those years, revitalized by the Sandinista National Liberation Front's victory in Nicaragua in July 1979. Since the success of the Cuban revolution in 1959, no other insurrection had triumphed in Latin America. By the mid-1970s, the MIR, PRT-ERP, Montoneros, and Tupamaros had been swiftly defeated by military governments in their respective countries. Hence, the FSLN's victory reenergized Latin American guerrillas, particularly in Central America, and the use of violence became apparent again.

1.4.2. The History of the MRTA

1.4.2.1. Preparations and Initiation of Armed Actions (1982-1984)

On March 1, 1982, a group of leaders from PSR ML - MIR EM met in a Central Committee, evaluating the international and national situation, concluding that "the conditions for the re-initiation of revolutionary violence were present." This assessment was guided by the victory of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua in 1979, the guerrilla offensive from the FMLN in El Salvador, and the growing armed struggle in Colombia. In addition, the rapid expansion of the PCP-SL since its initiation of armed struggle on May 17, 1980 was considered, along with their execution of more complex actions, like the Huamanga prison assault on March 2, 1982, that fast-tracked the PCP-SL into a significant pole of attraction for leftist militants.

The PSR ML - MIR EM agreed that "the organization as a whole would assume starting from this Committee Central the central task of developing armed struggle, understanding this process as the strategy of revolutionary war and the uprising of the whole people." They adopted the name Revolutionary Movement Túpac Amaru (MRTA), deciding to keep this name reserved until the party structure was prepared to back the MRTA with arms in hand.

The MRTA leaders defined a strategic plan involving two phases: initially accumulating clandestine forces through economic recoveries and weapons acquisitions, establishing "politico-military homogenization" schools and relocating their militants to various areas of the country, followed by armed propaganda prior to more direct guerrilla actions.

As the accumulation phase began shortly after the Central Committee, a political-military school was held where militants learned weapon handling and military tactics. With this basic military prep, the MRTA carried out some "recoveries" and disarmings while also attacking the British Institute using explosives to express solidarity with Argentina during its conflict with Great Britain over the Malvinas Islands.

On May 31, 1982, five MRTA subversives, including Víctor Polay Campos and Jorge Talledo Feria, assaulted a bank in La Victoria district. When two militants attempted to immobilize a police officer guarding the bank, he fired, resulting in Talledo Feria becoming the first emerretista, a Central Committee member, to die in action. His death caused the first desertions in MRTA's ranks. Acquired money and arms through "recoveries" allowed them to launch a series of political-military schools in Lima and execute several military actions, including an attack on the houses of U.S. Marines in Lima on November 16, 1983, protesting against the American invasion of Grenada. The leadership also agreed to start “mass work” to build a mass movement as part of the revolutionary war, utilizing the collective strength to push social mobilization based on the MRTA's ideology.

1.4.2.2. Deployment and Unification with MIR Voz Rebelde (1984-1986)

During the early years of its formation, the MRTA attacked various targets as it attempted to establish a footprint across the country, including a growing presence in urban areas. The aspiration was to mobilize a mass movement and sustain political pressure. Key militant candidates in Lima won municipal elections, reflecting favorable public sentiments.

However, with the increased visibility of the MRTA, they faced complexities that led to the capture of notable figures from their ranks. Ultimately, MRTA's entire political action during this period was marked by attempts to coordinate across various leftist fronts while retaining a distinct military posture: increasing necessary violence to create public upheaval, reinforcing their revolutionary narrative.

In December 1986, the MRTA and MIR Voz Rebelde held a meeting, adopting a united party title and merging their military forces under a single command. The unification allowed them to broaden operational reach, yet challenged logistical capabilities and caused internal tensions. From that point forward, political-military conflicts and ideological rifts became more pronounced, leading to declining cohesion within the emergent MRTA.

1.4.3. Conclusion

The MRTA's trajectory reveals the complexities of insurgent movements in Peru's political landscape amidst the various Left factions, internal strife, and external pressures. The evolving conflicts with PCP-SL illustrated the often chaotic nature of ideological warfare. Significant defeats—including the loss of critical leadership—underlined the fragility of their operational structure in adapting to broader social sentiments and maintaining effective political coalitions. The sequence of events culminating in the occupation of the Japanese ambassador's residence in 1996 marks the organization's last gasp, encapsulating their internal discord and external failures in broader revolutionary aspirations.