Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations Notes

Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations

  • Author: Kurt Taylor Gaubatz

  • Source: International Organization, Vol. 50, No. 1 (Winter, 1996), pp. 109-139

  • URL: JSTOR

  • Accessed: 15/01/2012

Overview

  • The article examines the ability of democratic states to make international commitments.

  • It challenges the traditional view that democratic governments are unreliable in international relations.

Historical Perspectives

  • Thucydides (400 B.C.): Critiques popular governments (democracies) as unreliable.

  • Machiavelli: Argues that republics adhere to agreements better than monarchs, citing historical instances of treaties maintained by republics despite potential advantages in breaking them.

Recent Trends

  • Notable trend of democratization globally has sparked renewed interest in how democratic governance impacts international behavior.

  • Important to evaluate whether regime types (democratic vs. nondemocratic) influence commitment behavior.

Theoretical Framework

  • Commitment: States create beliefs in others that they will follow through with agreements, ranging from defense treaties to informal assurances.

  • Liberal Institutionalism: Capacity to make commitments is vital for international institutions.

  • Realism: Emphasizes that the ability to make commitments is central to deterrence and alliances.

Significance of Commitment

  • Commitment represents both cooperative and non-cooperative behavior in international relations.

  • Raises questions on whether distinctions can be made between regimes based on their commitment reliability.

Critique of Democratic Commitment

  1. Structural Realism: Suggests that internal regime structure is irrelevant to external behavior, leading to similar commitment challenges across regimes.

  2. Skepticism on Democratic Capacities: Machiavelli and others argue democracies follow public sentiment and are unreliable, easily abandoning commitments.

  3. Positive Potential: Some theorists argue that democracies can form stable commitments due to shared norms and public accountability.

Framework for Analysis

  • Defines Liberal Democracy as a system limited by constitutionally defined institutions reflecting popular will.

  • Examines how domestic politics and majority rule impact external commitments.

  • Addresses concerns about the fleeting nature of public opinion affecting foreign policy.

Three Perspectives on Democratic Commitments

  1. Indifference to Internal Structure: The anarchic nature means all states face similar commitment issues.

  2. Democratic Instability: Public opinion sways foreign policy, leading to unpredictability (as per Thucydides and de Tocqueville).

  3. Strength in Stability: Some argue democratic norms can enhance reliability in commitments.

Stable Democratic Foreign Policy

  • Outlines arguments against the notion of democratic instability in foreign policy through:

    • Public Preference Stability: Suggests that public opinion may be more consistent than traditionally thought.

    • Social Choice Mechanisms: Challenges that democratic states are susceptible to preference cycling, noting that nondemocratic regimes also face similar issues.

Democratic Leadership

  • Emphasizes the role of regular leadership changes and its implications for commitments, often undermining long-term agreements.

  • Compares frequent democratic transitions to the more abrupt changes in nondemocratic regimes that can disrupt commitments.

Democratic Institutional Stability

  • Underlines that while leadership may change, institutional frameworks governing foreign policy remain stable, contributing to sustained commitments.

  • Importance of civil service and bureaucracies in ensuring policy continuity in democratic states.

Distinctive Preferences of Democratizing States

  • Discusses values unique to democratic states influencing their international commitments:

    • Respect for Law: Impacts both domestic governance and adherence to international agreements.

    • Interdependence: Greater economic ties and political interactions can enhance commitment reliability.

Role of Domestic Politics and Transparency

  • Domestic actors and public scrutiny impose additional costs on leaders regarding external commitments, enhancing reliability.

  • Calls attention to importance of two-level games in foreign relations, where domestic approval is crucial for international agreements.

Empirical Assessment of Alliance Behavior

  • Comparative analysis of alliance durability between democratic and nondemocratic states:

    • Empirical evidence indicates democratic alliances are more durable than those involving nondemocratic states.

    • Alliances between democratic states demonstrate a tendency toward longer duration, countering traditional skepticism about democratic reliability.

Statistical Analysis

  • Utilizes statistical models to evaluate the impact of regime type on alliance duration, demonstrating democratic alliances often have longer survival rates.

Conclusions

  • Democratic states possess capabilities countering the traditional narrative of unreliability, building durable international commitments through established norms and institutional mechanisms.

  • Future research is necessary to fully understand the nuances of democratic commitments in international relations.