Markowitz et al Productive Pacifists

The paper explores the changing motivations behind territorial conquest in the context of a global decline in land-oriented states.
The authors, Markowitz, Mulesky, Graham, and Fariss, propose that land-rent dependence influences a regime’s preference for territorial control.
The fundamental argument is that states dependent on land rents from agriculture and natural resources are more inclined to secure territory, contrasting with production-oriented states that derive wealth from goods and services.

Historically, states were motivated by economic gains from large-scale territorial conquests.
The paper discusses how the profitability of such conquests has diminished due to shifting norms and the rise of globalization.
As states have evolved economically, those still relying heavily on land-rent income tend to pursue territorial expansion more aggressively.

Land Orientation vs. Production Orientation:
- Land-oriented economies: Focus on extracting income from land, driven by agriculture and natural resource sectors.
- Production-oriented economies: Generate income primarily through manufacturing and services, leading to a weaker preference for territorial control.
The reduction in land-oriented economies has contributed to the overall decline in large-scale territorial conquests, yet some states still actively pursue these practices due to their economic structures.

The research employs a novel measure of land orientation based on historical economic data covering 200 years (1816-2015) for various countries.
Regression analysis is utilized to correlate land orientation with the likelihood of military conflicts and territorial claims.
The analysis includes both autocracies and democracies, demonstrating consistent findings across both regimes.

A significant relationship exists between land orientation and territorial competition. Land-oriented states are much more likely to engage in militarized disputes over territory than their production-oriented counterparts.
The authors argue that as states have become more production-oriented, their motivation for territorial conquest decreases proportionately.
The study identifies specific examples of current land-oriented states, like Iraq under Saddam Hussein and Russia under Vladimir Putin, that illustrate ongoing territorial ambitions tied to economic dependency on land.

The paper contributes to the discourse on international relations by identifying how domestic economic structures shape foreign policy decisions, specifically regarding territorial conquest.
It challenges conventional wisdom that links increased development and trade solely with diminished interest in conquest, instead positing that the structure of economic rent—how states derive their income—is critical.
This research offers a more nuanced understanding of why some states prioritizing territorial wealth exist even in an era of globalization.

The findings suggest that as global economies continue to shift towards production-oriented models, the potential for large-scale territorial conflict may diminish; however, land-oriented states may remain a significant threat to stability.
The importance of recognizing economic rent structures provides new avenues for understanding both current conflicts and potential future ones in international relations.

The paper argues for a broader understanding of state motivations beyond basic security interests, incorporating economic rent structures into analyses of military competition and territorial disputes.
The authors claim that efforts to combat territorial ambition must consider the economic foundations legitimizing such behaviors, particularly in the context of rich natural resources.