Bound to Fail: Notes on The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order

What is an Order and Why Do Orders Matter?

• An order is an organized group of international institutions that govern interactions among member states; it can be regional or global and does not need to include every country.
• Institutions are the building blocks of orders; rules are designed by great powers to constrain and guide behavior because they believe obeying those rules serves their interests. When rules align with vital interests, powers comply; when not, they may ignore or rewrite them.
• Example reminders from the text: President George W. Bush stated that the U.S. would do what is necessary to ensure security even if it violated international law, illustrating that rules can be subordinated to security interests. $2002$ State of the Union reference; the broader point is that powerful states leverage institutions but are not bound by them when essential interests are at stake.
• Orders help manage a highly interdependent world: economic interdependence (trade, investment), environmental health, global health (disease crossing borders), and military deterrence/cooperation (coordinated actions among allies).
• The “Global Operating System” metaphor (Adm. Harry Harris) highlights how the liberal order functions as a centralized platform for cooperation and coordination across states.
• Three types of orders, distinct in scope and purpose:
  • International vs bounded orders: international orders aim to include the world’s great powers and, ideally, all countries; bounded orders include a subset of great powers and are usually regional.
  • Realist vs agnostic vs ideological (liberal) orders: the type depends on the distribution of power (bipolar, multipolar, unipolar) and, in unipolarity, the ideology of the leading state.
  • Thick vs thin orders: a thick order has robust institutions with strong influence across economics and security; a thin order covers fewer domains or has weaker institutions.
• Figures of merit to track: breadth (economic and military scope) and depth (institutional influence).
• Key takeaway: orders are tools of great powers, designed to reduce transaction costs and manage interdependence, but they do not guarantee peace or stability; they reflect the power and interests of dominant states.

Types of Orders: International, Bounded, Realist, Agnostic, and Ideological

• International orders: include all great powers; ideally universal membership; geared toward fostering cooperation among major powers and, often, most of the world.
• Bounded orders: limited membership; regional focus; dominated by a single great power but may include multiple great powers; primarily designed to manage security competition rather than broad cooperation.
• Realist orders: arise in bipolar or multipolar systems; power competition remains central; even institutions with liberal-leaning features serve balance-of-power objectives.
• Agnostic orders: in unipolarity, the leading power is not committed to exporting a universal ideology; it tolerates diversity and focuses on pragmatic management of the system.
• Ideological orders: form when the unipole exports a universalistic ideology (e.g., liberal democracy or communism) and seeks to reshape the world accordingly.
• In unipolarity, the ideology of the leading state matters for determining whether the order becomes ideological or agnostic.
• Examples from the Cold War and post–Cold War periods:
  • Realist/bounded orders in the Cold War (e.g., NATO, Warsaw Pact; Comecon; bilateral arms control like SALT I/II, INF, ABM discussions; the UN as a largely symbolically influential but limited actor in shaping great-power behavior).
  • Liberal post–Cold War order sought open markets, democratic enlargement, and universal institutions; but its success depended on the leading state’s ideology and how it managed domestic political challenges.
• Important caveats:
  • Institutions do not compel powerful states to obey; they are tools that are used when alignment with interests exists.
  • The presence of liberal-leaning institutions does not automatically guarantee liberal outcomes; domestic politics and nationalism can override institutional logic.

The Rise and Fall of International Orders: Key Concepts

• Orders rise and fall primarily due to the distribution of power and the leading state’s ideology; nationalism and balance-of-power dynamics play a decisive role in the fate of ideological orders.
• Realist orders tend to have staying power because large shifts in power are gradual; major power wars are rare but possible.
• Ideological orders (universalistic aims) tend to have short lifespans due to domestic political frictions and the challenges of remaking other states’ political systems.
• Nationalism + balance-of-power politics undermine attempts to export an ideology; unipolarity makes regime-change-driven projects more feasible in theory but costly in practice.
• Hyperglobalization: deepening economic interdependence brings benefits but also costs (job loss, wage stagnation, inequality) and increased financial volatility; it can empower other powers and threaten the unipole’s dominance.
• The emergence of multipolarity (especially with China rising and Russia reviving) challenges unipolar liberal hegemony and is likely to produce a realist-based order that prioritizes economic and security concerns in a more decentralized system.
• The article’s central thesis: the liberal international order was bound to fail because its core policies—spreading democracy, open borders, and hyperglobalization—create nationalist backlashes, sovereignty concerns, and economic discontent that undermine liberal legitimacy.
• The author’s three-part argument aligns with a broader historical pattern: unipolar liberal orders are difficult to sustain once challenger powers rise, and the system tends to settle into a multipolar mix of realist orders and bounded arrangements rather than a universal liberal order.

The Liberal International Order, 1990–2019: Ambitions, Realities, and Cracks

• After the Cold War, the U.S. achieved a “unipolar moment” with unrivaled power; the liberal Western order remained intact and expanded globally.
• Three core tasks defined liberal order promotion:
  1) Expand universal membership in global institutions (e.g., IMF, World Bank, WTO) and create new ones as needed;
  2) Build an open, highly liberal international economy with increased free trade and capital mobility;
  3) Promote liberal democracy around the world, integrating major powers (China and Russia) into liberal structures.
• The expansion strategy relied on three mechanisms:
  • NATO expansion and European integration;
  • Engagement with China and Russia through institutions and trade;
  • The belief that liberal democracy would foster peace and prosperity, anchored in liberal institutionalism, economic interdependence theory, and democratic peace theory.
• Notable supporting narratives and actors:
  • Clinton’s push to expand Western institutions and integrate members;
  • Bush’s emphasis on a “new world order” of liberal weavings and post–Cold War reforms;
  • Albright’s notion of China as a “responsible stakeholder” in a liberal order;
  • The Bush Doctrine (2002–2003) linking terrorism, proliferation, and the spread of democracy as a unified strategy;
  • Fukuyama’s End of History (1989) used to argue liberal democracy would become universal;
  • NATO enlargement as a means to create a broader security community;
  • Engagement with China as a means to turn it into a liberal democracy;
  • The belief that economic openness and international institutions would reduce war likelihood and improve prosperity.
• Global economic integration progressed: Russia joined IMF/World Bank (1992; WTO membership in 2012); China joined the IMF/World Bank (1980) and WTO (2001); Maastricht Treaty (1992) and the euro (1999) signaled deep European integration; Eastern Europe and the Balkans moved toward democratic and market reforms.
• However, six sets of tensions emerged by the late 2000s–early 2010s:
  • Conflicts and regime-change attempts (Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria) exposed the limits of social engineering and contributed to geopolitical backlash.
  • Proliferation and arms-control outcomes (SALT I/II, INF, START, NPT, IAEA) demonstrated the fragility of coercive regimes and the difficulty of multi-lateral restraint when major powers diverge.
  • The Eurozone crisis (2009) highlighted structural weaknesses in a deeply integrated monetary union without political or fiscal union; it fed nationalist sentiment and hindered deeper European integration.
  • The 2014 Ukraine crisis and the 2016–2018 geopolitical shifts underscored growing great-power competition and a re-emergence of strategic rivalry with Russia and China.
  • Democratic backsliding and rising illiberal populism weakened the perceived universality and appeal of liberal democracy in the West; Freedom House and other measures documented worrying declines in liberal democracies after 2006–2018.
  • Open borders and refugee flows challenged the compatibility of liberal openness with national identity and sovereignty, fueling domestic backlash (e.g., Brexit, Euroscepticism).
• The 2016 shift from unipolarity to multipolarity is central: the rise of China and the revival of Russia erode unipolar dominance and push the system toward a multipolar, realist configuration with competing bounded orders and a thinner, more flexible international order.
• The author’s forecast: in a multipolar world, one should expect three realist orders—two thick bounded orders (led by the United States and by China) and a thinner international order managing global governance and climate—and a highly interdependent global economy that necessitates continued economic ties even amid security competition.

The Cold War Orders (1945–1989): Structure and Dynamics

• The Cold War produced three main orders:
  • One overarching international order (dominated by U.S.-Soviet cooperation in joint, limited fashion) that facilitated cooperation when interests aligned but was not liberal; two bounded orders—one Western (led by the United States) and one Soviet (led by the Soviet Union)—that waged security competition.
• The global order during this period was thin in terms of economic and political integration across the rival blocs; economic interdependence between East and West remained limited compared to the later Open World Order.
• War and arms control dynamics:
  • Nuclear nonproliferation efforts under major superpower leadership (NPT 1968; Nuclear Suppliers Group 1974) slowed spread; IAEA established (1957) to promote civilian nuclear energy with safeguards.
  • SALT I (1972), SALT II (1979) capped strategic arms; INF (1988) eliminated categories of missiles; Helsinki Accords (1975) promoted security principles.
  • Antarctic Treaty System (1959), Outer Space Treaty (1967), Seabed Arms Control Treaty (1971), and other agreements helped constrain competition and build a framework of “rules of the road.”
• Institutional architecture:
  • Western bounded order: IMF (1945), World Bank (1945), GATT (1947), CoCom (1950), EC (1950), NATO; realist in core purpose but with some liberal features in trade and alliance behavior.
  • Soviet bounded order: Comecon (1949) and Warsaw Pact (1955) structured economic and military coordination within the Communist bloc; Communist Information Bureau (1947–56) coordinated communist parties.
• The UN's role: visible but limited influence due to superpower rivalry; the order remained thin and non-liberal in nature.
• Key takeaway: The Cold War orders illustrate how a system can be stable and enduring even without a liberal international order, using bounded orders and arms-control regimes to manage competition while avoiding full-scale confrontation.

The Liberal International Order, 1990–2019: Construction, Expansion, and Cracks

• After the Cold War, the United States emerged as the dominant power in a rapidly liberalizing and expanding international order.
• Core strategy: transplant the liberal Western model worldwide by:
  • Expanding universal membership in core institutions (IMF, World Bank, GATT turned WTO, etc.) and creating new ones when needed;
  • Building an open, free-trade, capital-friendly international economy;
  • Spreading liberal democracy as a universal norm and political system;
  • Integrating China and Russia into liberal institutions to stabilize the system and turn them into liberal democracies if possible.
• The logic rested on three well-known liberal theories:
  • Liberal institutionalism: institutions reduce transaction costs and facilitate cooperation;
  • Economic interdependence theory: states become more peaceful when economically interlinked;
  • Democratic peace theory: democracies are less likely to go to war with one another.
• Notable policy choices and milestones:
  • NATO expansion into Eastern Europe to extend the security community;
  • Engagement with China (and Russia) to incorporate them into the liberal order;
  • The Oslo Accords (1993) as a sign of potential regional peace;
  • The Kosovo and Bosnia interventions as demonstrations of liberal interventionism;
  • The Maastricht Treaty (1992) and the euro (1999) signaling deep European integration;
  • The Bretton Woods-era institutions expanded and new regimes created (e.g., the WTO) to bind the global economy to liberal norms.
• The Bush administration and the “indispensable nation” framing signaled the U.S. leadership in the liberal order’s expansion; Clinton’s administration reinforced openness and integration; Albright’s “responsible stakeholder” concept sought to integrate China into the liberal order.
• The post–Cold War order appeared to deliver peace and prosperity for a time, with major interdependencies and opened markets; however, cracks emerged in the 2000s and beyond:
  • The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (2001, 2003) exposed limits of regime change and social engineering; Libya (2011) and Syria (2011–2015) exposed further limits.
  • The 2007–2008 global financial crisis undermined confidence in liberal financial governance and the credibility of the liberal order.
  • The eurozone crisis highlighted structural weaknesses in monetary integration without political union.
  • The 2014 Ukraine crisis and 2016–2018 tensions with Russia underscored renewed great-power competition and the fragility of established security architectures.
  • The rise of illiberal democracies and a decline in the share of liberal democracies worldwide; Freedom House metrics showed declines in liberal democracy since the mid-2000s; public support for open borders and expansive refugee policies faced nationalist backlashes.
  • Open borders and refugee flows strained national identities and sovereignty, contributing to political backlash and Euroscepticism (e.g., Brexit).
• The financial and geopolitical crises accelerated a shift toward multipolarity; the system’s center of gravity moved away from a unipolar liberal hegemony toward a more contested, multi-actor world.

What Went Wrong? The Three Fatal Flaws of the Liberal International Order

• Flaw 1: Regime-change social engineering is exceptionally difficult and politically costly
  • Replacing regimes and exporting liberal democracy frequently triggers nationalist backlash, legitimacy challenges, and protracted conflict; social engineering on a global scale clashes with the powerful force of nationalism and sovereignty.
  • Balance-of-power calculations further hinder such efforts; regimes that fear regime change band together to resist liberal promotion.
• Flaw 2: Sovereignty, national identity, and open borders collide in liberal-leaning states
  • Delegating sovereignty to international institutions and promoting open borders created a democratic deficit and public backlash in liberal democracies; voters perceived loss of control over key decisions and questioned legitimacy.
  • Brexit and similar trends reflect concerns about sovereignty and national control, particularly over economic policy and border management.
  • Open borders and refugee flows tested social cohesion and cultural identity in liberal states, undermining the universalistic appeal of liberalism for many citizens.
• Flaw 3: Hyperglobalization generated domestic political and economic costs
  • Outsourcing, automation, wage stagnation, and rising inequality eroded support for liberal globalization among broad swaths of the middle and working classes; prosperity did not distribute evenly.
  • Dependence on global financial flows made economies more vulnerable to crises; major crises (Asian financial crisis 1997–98; global financial crisis 2007–08) delegitimized the liberal order in many observers’ eyes.
  • The combination of nationalist backlash, sovereignty concerns, and economic discontent created a powerful political cocktail that destabilized the liberal international order from within.
• In short, the liberal order was structurally prone to collapse because its core push for universal democracy, open borders, and global economic liberalization generated both domestic resistance and strategic vulnerabilities that adversaries could exploit.

Turning the Liberal Democracies Against the Liberal Order: Internal Pressures and Sovereignty Debates

• The liberal order requires delegating significant decision-making authority to international institutions; this is perceived as eroding national sovereignty and democratic accountability.
• A democratic deficit emerges when distant bureaucrats make decisions with major national consequences; voters feel alienated from decision-making processes.
• The rise of nationalism and concerns over self-determination intensify opposition to open borders and foreign-imposed policy changes.
• Brexit serves as a prime example of national sovereignty concerns trumping liberal integration aims; similar dynamics have appeared across Europe and in U.S. domestic politics.
• The combination of nationalism, economic insecurity, and concerns about sovereignty undermines widespread support for liberal norms and institutions, contributing to the erosion of the liberal order.

The New Realist Orders in a Multipolar World

• The likely future is a multipolar system with three key features:
  • A thin international order: focuses on arms control and core economic governance; higher emphasis on addressing climate change and essential cross-border issues; broad but shallow in institutional reach across the economy.
  • Two thick bounded orders: one led by the United States, the other by China; each will be comprehensive in security and economic dimensions and will compete for influence and leadership.
  • A continued, but more regulated, global economy: extensive interdependence persists, meaning both bounded orders will need to manage cross-border economic flows and technology transfers, with competition and cooperation coexisting.
• Core drivers shaping these orders:
  • The U.S.–China strategic rivalry will be a defining feature; competition will be both economic and military; alliances and partners matter for shaping deterrence and access to technology.
  • Russia’s role is nuanced: it could align with the United States against China, align with China against the United States, or stay relatively on the sidelines; Europe is likely to belong largely to the U.S.-led order for strategic reasons, though the defense of European interests will require balancing American leadership with European autonomy.
• Economic interdependence complicates the security competition: even amid rivalry, there will be substantial trade and investment across the U.S.-China divide and with global partners; this is reminiscent of pre-WWI Europe where political rivalries coexisted with intense economic interdependence.
• China’s strategy includes instruments like the One Belt, One Road initiative and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to project influence and reshape the economic order to its advantage; this will be balanced by U.S.-led institutions and a push to maintain open trade with allies.
• The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and other regional economic frameworks are tests of whether a new set of institutions can sustain liberal economic norms, even amid strategic rivalry.

Russia, Europe, and the Future Geostrategic Landscape

• Russia’s status as a great power ensures it will not be easily sidelined; its alignment choices will shape Europe’s security architecture and the broader order.
• Possible trajectories for Russia:
  • Align with the United States to counter China, integrating into a U.S.-led bounded order;
  • Align with China in a China-led bounded order;
  • Remain non-aligned, playing a marginal role in the major bounded orders.
• Europe is likely to be pulled into the U.S.-led bounded order due to security and economic complementarities, though European powers will push for greater strategic autonomy and to limit European dependence on U.S. security guarantees.
• The U.S. goal will be to bring Russia into the U.S.-led order and to deter China through a mix of military alignment, economic pressure, and alliance-building; this includes maintaining NATO’s relevance and integrating Europe into a cohesive economic bloc that can resist strategic decoupling by China.

Implications for Policy and the Way Forward

• The liberal order has effectively ended; a new realist alignment is shaping global politics.
• For the United States, three strategic imperatives emerge:
  • Resist the urge to forcibly spread democracy by regime change; instead, work within a balance-of-power framework to contain rivals and maintain credible deterrence.
  • Maximize influence in the new economic institutions and ensure that U.S. interests are protected in the evolving global financial architecture; avoid ceding leadership in core rule-making bodies to China or other powers.
  • Build and sustain a formidable bounded order in Asia to contain China’s expansion, including economic frameworks (e.g., a revived or new regional trade architecture) and a robust military alliance posture, while seeking to pull Russia into a cooperative alignment that counterbalances China.
• The broader objective is to manage competition with China and Russia through a combination of containment, integration where feasible, and resilient domestic political support for liberal democratic norms in a multipolar environment.

Concluding Summary and Key Takeaways

• The liberal international order was never a guaranteed, permanent structure; it rested on a specific distribution of power and a universalist ideology that could be resisted by nationalism and great-power competition.
• Its decline is not solely due to external challenges (e.g., Trump’s rhetoric) but is rooted in structural tensions: the difficulty of social engineering across borders, sovereignty and identity concerns, and the domestic political costs of hyperglobalization.
• The coming world is likely to be multipolar with three realist orders: a thin international order and two thick bounded orders led by the U.S. and China; Russia’s role remains fluid.
• For policymakers, the emphasis should be on strategic restraint in democracy promotion, strengthening economic governance in the new order, and constructing durable bounded orders to manage China’s rise and preserve stability in Europe and beyond.
• The overarching narrative: a liberal order that sought to universalize democracy and openness was simultaneously too ambitious and too interconnected with domestic politics to endure in a multipolar, nationalist world. The future will favor realist arrangements that balance power, competition, and selective cooperation rather than universal liberal hegemony.

Key Dates, Institutions, and Figures (Quick Reference)

• World War II to early Cold War foundations: 1945–1950s
• Bretton Woods institutions: $1944$ (foundation of IMF and World Bank; anchor for the postwar liberal order); GATT established later and evolved into the WTO (1995).
• NPT and NSG established to curb proliferation: $1968$ (NPT); $1974$ (NSG).
• Arms control milestones: SALT I $1972$; SALT II $1979$; INF Treaty $1987/1988$; START negotiations through the 1990s.
• Cold War blocs: NATO (Western), Warsaw Pact (Soviet-led); COMECON; Communist Information Bureau (1947–1956).
• EU milestones: Maastricht Treaty $1992$; euro $1999$; ongoing expansion into Eastern Europe during the 1990s and early 2000s.
• Key crises and turning points: Asian Financial Crisis $1997–98$; Global Financial Crisis $2007–08$; Eurozone Crisis starting $2009$; Ukraine Crisis $2014$; Brexit referendum $2016$.
• Notable leaders and statements: Bush’s 2002 State of the Union; Clinton’s expansion rhetoric; Albright’s views on China as a “responsible stakeholder”; Obama’s engagement framing; Trump’s 2016 critique of the order.

Glossary of Core Concepts

• Order: an organized group of international institutions that govern interactions among member states.
• International vs bounded orders: international aims for broad cooperation; bounded focus on security competition among rival powers.
• Realist, agnostic, ideological orders: theoretical categorizations of how power and ideology shape the rules and aims of an order.
• Thick vs thin orders: degree of influence across economic and military domains; depth of institutional reach.
• Unipolar, bipolar, multipolar: distributions of power in the international system.
• Hyperglobalization: sustained, high levels of global economic integration that intensify interdependence and can magnify both gains and costs.
• Democratic deficit: perceived gap between the public’s influence on policy and the decisions made by distant international institutions.
• Responsible stakeholder: concept used to describe how a rising power (China) should engage with the international order.
• Oscillations between cooperation and competition: the recurring pattern of states seeking to cooperate on some issues while competing on others, especially in security and trade.

Connections to Foundational Principles and Real-World Relevance

• The analysis connects to foundational theories of international relations:
  • Liberal institutionalism explains why states create and participate in international institutions to manage interdependence; but it also acknowledges that institutions reflect interests of dominant states.
  • Realism explains persistent security competition and balance-of-power dynamics that constrain liberal projects and incentivize bounded orders.
  • Democratic peace theory and economic interdependence theory are used to justify liberal order promotion, though the world’s political economy reveals significant domestic constraints and backlash.
• Real-world relevance: The shift to multipolarity and the persistent rise of China and revival of Russia shape ongoing debates about how to manage global governance, trade, climate policy, and security alliances. The debates about NATO expansion, the EU’s cohesion, U.S.–China technology competition, and the fate of liberal democracy in a changing world all stem from these theoretical premises.