Chapter VIII — Nonchalance on Capitol Hill: Congressional Enactment of the Marihuana Tax Act (1937)
Page 177
• Treasury Dept. arrives on Capitol Hill seeking swift passage of Marihuana Tax Act—presents issue as “open-and-shut.”
• Four core assertions to Congress (House Ways & Means; Senate Finance sub-committee):
1. Marihuana is a disastrous drug.
2. Use is rising alarmingly, generating public hysteria.
3. States cannot cope; federal intervention imperative.
4. Separate legislation (not Harrison Act amendment) is preferable.
• New Deal-era Congress eager to exercise federal power; only Supreme Court invalidation looms as theoretical limit.
• Key concern during hearings: establishing a federal responsibility; legislators assume national problems demand national solutions.
• No definitive scientific study available—yet Treasury did not bring in Public Health Service, Treadway, Kolb, Bromberg, or Siler.
Page 178
• Treasury fails to supply synthesis of extant science; no PHS statement; no in-house medical testimony.
• Scientific summary instead provided by Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN)—a law-enforcement agency.
• FBN written statement concedes minor scientific disagreement, then dismisses it via anecdotal “ample evidence” of disastrous effects (violence, insanity, loss of will, etc.).
• Bureau cites only two supporting journal articles—Gomila & Stanley—neither of which is supplied in full.
• Longer, oral testimony by Commissioner Harry Anslinger eliminates even the faint acknowledgments of uncertainty.
Page 179
• Anslinger reads sensational letter from N.J. prosecutor Richard Hartshorne: brutal murder allegedly due to marihuana.
• Senators Brown & Davis shown gruesome photograph; react with shock.
• Anslinger recounts additional cases:
– Alamosa, CO citizens petition Congress for help.
– 15-year-old boy in Ohio goes mentally deranged; disclosure leads to seizure of lbs cannabis.
– “Florida boy” murders entire family;
– Ohio gang (< yrs) confesses to holdups under influence;
– Hotel-clerk shooting in Ohio.
• Exchanges reinforce narrative that a single cigarette may produce homicidal mania; effect varies by individual; “all experts agree continued use leads to insanity.”
• Senate sub-committee hears only Anslinger on drug effects—no other expertise.
Page 180
• House hearing: single outside “scientist” produced—Dr. James Munch (Temple Univ. pharmacologist).
• Munch’s research limited to dogs; draws sweeping conclusions about humans.
• Rep. John McCormack presses Munch, essentially feeding him answers: drug degenerates cerebral cortex, causes amnesia, violent irritability, personality disintegration.
• Munch admits differential susceptibility; tolerance develops in 3–12 months in dogs.
• Historical anecdotes: origin in Asia; link to word “assassin”; recent rapid spread (since ).
• Both Munch & McCormack portray illicit use as “rapidly increasing”—no data offered.
Page 181 – 182
• Hearing ends with committee thanking Munch—despite lack of human evidence.
• Bureau’s second pillar: claim of alarming recent spread & public hysteria.
• Evidence offered: single 1936 Alamosa newspaper letter + Gomila article—no statistics.
• Senator Brown inquires whether crackdown on opiates drove users to marihuana; Anslinger denies, insisting entirely new, younger demographic (≈ yrs).
• Anslinger cites marihuana arrests nationwide previous year—half () in California; admits data incomplete & incidence lower outside CA.
• Comparison: by arrests hit (CA ) highlighting paltry 1937 figures.
• Despite flimsy proof, congressional mood favors FBN narrative; public “hysteria” largely a press creation of 1935.
Page 183 – 184
• Third pillar: States purportedly ask for federal help because of interstate trafficking.
• Sen. Brown requests clarification; Anslinger claims requests but supplies no letters, reports, or trafficking analyses.
• FBN files today contain no corroboration.
• True subtext: Bureau believes most states lax or under-resourced; wants federal statute to spur local enforcement & secure manpower funds.
• Committee chairs (Sen. Brown, Rep. Doughton) had been pre-briefed; hearings mostly echo-chamber—technical objections come only from birdseed, oilseed, & hemp industries.
Page 185 – 186
• AMA Opposition Appears: Dr. William C. Woodward (AMA legislative counsel) testifies last; methodically challenges each assumption:
– Strangling of medical research/use.
– Lack of primary scientific evidence; reliance on newspapers.
– No Bureau of Prisons, Children’s Bureau, Office of Education, or Public Health testimony to substantiate prevalence or crime link.
– Existing state laws adequate; FBN already empowered (by 1929 Porter Act) to coordinate but has failed.
– If federal action required, simply amend Harrison Act; constitutional objections inconsistent.
• Woodward cites drafting secrecy; AMA not consulted during two-year preparation.
Page 187 – 189
• Contentious cross-examination: Reps. Vinson & Cooper attack Woodward—accuse AMA of obstructionism, reference AMA opposition to other New Deal measures.
• Key exchange:
– Woodward concedes marihuana is a problem but insists efficient state enforcement + FBN coordination will suffice.
– Cooper presses: if evil exists & States inadequate, must act federally; Woodward rebuttal: States never truly aided/organized by Treasury.
• Philosophical clash: 1937 Congress reflexively favors federal solutions; Woodward favors localized control & minimal physician burden.
Page 190 – 192
• Chairman Robert Doughton sharply rebukes Woodward—demands “clean-cut” answers; implies AMA resentment stems from not being consulted.
• Woodward reiterates: medical channel negligible in current abuse; law unenforceable given wild growth; bill imposes needless taxes/order forms on physicians & pharmacists.
• Hearing ends brusquely; Woodward not thanked; Senate hearing later only receives short AMA letter.
Page 193 – 194
• Committees report bill favorably; House report embeds FBN claims as congressional “findings”:
– Drug destroys will, releases inhibitions, produces violent crime & insanity.
– School children targeted; continued use brings impotency & insanity.
• Public largely unaware; press coverage minimal outside earlier scare headlines.
• Floor debate exemplifies ignorance & fatigue:
– 10 June 1937, late-day session—Rep. Snell objects to hasty consideration; knows nothing of drug.
– Leadership assures unanimous committee support—“something called marihuana … a narcotic.”
Page 195 – 196
• 14 June House debate: only brief reprise of violent anecdotes; bill passes on voice vote, no roll-call.
• Second House approval after Senate amendments equally cursory; Rep. Vinson misleadingly claims AMA support, misnames Woodward as “Wharton.”
• RESULT: Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 enacted with scant scrutiny, no solid scientific foundation, & vague enforcement rationale.
• Law serves FBN’s institutional aims: national jurisdiction, budgeting advantage, symbolic victory.
• Long-term effect: removes marihuana from medical practice for > years; sets precedent for punitive federal cannabis policy.