PolSoc: Gender

What was the traditional gender gap?

In traditional societies, where women were largely confined to activities in the home, they tended to support parties on the right of the political spectrum due to their family-oriented and socially conservative values, and reduced exposure to mobilizing forces such as trade unions. This was the “traditional gender gap” where men held more left-wing political attitudes than women.

What is modernization theory?

“Modernization theory” (Inglehart and Norris, 2003) has proven to be a very powerful explanation of how gender gaps have emerged over time driven by social and economic trends.

Over the course of the mid-to-late 20^th century, increasing secularization, divorce rates, feminist consciousness and female access to education and employment pushed women further to the left of the political spectrum. Over time, as older cohorts are gradually replaced by newer generations with more liberal, secular values, we eventually reached the “modern gender gap” around the 1990s where women are more likely to hold left-wing attitudes and support parties on the left than men.

What do some suggest is the driving force behind modernization theory?

Some scholars, such as Iversen and Rosenbluth, contend that the driving force behind the modernization theory is growing female participation in the labour force:

• Entry into the workforce exposed women to discrimination and gender inequality which makes them more supportive of leftist parties who emphasize social justice.

• Working women still take on disproportionate caring responsibilities compared to working men, which can be alleviated through welfare provision from the state such as subsidized child-care (Shorrocks, 2018). These policies make it easier for females to maintain their career while raising children.

What is another important, and related, factor?

The break-up of the traditional family and increased divorced rates have also contributed to the gender gap, as research consistently finds that employed and single women lean significantly more left-wing. With higher divorce rates, women develop political preferences for welfare state policies that would ease their labor-force participation and allow them to manage childcare whilst sustaining financial independence outside of marriage.

Longitudinal data shows that women become less likely to support the Democratic party once they marry, suggesting that marriage insulates them from the economic precarity that drives left-wing preference in the first place. 

Do these hypotheses hold?

Inglehart and Norris (2003) find little evidence that factors such as education, employment status or marital status have any impact on the gender gap.

What goes against modernization theory?

Shorrocks (2018) finds that women tend to be more left-wing than men in all cohorts and there is little evidence that they become more so in younger generations.

This finding is inconsistent with the predictions of the modernization theory, which suggests that the gender gap in economic attitudes should widen for younger cohorts as women become more independent and economically active. Older women are still more supportive of economic equality and redistribution than their male peers and yet more likely to place themselves on the right or express a right-wing vote intention. What could possibly explain this?

What is Shorrocks answer?

Instead of education or participation in the workforce, Shorrocks (2018) finds that secularization has had the greatest impact on changing gender attitudes.

Have people got more or less religious?

Analysis finds that in older cohorts, women are much more religious than men, overall levels of religiosity are higher, and religiosity is important for political position. However, in younger cohorts, religiosity declines, the gender gap in religiosity declines, and religion becomes less important in shaping political attitudes.

What does this decline in religiosity mean for political attitudes?

Once religiosity and its political salience are accounted for, Shorrocks finds in her analysis, the change in the size of the gender gap across cohorts is greatly reduced. This explains why older generations of women tended to vote for right-wing candidates whilst still being more supportive of equality, redistribution, and state intervention than men. These political preferences did does not translate into identification with the left-wing or voting for a left-wing party because religion was the more salient aspect of their identity.

With the decline both of religiosity and its salience in younger cohorts, women’s greater support for economically left-wing issues has finally translated into a left-wing political position and support for left-wing parties.

What evidence also supports Shorrock’s thesis? x2

• Manow (2014) finds strong and statistically significant evidence that religiosity has a strong negative effect (for both men and women) on the intention to vote for left or centre-left parties.

• In Southern European countries such as Italy, Portugal, and Spain, the gender gap in left-wing voting remains statistically insignificant, reflecting the persistent influence of a strong Catholic religious cleavage that anchors women to more conservative parties, delaying the broader leftward realignment seen elsewhere.

Have attitudes really changed?

Men and women’s political attitudes consistently differ with regards to issues such as the size of the welfare state, national defence and criminal justice policy, and studies confirm that these gender differences date back at least to the 1940s. Therefore, there must be factors other than political attitudes which have driven changes in voting behaviour.

When did the modern gender gap emerge in the US and why?

From the dawn of modern polling in the 1930s, women always identified as slightly more Republican than men. Only in the late 1970s did men begin identifying more as Republican and less as Democrat than women do. Gillion et al. (2018) attributes changes in gender voting over time to party polarization and ideological sorting.

Explain party polarization:

Prior to the 1960s, people did not perceive that the Democrat and Republican parties were sufficiently differentiated on major issues. It was only after the 1960s, when the two parties more consistently took liberal and conservative positions, respectively, on a wide range of prominent political issues, that members of the public noticed that their issue preferences were inconsistent with their party loyalties.

Explain ideological sorting:

Many women realized that the Republican Party’s conservative stance on crime, military aggressiveness and the size of the welfare state did not match their personal preferences. The same thing happened with male Democrat voters, and many of these citizens then adjusted their partisanship by “sorting” themselves into the party that better matched their policy preferences. This led to the emergence of the modern partisan gender gap.

When did the modern gender gap emerge in the UK?

Such a theory is also supported by the UK case-study which has been something of an outlier when it comes to the voting gender gap. It was only in 2017 that the modern gender gap finally reached Britain when women were more likely to vote Labour (the left-wing party) than men, and men were more likely to vote Conservative (the right-wing party) than women. This is strange because the gender gap in voting emerged around the early 1990s for most other advanced democracies.

Why did it take so long in the UK?

Campbell and Shorrocks (2021) suggest that this trend was delayed in Britain because of a lack of party polarization on issues where attitudinal gender gaps were evident. From the early 1990s to 2015 both parties took relatively centrist positions on a multitude of issues, both actively competed for the support of the middle class and explicitly targeted working women in their electoral campaigns (Heath, 2015).

Since 2010, however, the two parties have diverged greatly, with the Conservatives presiding over austerity and Labour swinging to the left under Miliband and then Corbyn. This has facilitated the ideological sorting which we observed in the US since the late 1960s, and has resulted – finally - in the modern gender gap.

What happened in 2019?

Interestingly, the 2019 gender gap was very different from 2017. Unlike a straightforward pro-Labour advantage among women and a pro-Conservative advantage among men, we observed a more complex pattern where women disproportionately voted for the Greens and men for the Brexit party. These findings were corroborated in the 2024 election, but with men disproportionately voting for the re-named Reform UK party (Campbell and Shorrocks, 2024)

What is the gender split on the environment and why?

Women are more likely than men to vote for parties that emphasise environmental protection (Shorrocks, 2021).

• Some suggest that women are socialized during childhood to be compassionate, cooperative, and caring, and this extends to the natural world (Gilligan, 1982).

• Furthermore, women still often endure the brunt of laundry, cleaning and recycling. Eco-friendly campaigns and product therefore tend to market themselves at female audiences.

• Brough and Wilkie (2016) in their paper "Is Eco-Friendly Unmanly? have shown experimentally that environmentally-friendly behaviours are coded as feminine, which makes men reluctant to adopt them for identity reasons

What is there to say about radical right parties?

Radical right parties (RRPs) consistently attract more male than female voters. Puzzlingly, there is no equally consistent gender difference in policy preferences regarding immigration or minority integration; the main issues of these parties. Harteveld (2018) attributes this to normative concerns about discrimination and prejudice, which he shows are motivations more likely to concern women.

In 2024, men were much more likely to vote for the far-right Reform UK than women (YouGov)

Is it really true to say that attitudes have not changed over time?

Studies that focus on the aggregate-level, comparing all men and women, find little change in attitudes between men and women over time, yet - moving away from the aggregate analysis - we find major differences between generations of women.

What is there to say about the gender gap among young people?

In the US and in Germany, women aged 18-30 are 30 percentage points more liberal than their male contemporaries (Gallup, 2024). In the UK the gap is 25 points; men aged 18-24 were twice as likely to vote for reform in 2024, and 23% of women aged 18-24 voted green compared to just 12% of men the same age. In Poland in 2023 almost half of men aged 18-21 backed the hard-right Confederation party, compared to just a sixth of young women of the same age.

This is a far more pronounced divide then those in their thirties or older.

What could be one explanation?

Correlation is not causation, but this trend has emerged since the early 2010s: around the same time when social media algorithms, designed to prioritize polarizing content and elicit strong emotional responses, such as anger or outrage, became sophisticated.

What is there to say about young women in the US?

In 2001, young men and women had similar political ideologies. However, since 2016, women aged 18 to 29 became significantly more liberal than the previous generation of young women, irrespective of college degree or race. The views of young men – who are more likely to be conservative than liberal – have barely changed.

It’s hard to say definitively what changed for young women in the last eight years. However, these were women who grew up in a period which focused on cultivating female civic engagement and involvement in previously male arenas. Events since 2016, such as Clinton’s loss to Trump, the #MeToo movement and the overturning of Roe v. Wade, gave a contradictory message and demonstrated that sexism was not a thing of the past. Trump and the Republican platform, particularly Roe vs Wade, pushed young women further to the left, and the positive influence of young prominent progressives such as Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez may also have contributed.

Education:

Women now substantially outperform men in higher education across most Western countries - they're more likely to attend university, finish degrees, and enter professional careers. Since education is strongly correlated with social liberalism, this alone produces some divergence mechanically.

Symbolic caveat:

Sides (2024) points out that symbolic ideology - how people self-identify - is not the same thing as operational ideology, having liberal or conservative views on issues. Younger men and women in the US are not nearly so different on many specific issues.

Similarly, Hudde et al. (2025) using Eurobarometer data from 32 European countries (1990–2023), similarly find that left–right self-placement shows more modest gender trends than voting behaviour does. They argue voting is more volatile than ideology so the headline divergence may reflect opinions about candidates and short-term political context rather than deep ideological realignment.

Have men become more right-wing? x2

• Norris and Inglehart’s “cultural backlash” hypothesis argues that men, particularly older and less-educated men, may feel alienated by progressive cultural changes, leading them to support right-wing parties or leaders who promise to uphold traditional values.

• The decline of traditional industries and job security has disproportionately affected men in sectors such as manufacturing. This has fuelled support for nationalist and populist right-wing economic policies, which promise protectionism.

What else is pushing young men to the right?

Figures such as Andrew Tate, Jordan Peterson, and a broader "manosphere" ecosystem of podcasts, streamers, and influencers explicitly frame progressive gender politics as hostile to men and offer a reactionary vision of masculinity built around traditional hierarchy and grievance.

What is descriptive representation like for women?

Women are majorly under-represented in political leadership roles, comprising only 26.6% of national parliament members across the world on average (Clark, 2024).

What is substantive representation like for women?

Substantive representation: Persson et al. (2023)’s analysis of 43 countries over four decades finds clear and robust evidence that women’s policy preferences are underrepresented compared to those of men. Any positive association between policy and the preferences of women disappears when controlling for the preferences of men, which suggests that much of women’s representation is an accidental byproduct of their alignment with male preferences.

What are the two strands of factors affecting descriptive representation?

The gender composition of parliament may be a function of the country’s “supply” of women who are viable political candidates. Demand-side explanations are institutional characteristics that affect the likelihood that women will be elected to office from the supply of available candidates.

What is there to say about the electoral system?

Under proportional representation, citizens vote for political parties rather than individual candidates, and parties are then awarded a proportional number of seats in parliament. Thus, women are not competing against men for political office, but are included together on party lists.

• Numerous studies find statistically significant evidence that PR increases the presence of women in parliament (Cole, 2022)

What is there to say about quotas?

The adoption of quotas in over 70 countries has led to an impressive surge in parliament shares for women across the world (Rosen, 2017)

• Countries with gender quotas featuring strong sanctions or reserved seats have parliament shares that are almost 10% higher than those with no quotas at all (Clark and Kroska, 2024)

• In 1993, the Labour party decided to introduce All-Women Shortlists (AWS) in 50% of vacant or winnable seats, guaranteeing these seats for female candidates. AWS has led to a sizable increase in female candidates (doubling with one election from 9.2% to 18.2% in 1997). By 2019, 51% of Labour MPs were women

India case study:

India’s 73rd amendment reserves one-third of local government positions for women:

• These gender quotas coincided with an increase in reports of crimes against women, but not the number of crimes committed against women. This suggests that such policies produce an empowering effect on women to seek justice for otherwise underreported crimes.

• However, studies question whether some women merely act as proxy candidates for their husbands in reserved seats. 43% of female Pradhans (heads of the village council) report receiving help from their spouse in governance. 17% had spouses who previously served in local politics and 42% of female Pradhans and GP members report that they were encouraged to run by their husband.

Sweden case study:

In Sweden, major parties began voluntarily adopting gender quotas in the 1990s which  led to many progressive policies being introduced focusing on addressing equality in the workplace and supporting a work-life balance.

However, a former VP of the FBF, the oldest women’s rights organisation in Sweden, observed that as soon as the number of women in parliament increased, the decision-making power shifted to commissions where few women held positions.

What is the strongest indicator of female seats in a national parliament?

Clark and Kroska (2024) find that countries with more progressive gender attitudes tend to also feature higher shares of women in national parliament. This is the strongest indicator in the literature.

What factors shape societal attitudes?

• Religious and cultural doctrines often reinforce traditional gender roles

• Economic empowerment can lead to corresponding shift in attitudes toward gender roles.

• Higher levels of education correlate with more progressive views on gender equality.

• Early childhood experiences and parental attitudes play a critical role in shaping gender perceptions.

  • Families that model gender equality in decision-making and responsibilities influence children to adopt similar values.

• Representation in media, such as movies, TV or adverts, can reinforce stereotypes.

  • Narratives that highlight women in leadership or nontraditional roles can reshape societal expectations.

Jensen and Olster (2009) show that the spread of cable TV in India led to lower acceptance rates of spousal abuse, a diminished preference for sons, greater levels of female autonomy

• Age: Countries with older populations have national parliaments with significantly fewer women (Clark and Kroska, 2024).

Do men and women believe they are equally qualified for office?

Traditional gender socialization leads men to conclude that they are well suited for politics and for women to belief that they do not possess the necessary qualities. Men in 2021 were almost twice as likely as women to consider themselves “very qualified” to run for office (30% compared to 16%). (Fox and Lawless, 2024)

Do men and women receive equal encouragement?

Women were 8% less likely than men to report receiving encouragement to run from other political actors, and even less likely to receive encouragement from personal sources such as family members and colleagues.

Do men and women share the same political ambitions? Why is this strange?

“The Invincible Gender Gap in Political Ambition” (Fox and Lawless, 2024) Women and men with the same credentials were not equally interested in running for office. In 2021, among a sample of more than 3,500 well-credentialed potential candidates, 17% more men had considered running for elective office. This was an increase of 1% since 2001, even given that we have seen an increased female presence in Congress and state legislatures, as well as several viable female presidential candidates.

Does the presence of female politicians help or harm political ambition for girls?

It was suggested that potential female candidates would come to embrace the possibility of a candidacy as they observed more women in positions of political power.

However, perceptions about the way female candidates are treated may have counter-acted any positive effects. On both sides of the political aisle, high-profile women running for office encounter sexist attacks which get covered extensively in the media.  This may cause potential candidates to infer that gender bias is pervasive and unavoidable, discouraging rather than encouraging them to join.

What is there to say about voters and sexism?

What is there to say about voters and sexism?

De Gues et al. (2022) finds that more than half of the British population hold sexist attitudes.

Stewart and Clarke (2019) find that people holding progressive attitudes towards women’s roles and statuses were much more likely to vote for Clinton in 2016. Sexism powerfully predicted vote choice even after controlling for authoritarianism, partisanship, and other predispositions (Valentino, 2018)

What is there to say about Trump?

At least 26 women have accused Trump of sexual misconduct and assault, and he frequently makes offensive comments about women. He appointed the judges who overturned Roe v Wade. Harris was frequently attacked, not on her policy positions, but on her sexual history as Republicans claimed she had “slept her way to the top.”

What does Trump show?

Trump not only won in 2016 and 2024 but actually improved his performance among some groups of women in 2024 — particularly Latina and non-college-educated women. This suggests that partisan, economic, and racial identities can override gender-based considerations.

How does descriptive representation help women?

How does descriptive representation help women? Congresswomen are more likely to support so-called women’s issues (e.g., gender equality, education, and childcare) than their male colleagues – irrespective of party affiliation. Women's lived experiences are more likely to influence policies and discussions; for example, women may bring attention to issues like workplace discrimination, childcare, or sexual violence.

What else does descriptive representation do?

What else does descriptive representation do?

When women hold political positions, it challenges stereotypes about gender roles and expands societal perceptions of who can lead. This normalization makes it easier for future generations of women to enter politics as the presence of women in visible, high-status roles helps to challenge deep-seated norms (Olsson, 2018)

Rwanda case study:

Rwanda’s new constitution in 2003 introduced a 30% gender quota for all elected positions in government. Since the introduction, female parliamentarians have helped implement laws regarding equal pay, equal succession rights, gender-based violence, harassment and discrimination at work, among many other reforms. Studies conducted between 1997 and 2009 also suggest that the gender quotas have led to a general increase in women’s economic empowerment and autonomy in society.

What is there to say about cross-national differences regarding gender?

Clark and Kroska (2024)’s analysis proves compellingly that cross-national variation in gender ideology accounts for most of the gaps in parliament shares between Western countries and the rest of the world. 

Countries with larger Muslim populations have fewer women in their national legislatures.

The percentage of women in a country’s national legislature also decreases as the percentage of Catholics and Orthodox citizens increase (Paxton, 2003)

What type of women is driving the modern gender gap?

Educated women in employment support parties that are economically left-wing, pro-environmental protection, and pro-international engagement. This coalition is driving the observed ‘modern gender gap.’

Is gender one homogenous bloc?

However, religious women, women out of the workforce and at lower levels of education tend to still support parties on the centre-right that adopt traditional stances. This finding is important because it highlights that not all women are necessarily more supportive of the more ‘progressive’ or ‘liberal’ option and shows how women cannot be conceptualized exclusively as a homogenous group with a unified set of interests and preferences (Shorrocks, 2021)

What is the South Korea example?

South Korea offers perhaps the sharpest contemporary example of a gendered political cleavage among young people. In the 2022 presidential election, there was an over 20 point gender gap in those in their 20s voting for the Conservative and Liberal candidate. The conservative candidate Yoon Suk-Yeol actively courted young male voters by pledging to abolish the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, framing feminism as a source of male disadvantage in a country. This challenges the standard modernization narrative, not only does economic development and high female educational attainment push women to the left, it may push men to the right.