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Concepts

mental representation of a class or individual (varies in generality) (ex. 'Cat is an animal' part of the concept of a cat)

Categories

"Pointers to knowledge", groups of items that go together, ex. Species of cats, 'furniture', 'schools'

Conceptual knowledge

knowledge that enables us to recognize objects and events and allows us to make inferences about their properties (for example, birds can fly)

categorization

the process by which things are placed into categorical groups; includes all possible examples of a particular concept

Definitional approach to categorization

Determine category membership based on whether the object meets the category definition, must meet specific criteria for category membership

Wittgenstein's 1953 work on family resemblance

Saw that not all category members shared exact definition, instead had similarity (ex. Many things can be a chair). Category members resemble one another in various (but not all) ways.

Prototype categorization

we decide whether something is a member of a category by determining whether it is similar to a certain prototype

Prototype

a standard representation of a category, or 'average' comparison (most 'typical' object to compare to)

Rosch 1975 on participants ranking objects on representativeness

Participants ranked object on a scale of typicality, strong relationship between prototypicality and family resemblance (more typical \= more shared features)

Typicality

how closely a member resembles the category prototype

Relationship between prototypicality and family resemblance

high prototypicality \= greater family resemblance (more similarity to the prototype), higher prototypicality \= quicker reaction time (Smith 1974)

Typicality effect

ability to judge highly prototypical objects more rapidly (named first, affected more by priming, judged more rapidly)

Exemplar approach to categorization

A concept is represented by multiple actual examples (i.e., particular exemplars), not a single prototype, so abstract averages (as in prototype theory) don't exist

Exemplar

examples of members of the category that the person has encountered in the past.

Rosch's category hierarchies

Categories are hierarchically organized from more specific to more general (subordinate/basic/superordinate or specific/basic/global)

Exemplar approach explains the typicality effect

objects that are like more of the exemplars are classified faster

Global/Superordinate Level of categorization

high-level (furniture, vehicle), non-specific, least information

Describe how expert knowledge differs in area of category hierarchy

for experts of a topic, more complicated examples become 'basic'

Collins & Quillian (1969) Hierarchical semantic network model

concepts are arranged in (semantic) networks that represent how they are organized in the mind

Some sentence-verification results problematic for C & Q pt 2

e.g., "pig is animal" verified faster than "pig is mammal", even though former distance is longer (in C & Q hierarchy)
-Some sentence-verification results problematic for C & Q

spreading activation

When concept presented, relevant node activated. When node activated, activity spreads among all connected links- semantically related concepts, properties, etc.)

Priming and spreading activation relationship

relevant nodes are primed and thus are easier to retrieve when you activate a node

node

a memory category that represents a specific knowledge concept; a category/concept; semantically related nodes are linked

inheritance

properties at higher levels are "inherited" by (related) lower levels, with exceptions noted at lower-level (more specific) nodes (ex. Node \= living thing (high level), is inherited by items below it (ex. cat))

Predictions by Collins & Quillian

-(other) concepts that receive activation are primed and more easily accessed from memory

Hierarchical semantic network model issues pt. 1

-Cannot explain some typicality effects e.g., "canary is bird" verified faster than "ostrich is bird", but C & Q predict should be equal bc distance is one node for both sentences
-Little evidence for cognitive economy/inheritance e.g., some results suggest "wings" also stored at "canary" node

Connectionism/parallel distributed processing models

approach to creating computer models for representing cognitive processes

Connectionist Model (Diagram)

Units

neuron-like nodes

input unit

activated by stimulation from environment

hidden unit

receive input from input units

output unit

receive input from hidden units

connection weights and function

determine how strongly signals from one unit increase or decrease activity of next unit

High connection weight

result in a strong tendency to excite the next unit

Low connection weight

less excitation, and negative weights can decrease excitation or inhibit activation of the receiving unit

back-propagation

process wherein error signal transmitted back through the circuit
- The process repeats until the error signal is zero
- Indicates how connection weights should be changed to allow the output signal to match the correct signal

graceful degradation

Disruption of performance due to damage to a system that occurs only gradually as parts of the system are damaged.

sensory-functional hypothesis meaning

maybe we categorize animals w/sensory info, artifacts by function (ex. 'Has spots' vs 'used to sit on')

sensory-functional hypothesis function

used to explain why some memory loss patients can distinguish artifacts (ex. furniture) but not living things (ex. animals). BUT there is inconsistent evidence.

semantic category approach

Specific neural circuits in the brain for specific categories, but not on sensory vs. functional basis. -notice also emphasis isn't just on particular area (like FFA), but circuits in brain (e.g., linking faces, emotion, evaluation of attractiveness, etc.)

multiple factor approach

Examines how concepts are differentiated from each other as function of various kinds of properties (e.g., color, motion, performed action), not identifying specific brain areas/networks for existing concepts

embodied approach

- Our knowledge of concepts is based on reactivation of sensory and motor processes that occur when interact with object
-These patterns of various activations represent concept in brain

Hub and Spoke model

model of semantic knowledge that proposes that areas of the brain that are associated with different functions are connected to the anterior temporal lobe, which integrates information from these areas.

mental imagery

experiencing a sensory impression without sensory input

Wilhelm Wundt's three basic elements of consciousness

sensations, feelings, and images

Paivo's 1963 and 1965 experiments with paired-associate learning

study pairs of words; first word used as recall. cue at test varied whether words were concrete or abstract

Paivo's 1963 results

-better memory for concrete words
-"Conceptual-peg" hypothesis—concrete words allow forming
-visual images that other words, items, etc. can "hang onto"

Shepard & Meltzer's 1971 mental rotation experiments and results

-vary angle of comparison shape, measure response RT
-Objects with greater rotation had longer RT

Spatial vs. propositional theories of imagery

The debate about whether imagery is based on spatial mechanisms, such as those involved in perception, or on propositional mechanisms that are related to language.

Define propositional theory

imagery is not in fact using actual visual mechanisms, but is based on previous knowledge (ex. taking longer to imagine a long boat vs a short boat because of previous knowledge that it is bigger)

Pylyshyn (1973 & 2003)

Argued Kosslyn's results can be explained by using real-word knowledge unconsciously.

Pylyshyn arguments for propositional imagery and tacit-knowledge

participants use knowledge of the world without realizing it

spatial theory

mental visual imagery is 'spatial', in that it uses the similar processes as visual perception

Finke & Pinker 4 dots experiment (1982)

-First, briefly presented display w/four dots
- Then, second display w/arrow appears
-Participants judge whether arrow points to dots previously seen
-Only could be spatial used bc participants had only a couple seconds which could not be accomplished by propositional

(-No time to memorize, no (prior) tacit knowledge)

Result Finke & Pinker

Longer RT when greater distance between arrow and (previous) dot, supports mental spatial/"traveling" imagery idea

relationship between viewing distance and ability to perceive details in detail perception

Imagine small object next to large object, Quicker to detect details on the larger object

Kosslyn's 1978 experiments with imagined mental zoom and animals

Participants asked to imagine a large animal next to a small one, able to describe more detail with large one, RT faster when animal takes more space in mental visual field.

Mental-walk Kosslyn

single animal, zoom in closer, "Zoom in" in imagination until animal fills visual field, estimate distance. Result: Move closer to small animals than to large animals

Perception and Imagery Perky, Projection (1910)

projected faint images, participants imagined same object, reported images closely resembled projected ones, participants didn't realize projected images were present. So...images and actual visual stimuli seem confusable/similar

Perception and Imagery Farah HT (1985)

participants initially imagined "H" or "T", then either H or T actually presented (briefly), accuracy calculated Result: better performance when prior image matched actual stimulus (again suggests that imagery and actual perception closely related)

(neuron responses, P vs. I) Kreiman et al (2000)

Record individual neuron responses to perceiving vs. imagining object—same neurons respond

(neuro P&I)Le Bihan fMRI(1993)

Both real & imagined (visual) stimuli activate similar areas in visual cortex

(neuro P&I, TMS) Kosslyn et al (1999)

Used transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), TMS applied to visual brain area during both perception and imagery task. Results, RT slower for both tasks when TMS applied to visual area, no effect for either task when applied to control brain area. Suggests visual area brain activity plays causal role for both perception and imagery

(visual brain damage) Farah (2000)

MGS patient w/removed right occipital lobe. Decreased both perceptual visual field and size of image visual field \> so...in "mental walk", horse filled up imagined visual field from further away < again, strong perception/imagery relationship

Bisiach and Luzzatti (1978) unilateral neglect

unilateral neglect, Depending on whether patient imagined familiar location from one end or the other, "left" side was neglected again, strong perception/imagery link

Guarriglia et al (1993) unilateral neglect, but only with images

patient with unilateral neglect, but only with images (!) perception OK (indicates dissociation between I and P)

Behrmann et al (1994) visual agnosia

patient w/visual agnosia couldn't visually recognize real objects, but could image/draw, means P and I mechanisms partially overlap

Visual perception (processing type)

involves bottom-up processing; located at lower and higher visual centers (Behrmann)

Imagery (processing type)

is a top-down process; located at higher visual centers (only) (Behrmann)

Chalmers and Reisberg (1985) ambiguous figures

Participants created mental images of ambiguous figures. Harder to "flip" imaged vs. perceived ambiguous figures

How mental imagery can improve memory/food cravings

imagining non-food things (such as a vacation) rather than a food can decrease food cravings. Group that imagined food had increased food cravings.

method of Loci

Visualizing items to be remembered in different locations in a mental image of a (familiar) spatial layout

pegword technique

Associating to-be remembered words w/images. similar to method of loci, but use standard words rather than locations. Both word and "peg-word" are visualized.

Define a problem

An obstacle between a present state and a goal

Describe Gestalt problem-solving framework

First, ascertain how problem is represented in mind, To solve, generally need to restructure problem (i.e. change problem representation). Emphasis on insight.

Role of insight

sudden solution to problem, only works with some problems. No warning before solution arises.

Insight

sudden realization of problem solution

non-insight problems

solved gradually, 'warning' before problem is solved

Metcalfe and Wiebe difference between insight and non-insight problems, (examples) (1987)

Insight \> triangle problem, chain problem. Noninsight \> algebra. Warmth judgments every 15 seconds.

Fixation

focus on aspect of problem that prevents arriving at (different) solution.

Mental sets

the tendency to stick to solutions that have worked for you in the past when trying to solve a new problem

functional fixedness

restricting use of an object to familiar functions

Luchins (1942) water-jug problem

three jugs, hold different quantities of water. Task \> obtain desired amount by pouring water back and forth. Result \> (successful) method for earlier problems carried over to final problems, even though latter had simpler solutions

Modern information-processing approach (Newell and Simon 1972)

Models problem solving as a search (for solution), initial state and goal state, need to transform initial state to goal state, involves intermediate states.

Means-end analysis and role

take steps to reduce difference between initial & goal states. Do this by establishing subgoals (intermediate states closer to goal)

Mutilated checkerboard problem

can you cover checkerboard with two missing pieces with dominoes? Key insight \> any domino must cover "pairs" of squares. Different versions make this more or less obvious. Best performance \> bread/butter, intermediate: regular & black/white; worst: all white. Problems easier to solve when closer to key representation.

Analogical problem solving

Using a solution to a similar problem can aid solution to new problem. Transfer from one (source) problem to another (target) problem. Using ideas from another problem to solve current one.

Duncker radiation problem

person has cancer/tumor, can destroy w/enough radiation, but this will also kill healthy tissue. So...how do we cure the patient?? (see Gick and Holyoak)

Gick and Holyoak's three steps

(for analogical transfer) 1 Noticing relationship. 2 Mapping correspondence between source and target, 3 Applying mapping

Gick and Holyoak (1983)

Trying to solve radiation problem. Two groups: Radiation problem only vs. reading analogous problem ("fortress story") first. When told to remember fortress story, 75% solved (!)

Surface features

specific aspects of particular problem, these usually differ markedly in different problem situations

structural feature

underlying features that govern solution, may be shared between problems (such as radiation problem).

Structural and surface feature similarity

the more structural and surface similarities a problem has, the easier it will be to solve.

Gentner and Goldin-Meadow (2003) Analogical encoding

Problems are compared and structural similarities between them are determined. This training improves analogical transfer to problems w/similar structural features

Describe how experts engage in analogical problem solving

Experts analyze problems using structural features more, by spending more time analyzing the problem

Describe creativity

Innovative thinking, Novel ideas, New connections between existing ideas. Often seems to include divergent thinking. Open-ended; large number of potential "solutions"

Practical creativity

involves analogical transfer, ex. The idea of velcro from plant sticking to pants.

Describe Basadur (2000) four steps (creative problem solving)

Stage 1: problem generation Stage 2: problem formulation Stage 3: problem solving Stage 4: solution implementation

Finke (1990) and creativity training

participants get many random components. Must use three to make an object, then explain how it would be used in several categories (furniture, transportation, etc.). Called "preinventive forms". Result \> judges rated many of these items as practically promising and/or creative inventions

Associations between latent inhibition and creativity/mental illness

LI reduced in both creative people and certain mental illnesses