Function Argument

What is the intro to eudaimonia?

The Nicomachean Ethics opens with the claim that "every craft and every discipline, and likewise action and decision, seems to seek some good" (I.1). Ends form a hierarchical structure: subordinate ends (flute-playing) serve higher ends (musical performance), which culminate in the architectonic art of political science, which "embraces the ends of all the others" (I.2). The formal end of political science is in turn eudaimonia, the human good. Aristotle suggests that that there is such an end is uncontroversial; the true issue is identifying what it is.

What is the Function Argument?

His Function Argument in Book I, Chapter 7 seeks to do so by appealing to the distinctive function (ergon) of human beings. It can be simplified as followed:

P1: There exists a human function.

P2: The human function is activity of the rational part of the soul. (the Substance claim)

P3: Performing your function well is performing it in accordance with the virtue proper to it (the Virtue claim)

P4: The good of a thing is to perform its function well (the Inference claim).

C1: The human good is rational activity in accord with virtue (over a whole life)

What is Aristotle’s argument for existence?

Aristotle's case for the existence of a human function in I.7.11 is famously compressed and reads more as rhetorical persuasion than as formal argument. He observes that (a) carpenters and leatherworkers have functions, and (b) eyes, hands and feet have functions, so why not humans? He then c) poses the rhetorical question of whether man can really be, "by nature, argon" (a derogatory term in the Greek associated with laziness and being unemployed).

Is his argument for existence compelling?

Read at face value this is no argument at all: there is no logical inconsistency in granting that craftsmen and body parts have functions while denying that man as a whole does. Charitable reconstructions exist but Aristotle’s subsequent appeal to our intuitive aversion to the idea of humans as purposeless – with his argon question – perhaps shows that even he failed to recognise a conclusive philosophical case for the existence of a human function.

Nevertheless, for present purposes, P1 carries less weight than it appears: the formal criteria of completeness and self-sufficiency established in I.4–6 already presuppose some substantive end at which human life aims, so the Function Argument is best read not as establishing the existence of such an end from scratch but as specifying its content.

What is his disjunctive argument for substance?

Aristotle appears to offer a disjunctive argument for the substance of the human function as, in I.7.12 he explains that “what we are looking for is the special (idion) function of a human being.” Because of this, he immediately dismisses the life of nutrition and growth, and the life of sense perception and locomotion, as we share these lives with plants and animals.

Aristotle conceives of a thing's essence as being its soul and recall that he views the human soul as consisting of three parts: a nutritive part, a locomotive part, and a rational part. Therefore, by elimination, he concludes that the “human function is activity of the soul in accord with reason” as this is the part which is unique to humanity.

Why is the disjunctive interpretation unsuccessful?

This disjunctive interpretation is unsuccessful because “looking for the special function of a human being” in terms of distinctness is highly problematic.

Firstly, the human function turns out to be highly contingent on what other beings are capable of. Suppose that dolphins or aliens, like humans, have rational souls. If this were the case, activity of the rational part of the soul would not be uniquely human, and hence could not be the human function. This argument’s conclusion seems to be contingent on a fact that we have little reason to think is true, namely that no other being reasons.

What is the God issue?

Worse, Aristotle is himself committed to the fact that other being’s reason since his gods engage in contemplation. In fact, because they contemplate continuously and without tiring, they do so better than humans can. Thus, if Aristotle's argument is that the human function is the activity unique to humans, he should have eliminated contemplation as a candidate.

This would leave the activity of practical reason as the only uniquely human activity left. However, this cannot be the correct interpretation because Aristotle, in book X.6-9, explicitly states that contemplation features as at least a constituent, if not completely, in eudaimonia. Thus, if Aristotle's argument for Substance is in fact disjunctive, it undermines the conception of eudaimonia that Aristotle appears to eventually defend.

What is the solution?

The response is to deny that idion means unique at all. The Greek admits of two senses of the term – unique but also essential/proper to the kind – and Aristotle must be understood as using the word in the latter sense in the function argument. When Aristotle isolates rational activity, he is identifying not what humans alone do but what is essential to what humans are.

What supports the ‘essential’ reading?

This reading is squarely supported by Aristotle's surrounding metaphysical commitments: for Aristotle, a thing's essence just is its soul, and the function of any soul-part is the activity that defines that part. Hence, the function of an organism is what it does qua that kind, regardless of whether other kinds happen to do something similar.

The function of a horse, for Aristotle (unlike for Plato), is not to serve human ends but to lead a flourishing equine existence - and it is not undermined by the existence of zebras with overlapping capacities, because what matters is not what is unique to horses but what is essential to being one. Our function is what is distinctive or proper to us in the sense that it best realizes our nature: we do it best and most characteristically of the things we do.

The reason Aristotle references plants and animals is because rational action is our distinctive way of being alive, and this becomes most apparent when contrasted with the lives of other living things.

What is there to say about virtue?

Our good requires us to perform the function of a human being. But simply performing the function will not ensure our good: many people live human lives, performing human functions to some extent, and yet are still badly off in their lives.

"Performing one's function" therefore cannot be a sufficient account of a person's good - what is needed is performing it well. This is the completion principle: for any kind F whose function is some activity X, the good F is one that performs X well, and the virtue of F just is the state that disposes F to perform X well.

Introduce the inference issue:

Suppose now, for the sake of argument, that there is a human function and this human function consists in rational activity, and suppose we also accept Aristotle’s claim in I.7.14 that performing your function well means performing it in accordance with the  virtue proper to that function. Thus, rational activity of the soul in accordance with virtue makes for a good human.

Unfortunately, it simply does not follow from these premisses that rational activity of the soul in accordance with virtue is actually good for humans. To reach this conclusion Aristotle relies on an implicit fourth premiss: that the good for something consists in its excellently serving its function.

As such, many charge that Aristotle moves from purely descriptive and non-evaluative claims about what the human function is to explicitly normative conclusions about what is good for men.

Introduce the Unemployed Harpist:

This premiss is dubious to say the least. Let us use the example of the Unemployed Harpist. It is the function of a harpist to play the harp and so, as Aristotle explicitly states, a good harpist is one that plays the harp well. Talents such as perfect pitch that enable excellent harp-playing make for a good harpist.

Nothing from this, however, necessarily seems to follow about what is good for a harpist. The unemployed harpist may well have been better off had they been tone deaf, and pursued a more lucrative, secure career rather than the career of a musician - during a recession this would certainly be the case. This shows that the fourth premiss is questionable.

However, rather than uncharitably condemn the function argument to failure, let us attempt to construct a plausible defence of this controversial step.

What is Wilkes’ defence?

One natural defense, defended by Wilkes, is to deny that P4 is a general principle at all. On Wilkes's reading, Aristotle is not arguing from a universal claim (for any X, what is good for X is what makes X a good X) but is making the local claim that, because the human function is rational activity, excellently performing the human function is good for humans.

Why does the specifically human function justify this premiss?

This still leaves us with the challenge of explaining why the specifically human function justifies the fourth premiss in this instance, but this can easily be constructed. On any plausible interpretation of the function argument, the human function is either contemplation or rational activity broadly, and both would satisfy.

Contemplation is itself a divine sort of happiness (Book X), and practical reason just is deliberation "about things that are good and beneficial for [the person who reasons, and] about what sort of things promote living well in general.” (VI.5).

Excellently performing the human function, whether that is narrow contemplation or broad rational activity, then, not only makes for a good human being, but is good for human beings.

Why is this response unsatisfactory?

Despite its ingenuity, this defence is unsatisfactory on three fronts.

First, textually: Aristotle uses the harpist as his running example throughout the function argument and flits between "good of" and "good for" as if they were interchangeable. He never pauses to indicate that the last leg of the inference can be completed only in the human case and not the harpist one.

If the inference really worked differently for craftsmen and humans, one would expect this - given Aristotle's general methodological care - to be explicitly flagged.

What are other issues?

Second, structurally: on Wilkes's reading, the real work is being done by independent considerations about what reason secures, with the appeal to function dropping out as redundant scaffolding. The function argument turns out not to be a function argument at all.

Third, the resulting picture distorts the conclusion of Book I: on Wilkes's view, the best life turns out to consist not in the excellent exercise of reason itself but in the goods that the excellent exercise of reason happens to secure. This is plainly not Aristotle's view - eudaimonia is energeia, the activity itself, not its instrumental products.

Hence, we ought to find a better interpretation that solves the alleged counterexamples to Aristotle's fourth premiss without relying on the specific substance of Aristotle’s human function.

What is Whiting’s defence?

According to Whiting, Aristotle can argue that the inference from an activity's being characteristic of the good man to that activity's being good for man is an instance of an inference pattern that is valid only for natural kinds, like human beings.

If I ceased to be a human being, I would cease to be me, so I am essentially a human being. The same applies to all other human beings so human beings are a natural kind. Being human is an essential property.

On the other hand, if some category is not a natural kind, then some thing's being in that category is not an essential property. For example, being a harpist is not an essential property because some person could cease to be a harpist without ceasing to be the person that they are.

Go further on the natural kind defence:

Then, something could be good for a living being in two ways, either in virtue of its essential properties or in virtue of its non-essential properties.

In the alleged counterexample of the harpist, perfect pitch is good for the harpist in virtue of the harpist’s being a harpist i.e. in virtue of the harpist’s non-essential properties. These things then, are good in only a contingent way.

To summarise the point, Aristotle would think that excellent rational activity is good for a person as such and perfect pitch is good for a harpist as such, but what is good for the person who is a harpist is excellent rational activity because this person is essentially a person but not essentially a harpist. Thus, it is unsurprising that in some cases (such as a recession) perfect pitch is bad for this person, but under no conditions will excellent rational activity be bad for this person.

Does Aristotle make this natural kinds argument?

In sum, the natural kind interpretation offers a compelling way to defend Aristotle’s inference from “good human” to “good for humans.” It explains why counterexamples like the Unemployed Harpist fail, since being human is essential while being a harpist is not.

Admittedly, Aristotle does not frame his argument in terms of natural kinds, but the conceptual resources of his philosophy make such a defence plausible, even if it requires going beyond the explicit text.

What about the pleasure argument?

A more direct piece of justification, often overlooked because it lies in the chapter following the function argument, is the pleasure argument of I.8, developed further in Book X.

The objection that performing one's function well is not necessarily good for the person trades on the thought that the agent could perform well yet be miserable, indifferent, or alienated from her own activity.

Aristotle denies this, since on his account every activity is completed by its attendant pleasure, provided the activity is performed by a faculty in good condition directed toward a worthy object.

Why is a life of rational activity pleasurable?

When a human performs their function well - meaning they exercise reason with precision and virtue - pleasure supervenes upon the act. And because humans are fundamentally rational beings, the exercise of reason is our most natural and proper activity, so performing this function well is not a chore but the most intensely pleasant experience available to us.

This is why, for the properly habituated agent, function-fulfilment is experienced as the good: each type of person, Aristotle writes, "finds pleasure in whatever he is a lover of," so what accords with virtue pleases the lover of virtue, and the life of the virtuous individual is pleasant in itself. Indeed, virtuous actions are "pleasant more than anything else is, since on this question the excellent person judges rightly" (I.8).

How is this justification different from the metaphysical one?

This justification is different from the metaphysical one. It does not argue from natural teleology that the function-bearer's good must coincide with function-fulfilment. Rather, it argues from the phenomenology of virtuous experience that, for the properly habituated agent, function-fulfilment is experienced as the good.

It also avoids Wilkes's structural problem: pleasure here is not an external good that excellent rational activity happens to secure, but a feature internal to the activity itself, completing it from within.

Eudaimonia therefore remains energeia, the activity, rather than collapsing into its instrumental products.

Why may some find this unsatisfactory?

Yet some will find this defence unsatisfactory, since it appears to vindicate the fourth premiss only for the properly habituated agent, and the argument seems to leave untouched the more fundamental question of why function-fulfilment should constitute the human good in the first place.

Discuss is-ought for Aristotle?

It is worth seeing, finally, that the charge of deriving an "ought" from an "is" presupposes a metaphysics on which descriptive and normative claims are cleanly separable. Aristotle's is not such a metaphysics: to attribute a function to a thing, for him, is already to make a claim about its essence and the normative standards that apply to it in virtue of being the kind of thing it is — so to say "humans are rational" is already to say something with normative consequences about what a good human is and about what is good for a human.

Hence, the naturalistic-fallacy objection mischaracterises the kind of philosophy he is doing. To press the is–ought charge against the Function Argument is in effect to reject Aristotle's whole teleological philosophy, not to identify a flaw internal to this particular argument.

How does the Function argument’s success ultimately depend on our view of human nature?

The success of the Function Argument ultimately depends on whether one accepts Aristotle's view of human nature. Each premise has a defensible reconstruction, but each reconstruction depends on a substantive metaphysical commitment. Reject any link in the chain - i.e. deny that humans have an essence, deny that essence is normatively determining, deny that reason is essential rather than one capacity among others - and the argument unravels at that point.

Why is eudaimonia an activity and not a state?

Eudaimonia is necessarily defined as an activity rather than a state. In Book I.8, Aristotle uses the analogy of the Olympic Games: prizes are not given to those that are the finest and strongest, but to those who actually compete and win.

Similarly, a person might possess the disposition of justice while asleep or incapacitated, but for Aristotle, such a dormant state cannot constitute eudaimonia. This aligns with his broader metaphysical commitment that actuality is inherently superior to potentiality.

The definition of eudaimonia as an activity is also the necessary logical conclusion of the Function Argument. Aristotle posits that the good for any being resides in the excellent performance of its specific function, which – for humans – is rational activity. Simply possessing reason is therefore insufficient for flourishing. Much like a harpist’s excellence is found in the actual playing of the harp - not merely in the latent ability to play - human flourishing is found in the active exercise of reason.

What is the distinction between a process and an activity?

This point is reinforced by the distinction Aristotle draws in X.4 distinguishes between kinesis (a movement or process) and energeia (an activity). A process, such as building a house or traveling to a destination, is incomplete until the goal is reached; the value of a kinesis is essentially deferred until its conclusion.

An energeia, by contrast, is end-inclusive: at every moment of its duration, it is already what it is meant to be. While you are seeing, you have already seen; while you are contemplating, you have already contemplated.

Eudaimonia is an energeia in just this sense. When an agent is acting virtuously or engaging in contemplation, the activity is not a process tending towards a result that will eventually make it worthwhile. Rather, the activity is intrinsically valuable and complete in itself. Eudaimonia is the very quality of a life being lived in accordance with the highest part of the soul.

I.1-2 Regress criteria

If the hierarchy of ends were to go on without limit, our wishes would ultimately be empty and futile. Thus, it cannot be that we pursue every end for the sake of something else but there must be a highest good: the best good.

1.5 Aristotle’s three lives:

·       Aristotle considers three popular candidates for eudaimonia which are embodied in the life of pleasure, the life of political activity, and the life of study.

·       The life of gratification is a slavish life suitable for grazing animals.

·       The end of political activity may be conceptualized as honour or perhaps virtue. However, the highest good as honour would be objectionably contingent on the attitudes of others. Furthermore, virtue is too incomplete to be the highest good because the best life for humans must be an active one. It seems possible for someone to possess virtue but be asleep or inactive throughout his life, or suffer the worst evils and misfortunes. No-one would count this person as happy.

·       Finally, the highest good cannot be wealth because the highest good is non-instrumentally good whereas money is choiceworthy only for some other end.

1.7: formal and substantive criteria

(a) formal criteria — completeness and self-sufficiency; (b) substantive specification via the function argument

·        Eudaimonia is complete without qualification; choiceworthy always for its own sake and never because of something else, and the most complete end.

·        Eudaimonia is also self-sufficient as, by itself, it makes a life choiceworthy and lacking nothing. It could not be the case that happiness were merely one good among many because then we could always add more of another good to make the life even more choiceworthy.

1.8: Defence of the account of the good

·        Aristotle sets out common views about eudaimonia and argues that on his account, each view is at least partially correct.

·        (1) Consistent with the views of many philosophers, eudaimonia is a good of the soul.

·        (2) The view that eudaimonia consists in virtue is correct in identifying virtue as essential to eudaimonia.

·        (3) The view that eudaimonia consists in pleasure is partially-correct in claiming that the eudaimon life is pleasant. This is because actions in accord with the virtues, done by virtuous individuals, are pleasant in their own right.

·        (4) People are right that eudaimonia requires some degree of good fortune. “Happiness evidently also needs external goods to be added for we cannot do fine actions if we lack the resources” such as friends, wealth and political power. Furthermore, we do not altogether have the character of happiness if we look utterly repulsive or are ill-born, solitary or childless.