phil 275 exam 1

what are the three types of knowledge?

propositional, acquaintance, skill

propositional knowledge

factual, knowledge that has a proposition as its object

example of propositional knowledge

S knows that P (she knows that dogs are mammals, i know that the earth orbits the sun)

acquaintance knowledge

personal

example of acquaintance knowledge

I know this song, I know my next door neighbor, I know Paris

skill knowledge

procedural

skill knowledge example

 I know how to ride a bike, I know how to speak French 

JTB account of knowledge

justified true belief, is a theory that states that knowledge is a combination of three conditions: belief, truth, justification

JTB analysis: S KNOWS THAT P IF AND ONLY IF:

1. S believes that P

2. P is true

3. S is justified in believing that P

Necessary condition

A is a necessary condition for B if and only if the non-occurrence of A guarantees the non-occurrence of B.

example of a necessary condition

oxygen is a necessary condition for human life, citizenship is a necessary condition to legally vote

Sufficient condition

A is a sufficient condition for B if and only if the occurrence of A guarantees the occurrence of B

example of sufficient condition

decapitation is a sufficient condition for death, being a woman is a sufficient condition for being a human.

factivity of knowledge

A propositional attitude is factive just in case it can only exist with respect to true propositions

is belief factive? example

NO. we can believe both true propositions and false propositions

EX: Damen believes that the earth is spherical (possible), Damen believes that the earth is cubicle (possible). 

Is knowledge factive?

YES.  We can know true propositions but we cannot know false propositions 

EX: Damen knows that the earth is spherical (possible), Damen knows that the earth is cubicle (not-possible).

Counterexample

an example of something that shows a rule, principal, or generalization to be false (or at least in need of qualification)

example of counterexample

all swans are white. CE: a black swan

individuals are morally accountable for their actions. CE: small children

counterexamples can be employed to show that

(a) that allegedly necessary conditions are not necessary and (b) that allegedly sufficient conditions are not sufficient 

EX:

A. being land-dwelling is necessary for being a mammal. CE: whale

B. being water-breathing is sufficient for being a fish. CE: jellyfish

Gettier counterexamples

examples of justified true belief that fail to be knowledge (conditions are not conjointly sufficient for knowledge)

defeator

 a piece of information, such that, if one had access to it, would undermine one’s justification for believing a certain proposition 

No defeater

the idea that for a justified true belief to count as knowledge, there must be no additional true information that, if known, would undermine or "defeat" the justification for that belief ( no hidden facts that would negate the justification for believing something to be true)

No false premise

the idea that a person cannot truly know something if their justification for believing it relies on any false beliefs

internalism def

the view that your beliefs can only be justified by factors that are internal to you (by factors of which you can be consciously aware)

internalism

If S knows P, then S should be able to provide their justification for believing P

externalism def

the view that your beliefs can be justified by factors that are not internal to you (factors of which you are not consciously aware)

externalism

If S knows P, S may or may not be able to provide justification for believing P 

KK-thesis (know-know)

if S knows that P then S knows that S knows that P (infinite), problem with internalism

a deontological account of justification

a duty-based account according to which S is justified in believing P if and only if S has fulfilled all of their duties in arriving at the belief that P. such duties are called epistemic duties. internalism

Causal theory of justification

S is justified in believing P if and only if S’s belief that P is caused in the appropriate way. More specifically, S is justified in believing P if and only if S’s belief is causally linked in an appropriate way to the fact that P. (externalist)

Example of causal theory

When I look outside and see it raining, and form the belief that it is raining, my belief that it is raining is caused by the fact that it is raining. According to the theory, this renders my belief justified 

reliabilist theory of justification

S is justified in believing P if and only if S arrives at that belief by a reliable belief- forming process. Belief forming process is reliable when it tends to produce true rather than false beliefs. (externalist)

Agrippa’s Trilemma

proposition that the attempt to justify any philosophical belief can only end in one of three ways: infinite regress, circularity, dogmatism

infinite regress

the justificatory chain will regress infinitely, with each belief in the chain receiving its justification from a prior belief without end. an infinite number chain of justifications is required to support belief

( B_n ← B_n-1 ← B_n-2 ← B_n-3 ← B_n-4 . . . ∞.)

problem with infinite regress

wrongly assumes that we can hold an infinite number of justifying beliefs 

circularity

the justificatory chain will go in a circle, with the belief being justified serving as justification for the beliefs that justify it. beliefs are only justified by themselves, creating a circular argument

B_n ← B_n-1 ← B_n-2 ← B_n-3 ← B_n-4 ← B_n.

problem with circularity

Wrongly assumes that a belief can justify itself 

dogmatism

the justificatory chain will terminate in one or more propositions that receive no justification from any other proposition. beliefs are justified by starting with some knowledge rather than none

B_n ← B_n-1 ← B_n-2 ← B_n-3 ← B_{n-4 .}

problem with dogmatism

Wrongly assumes that an unjustified belief can provide justification to other beliefs. 

Foundationalism

justification has the form of foundation and superstructure with basic beliefs forming the foundation and non-basic beliefs forming the superstructure

Basic beliefs

beliefs not deriving their justification from other beliefs 

Non-basic beliefs

beliefs deriving their justification from other beliefs

classical foundationalism

basic beliefs must be maximally certain: indubitable, infallible, irrefutable, etc.

modest foundationalism

basic beliefs may be less than maximally certain: well-supported, highly plausible, etc

coherentism

 view that every belief receives its justification from other beliefs that collectively form an interlocking web of belief 

isolation objection to coherentism

argues that a system of beliefs can be perfectly logical within itself but still be completely disconnected from reality, thus failing to provide any guarantee that those beliefs are actually true

naive realism

common-sense theory, idea that our senses directly present us with the world as it truly is (see apple as an apple)

argument from illusion

challenges naive realism by pointing out that our perceptions can be misleading (stick being bent in water)

sense data theory

suggests that we only directly perceive mental representations of objects, not the objects themselves. when we perceive something, we are aware of a mental construct rather than the external object itself