more objections to substance dualism (interactionalism & epiphenomentalism)

define epiphemonmentalism

physical properties cause changes in the mental properties

but the mental properties have no causal powers

define interactionalism

physical properties cause chnages in the mental

and mental properties cause changes in the physical

there is a 2 way inetraction

explain epiphenomentalism in terms of a steam train

conscious experience to the whistle on a steam train and the body and brain to the train itself.

The steam that drives the whistle is produced by the engine which drives the train forward, but the whistle doesn't affect the forward motion, it is just a by-product and the train would move as well without it.

The whistle, like consciousness, is a 'collateral product' or 'epiphenomenon', meaning it is produced by underlying process but has no causal impact on those processes

what causes mental events according to epiphenomentalism

mind causes no mental events either – mental events are all caused by physical events (the brain)

what is the first criticism of epiphenomentalism?

The causal redundancy of the mental

explain the criticism of the The causal redundancy of the mental

The most influential objection to epiphenomenalism is that it is obviously false. It is obvious that, e.g. whether I feel pain makes a difference both to what I think (e.g. that I’m in pain) and to what I do (e.g. jump around shouting). To say that the mind is ‘causally redundant’, i.e. does not work as a cause, is highly counterintuitive

what is the second criticism of epiphenomentalism?

The argument from introspection

explain the ciricism of The argument from introspection

suppose I am in pain. How do I know that I am in pain? The obvious answer is that my belief that I am in pain is caused by my pain itself. I can tell that I am in pain just from introspection.

But epiphenomenalism must deny this, because, as a mental state, pain doesn’t cause anything. Likewise, it seems that when I say what I think, what I say is caused by what I think.

But epiphenomenalism must deny this. Both my belief that I feel pain and saying what I think are caused by physical processes and not pain or thought themselves. According to epiphenomenalism, it is physical processes that cause my beliefs about my mind.

So as long as the same physical processes occur in my brain, my beliefs about my own mind will be the same whatever mental states I have.

My beliefs about my mind, therefore, are unjustified and unreliable. So I can’t know my own mind.

what is the last ciriticism of epiphenomentalism?

Free will and responsibility

explain the criticism of Free will and responsibility

we need mental causation in order to be free and take responsibility for our actions. In order to be free and responsible for what you do, you need to be able to choose what to do, and to do it because you choose to do it.

Therefore, we might say, your choice needs to cause what you do. If what you do is not caused by your choice, but by something physical over which you have no influence, then you are not free in what you do, anymore than you are free in what you do when you are blown over by a strong wind. Choices are mental events.

Epiphenomenalist dualism must therefore say that your choices have no causal powers and do not cause what you do. Instead, your choice is simply an effect of some process in the brain, as is your action. It is hard to see how ‘you’ have chosen what to do.

explain the threat of solipisism

We each experience our own minds directly, from ‘within’

We can know what we want or believe through introspection.

We cannot experience other people’s mental states

what does the agument from analogy claim?

we can use the behaviour of other people to infer that they have minds too

outline the argument from analogy

1\. I have a mind.

2\. I know from experience that my mental states cause my behaviour.

3\. Other people have bodies similar to mine and behave similarly to me in similar situations.

4. Therefore, by analogy, their behaviour has the same type of cause as my behaviour, namely mental states.

5. Therefore, other people have minds

what is the criticism of the argument from analogy

Argument is perhaps the ‘common-sense’ position on how to solve the problem of other minds. But we can object to its use of induction. The conclusion that other people have minds is based on a single case – mine. This is like saying ‘that dog has three legs; therefore, all dogs have three legs’. You can’t generalize from one case, because it could be a special case. Perhaps I am the only person to have a mind.

who puts forward the argument against solipisim?

mill

outline mills standard argument

p1) i have a min

p2) i know from experience that my behaviour is caused by my mental states

p3) other people have bodies similar mind and behave in similar ways to me when in similar situaltions

c1) therefore by analogy, their behaviour is caused by their mental states

c2) therefore other people have minds

what is the first criticism of mills standard agument?

human behaviour is not uniformed

explain the ciriticsm that human behaviour is not uniformed

the argument fails as soon as someone reacts differently

e.g someone might fall over and cry and someone else might stand up and walk away

as these behaviours as too different they cannot assume they have minds and ignore differences

what is the second criticism of mills standard argument?

it is a weak inductive argument

explain how mills standard agurment is a weak inductive one

a strong inductive one reaches a general conclusion on the basis of lots of examples

but this argument only argues from a singal observed exmaple (one mind) and applied to all minds

for exmaple it is like being given boxes, you open one and it has a puppy so you conclude the rest also have puppies

we need to strengthen inductive arguments by opening more boxes

but with minds this is not possible

outline mills modified argument

p1) this behaviour has a mental cause

p2) that behaviour has a mental cause

p3) other behaviours have a mental cause

c1) therefore whenever i observe behaviour it ha a metal cause

c2) behaviours have mental cause and people have minds

what is an issue for interactionalism?

conceptual issues

breifly outline the conceptual issues with interactionailsm

if minds are non physical and bodies are physical

then it is difficult to conceive of how they could affect each other

there seems no way for the body to latch onto a non physical thing

and now way a thing that doesn't exist to influence something physical

who helped the conceptual inetraction problem?

Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia

outline the conceptual interaction problem

1. Physical things only move if they are pushed
2. Only something that is physical and can touch the thing that is moved can exert such a force
3. But the mind is not physical, so it can’t touch the body
4. Therefore, the mind cannot move the body

what is an issue with this concpetual interaction argument?

We know (4) is false, so there must be a problem elsewhere in the argument.

Of all the premises, (3) seems easiest to dispute. It follows from this that the mind *is*, in fact, physical. And if the mind is physical then substance dualism is wrong.

how does descrate respond to princess of bohemia?

she has misinderstood how things move

she claims for one thing to move another they must touch

but we can understand the weight of a rock causes the rock to fall downwards w/o thinking the weight actually pushes the rock

what is another issue with interactionalism?

empiricial issues

what law is used for the empiricial issues of inetractionalism?

the law of conservation of energy

outline the law of conservation of energy

1) there is a transfer of energy from cause to effect

2) the total amount of energy in the universe always remains the same

how is the law of conservation of energy an issue for interactionalism?

suppose a bodily event causes a mental event to occur

according to 1) the body would lose energy but the mind could not gain energy

so there is a loss in energy which violate 2)

and this is the same for the mental

what is more convincing conservation of energy or substance dualism?

 the law of conservation of energy